Location of machine guns

[jay dubaya]

Hello folks,

I'm hoping some kind soul could help out with a tactical location of where a MG squadron would be placed at Mesnil in order to fire at long range towards Thiepval?

cheers, Jon

[Old Tom]

I don't think I can provide an answer, but given the date might make a suggestion.

Old ||Tom

[jay dubaya]

ah yes that would help.... 18th August 1916

Jon

[Jack Sheldon]

A shoot at that range (about 3,000 metres) is almost on the limit of the possible for the Vickers. There would be no question of observed fire being possible. Apart from anything else, including the convex slopes, Thiepval is higher than any rise in the ground near Mesnil. I suspect that any such operation would have been mainly an exercise in turning live rounds into empty cases - anybody hit would have been very unlucky. I suppose that it could have had some harrassing value, however. In practical terms, even today, 1,700 - 1,800 metres is the limit of effective observable fire for a medium machine gun.

Jack

[centurion]

A shoot at that range (about 3,000 metres) is almost on the limit of the possible for the Vickers. There would be no question of observed fire being possible. Apart from anything else, including the convex slopes, Thiepval is higher than any rise in the ground near Mesnil. I suspect that any such operation would have been mainly an exercise in turning live rounds into empty cases - anybody hit would have been very unlucky. I suppose that it could have had some harrassing value, however. In practical terms, even today, 1,700 - 1,800 metres is the limit of effective observable fire for a medium machine gun.

Jack

A machine gun barrage (indirect fire) would be possible though and 2,500 to 3,000 metres was not uncommon and were often very successful at neutralising a particular area

[jay dubaya]

Thnaks for the replies fellas

I suspect that any such operation would have been mainly an exercise in turning live rounds into empty cases

I did wonder along these lines - the war diary for the unit concerned does note that the 2 sections at Mesnil did fire 9,500 rounds in 24 hours.

I'm not familiar with the lay of the land in this area and looking at trench maps and google earth it would appear that Thiepval Wood would somewhat obscure a line of fire from Mesnil and what of British forward trenches? I'm at a loss as to where exactly MGs would be placed at Mesnil, perhaps SE of the village?

cheers, Jon

[Jack Sheldon]

Jon

Do not interpret my remarks as being anything than in agreement in principle with Centurion, He is absolutely right about indirect barrages. I have heard of cases where twelve guns were able to lay down as many as one million rounds in twenty four hours. In this case, however, I think that the practical difficulties would have been greater than usual.

Jack

[jay dubaya]

Thanks for that Jack.

I'm still at a loss as to where the MGs in question would have been situated in order to carry out such an exercise, at least one gun was shelled out leaving 2 dead and 3 wounded.

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

A machine gun barrage (indirect fire)... were often very successful at neutralising a particular area

I would urge significant caution with this interpretation. It is often stated that such barrages were 'very successful' or equivalent. There is very little evidence to support this. By calculating the number of bullets that landed per hour and by comparing this with the wide spread of the beaten zone at maximum range, it is possible to understand why. A 12 gun barrage of 1 million rounds in 24 hours would see a maximum of 600 rounds per minute falling across a wide and deep beaten zone (or overlapping beaten zones, given that 12 guns were firing). I have not seen any evidence of a neutralising effect in German sources, although casualties might be inflicted. British soldiers came under indirect MG barrages too. There was a very significant difference in the casualty rates from indirect versus direct fire. I have not come across any examples where the British were 'neutralised' by indirect fire.

Sorry, Jon. My response doesn't answer your last question.

