The Somme

[RodB]

I assumed from the fact that they had bothered to write yet another book on the topic, and the fact that my university library had bought it, that they had something new to say about it.

It starts promisingly, introducing the premise that the British civilian leadership were responsible for the big idea rather than a myth that it was solely the military's idea. I was then expecting some explanation of how Lloyd George rather than Haig was responsible for the whole gruesome mess that it became.

There are initial hints that there was muddled thinking about the start date of the campaign - Haig needed an early start because it would need many months to finish the campaign before winter... yet the artillery & munitions buildup could not be complete before June... They presents the leadership as waking up late to the French weakness at Verdun.

Early reference is made to some highly suspect numbers about guns available compared to the Germans & compared to Loos - genuine critical thinking at the time should have shown that Haig would not in fact have the overwhelming firepower he said he would need after Loos. What later became evident about the insufficiency & ineffectiveness of artillery is never really overcome, but the authors so far have not dwelt on the reasons.

But then it settles down to demonstrating that Haig, Rawlinson and Gough were at worst idiots and at best guilty of muddled contradictory thinking, and by page 185 no civilians have been mentioned for 100 pages.

So I'm wondering if the point wasn't to be another Donkeys expose, then what was it ? If one gave this book to somebody who didn't know the result of the war, they would say, judging by the thinking of the British civilian & military leaders in this book they had no hope of winning this war. The question of why & how the various leaders adapted so slowly to the realization that modern war was all about firepower actually delivered to a spot on the ground, rather than about numbers of men, by page 185 has not been addressed, although there has been one line about Haig thinking about using the new tanks to effect a breakthrough.

[armourersergeant]

Pay check perhaps?

Arm

[Justin Moretti]

Arm, you might have a point there. Parts of it read like "Command on the Western Front", albeit for obvious reasons.

I re-read my copy recently, and it raised a few questions which I felt the authors didn't tackle adequately. The biggest of these relates to 36th Division finding the artillery's work sufficiently well done that they could get into the Schwaben Redoubt (although they could then not stay there). And I thought to myself, what was it about the artillery barrage (which they clearly state to be inadequate) on this one little part of the disastrous left wing that enabled this local success? Because if they really had done nothing different there, this might truly make it a stroke of bad luck that the barrage failed in so many other places. Did their part of the front perhaps receive a lesser proportion of 'dud' shells? Were their artillerymen better? I can't stop thinking about it.

[truthergw]

I have not read this book yet but will probably add it later for the sake of completeness. P&W are criticised elswhere for this sort of thing regarding YpresIII. Their results are slanted toward a foregone conclusion. The books are worth reading and indeed buying but need a healthy dose of antidote. I have just finished a book about Tunnelers. Needless to say, there is a lot about the Somme. One point made strongly by the author is one that I am aware of but is seldom mentioned in the books I have read. Originally, the Somme was to be a French do with the British very much in a support role. As Verdun developed, the roles reversed. What effect this had on the original plans is something I feel would warrant closer inspection.

[bmac]

The reduction in French involvement had no effect on the width of the British front, that had already been determined. It reduced the width of the French front and the number of divisions they employed. Not that it did them much harm initially as they took all of their first day objectives, in places more.

It gave Haig a greater say in the planning of the battle than might otherwise have been the case and switched the emphasis to the British front north of the Somme rather than the French. Having said that though I think it is true to say that, by the end of the battle, just as many French divisions had been involved as British ones. It has become a rather 'British' battle partly because of what happened on the first day and because it was our biggest so far and partly because the French concentrate on Verdun rather more (quite reasonably).

[truthergw]

The reduction in French involvement had no effect on the width of the British front, that had already been determined. It reduced the width of the French front and the number of divisions they employed. Not that it did them much harm initially as they took all of their first day objectives, in places more.

The French were originally planning on employing 40 divisions along side 25 British. This was reduced to 5 French divisions on day one, alongside something like 20 divisions. This is a very large distortion of the original plan which was not changed until well into March. Joffre was very slow to respond to Verdun, fearing a feint. Planning for the Somme offensive started in 1915. Rawlinson would be confronted in March/April with vast changes in the conditions affecting his attack. The French had 6 months to plan, Haig and Rawlinson finally had 3 to plan for a battle which had escalated from 1/3 of the frontage with roughly 1/3 of the men to about 4/5 of the frontage with 4/5 of the men. I believe that the planning was bound to suffer. The numbers I have given are rough but I feel not too far out.

[Jack Sheldon]

It is more like 2/3 - 1/3. The French attack width was determined more by the number of heavy artillery pieces available than the number of troops per se. This is made quite clear in the French Official History 'Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre,' which explains that by this phase of the war, the French had learned to apply a formula concerning the number and types of artillery required to support an assault - a far more 'scientific' approach than was applied in British planning at the time.

