Gallipoli

[paul guthrie]

I am about 175 pages into this superbly written book... but I wonder if it's researched as well. Tim Travers, a superb historian with two relatvies killed there published Gallipoli 1915 before this one and says research in Turkish archives shows the anti ship guns has plenty oof ammo left. Carylon sticks to the old story that they were nearly out of ammo and mines.

Also he says Australian doctors at induction centers were instructed to reject men with traces of corporal punishment and those marked with the letters D. or B.C., what is that about? Thanks.

[Tom Morgan]

Paul, I think it goes back to the days when courts martial could include, in addition to any other punishment, marking or tatooing. "D" meant "deserter" and "BC" meant "bad character". The British Mutiny Act of 1859 provided for this, and the mark had to be on the left side, two inches below the armpit. The letters couldn't be more than an inch long.

The punishment was abolished in 1879, though, so anyone at Gallipoli sporting such a mark must have been a VERY old soldier.

Tom

[paul guthrie]

Great answer, thanks Tom! Now, what about the discrepancy on shells and mines? I lean toward Travers, 1, he's quite accomplished, 2 he says he did the rsearch in Turkish archives.

He makes a great point too, Ataturk switching from Arabic script keeps many Turks including historians, from being able to read their history.

[michaeldr]

quote: I am about 175 pages into this superbly written book... but I wonder if it's researched as well. Tim Travers, a superb historian with two relatvies killed there published Gallipoli 1915 before this one and says research in Turkish archives shows the anti ship guns has plenty oof ammo left. Carylon sticks to the old story that they were nearly out of ammo and mines.

Paul,

The question of the state of the Turkish shell supply is an interesting one

As you say, Travers goes into some detail (page 32) listing what the Turks had left after the battle of 18th March. It is difficult to check this with the Turkish GS's 'Brief History' as they have chosen to give tables showing what shells were spent rather than what was left

However in the narrative, the Turkish GS's 'Brief History' says

page 49 - "...the Turkish Artillery units which resisted the hellish fire all day long, managed to endure despite the shortage of ammunition..."

and on page 51 - "Although the Turkish artillery spent one third of its limited ammunition on March 18, they still had sufficient amount of ammunition to continue the battle for two more days."

I'm not sure that Travers has proved his point here; 'shortage of ammunition' and 'limited ammunition' and 'sufficient ... for two more days' does not sound overwhelming

I think that the jury is still out on this one

I know that you're a great fan of Travers and I too like his book and I regularly refer to it

However, Carlyon's is very well written and is to be recommended to the general reader who may be new to the subject (Travers' book is not a chronological history in the traditional format)

best regards

Michael

[paul guthrie]

Thanks Michael, I had not seen those figures but you are right that they don't tell us what was left. Travers does not speak in generalities, 1732 for this gun, 378 for that etc, also about Turkish gun and gunner losses, exact #s that are minimal. I wish by studying the footnotes I could tell more about exactly where he got the #s but he's such a solid historian they are not fudged.

[paul guthrie]

Every time I get into Gallipoli I am appalled, even by the standards of British military planning and execution in 1915 it's amazing. Hamilton, Hunter- Weston and Stopford were pretty bad and Hunter-Weston gets promoted and another big command on the Somme which he also botched. The book though is extremely well written whether or not correct about the shells question and perhaps some other things.

I do want to go back.

[Martin Bennitt]

Rhodes James in the first book I ever read on Gallipoli quotes the official German account of the situation on the evening of March 18, viz:-

Most of the Turkish ammunition had been expended. The medium howitzers and minefield batteries had fired half their supply ... Particularly serious was the fact that the long-range high explosive shells, which alone were effective against armour, were nearly used up. Fort Hamidieh had only 17, Kilid Bahr but 10. Also there was no reserve of mines. What, then, was to happen if the battle was renewed on the 19th and following days with undi,inished vigour?

Something I too have always wondered.

I agree Carlyon's book is brilliantly written. His description of 2nd Krithia is enough to make one weep.

Must go someday....

cheers Martin B

[paul guthrie]

Apart from shells it was the mines that were sinking ships. Even if shells were nearly gone which is debatable there is no dispute naval shelling was not doing much to the guns or gunners. So, even if short of shells at the time/place were there others somewhere that could be brought in.

For this to succeed the minesweepers would have to make a run with no or little fire to build confidence they would be reasonably safe operating. This was a bit of a chicken/egg situation. Interesting question.

[joseph]

I don't think it was the mines or the Turkish guns that halted the Naval attack it was the simple point of spotting for the naval guns. If they had a good outpost to spot the fall of shot, things would have been different.

Regards Charles

[paul guthrie]

Have just finished the bit about the attacks at the Nek which were ordered by Australian officers even after the complete failure of the first within seconds. I have not seen Mel Gibson's movie version in years, did he blame the British for this directly, that is on the spot? From memory he did as opposed to from a distance, Godley, much higher up, was British.