Robert

[centurion]

I would urge significant caution with this interpretation. It is often stated that such barrages were 'very successful' or equivalent. There is very little evidence to support this. By calculating the number of bullets that landed per hour and by comparing this with the wide spread of the beaten zone at maximum range, it is possible to understand why. A 12 gun barrage of 1 million rounds in 24 hours would see a maximum of 600 rounds per minute falling across a wide and deep beaten zone (or overlapping beaten zones, given that 12 guns were firing). I have not seen any evidence of a neutralising effect in German sources,

From a British Army Intelligence summary covering the fighting in August 1918 commenting on a machine gun barrage

"The success of our attack (after Trones Wood on the Somme had been recaptured(, as stated by German prisoners taken, was largely due to our machine gun covering fire which succeeded in keeping down the heads of the enemy"

From a British analysis of the impact of machine gun barrages

"About October 1917 our succesful use of indirect fire on the enemy's back areas caused the Germans to change their defensive dispositions. Instead of holding his front lines thickly with the machine guns disposed in depth the enemy now placed more troops in the forward area. German counter attacks were delivered much sooner than previously, by troops much closed forward."

[Robert Dunlop]

Yes, I have seen these intelligence reports. In the first case, the information from prisoners needs to be treated with caution. The October 1917 example is open to major criticism. The decision to pack the front lines was not due to fears of machine gun barrages, from the German perspective. Please note that I am not saying that British MG barrages did not cause casualties. Nor am I saying that barrages did not interfere with movement. My point is about the comment that barrages 'neutralised' the enemy.

Robert

[jay dubaya]

So the 8 (possibly) gun barrage firing 9,500 rounds at maximum range would atchieve very little other than my initial thought of producing a pile of cartridge cases.

The quandry that I have with this is and perhaps paint a better picture of the situation is that the war diary I'm looking at precisely locates 4 sections in the front line at Leipzig Redoubt firing 50,000 rounds assiting an infantry attack towards Mouquet Farm whilst the remaing 2 sections are 'moved to Mesnil to fire long range towards Thiepval' and they remained here for 3 days, on the 3rd day the man I'm researching along with one other were killed and 3 wounded (all from one section) and there are no casualties reported from the other 4 sections in the front line.

Perhaps the above suggests that the 2 sections at Mesnil were causing to much harrassment and were shelled out or was it just unlucky that these men got caught.

Any thoughts of where the guns at Mesnil could have been in order to fire towards Thiepval would be of great assistance, I have very little knowledge rgarding MG tactics and so it interesting to read the above analysis.

cheers, Jon

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Jay, long range machine gun fire was certainly feared by the soldiers and would have been effective in neutralising those in the beaten zone. I remember standing on the crest of a ridge in my army reserve days and watching a demonstration of indirect machinegun fire sweep over the crest itself so that the beaten zone was in the supposedly dead ground (safe from fire and observation). This demonstration really shocked us and I still recall it 25 years later. To put it in layman's terms, you are a soldier lying on the other side of a hill. You cannot see the enemy and they cannot see or fire on you with rifles or machine guns (so you think). Interestingly, infantry officers of the day told us that my country seriously considered the Vickers as a long range MG contender for the M60 replacement, at the time. To me, this demonstration met the definition of neutralising.

Going back to WW1, here is a quotation from Sapper Dadsell MM, a signaller of the AIF, writing about Ypres October 1917. I bought his book from his son and I have often quoted it as a primary source on this forum:

As the shelling didn't stop we started off again. Next thing we ran into a machine gun barrage.

Both sides had worked out angle fire for machine guns.They fired up into the air and had the angle worked out for the bullets to land in a certain area - and we were in it. A more unpleasant thing is hard to imagine. If one laid down or crouched he only made a bigger target and with bullets coming out of the air and hitting all around, sometimes within a foot or two, one got a horrible sinking feeling in the stomach.

We were about in the middle of it when Weir suddenly turned around and said "come on, nothing is going to touch us". We thought he had gone mad and rushed up to him but he was so cool and confident and just said "everything is alright, just follow me". We did but I can't say I thought it was alright when a couple of bullets went down right beside me. However we got out of the area and I for one didn't want another experience like it.

Weir was one of those strange soldiers every army has, who by a combination of skill, judgement and plain luck, simply couldn't be killed by anything. Dadswell once saw him with a shell splinter gently but firmly lodged between his eye and ear, but it was removed by the nearest medic and he returned after a good sleep!

