Cavalry units of the 1st World War

[Robert Dunlop]

I agree. I have not found any evidence that cavalry traded their Hotchkiss automatic rifles for Lewis guns.

Robert

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Not the right answer but when the ALH MG Sqn's were formed from the MG Sections with each ALH Regt in July 1916, a new MG Sect was raised and equipted with Lewis guns, but due the the weapon being unsuitible they were repaced by late 1916 with the Hotckiss MG.

What happened in British units is unknown to me, sorry

S.B

[KennethB]

Welcome Bill,

Solar Topee in photo either in Palestine or Mesopotamia.

A better picture (I think this one is Boer War era, but you get the idea)

My turn,

A bit of clarification please. While in the trenches cavalry would of course use what was standard to trench warfare. What about in the desert regions where the cavalry fought more traditional? I saw a great picture of a mounted MG section (with Vickers I think) practicing for the Somme. Would the MG section have 2 MG's or only 1? Also would there be 8 men per gun (seems that I read that number somewhere)? Would any of this change with the Hotckiss MG?

S.B.,

Since my Great Grand Dad served with the Australian Mounted Division (5th Mounted Brigade) how much did things vary in that campaign? Also any thing you can add about the ALH would be very welcome!

And finally, did the Americans bring cavalry to France in 1917?

Cheers,

Ken

[Robert Dunlop]

S.B. - you are correct re the use of Lewis guns by the ALH. They were not cavalry, however, but mounted infantry.

Robert

[KennethB]

Robert,

Did the ALH have squadrons or platoons. It was always my understanding they organized like a cavalry unit but fought dismounted (not including Beersheeba) with horse-holders. Same question could be posed for the Canadian mounted rifles and South African mounted units as well. Thoughts?

Ken

[Robert Dunlop]

Ken, good question. The units used the same terminology as cavalry. There were several important differences in training and tactical use. The naming of the units should not cause them to be confused with regular cavalry.

Robert

[nigelfe]

It's blindingly obvious that once war started the continental cavalry nonsense met reality. They had to dismount. The doctrinal question to ask is whether they were equipped with rifles or carbines, if it was the latter then any claims about preparedness for dismounted action should be treated as BS and attempts to re-write history! Holmes says: "There was a world of difference between British cavalry and their allies and opponents, all of whom took a decidely more arme blanche view of things." He then offers a couple of quotes to demonstrate that once war started they realised how wrong they had been pre-1914.

Holmes also quotes the 14th Hussars in 1908 - 354 marksmen, 212 1st class shots, 35 2nd clas, 4 3rd class, as he says many infantry battalions would not have been ashamed of this!

UK cav regt org was 3 sqns (2 comd by majors), each 4 troops comprisng 4 7 man sections. The MG section (with 2 Maxims pre-war) was with RHQ. Interestingly when dismounted it needed one man as a horseholder for every 4 horses.

RHA btys with cav bdes had 13-pr, however, as the war progressed while 13-pr were generally retained in the BEF those in the Palestine and Mesopotamia chnaged to 18-pr. Of course with a 6 horse team an 18-pr was less mobile than a 13-pr (more weight for the same horsepower).

In 1914 the Brit org was the Cav Div, a cav bde per corps and a cav sqn per infantry division. In India cav bdes had 1 Brit and 3 Indian cav regts and 1 RHA bty. The 1908 TF org had 14 Inf Divs and 14 Yeomanry Cav Bdes. I think there were about 24 Brit reg cav regts, not sure about Indian nos.

During the war the Brit cav total seems to have reached 15 cav bdes in 6 cav divs (excluding Indian). In 1918 the Cdn cav bde seems to have been part of 3 Cav Div in France. At peak there were 7 Brit cav bdes in Palestine in 2 Cav Divs (4 & 5) and an independent cav bde (7). This compares to the 5 ALH and 1 NZMR bdes, which of course relied on Brit arty.

[Steven Broomfield]

I think there were about 24 Brit reg cav regts, not sure about Indian nos.

British: 31 total (3 Household, 7 Dragoon Guards, 3 Dragoons, 12 Hussars and 6 Lancers)

Indian: off-hand, not sure. About 38, but I'll check this evening.

