Americans At Soissons, 1918

[HMS Resolute]

Wondering which American infantry divisions participated in the Battle of Soissons, 1918 with French Troops. Thanks!

(If you want specifics, I am wondering which AEF Inf. Divisions served with the French 151st INf. Regt. )

[Pete1052]

From Parameters, quarterly journal of the U.S. Army War College, Summer 2000:

Soissons 1918. By Douglas V. Johnson II and Rolfe L. Hillman, Jr. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. 213 pages. $29.95. Reviewed by Rich Yarger, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College.

In the bigger picture, the Battle of Soissons is the main effort by the Allies in the Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18 July - 5 August 1918. The July struggles, including the German offensive and the Allied counteroffensive, are often referred to as the Second Battle of the Marne. This battle is the strategic turning of the tide, where Ludendorff loses the initiative and the war in reacting to Foch's surprise offensive. Four nations and eight American divisions participated in the grand offensive. At the point of the spear in the main effort by the French 10th Army, the US 1st and 2d Divisions led the way. Soissons 1918 is the story of this battle and an analysis of the American Expeditionary Force's ability to fight by analyzing the performance of these two divisions.

This book can be read on several different levels and should appeal to a number of different readers. First, it is the most detailed and descriptive account of the battle to date--not an easy accomplishment given the scarce and widely scattered documentation of the engagement. The authors appropriately use French, US, and German sources to reconstruct the events of the battle. On a second level, the authors provided a succinct and compelling analysis of the battle. Setting the battle in the appropriate context of the overall counteroffensive, Johnson and Hillman offer an insightful interpretation of the senior commanders' intents, the ebb and flow of the battle, and the complexities of coordinating battle operations among allied forces and different combat arms. While providing excellent insights into multinational operations and Clausewitz's friction and fog of war, the central focus of the book is an analysis of divisional-level performance in the AEF. The authors extrapolate this analysis to draw conclusions about AEF leadership and performance in general, and, in turn, provide insights into warfare writ large.

As complex as this methodology is, it works--but the reader will find himself thumbing back and forth through the text to confirm his understanding. This "thumbing" is entirely appropriate because Johnson and Hillman conclude that the AEF, itself, was a learning organization and guide their readers through the learning process by the organization of the book. Clearly these authors possess a thorough understanding of war and warfighting, and Soissons conveys this knowledge to the reader.

AEF divisional performance was hampered by a lack of preparation as a result of Foch's emphasis on surprise, poor multinational coordination, a lack of maps and reconnaissance, a lack of training and rehearsal, and the near-term replacement of American commanders. But the real story for the AEF at Soissons is the American struggle with command and control. Here the authors open the window on a continuing issue in the American way of war: From where can the commander best command and control the flow of the battle? Where is the nexus of information flow and ability to influence the action for the engaged commanders? Johnson and Hillman do not answer the question for today, but their analysis of the role of American leadership at Soissons appropriately frames the issues and suggests areas for contemporary study.

With Soissons the reader feels that he is a participant in the battle as it teaches its lessons in command and control--command style, communications, and experience. The organization of the book serves the reader well. The authors introduce the battle with a strategic and operational-level overview that brings the reader up to the time of the battle. Of particular note is the first chapter's summary of the state of the AEF going into the battle. This summary provides the basis for the assessment of AEF training and command and control. The book has ample maps, and they are essential to understanding the flow of the battle. Helpful appendixes provide the Order of Battle for the forces engaged and the organization of an AEF division. Serious students and researchers will be encouraged by the detailed notes and lengthy bibliography. A judicious selection of photographs rounds out a complete picture of the battle.

Soissons 1918 is a very worthwhile read not just for those interested in World War I, but for any student of multinational operations and coalition warfare.

[4thGordons]

Wondering which American infantry divisions participated in the Battle of Soissons, 1918 with French Troops. Thanks!

(If you want specifics, I am wondering which AEF Inf. Divisions served with the French 151st INf. Regt. )

Suggest you have a look at Johnson and Hillman's excellent "Soissons 1918" Texas A&M Press 1999

From memory

I believe it was the 1st and 2nd Divisions AEF who made up XX Corps of the 10th Army

1st Division

1st Brigade = 16th Inf, 18th Inf

2nd Brigade= 26th Inf, 28th Inf

2nd Division

3rd Brigade = 9th Inf, 23rd Inf

4th Brigade = 5th Marine Regt, 6th Marine Rgt

I am less familiar with the French units but my recollection was it was the 1st Moroccan Division (which included the Regiment de Marche (Foreign Legion), 4th and 7th Tirrailleurs and 8th Zouaves who were in closest cooperation with the American units.

IIRC the 1st Div was above (north) of the Morroccan Div. with the 2nd Division below (south).

I did some work on the 26th and 28th Infantry who were at the north of the attack charged with taking Breull , Ploisy and Berzy-le-Sec and again, IIRC there were problems because at at least two points destructive flanking fire was coming from areas nominally within a French Divisional (I thought 153rd?) area north of the 1st Div's line, but the US commanders did very little to respond to this (seeing it as a French issue) and suffered heavy casualties as a result. It is my recollection that Johnson and Hillman are quite critical of this (the US command) indicating a "mental block" on the part of the 1st Div commanders which led to many of the casualties in the 26th and 28th Infantry as they advanced on Ploisy and Berzy le Sec.

All of this is from memory so I hope I am not leading you too far astray - suggest you check the book which is a nice case study of a particular engagement.

Chris

EDIT: I swear Pete's post wasn't there when I posted! glad to see we agree though.

Edited 24 September , 2009 by 4thGordons