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you very much for the quote from Sapper Dadsell. It is typical of other quotes that I have found too. There is no doubt that indirect MG fire was unpleasant. Dadsell's quote demonstrates, however, that it did not neutralise his unit. One of the best examples that I have come across also related to an indirect German MG barrage in Third Ypres. It was fired from the direction of Tower Hamlets. The barrage was falling on the British side of the ridge line, just below Stirling Castle. There were some casualties as the unit headed towards the top of the ridge. As soon as the ridge was crossed, however, there was a definite change in the number and the nature of the casualties. The MG fire was direct, far more deadly. It completely neutralised the attack, bringing the unit to a halt.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Perhaps the above suggests that the 2 sections at Mesnil were causing to much harrassment and were shelled out or was it just unlucky that these men got caught.

I think it is highly likely to have been the latter. The German shelling of the area was very significant, especially given that this sector could be bombarded from several directions. I don't recall that the German accounts of the defence of Mouquet Farm include mention of MG barrages but I will check. I don't know of any evidence from the Thiepval area either.

As to the location of the guns, it is difficult to guess. It's a shame that the unit history does not give the coordinates. Sometimes the war diaries have the actual barrage maps.

Robert

[truthergw]

Use of indirect fire makes the calculation of where the guns may have been very difficult. They could have been almost anywhere on an arc of a radius of some 3000 yards. They would likely be in the reserve or support trenches or even in the artillery lines rather than in the front line trenches. As Robert has said, there is no comparison between the effect of MGs firing directly and the same guns firing indirectly. I still think that they were perhaps more effective than Robert seems to imply. A 303 bullet falling from a height of a few hundred feet would surely sting a bit if it hit you. I have the advantage of having been in TA when Vickers were still being used by them so I have seen and taken part in training exercises with them albeit with a minimum of live firing. Very greedy guns, those Vickers.

[auchonvillerssomme]

I am no expert on ranges or the effectivenes of rounds over diferent terrain, but the straightline distance from, using for example, Mesnil Church to the German front line trenches at Thiepval was 1.6- 1.7 miles or 2.7-2.8km, if the guns were located on the lower slopes you are looking at less than a mile. I know there are complcated equations for the lie of the land but the guns could surely have been located anywhere in the area so the range wouldn't be the best way of finding them.

[Robert Dunlop]

I still think that they were perhaps more effective than Robert seems to imply. A 303 bullet falling from a height of a few hundred feet would surely sting a bit if it hit you.

Hi Tom. I am not saying that indirect MG fire was ineffective (not that you have suggested this), merely that this type of fire was not so effective as to 'neutralise' the enemy. In support of your comment, I have seen reports of men who were wounded by barrage fire where the bullet entered the neck or shoulder region and exited via the buttock or lower limb. The things to remember about long range MG barrages, however, are that Vickers were not fired at anything like their maximum rate of fire and that the beaten zones were much bigger. In other words, to be hit by a falling .303 or 7.9mm round was very nasty but the likelihood of being hit was lower. The same principle applied to massed rifle fire (musketry) at long range. The bullets fell at a steeper angle but the beaten zone was much bigger.

Robert

[RobertBr]

The following extracts relate to the Mars offensive of 28th March 1918

"Lieutenant Colonel E. C. S. Jervis observed:

Tender spots in his defence were the low ridges running east and west through Bradford Post and from Mill Post south of Belvoir Alley and then west. The former could not be covered by machinegun fire. The enemy around Gavrelle were mown down by the indirect fire of 14 machine guns."

"The Germans advancing almost shoulder to shoulder entered Gavrelle. There were no living souls to oppose them. However 14 machine guns had the place under indirect fire an enemy losses was severe."

I can place 6 of those machine guns in Point de Jour some 4000yds from Gavrelle.

Bob

[jay dubaya]

Thank you gents, I feel somewhat enlightened as to the use of MGs, their tactics and the effects on the enemy, your analysis has certainly given me plenty to mull over. Sadly I don't have the full diary for the unit concerned only from its formation in February 1916 to August 1916 when my man was KiA, there are a few notes in the margins for July/August but alas nothing of any great significance that helps in placing the section I'm looking at. Mesnil it would appear covered a large area, so can I assume (dangerous I know) that the entry 'Moved to Mesnil' could also include the areas around Mesnil Ridge and perhaps as far as Aveluy Wood or would such locations be stated as such in the diary?

