Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment

[Pete1052]

From Field Artillery Journal, Sept-Oct 2001, review by Michael J. Forsyth

Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I

Mark E. Grotelueschen, Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 2001, 174 Pages, $62.50

Our Army is currently struggling through a period of change as we enter the 21st century. Many of the questions of organization and doctrine are not unlike those that a previous generation of artillery officers faced. At the dawn of the 20th century, armies worldwide were in a state of upheaval as their leaders struggled with the challenge of how to harness overwhelming firepower at a time when logistics, transportation and communications capabilities lagged behind.

Mark E. Grotelueschen provides a glimpse of how the US Army's antiquated pre-World War I doctrine evolved on the battlefield to overcome the challenges of combat. Further, the author introduces the reader to the conflict that arose among post-war leaders over what our warfighting doctrine would look like in the wake of the world war.

This book is a thought-provoking account of challenges to consider and a "must-read" for Field Artillerymen grappling with finding solutions to similarly vexing problems today.

Documenting Artillery Developments

The purpose of Grotelueschen's book is to fill a glaring gap in the historiography of artillery development in World War I. Much is written about the experiences of the European powers in terms of the evolution of artillery tactics. In addition, there is a great body of work concerning the birth, training, deployment and the combat experience of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). However, no one has chronicled the interesting and important development of the AEF artillery in the war.

Because there are a great number of official documents from the various Field Artillery units from the war with widely varying experiences, Grotelueschen chose to focus his work by exploring the record of a single division artillery, the 2d Infantry Division Artillery. The 2d Division's set organizational structure combined with its combat experience from various sectors on the Western Front made it an excellent case study through which to gauge the Field artillery branch as a whole.

State of the Branch before the World War

Grotelueschen begins by providing an overview of the Field Artillery at the outbreak of World War I and its role within the larger US Army doctrine. Using many contemporary doctrinal sources and professional literature, such as field manuals and Field Artillery Journals, the author succinctly traces the status of the branch in reference to training, organization and doctrine. Grotelueschen introduces the reader to a Field Artillery branch that is "professionally dormant, unprepared" and organizationally "obsolete."

The experience of the Allies in the Great War forced them to reconsider their infantry, offensive-oriented doctrine in the face of the dominance of firepower. As stated by the AEF commander, General John J. Pershing, US doctrine still retained the Allies pre-war conceptions of combat. The author concludes that, "In short, when America joined the war, the whole of its army, and especially its field artillery branch, was too small, devoid of any applicable combat experience, insufficiently trained, and in possession of a doctrine that did not appear in any way suited to the daunting military operations that lay in its future in Europe."

As the author notes in succeeding chapters, unfortunately for the soldiers of the AEF, the horrific combat characteristics of the Western Front forced a change in the thinking of our leaders. Pershing arrived in France wedded to the concept that the infantryman with rifle and bayonet dominated the battlefield. He believed the Allies had lost their aggressiveness and become "overreliant [sic] on artillery support."

One American observer noted that Allied infantry officers "do not hesitate to say that infantry should not leave its trenches until artillery has smashed all targets" and further "can advance only so far as their artillery can escort them with fire." Pershing felt this attitude bred timidity in the infantry, and he sought to show the Allies what the American Army could do. The 2d Infantry Division's baptism by fire in Belleau Wood began the slow, evolutionary change to this mentality and tactics and techniques, based on the reality of modern combat.

Slow Changes

In June 1918, the 2d Division deployed to the front after a period of training under the tutelage of French officers. In spite of French efforts to impress the need to use artillery as an integral part of any offensive action, their suppositions went largely ignored as the division entered the fray to stop the massive German Spring Offensives. The soldiers and Marines of the division deployed opposite a thin stretch of timber known as the Belleau Wood.