As far as the assault on the Schwaben Redoubt is concerned, we have been round the buoy on this one a few times in the last year. The reason for the Irish success (apart from their self-evident skill and dash in the attack, which we all accept), had much more to do with the problems for the German defence posed by the shape of the ground, in particular the amount of dead ground on its approaches, (which were not vulnerable to direct fire weapons) and the use that the 36th Division made of it, than any particular quality of the preliminary barrage - though it is entirely true that it came in for a great deal of attention from the heavies and was well knocked about in the days leading up to 1 Jul 16.

Jack

[Justin Moretti]

Thanks for the clarification, Jack Sheldon.

I felt it was an important work in the end simply because, having been written (if I recall correctly) by a couple of Aussies with no special reason to love the High Command, it ruptures quite a few of the worst myths about the Somme at the same time as laying the blame where it does.

Most of the literature on the Somme I have read concentrates on the disasters that happened to the British, and the lives that were wasted on the British side. Very little of it concentrates on the fact that the Germans, too, suffered. Perhaps much of that story has been lost with the bombings of WW2, but I think more of it needs to be stated. Far too much is "the attack of the 5th Blankshires was repelled with heavy loss, and no gains were made", whereas the same Blankshires' comprehensive destruction of the 231st Pickelhaubers' Regiment does not rebound with similar fury upon the heads of the German commanders. This is mentioned by P&W, true, but not with the same emphasis or frequency. Too much of what the Germans went through to drive some British units out of their hard-won gains is left unsaid.

[Jack Sheldon]

Justin

I think that you make an entirely valid point. Much the same is true of descriptions of the Third Ypres fighting. Because the historiography is so very Anglocentric, writers frequently overlook (so the readers do not know about) difficulties on the German side. The cumulative effects of losses during the Somme fighting became very clear towards the end. During the Battle of the Ancre, for example, some German infantry companies which were most closely involved began the battle at only 1/3 of the strngth of a typical sub-unit on 1 July. Not only that, they were half-starved knackered and ill because they had had to spend too long in the line and there were no reinforcements to hand.

Jack

[RodB]

So is it perhaps time to re-evaluate the battle waged by the German army as one of the alltime great defensive battles ? And that Wellington himself would have struggled to advance against it ? I suppose for years it would have been difficult for Britons to accept the reality that the other mob had been just too good on the day, similar to the way the Turks' performance at Gallipoli tended to be downplayed and British high command blaimed for the Allied failure instead.

To me the implication for Haig, if he indeed grasped the reality that any sort of victory would be incredibly expensive no matter what he did, and I am sure he did, his main job was political - presenting an image of stability to the less optimistic Allies.

[Jack Sheldon]

Rod

I certainly agree that facile condemnation of British generalship as an explanation for all the setbacks and difficulties is wrong. It certainly gives the defence no credit for the skilful way it was generally conducted. Here I am thinking in particular about the performance on 1 July 1916 of the reinforced 26th Reserve Division (Redan Ridge to Ovillers) which utterly smashed two British Corps (VIII and X). In places the casualty exchange ratio was 20:1 thanks to the way the defence was organised and the artillery handled. On the other hand there were German errors of command during the battle, which the all heroism and determination of the men in the trenches could not overcome. But we seldom hear about those. In my forthcoming book on Passchendaele, I spend some considerable time emphasising how badly hurt the German army was by the end of it and the fact that the Allied switch of command and then tactics from late September was never effectively countered. If it had not been for the weather there would have been real difficulties for the defence in October and November 1917. In the rush to condemn the British High Command the effect of the operations on the German defence tends to go by the board.

Jack

[Jonathan Saunders]

I certainly agree that facile condemnation of British generalship as an explanation for all the setbacks and difficulties is wrong. It certainly gives the defence no credit for the skilful way it was generally conducted.

Jack - without compromising your new book can you comment to what extent you think British senior generalship was at fault for under-rating the German army's ability to defend their positions.

To my mind this had a major impact at the beginning of the Somme battles and presumably German defensive tactics had improved by Third Ypres, but is it possible to say to what extent the error was repeated at Passchendaele?

Regards,

Jon S

EDITED: Just in case I have explained myself poorly, I am thinking in the context that you should know your enemy. As I understand it the ability of British and French troops to defend and go on the offensive was a consideration when drawing up the German offensive plans for 1918. I assume the British (and French) made similar considerations of the German army and that was the whole purpose of the trench raids to gather intelligence.