[Robert Dunlop]

Holmes was incorrect. Belgian, German and French cavalry were well aware of the need for dismounted action prior to the war. British cavalry drew on these insights as they developed their tactics before August 1914. For example, a French book was translated as 'Cavalry in Action in the Wars of the Future: Studies in Applied Tactics'. It was published in English in 1905 (the original was published earlier than this in French), with Sir John French providing the preface. Topics covered included:

• Defence of a defile (wood) by a detachment of cavalry
  
• Defence of a locality by a cavalry detachment covering the assembly of a division
  
• An ambush laid by a portion of the rear guard to stop pursuit
  
• The rear guard of a cavalry division covering the retreat after a reverse
  
• Cavalry holding an important position and waiting for the infantry to come up
  

These are the topics that primarily involved dismounted actions. There are numerous other examples of French, German and Belgian cavalry tactical analyses. Many of these were translated into English and were studied by British cavalry officers. All featured discussions about dismounted tactics.

Robert

[squirrel]

Cavalry Training 1904 (provisional) preface by Lord Roberts page v:

"But what does the development of rifle fire consequent on the introduction of the long range, low trajectory, magazine rifle mean? It means that instead of the firearm being an adjunct to the sword, the sword must henceforth be an adjunct to the rifle; and that cavalry soldiers must become expert rifle shots and be constantly trained to act dismounted".

[Robert Dunlop]

The 1909 German equivalent of 'Cavalry Training', viz. Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie, contains sections on 'Dismounting to fight on foot' (Absitzen zum Gefecht zu Fuß); '[Creating and manoeuvring a] Firing line' (Die Schützenlinie); and, as per their infantry colleagues, 'Commencing the assault' (Sturmanlauf); followed by 'Rallying and [re-]mounting' (Sammeln. Aufsitzen.).

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

Indian Cavalry Regiments, 1914: 39. All but three (26th King George's Own Light Cavalry, 27th Light Cavalry and 28th Light Cavalry - all originally from the Madras Presidency Army) were on the silladar system, and all but one 39th Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides (Frontier Force) (Lumsden's) Cavalry) were on a 4-squadron basis (the Guides having only 3.

In the post-war period, both Armies reduced cavalry quite severely. In the British service the number fell to 2 Household regiments (the 1st and 2nd Life Guards being amalgamated) and 20 Line (5 Dragoon Guards, 2 Dragoon, 9 Hussars and 4 Lancers). Initially it had been intended to disband the 8 junior regiments, but in the event, amalgamations of the junior 16 took place, thus creating, for instance, the 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's own) and the 16th/5th Lancers.

Incidentally, when the 11th Hussars and 12th Royal Lancers were mechanised as armoured car regiments in 1928 (the 11th in Aldershot, the 12th in in Egypt), it was believed that they were selected because they were the two junior non-amalgamated cavalry regiments. Whether this is true or not, it's a nice story.

In India, the number of regiments reduced to 21, again, by amalgamation. However, in India, only the 27th Light Cavalry and The Guides Cavalry remained separate: all others were amalgamated. Generally, this was done between regiments with earlier connection. For instance, the 1st Duke of York's Own Lancers (Skinner's Horse) and 3rd Skinner's Horse combined to form Skinner's Horse (1st Duke of York's Own Cavalry). The British 'combined numerals' weren't used. Although intially it was tried (the 11th Lancers (Probyn's) and the 12th Cavalry for example became, for a while, the 11th/12th Cavalry), sense took over and single numbers were allocated (the 11th/12th becoming , eventually, Probyn's Horse (5th King Edward's Own Lancers).

At the same time, in India, the silladar system was abolished.

Hope this is of interest.

[stevenbecker]

Robert.

Sorry mate but the term "mounted infantry" is incorrect.

The ALH was trained in dismounted tatics but there role was as light cavalry, they patroled protected the flanks and could if needed charge, but that was not practiced as they were armed with a rifle not a sword.

"mounted infantry" is only Infanty mounted of some form of transport, either horse, camel or truck. But not trained as cavalry like the ALH. A better term for the ALH would be Mounted Rifles, as many of the pre war Cavalry Regts were termed in Australia.

The removal of the MG's (Vickers and Maxums) from the LHR's in July 1916 a replacment was found in the new Lewis gun, but was found unsuitible for horsed transport and the Hotchkiss replaced them.

S.B

[KennethB]

nigelfe,

UK cav regt org was 3 sqns (2 comd by majors), each 4 troops comprisng 4 7 man sections. The MG section (with 2 Maxims pre-war) was with RHQ. Interestingly when dismounted it needed one man as a horseholder for every 4 horses

Would the Squadron breakdown be the same for the Yeomanry of the TF? What rank would lead a troop? Likewise a section?

