German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Eric von Falkenhayn

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Reviewed in Parameters, Quarterly Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Winter '05-'06

German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Eric von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916. By Robert T. Foley. Cambridge Military History Series. Hew Strachan and Geoffrey Wawro, general editors. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 301 pages. $70.00. Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II (LTC, USA Ret.), Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

I like this book because it takes the original thesis beyond mere intellectualizing. While it is very useful in describing the development of intellectual support for two contending schools of thought—Vernichtungsstrategie (a strategy of annihilation) and Ermattungsstrategie (exhaustion warfare or attrition strategy)—several major enabling factors are also developed. The first is a refreshing discussion of the impact of changes in the geopolitical landscape, and the implied need to monitor that landscape closely. A combination of demonstrated performance (the Russo-Japanese War), population growth, and growth of infrastructure (railroads in particular), worked together to have a direct effect upon the relevance and potential application of theory. Falkenhayn understood that shift better than most of his contemporaries, Hans Delbrück excluded. It was Delbrück who first suggested that Volkskrieg (war by total populations) was reemerging, and that put Germany at a strategic disadvantage, especially for pursuing Vernichtungsstrategie.

The second is the connection of tactical realities to strategic theory. For example, in a tactical approach at least as old as Napoleon, there is such a thing as key terrain, and without its possession, a higher-level plan is likely to fail. Also, when the power of the defense is ascendant, as was the case in the first three years of

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World War I, the best course of action may reasonably be focused in “maneuvering to a position of advantage” (a phrase increasingly in use today when describing Future Force concepts) in order to make the enemy attack under highly unfavorable conditions. The understanding of this basic tenet was complicated by the fact that Bewegungskrieg, what we today call maneuver warfare, was being practiced during World War I with enormous success on the Eastern Front, at least at the operational level. But the failure to achieve recognizable strategic results in the east before late 1917 compromised efforts to produce decisive action in the west—or so Falkenhayn believed. This led to his third factor.

The third factor affecting Falkenhayn’s efforts to convert the German military establishment’s thinking on strategy was that not-so-often-addressed issue of internal institutional politics that limited his authority. This factor alone was strong enough to compromise both the French and German operations in the field. In Falkenhayn’s case, the near revolt of the “Easterners” was detrimental to the harmonious conduct of the war. In the west, the disobedience of the German 5th Army commander, charged with conducting the attack on Verdun, completely frustrated the plan. It was essential that 5th Army follow a tactical approach that kept casualties to a minimum, and that meant pursuing a specific doctrine, something its commander utterly ignored. Some of this may be explained by the fact that Germany had not actually existed until 1870, and the intervening 40-year period had been insufficient to bring about true unification, even in the most unified of all institutions, the army. Some of it can be explained by the royal structure that placed noble title above demonstrated competence. Foley may not have intended these issues to be key points, but they came through strongly to this reviewer.

The central matter, the portrayal and evaluation of Falkenhayn’s thinking regarding Ermattungsstrategie, and his attempt to validate it via Verdun, is handled well. Foley does an excellent job of bringing the matter to a coherent conclusion. He provides the reader with an understanding of the institutional prejudice for Vernichtungs-strategie; the lack of support for Ermattungsstrategie (a theory not congenial to main-line thinking); Falkenhayn’s personality that constrained his willingness to engage in extended, open discussion; and the realities of an enemy who would not perform according to consensus estimates. As we have come to know too well, the enemy always has a vote, or as Moltke the elder noted, we develop three courses of action and the enemy generally chooses the fourth.

Delbrück’s role in the debate over the efficacy of which strategic approach better fit German requirements is well crafted, reinforcing the argument that it is good to pay attention to the arguments of well-informed, nonmilitary thinkers. The most important point made in this book is that theory and practice often live apart until too late. Foley is convincing in demonstrating that Falkenhayn was indeed one of those who did understand this relationship, but who, for a variety of reasons, could not persuade others to bring the two together. It probably wouldn’t have mattered to the million dead who would just as likely have died elsewhere.

There are a number of weaknesses in this work: First, for $70 the reader should be provided a good, readable map on the primary zone of action about which the tale revolves. An accurate World War I vintage, hachured map may be authentic,

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but it is next to useless in a book of this size, and it is even worse when printed on plain paper. The editors are most likely at fault for this oversight, as they are with my next issue. For whatever reason, the style adopted was narrative-summation, narrative-summation, but at no point is the reader alerted that a summation is beginning. His only lead is recognition that the author seems to be repeating himself. This could have been avoided by a small subtitle. Finally, the use of numbers and factors for one side are next to meaningless without some comparable figures for the other. Comparative figures do emerge in the final chapter, but they are derived from a single source. It is this reviewer’s experience that nothing is more contentious about World War I than casualty figures, especially for the French. This fact should have been acknowledged and some effort devoted to explaining variations, particularly since casualty figures are the central measure of a particular strategy’s success. All that said, except for the issue of cost versus a useful map, these criticisms are really mere irritants. The book is truly a fascinating effort well worth reading (if not purchasing at the full retail price).