[Jack Sheldon]

Jon

The first half of Defeat into Victory by FM Slim ends with the words,'..cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them and remember only the lessons to be learnt from defeat - they are more than from victory.' Wise words from a wise soldier; words which encapsulate, though from a later generation, the philosophy applied by the German chain of command to 'lessons learned.' Throughout the Great War, after-action reports were written by all levels from company upwards, commented on by higher headquarters, then consolidated into reports, tactical notes and handbooks. Successful methods were naturally studied and captured this way, but the attention to critical analysis of reverses is truly striking.

This was not just a matter of shovelling off the blame, it was intended as the basis for changes of emphasis and direction which would leave the formations and units better able to deal with the problem it reappeared. I labour this because when we think about 'learning curves', there is a tendency to believe that they only applied to the British army - not a bit of it. Analysis of the Battle of Serre and the French Spring and Autumn offensives of 1915 in Artois (all of which delivered unpleasant shocks to the German defenders) certainly informed preparations for the Battle of the Somme. The shock loss of Vimy Ridge led to spectacularly swift corrective action - initially largely instituted by Oberst Fritz von Lossberg, Chief of Staff to Sixth Army, but followed up, after a rigorous post mortem, by changes in defensive posture and methods which had an immediate effect when the advance east of the Ridge ground to a halt very quickly. Out of this came flexible defence, which stood the German army in good stead until late September 1917, when Plumer's large-scale use of 'bite and hold' posed problems for the defence. Fortunately for the German army the rain quickly came to the rescue - that plus the fact that Plumer's methods permitted an attacker to break into a position, but still did not provide the key for breaking out.

Now you could argue (and many do) that British generals should have realised what was happening, should have given the Germans credit for the way their tactical thinking evolved and, therefore, adjusted their dispositions and methods accordingly, but I am not sure if that, in itself, provides sufficent grounds for criticism of their performance. After all, even though, for example, the Germans had reorganised their platoons after the Somme; even though the number of automatic weapons multiplied many times between mid-1916 and the end of the war, the Allies had no choice but to take on what was in front of them and, given the quality of the German army, that was always going to be extremely challenging. In addition, though it is indeed essential to 'know your enemy,' it is unsound to get mesmerised about what they might do - that way lies low morale and defeatism. All that said, I am no apologist for the German army. As I have indicated, in autumn 1917 their best brains could not develop a really effective counter to 'bite and hold' for example.

There were certainly times when British generalship did not scale the heights of brilliance, but I often wonder more about the quality of advice the generals in command were being given by their intelligence staffs. If, during the Somme and Passchendaele too many of them were feeding their generals over-optimistic intelligence designed to give them what they wanted to hear, then they were failing in their duty to provide the unvarished truth, together with a gloss of informed comment (which is where 'know your enemy' comes in). Perhaps their methods were not good enough, perhaps they were on steep personal learning curves themseves; but again, to be fair to them, in my experience whilst there are large numbers of intelligence officers who can explain precisely why something has just happened, only a mere handful can predict what is going to happen and get it right.

So, to sum up, I am of the opinion that German methods and tactics were rigorously developed and effectively applied, that perhaps there should have been more acknowledgement of this by the Allied generals, but that, even if it had been, that realisation would not, in itself, have eased the cost of defeating a first class enemy in a main theatre of war.

Jack

[truthergw]

Thanks for that Jack. A lot to read and ponder on. The last paragraph but one is very welcome as it touches on one of the problems I wrestle with. When trying to understand why commanders did what they did, it is extremely difficult, if indeed, it is possible, to put yourself in the position of the higher command. Especially as an action was actually unfolding. It is very difficult to know exactly what information was arriving on the commander's table and , crucially, when it arrived.

The problems of communication, to and from the front and also to the flanks was one which cannot be given too much importance and I do not believe it was ever truly solved in this war. Valiant efforts were made but the technology just did not exist.

[Justin Moretti]

The question I ask myself at the end of the day is: Were they totally incompetent? To answer this I ask myself a second question: If Haig had had twice the guns and ten times the ammunition, would he have used it all, and transformed a half-a##ed barrage into one that would have stood a better than even chance of getting his troops forward? The answer to the second question has, since early 2003, been yes, which means the answer to the first must be no. They may have made terrible mistakes with dreadful consequences, and they may have had flaws in their command style that combined with the circumstances to lead them into the errors they made, but I cannot say that they were intrinsically incompetent.

[Jonathan Saunders]

The answer to the second question has, since early 2003, been yes, which means the answer to the first must be no.

You might be raising a fair point but to my mind it doesnt quite sit well with Haig increasing the frontage of attacks from preliminary plans submitted when his artillery and munitions are already limited.

[Jonathan Saunders]

The first half of Defeat into Victory by FM Slim ends with the words,'..cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them and remember only the lessons to be learnt from defeat - they are more than from victory.' Wise words from a wise soldier;

Jack ... great quote!