I think that fighting dismounted was not a new idea by the time of the war. There is the example of the Union Cavalry lead by Bufford dismounting and holding the gathering Army of Northern Virginia in place to allow the Army of the Potomac to arrive in Gettysburg 1863. I'm sure many more could be added to this.

S.B.

Is there a good source for ALH info? We've broken down the British and Indian Cavalry quite well unit wise. Can you add to this? Finally, was the Hotchkiss a tripod mount or a bi-pod mount like the Lewis when used by mounted units?

Cheers,

Ken

[nigelfe]

Troops were led by 2Lt or Lt, I'd assume the TF regts were the same org as regs.

Roberts had created the MI when he was CinC in S Africa, interestingly the first units were from RFA, his staff had considered the vet stats and concluded that good horse management practices were not a strength of the cavalry.

Yes Roberts was the driver of change in the revised cav doctrine in 1904, but there was a bit of backsliding in later editions (not forgetting Lancers being reissued with Lances instead of swords). Nevertheless the Brit cav did take dismounted action seriously, and their shooting standards reflect this, continental cav culture was far more resistant to the change, the traditionalists held sway despite some of the incidents in the war of 1870, of course the Boer War had been a learning experience for the British. And my question remains - did the continental cavalry have rifles or carbines?

[Robert Dunlop]

..."mounted infantry" is only Infanty mounted of some form of transport, either horse, camel or truck.

Steve, thank you for providing your definition. I agree that, by this definition, the ALH could not be be considered 'mounted infantry'. This was not, however, the definition I had in mind.

Before proceeding, let me reassure you that I am not trying to denigrate the roles and contributions made by the ALH. As a New Zealander, I am very proud of the tradition of our Mounted Rifles who, as you know, were the equivalent of the ALH.

The crux of the matter is reflected in your comment that the "ALH was trained in dismounted tatics but there role was as light cavalry, they patroled protected the flanks and could if needed charge, but that was not practiced as they were armed with a rifle not a sword."

As you say, the ALH were not armed with sword (except for a brief spell for some units in 1918 IIRC) or lance. Light cavalry were armed with the one or more of the l'arme blanche weapons. ALH were not light cavalry. ALH could move forward at the gallop en masse, similar to the final approach of cavalry in the charge. There were attempts to improve the effectiveness of this attack option by using the longer bayonets like a sword. There was even an attempt to provide a sword, again as evidence that just riding at at enemy without some form of purpose-built (for cavalry) stabbing/cutting weapon was not as effective. But the ALH were not cavalry, light or otherwise.

The pre-WW1 concept of mounted infantry is discussed at length by Badsey in his book 'Doctrine and reform in the British cavalry 1880-1918'. The Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians, through the performance of their mounted rifle units, all contributed the near discontinuation of the British regular cavalry.

I have no problem, FWIIW, referring to the Australian and New Zealand units as light horse or mounted rifles.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

... was the Hotchkiss a tripod mount or a bi-pod mount like the Lewis when used by mounted units?

Ken, 'the Hotchkiss' used by the cavalry was not the tripod mounted medium machine gun used by the French machine gun units, for example. It was a light machine gun or automatic rifle, which was fired using a bipod mount (see example here).

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...continental cav culture was far more resistant to the change, the traditionalists held sway despite some of the incidents in the war of 1870, of course the Boer War had been a learning experience for the British. And my question remains - did the continental cavalry have rifles or carbines?

I respectfully disagree with your view about continental cavalry culture being 'far more resistant to the change...' Two examples, one French and one German, have illustrated the transformation in thinking about the cavalry. There are many others, many of which are not available or read in English. There were constant debates, often spilling into the public domain, about tactical issues. These debates were not unique to the cavalry. Nor were they unique to the 'continent'. Badsey's book 'Doctrine and reform in the British cavalry 1880-1918' documents the tremendous debates and problems in processing the lessons of the Boer War. Even when WW1 started, there were some catastrophic charges carried out by British cavalry, where the enemy was not suppressed or routed.

'Continental' cavalry were armed with carbines.

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

The 11th Hussars history refers to the Hotchkiss as an "Automatic rifle".