Thank you all for the information provided so far, it has been of great assistance,

cheers, Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, you will sometimes find the MG barrage maps in the war diaries of higher level units, such as brigade or sometimes division diaries.

Robert

[jay dubaya]

Thanks for that Robert, unfortunately the diaries concerned don't appear to have been digitized as yet and alas I'm at the opposite side of the country from the NA but I do live in hope,

cheers, Jon

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi Jon,

Please find below an extract of George Coppard’s book: With a Machine Gun to Cambrai. I don’t know if you have read the book, but if not, the piece below is a useful extract as it paints a vivid picture of a machine gunner’s lot in 1916 at the Somme. It may not answer all of your questions, but it will at least give you a better impression on how a hasty machine gun position was selected and how the machine gun was sustained for the duration of its task. The reason why the passage is significant is that it is of a similar date and the machine-gunners have a similar target to the information you require.

On 12th August my team was told off for barrage fire, to assist the Aussies’ attack on Thiepval. The position of my gun would enable its fire to enfilade the ground between the new German front line and support trenches, at a point where the attack was to be made that night. Sixteen thousand rounds had to be fired, and the team were kept busy fetching ammo and generally making ready. Clinometer calculations were made by an officer, and at early dusk Nobby and I crept out to a shell hole at the back of the parados and mounted the gun, to which we had fitted a new barrel.

It was quiet just before zero and then, suddenly, the sky was ablaze, as if by continuous flash lightening. The thunderous roar of our artillery reached us on the instant as the screaming shells sped towards the target. The bombardment blasted Jerry’s front line and later developed into a creeping barrage on his support trenches. At zero plus fifteen minutes I opened fire and, with the aid of a shaded light and two pre-set pegs, kept the fire in its correct elevation and scope of traverse. The gun ripped through its first belt in less than half a minute. I reloaded, gave the gun a check-up, and continued the process. In the meantime, Number Three was crawling to and fro, building up the supply of ammo. The rest of the team were in the dugout, filling the empty belts by a hand-operated machine. Periodically, fresh water was added to the cooling jacket, and a touch of oil was added to the sensitive part of the gun with a brush kept in one of the grip handles. Although it was dark, we could see and feel what we were doing without difficulty. The ammo, British cordite type, gave little trouble. Now and then a stoppage occurred, but the position of the crank handle quickly indicated the necessary clearance action. Things were going nicely, the bombardment had eased off, and I wondered how the attack had fared. I knew there was a chance of success, as Jerry, already driven from the powerful front line, now had to fight in weaker support trenches behind flimsy wire.

Various signal flares lit the sky but were of no significance to us, as our firing had to continue until stand-to. Our job was to assist in pinning the enemy down in his support trenches, and to harass any reinforcements coming forward. There was also a sunken road likely to be used, which had to receive our attention. I kept up the fire, and, as expected, a whizz-bang battery began to search for us. Clark and I were apprehensive, although not exactly displeased, as we guessed our fire was damaging in some way. If the German infantry asked for assistance from their light artillery, it was on the cards we were causing mischief. The first whizz-bang landed about twenty yards to the right. The range was bang-on, and a little adjustment in direction was all Jerry needed. The shells came nearer, some a few yards to the left. One hit two yards in front, showering us with dirt and fumes. It looked as if any minute, time would stop, so far as we were concerned. My stomach rolled in a funk, and I know Clark felt the same. Keeping the gun going was the surest antidote to our rising fears, and that we did. Nobody came up and said, ‘pack it up’, so we stuck it out and carried on. We finished our quota of rounds in four and a half hours, so our firing was more or less continuous.