Many thanks for your comprehensive answer ... it has given me a few things to think about.

I believe there is much more evidence to suggest that Germans learnt from tactical errors (both theirs and the Allies) much quicker and this was the general conscensus as I recall in our recent thread on this issue.

From my experience I also think a look through any British Brigade Diary would provide evidence of after-action reports being fed upwards. It is how the British critically analysed such reports and adapted their methods that I am still struggling to understand. The hardware was certainly progressing as you would expect with any prolonged conflict, but often if I look at the battles of 1915 and I see the mistakes repeated in 1916, and from 1916 into 1917 etc.

It is an interesting point you make about intelligence staffs feeding back over-optimistic information but I think this still reflects badly on the individual being reported to. I can only presume it is his character and persona that would cause the staff to be over-optimistic ie. telling him what he wanted to hear. Possibly I am being naive but I generally regard intelligence work with astute people.

Once again , many thanks for the thought-provoking reply.

Regards,

Jon S

[squirrel]

I have been reading this thread with avid interest. Educational contributions and I hope that you won't mind me adding some of my thoughts.

As far as I understand, and I may of course be wrong, Haigh was always looking for a breakthrough battle. This is what he was trained for and what was in the Infantry Training Manual, into which I believe he had some significant input.

His intelligence officer, in perhaps not providing him with the absolute truth, may also have been seeing things not exactly as they were, due to the reports from Brigade through Division to Corps to Army, and then to GHQ, having had similar treatment on the way up. At each level possibly, the "pill was sweetened" resulting in an altogether unrealistic appraisal of what was actually happening on the ground. Or is this too simplistic?

Haigh also left the planning to his Army, Corps and Divisional commanders and then where he thought necessary he amended their plans. There was, if what I have read is anything to go by, very little opposition to these amendments from his subordinates.

In North Africa in WW2, B.L. Montgomery made sure that he had his own "intelligence" officers with each Division(?) to ensure that he had first hand reports on how a battle was going and whether or not his plans were being adhered to. Admittedly this was easier for him with radio comms making the difference. But, IIRC, he also made his own plans and left his staff to translate them in to orders. This being due to his experiences in WW1 with regard to command, communication and control.

Would Haigh controlling a battle in this way have made a difference had he been able to do it?

[Jonathan Saunders]

Would Haigh controlling a battle in this way have made a difference had he been able to do it?

I think one accusation that doesnt past muster against Haig is that he was a technophobe. I dont think there is any evidence to suggest that he would not have sought to use better communications to be more informed and this would have obvious impact on how he directed/guided battles.

Against this, IMVHO, are some poor character traits, for example I believe he was often a bad judge of character and this was exasperated by his preference to surround himself with "yes" men or men indebted to him. I think he was also stubborn and unduly optimistic (he saw himself as an earlier day "chosen one"). I have doubts as to how much he respected other peoples opinions, there is evidence to suggest "he did" and "he didnt".

However he was a man of his time, and his time was Victorian. Had he been born 20/30 years later like Montgomery then Haig may have had very different character traits.

These are my opinions only but I hope they give you a coupel of pointers to consider.

Regards,

Jon S

[RodB]

Reading the book I ended up thinking that if war is a continuation of politics by other means, then we need to look at how well the military action is achieving the political objective, rather than just judge it like a football match with a simple scorecard.

Haig had the advantage of acting to a clear political agenda - look like the leader of the "good guys" coalition who just wanted to put the "bad guys" back in their box and resume "free" world trade as before. The idea of "Allies" was important - to have legitimacy after the war Britain would need as many collaborators as possible, to avoid being seen as just an imperialist bully.

Germany on the other hand only had a vague political objective of "security". It chose purely military means to achieve them - to eliminate perceived military threats to its East and West borders. To me Germany achieved this objective in 1914, and anything more was military grandiosity beyond its means and to no political advantage. A modern comparison, to me, is the US declaring victory over Saddam in 1991 and ending the war, and getting its friends in the coalition to pay all the bills. Political objective achieved. Further military action was not seen as bringing any political benefit.

If Britain's political objective in 1916 was firstly to keep France and Russia in the war, secondly to get new allies such as Romania to join the "winning side", then Haig was successful with France and Romania but failed to prevent the defeat of Russia.

My reading of the book led me to understand that Britain had a very difficult task in giving any meaningful direct support to Russia, both logistically and industrially - they lacked the manufacturing capacity and transport to send Russia artillery or shells. Hence to me the Somme was Britain's only way of aiding Russia, and it did not prevent Germany sending men East. Hence Haig failed bigtime on that one.

Romania's help was worthless but nobody could have foreseen that. Hence for me Haig gets 2/3.