[Ozzie]

For further reading on The Nek, "Goodbye, God Bless You Cobber" by John Hamilton.

Superb.

Kim

[paul guthrie]

Another difference between Carylon and Travers, there is no question the British were quite dilatory at Sulva in failing to take the heights, Lala Baba and Hill 10 are pimples not heights. Carylon repeats a statement made many times I think erroneously that they were only 30 minutes behind the Turks at Tekke Tepe August 9 but Travers says Turkish official history says they were there very late the 7th or early 8th, also to attack there British gave up Scimitar Hill the only important high ground they had!

[MartinWills]

Firstly, as regards mines, I believe that the disposition of mines (with one exception) was well known to the allies. It was the extra line reputedly laid by "Nusrat" that created the problems.

The question of ammunition is a far more interesting one. Firstly, I am not convinced that the Turkish archives have been adequately explored to establish how much ammunition was left, though there seems to be enough from several sources to suggest that there were some shortages of ammunition. Whether this was related to particular key guns; particular types of ammunition or particular batteries we can't be sure. It is worth remembering that to be effective one needed the right sort of ammunition for the right type of gun in the right place. I am inclining towards supporting the work and comments in the Turkish GS brief history in english - I suspect the GS had more time than travers for their research. It sould be interesting to check what was in the earlier translation of a Turkish history held in the Aus archives

[paul guthrie]

I have edited my prior post, it is Travers not Carylon who says Turkish Official History demonstrates Turks go to Tekke Tepe well ahead of British, any thoughts? Carylon says only 1/2 hour behind.

[joseph]

POW report from Capt RD Elliott East Yorkshire Regiment

6th East Yorkshire Regiment Tekke Tepe

At midnight on the 8th-9th August 1915 we were withdrawn from a position to the E of the SALT LAKE, which we had occupied with slight opposition, to an old Turkish trench about ¾ mile nearer the sea. At about 4 AM on the 9th orders were received that we were to make a dawn attack on the hill known as TEKE TEPE. “D” Company 6th East Yorkshire Regt was on the left nearest opposite to the hill. Lieut Colonel Moore Commanding 6th East York R. ordered as many of us as possible to advance immediately for dawn was now nearly up.

We started about 100 strong & came under heavy rifle fire from both flanks as we approached the foothills & particularly from the position from which we had been withdrawn during the previous night. Capt Grant Commanding “D” Company was hit & I took charge. At the foothills Col. Moore gave me the necessary orders & the position I was to make for. We started up TEKE TEPE about 60 strong. Lieut Wilson, who was killed, leading the party on my left & I leading the other party. Lieut RAWSTORNE was to collect men who came later & to join up on my right. When about half way up the hill we extended having come under rifle fire from the higher ground above. Nearly at the top we found that a deep fold separated us from the top of the hill. It was impossible to advance further, the enemy were in large numbers round by on the East of the hill. I waited for reinforcements. We were now about 30 strong & under heavy rifle fire.

LIEUT COL. MOORE, Lieut STILL & MAJOR BRUNNER RE came up about 15 minutes later with some more men & I reported to Col MOORE that the enemy were above us in very superior numbers & after considering he ordered us to retire with the remnants. I took charge of a small party to cover the retirement where necessary. When nearly at the bottom of the hill we were surrounded & Col MOORE ordered us to surrender. When we had surrendered Col MOORE made an attempt to sit on the bank of the ravine & was bayoneted through the back, he died about 10 minutes later.

Lieut RAWSTORNE, who I did not see at all until we were at the HQ of General LEMON VON-SANDERS, appears to have taken up about 10 men. The men captured consisted of about 6 taken with Lieut RAWSTORNE, a number of men who did not get beyond the foothills, some who did not get the order to retire & 3 or 4 signalers & other men who arrived down safely with Col MOORE, Lieut STILL & myself. Whilst up the hill I could see the remainder of the Battalion being attacked so we could not expect reinforcements and I was powerless to help them.

R D Elliott Capt

6th E York R

As a matter of interest it was Scimitar Hill they were withdrawn from.

Regards Charles

[paul guthrie]

Yes abandoning Scimitar was clearly an error, the only real high ground they had, there were a lot of men on the ground surely others could have attacked TekeTepe.

[Gibbo]

In reply to Paul's query about the Mel Gibson film in post 10, Major Barton, the CO of the featured unit, sent Frank Dunne, played by Mel Gibson, to ask a staff officer, Col. Robinson, that the attack be called off but Robinson refused. Most people thought that Robinson was English, but to my ear he seemed to have a slight Australian accent. According to the Wikipedia entry on the film he had an Anglo-Australian accent typical of the time & the film makers didn't intend viewers to think that he was British. Barton then sent Dunne to contact General Gardiner, who certainly had an Australian accent. He agreed to reconsider the attack but it had taken place by the time that Gibson got back with the new orders.