[Robert Dunlop]

Yes, the term is used quite frequently. Machine-gunners referred to the Lewis gun and the Hotchkiss LMG as automatic rifles. The distinction was based on the fact that machine guns used tripods, which enabled accurate longer distance indirect fire. Bipod-mounted automatic weapons were used in direct fire mode and could not be used in the same way for indirect fire (though indirect fire was possible). In fact, there was a tripod for the Hotchkiss and it also came with an elevating mechanism. This could be fitted to the underside of the stock and, with the bipod barrel rest, as it was called, enabled the elevation of the gun to be altered by small increments. I have never come across any references to the Hotchkiss automatic rifle being used for indirect barrage fire.

The training manual 'Complete Guide to the Hotchkiss Machine Gun' refers to the "Hotchkiss Portable Machine Gun or Automatic Rifle".

Robert

[Jeff Pickerd]

Ken,

No one seems to have directly answered your question as to the make-up of an Australian Light Horse Regiment.

An ALH Regiment had a Headquarters, Machine Gun Section and three Light Horse Squadrons.

Each Squadron had four Troops, A, B, C, & D, broken down again into eight Sections of four men. The detail of training outlined further within this post will give a greater understanding of the four man sections.

Some years back a discussion was running on the old Australian Light Horse forum, re the structure and operations of the ALH, to which I submitted the following, or more correctly, extracts from that post that may be pertinent to your enquiry.

All the military training for the Australian Military Forces, permanent and Militia, were based on the British standard, and for Mounted Infantry, this would have been influenced by the experience gained during the Boer War as well.

The standard of mounted work was based on, and therefore similar to, that of the British Yeomanry, as well as the mounted units of the Indian Army.

The Field Service Pocket Books, 1913 & 1914, as used by Officers and N.C.O.s of the 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment (Militia), are of English origin, being published under the auspices of the General Staff, War Office, by His Majesty’s Stationery Office and printed by Harris and Sons 45 – 47 St. Martin’s Lane, W.C.

Pre World War 1 Militia units, albeit under a vast array of differing titles, were either Infantry or Mounted rifles, and excluding the infantry units, whether they were titled Mounted Infantry, Mounted Rifles, Cavalry or Lancers, they all were in essence Mounted Rifle troops. The cross over of training and tactics were all based on the British model for Yeomanry operations, and again by extension, the tactics of Cavalry, excluding the charge with sword directly onto the enemy ranks or positions.

The Australian Light Horse as this title indicates were mounted troops, and as such conformed to the strength, formation, rank and trades to that of the Cavalry, i.e., Squadron, Troop and Section. Troopers, Farriers, Shoeing Smiths, Saddlers, Trumpeters, etc.

From my study of the 8th LHR, from the very beginning with the formation of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade on Thursday 3/9/1914 in which the surplus men enlisting in Victoria were appointed to the 6th LHR at Broadmeadows Camp, until the formation of the 8th LHR 17/10/1914, all training again appears to conform strictly to that of the Light Horse Manual 1910.

Further to this, the only Australian Light Horse Regiment that appears to have been allocated the roll of a Cavalry Regiment was the 4th LHR, raised in Victoria as a Divisional Cavalry Regiment for the 1st Australian Division, to accompany the infantry to England. It would be envisaged that the 4th LHR would have undertaken training and equipping as a Cavalry Regiment in England, as there is no evidence that it under took such training and equipping in Australia. As events transpired, this never eventuated with the redirection of the 1st Contingent to Egypt, where again, there is no evidence that the 4th L.H. went through any Cavalry training.

From the War Diaries of the 3rd L.H. Bde, its component units, Brigade Orders, Routine Orders, letters and diaries from the periods 1914, 1915 and 1916, there is no indication that any training other than that of mounted infantry/mounted rifles was in force. The archival film footage held by the AWM of the 8th LHR training in Egypt 1915 and the Sinai 1916 clearly show mounted and dismounted exercises in strict accordance to that set out in the Light Horse Training Manual.

The “LIGHT HORSE MANUAL for the DRILL TRAINING and EXERCISE of the LIGHT HORSE REGIMENTS of AUSTRALIA, 1st January 1910. Issued by the MILITARY BOARD, MELBOURNE goes into great depth to the training undertaken by the Light Horse Regiments.

Page 4 of the manual under “PRINCIPLES of TRAINING”, part 2, states: -

“Training should embrace horse management, riding, scouting, patrolling, skirmishing, musketry, judging distances, drill, dismounted action, reconnaissance, protection on the move and at rest. Field exercises should be practiced on varied ground, including marching, bivouacking, attack and defence, and field firing. Combined operations with other arms when ever possible should be carried out.”