Whizz-bangs were a torment to us. They travelled faster than sound. If you happened to be near the receiving end, you first heard the thing burst, then the whizz of its approach and lastly the boom of the gun that fired it. There was no split-second warning to get one’s self-preservation instincts to work, as was the case with howitzer shells, which had higher trajectories and less speed.

I must mention that Captain Graves in Goodbye to All That refers to machine gun crews indiscriminately firing off belt after belt to boil their water. This suggests that machine gunners who fancied a cup of tea or a shave simply fired off a couple of belts. In fact, this was not the case, as tea laced with mineral oil would be pretty ghastly. Also machine gun crews who fired ‘indiscriminately’ might well be engaged on barrage fire, and infantry officers would not necessarily be aware of that fact.

Captain Anderson told my team that the Australian GOC had sent a ‘Thank you very much’ telegram for our work in assisting his men on the night of the 12th August. It was a most encouraging message for us. Bearing in mind that the General would get his knowledge first hand from his own troops, it proved that although we could not actually see our target, we had taken an effective part in the attack. Relief came on the 13th and at night the company bivouaced [sic] in a field near Albert. A storm arose, and we were washed out, water running over the ground as we lay on ground sheets. It was rumoured that the King would review the 37th Brigade, but he must have been told of the soaking and the review was put off.

Reference the location (Mesnil), without knowing the unit and its diary details it would be very difficult to pinpoint the MG Squadron’s location. What I can say is that Mesnil sits on a gentle reverse slope of a shallow valley. To some degree, this is ideal for an indirect fire shoot at Thiepval. Though, saying that, the German reply to any fire on their positions would possibly mean that Mesnil would be shelled, as a matter of course, as part of the German Defensive Fire scheme. We can only speculate as to the nature of the shellfire that killed your relative, but it is still possible that the Germans spotted the machine gun location (by smoke, flash, movement, disturbed earth, etc.), especially if the gun was not on a reverse slope. The church in Mesnil to the church in Thiepval is about 1.5 kilometres (km), as the crow flies. The Vickers machine gun trajectory table provides accurate calculations to 2800 yards using Mk VII ammunition - 2800 yards equates to 2.56 km, this will give you some idea of distances. The yard markings on the Vickers Tangential Sight (up to 2900 yards) are used more as a reference marker, rather than the actual distance, when the gun has been prepared for indirect fire using a clinometer.

Indirect fire would be used to prevent support coming from the flanks and the rear during an assault. It would also be used to harass and search likely enemy positions. It is very effective; though consumes much ammunition. The beaten zone produced by indirect machine gun fire lengthens on reverse slopes. At longer ranges (but within effective range) the beaten zone shortens in length; however, the elliptic shape does widen. Also, when considering indirect fire, you also have to think in terms of more than one gun firing on the area to be covered (often multiples of 4). At some point each gun will require a new barrel (usually 15000 rounds of continuous fire) and every 1000 rounds the barrel will need a 'pull-through'. The other guns can ‘take up the slack’ whilst these tasks take place. Additionally, the beaten zone (of a given gun) can be moved longitudinally and laterally to ensure complete coverage of the area intended to be fired upon. In GS Hutchison’s book about machine guns, the attack on High Wood (24 August 1916) sees one machine gun barrage firing nearly a million rounds from ten guns in about 12 hours (page 186).

Anyway, I hope there is something of interest in the above. If you have any details of the Machine Gun Squadron involved, it will be useful.

Aye,

Tom McC

[jay dubaya]

Thanks for that Tom, a very useful first hand account from a book that I had overlooked until now, a friend has a copy that he will gladly lend me. Your comment on the location and the lay of the land around Mesnil is very helpful and gives me a further dimension to the maps that I'm looking at. I'm gathering other significant information from other threads which may assist in a more precise location of the MGs in question and like Robert has mentioned above a more detailed location may be obtained from the higher level diaries,

cheers, Jon

[Jack Sheldon]

Jon

A fresh line of enquiry which you my care to pursue is to contact the team that run the Machine Gun Corps Research Data Base (just tap that in as a search). They do charge for their asistance, but I think that it is fairly nominal. More details on their web site.

Jack