Ian Hamilton

[dobbin]

I found this a most readable book that left me with a view of Hamilton that I would like to discuss with those of you more widely read than me to give me your points of view. It seems that Hamilton had a most interesting life as a regular soldier hard, exciting, dashing and full of opportunities with his wide travels, to aquaint himself with the state of military progress at the late 19th and early 20th Centuries as practised by the Japanese, Chinese Germans to name a few. This "on the job" knowledge base made him a very rounded soldier indeed his influence, writings and training in musketry seems to have been extremely influential in improving the regular army's infantry tactics and allowed the thinking soldier to not only improve his shooting prowess but aim and fire at his target, indeed even if it was moving as was evidenced in the actions of the BEF in 1914.

My question really is do you agree with Lee that if Hamilton had become CIGS with Sir Leslie Rundle as his Adjutant General working with Kitchener taking tracts of work from him and sharing the burden it would have sorted out the chaos at the outbreak of war? Was Hamilton in fact a lost opportunity, did his time at Gallipoli deny the army later on a great leader? It does seem that Hamilton had a raw deal he was not helped much by the system and Kitchener ignored or failed to act when help was clearly needed during that battle.

Hamilton seems to have a streak of egalitariasnism considering his elitist background. He appears to have argued that officers should be drawn from a wider social background presumably much influenced by his Australian experience. At the same time he seems to have made use of the "old boy network" and his absentee wife back in London was constantly being asked by him to make contacts on his behalf. Lee says he favoured qaulity over quantity on the battlefield, was that an attitude not favouring conscription? If this was so how would that have squared with Kitchener's views if as Lee suggests he would have made a good CIGS.

He seems to think altruistic discipline and high motivation are the "latchkeys to success" iron discipline is not enough. There is a high sernse of patriotic spirit abiding in the heart of the people and yet he then says that The National Schools system failed to inculcate this love of duty and sacrifice so it was left to the army with its officers drawn from the Public Schools to become the school of the nation. The Army taught the people the civic virtue of citizenship. Whilst seeing how these views fit together there does seem to be some conflict of ideology here.

In the 30s he seems to have been influenced even one might say misled by the doctrines of National Socialism sweeping across Europe when one reads of his meetings with Hitler who he seems to have impressed him. Perhaps his fluency in German made Hitlers views seem more palatable or is this the niave soldier being misled by the facile views portrayed in Mien Kampf ?

In summary therefore did the army make make a serious error in passing Hamilton over, was he a missed opportunity ?

[PMHart]

Hamilton was totally out of his depth commanding a couple of army corps at Gallipoli against the Turks. The idea of him commanding the BEF on the Western Front facing the might of the German Army is terrifying. True he was intelligent, but he prove unable to devise a coherent plan or judge the strength of the opposition, he failed to take due notice of the copious intelligence he was supplied with, he endlessly over-complicating his plans and repeatedly failing to concentrate his resources to achieve key objectives. In addition he was generally far too over-optimistic or emotionally cast down, beside being overly subservient to Kitchener. Subsequently he deliberately falsified his so-called diary after blatantly attempting to pervert the course of the official Dardanelles Commission. Some record! Hamilton was an utter disaster by any account - I still like both the book and Hamilton though! It's all just a matter of historical record and opinion......

Pete

[SiegeGunner]

Heck, Pete-e-Pops - you should write a book about it ...

Personally, I think Hamilton was adversely affected by spending too much time aboard ship in the company of de Robeck and Keyes.

I like Hamilton and John Lee's book too - and also Celia Lee's companion biography (A Soldier's Wife) of Jean Hamilton.

Mick

[Philip Wilson]

[Was Hamilton in fact a lost opportunity, did his time at Gallipoli deny the army later on a great leader? It does seem that Hamilton had a raw deal he was not helped much by the system and Kitchener ignored or failed to act when help was clearly needed during that battle]

Well you have clearly read the book. I recall reading it back in 2000 when it was first published. Lets start the ball rolling not that we can change events but perhaps enable others to gain a clearer appreciation of Sir Ian Hamilton's views back in December 1915 and January 1916.

Part of the answer you seek is contained within Colonel Repington's diary Thursday 9th December 1915: Saw Ian Hamilton in the afternoon.....Hamilton was not in favour of the troops leaving the Dardenelles and reported against it, mentioning large figures as the probable price of evacuation. He had obtained the opinions of both Corps and Divisional Commanders, who had changed their views after he had come home..... Lord K thinks evacuation possible.....Hamilton declares troops sent out to him had always been sent out too late, but admits that for the Suvla Bay affair he got all he wanted.

'Lord K told Sir Ian that there was no fault to be found in his conduct of operations, and that he could always hold his head up high. Sir Ian naturally replied that in that case he did not know why he was at home.'

Clearly Hamilton still firmly believed on the 9th December 1915 that had he been allowed to remain in command then Birdwood would never have recommended evacuation. Hamilton believes 'we may be able to get away with half our guns' and expresses concerns as to 'the loss of guns, three weeks supply of stores on the beach,will be sacrificed in the event of retirement and that such losses will drag down Lord K and the Govenment.'

On the question of a raw deal 'he evidently does not think Lord K. has treated him very well, or shown any skill in in the general management of the War. He said it was as hard to get troops out of him as to get butter out of a dog's mouth.'

Repington lunched with Sir Ian and Lady Hamilton on Tuesday 11th January 1916 and the conversation gravitated to the successful final evacuation of the Penninsula. Hamilton said the largest number of effectives he had under him at any time was 130,000 compared with Turkish Forces within easy reach of some 240,000. Repington states he had written an article on ''Amateur Strategy' which had been banned by the Censor that morning in which he had argued the British Forces had not been strong enough to gain victory. Hamilton admitted over lunch that day 'the whole thing had been planned in a most sketchy manner, between him, K; Calwell and Braithwaite during an hours vague talk before he went out, when Kitchener, scarcely thought that a landing would be necessary' for reasons which are then explained.

Philip