The French corps commander ordered a limited counteroffensive to halt the German advance. The 2d Infantry Division received the mission to take Belleau Wood and planned to take it using the doctrinal concept of "self-reliant infantry." The result was a tragedy as the brigades attacked devoid of any artillery support. The fight convinced one brigade commander that it was "impossible to attack hostile machine gun positions without artillery."

As a result of this grim lesson, the division planned a subsequent attack that began with a massive artillery preparation followed by a rolling barrage and concluded with a standing barrage upon objective consolidation, the latter similar to a final protective fires (FPFs). The division staff planned a well-synchronized fire plan for this assault, and it succeeded in marked contrast to the infantry-only attack.

The author continues to breakdown how the fledgling AEF artillery came into its own at the battles of Vaux, St. Mihiel, and Mont Blanc. However, some in the AEF still attempted ill-conceived self-reliant infantry assaults, such as at Soissons.

By late 1918 these officers--at least at the divisional level--were in the minority as most realized that a combined arms approach complete with copious numbers of artillery weapons proved the best way to mount an offensive. The AEF did not take the final step in its doctrinal evolution in World War I. This took continued efforts to evolve the doctrine during the inter-war years.

Grotelueshen demonstrates in the closing chapters that although the AEF had perfected the set-piece battles, as at Meuse-Argonne, it still had not solved the challenge of making and exploiting a breakthrough. In the closing days of the war, the Allies made their greatest advances, but as they neared the point of making the long-sought-after breakthrough, the offensives petered out.

Why?

The author alludes to the fact that the problem lay in a lag in the technological development of transportation, logistics and tactical communications systems. Although by the end of the war, use of motor tractors, transport vehicles and wireless communications had begun to catch up to firepower on the battlefield, tactics, techniques and equipment availability were inadequate at best.

A particular problem that he points out is in the realm of liaison between artillery and infantry units. The AEF had not developed a standard doctrine for the duties and responsibilities of artillery liaison officers. Moreover, such officers needed cumbersome field telephones to carry out their vital duties. This required time to set up the equipment and lay wire all while the battle situation changed.

Although commanders took strides to codify duties, responsibilities and tactics during the Great War, much remained unresolved at the termination of fighting in November 1918.

Because our involvement in the war only lasted a few months, all of our officers did not succumb to the more conservative line. A good many, including Pershing, still believed in the nebulous concept of "open warfare" using self-reliant infantry rather than a combined arms approach. The conservative approach lost in the inter-war years as technological advances in transport, logistics, communications and, most notably, the tank overcame the long lead firepower had over mobility in World War I.

Conclusion

The author concludes by identifying the beginnings of a power struggle for the soul of the US Army in the post-war years. While there were those who advocated a more conservative style of warfare as a result of their experiences on the Western Front, the infantry, offensive-centered devotees still abounded, particularly among officers who served at echelons above division.

Groteleuschen's book is an excellent read that explores a heretofore-ignored area of the history of the AEF. Although the author does an excellent job of exploring the evolutionary changes forced on our antiquated doctrine, I believe he needed to discuss the reasons why the AEF failed to solve its problems with making and sustaining breakthroughs in more detail. Firepower had outstripped mobility on the battlefield by the early 20th century by a wide margin. While he alludes to the shortcomings of transportation, logistics and communications, he fails to drive home the point that these shortcomings forced the AEF into set-piece attacks and conspired to prevent the transition to open warfare. His wrap-up leaves open the possibility of another book to chronicle our doctrine in the inter-war years--a good contribution to our knowledge.

Note: A more recent book by Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I, is reviewed in this thread.

[SiegeGunner]

Well, there I go, shooting my mouth off again ...

Actually, it's a nice piece of work, and good to see a modern-day artillery officer interested in the history and evolution of his arm of the service.

[4thGordons]

I asked about this author's other (broader) book in the thread Pete linked.

Has anyone read it? It is rather pricey and was hoping for some commentary before I took the plunge.

Chris

[truthergw]

I had a look on Amazon and he has 2 books on sale. They both look worth a read but a bit too pricey.