Clicking on the names of Robinson or Dunne in the IMDB link will give a transcript of their conversation. Similarly, clicking on Barton's name brings up an earlier converation about a false report that Australian marker flags had been seen in the Turkish trenches.

The Wikipedia entry on the film quotes Les Carlyon as being critical of the film. A comment about the British drinkiing tea at Suvla is heard at Gardiner's HQ but the attack featured in the film was actually a diverson for a New Zealand attack, not he British landing at Suvla.

[joseph]

Of the Brigade ordered to attack it was only D Coy East Yorkshire Regiment that went forward early enough to capture Tekke Tepe, hence the "30 minutes late" I also have a reconaissance report from the evening of the 8th August 1915 stating Tekke Tepe was guarded by 4 party's of 4 men.

Regards Charles

[paul guthrie]

Could you explain in more detail? Turks according to Travers say they held it late on the 7th or early 8th. Also even if they got there in time I doubt only one company could have held out at all.

[joseph]

I also have a reconaissance report from the evening of the 8th August 1915 stating Tekke Tepe was guarded by 4 party's of 4 men. The commanding officer of the 6th Bn East Yorkshire Regiment sent two Officer patrols out on the evening of the 8th of August to reccon the high ground 1/2 mile North of Anafarta Sagir, the report was sent to 32nd Brigade HQ.

Who is Travers? was he there.

The Brigade was ordered to attack, the one Company made it up the hill, pity they never got there as a unit.

Regards Charles

[Bryn]

Regarding the movie, 'Gallipoli':

Many people have criticised it as showing a supposedly English officer (Robinson) ordering the attcks to go ahead. However Robinson appears three or four times in the film wearing his Australian 'Rising Sun' collar badges.

It was not Mel Gibson's film; he was only one of the lead roles.

Gibbo noted that, "The Wikipedia entry on the film quotes Les Carlyon as being critical of the film. A comment about the British drinkiing tea at Suvla is heard at Gardiner's HQ but the attack featured in the film was actually a diverson for a New Zealand attack, not he British landing at Suvla."

Wikipedia entries such as these are opinions. To say the attack at The Nek was a diversion for the New Zealand attack on Chunuk Bair is putting it much too simplistically and indicates a lack of understanding of the overall picture. The Battle of Sari Bair was a coordinated effort of many parts, relying on many diffferent commanders and units at many different points.

[Charles Fair]

Tim Travers ... says research in Turkish archives shows the anti ship guns has plenty oof ammo left.

He is right. Edward J Erickson who wrote an excellent book called 'Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War' (pub 2000 by Praeger - Contributions in Military Studies series ISBN-10: 0313315167 ISBN-13: 978-0313315169) wrote a paper which did exactly that. I cant remember off hand which journal it was in - could have been War in History but I'm not certain.

Edited 2 July , 2008 by Charles Fair

[michaeldr]

It is quite a puzzle when Travers & Erickson say that after examining Ottoman records there was plenty, while the Turkish General Staff, in their own version of the history, speak so inconclusively. Another aspect of the puzzle is why has it dragged on for so long? There is a foot note in the Naval Operations Vol.2 (second ed. September 1929) which describes

"An impression seems to have prevailed in Constantinople that the ammunition was practically exhausted on March 18th (see Morgenthau, Secrets of the Bosporus, pp147, et seq,). The official statement of the Turkish War Office, however, says 'modern ammunition for heavy guns was very short, but there was a plentiful supply of older ammunition. Ammunition for medium and light guns was so plentiful that many attacks could have been repulsed.' Possibly this was a sanguine view, but a further statement was furnished which purports to give the actual number of rounds per gun remaining after the action was over. This shows an average for the heavy guns of about seventy rounds; for 6-inch, 130 rounds; and for the smaller mine defence guns 150 rounds – a proportion which in view of our own shortage of ammunition was far from negligible. For howitzers and barrage guns there was no return."

So numbers were known at least as early as 1929 - yet the controversy continues

One other thought/speculation on the matter; if Morgenthau was right and the prevailing view in Constantinople at the time was that the ammunition was low, then does it really matter what was discovered later? Your enemy is beaten if he thinks that that he is beaten at that moment in time. In other words, if the prevailing view of the defenders on the evening of the 18th March 1915 was that they were running out of ammunition, then if the allies had pressed on with another attack without delay, the result may have been different.

Just a thought

Michael

[paul guthrie]

But Micheal the guys on the ground knew how much there was since they were at the guns. If decisions were made locally they had the knowledge and whatever was there would surely have been used.

[michaeldr]

It's an interesting read Paul see http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/comment/m...au/Morgen18.htm

quote: "I should advise you (Morgenthau) to get up at six o'clock tomorrow morning," said General Mertens, "and take to the Anatolian hills. That's what we are going to do"

The gunners had orders to exhaust their ammo before withdrawing themselves, so perhaps you're right

a fight to the bitter end

regards

Michael