The manual does however give detailed instructions in the use of the sword (Appendix 1) and the lance (Appendix 2), but with the following proviso: -

“For practice in connection with tournaments, skill at arms competitions, etc., and not to be practiced as a drill exercise.”

Page 99. DISMOUNTED DUTY. S146. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS, out lines the procedure for going into dismounted attack by section and this was the training method in place for the A.I.F. Light Horse units.

The photographs and newspaper articles relating to the 5th A.L.H. Bde. camp at Broadford, beginning of March 1914, would all point to the field operations being undertaken in accord to those as outlined by the Light Horse Manual. Of the 13th, 15th & 16th A.L.H. Militia Regiments who participated, none were equipped with the sword or lance.

The following is taken and transcribed verbatim from the “LIGHT HORSE MANUAL for the DRILL TRAINING and EXERCISE of the LIGHT HORSE REGIMENTS of AUSTRALIA, 1st January 1910. Issued by the MILITARY BOARD, MELBOURNE.

Page 99. DISMOUNTED DUTY.

S146. General Instructions.

The cases where mounted troops would be most effectively employed upon dismounted duty are –

(a) To seize and hold tactical positions, often far in advance of the slower moving infantry columns, and to deny their occupation to the enemy.

( While holding the enemy in front to turn and outflank him upon all occasions, and even by a widely extended manoeuvre to threaten his rear.

© To force a defile, or to seize a bridge, fords, etc.

(d) To offer resistance, during a retreat, sufficient to compel the enemy to deploy, and thus gain time.

(e) To support cavalry or reconnoitring parties by covering their retreat through a defile, or by taking advantage of any other suitable position for bringing fire to bear unexpectedly on pursuing cavalry.

(f) To form strongly posted points for support of cavalry when attacking, and to hold in check an enemy’s cavalry and artillery at bridges, fords, defiles, etc.

(g) To defend camps, bivouacs, and unoccupied posts.

With references to ( a well directed fire opened upon the flank and rear of an enemy by even a small body of dismounted men, well placed under cover, has frequently had the effect of turning the enemy out of a strong position.

The utmost care is required in dismounting men where opposing could attack them.

Troops should dismount for fire action, if possible, under cover.

The nearer horses are to the men the better, as they gain confidence thereby and can then allow the enemy to approach within easy range, at the same time retaining the power to mount and move off rapidly.

Mounting and dismounting must be carried out expeditiously, and when mounted, the men should get away quickly.

Sections and larger units on fairly level ground where no immediate cover is available should gallop to the point where they are to dismount, and the led horses should be taken to the best available cover.

S. 147. Methods of Carrying out Dismounted Duty.

Dismounted duty may be performed by the following methods : - (1) By the whole force dismounting and linking horses. (2) By three fourths dismounting and leaving the Nos. 3 mounted in charge of the horses of each section. Nos. 3 will be dismounted as soon as practicable.

Method (1) is applicable when a long continued dismounted action is contemplated, and when the horses are required to remain stationary. In the event of the dismounted men having left their horses at a distance, and it not being advisable to withdraw them from the firing line, the Nos. 3 only may be sent back to bring up the horses, the remainder maintaining their position.

Link Horses Action: - Troop leaders and odd numbers advance one horse length. – All dismounted. The even numbers bring their horses up into line, and close in towards the centre; the men then take one pace to the front, and turn about facing their horses. The head-ropes, without unfastening the knot, are brought over the horse’s head clear of the reins. Each man then passes his head-rope to the man on his then right, who secures it with two half hitches to the jowl-piece of his own horse’s head collar.

Officers’ horses will be linked on the right and serrefiles on the left of their troops.

Horses may be “ringed” into a circle by bringing round and tying the flanks together.

A horse guard will be detailed.

Hoses may also be coupled or left singly by tying their heads round to the saddle.

Method (2) has the advantage of quickness and mobility, and should be usually adopted.

Action: - The troop leader and the odd numbers advance one horse’s length, and all except Nos. 3 (who sling their rifles) dismount as rapidly as possible, the even numbers bring their horses up in line, and the horses of each section are handed over to the Nos. 3. The men then double out and form ten paces in front of their horses.

S. 148. How the Horses should be Handed Over.

Nos. 1, 2 and 4 will drop their bottom reins on to their horse’s neck, and take the top reins clear over the horse’s head and hand them to No. 3; No. 1 passing the reins between the jowl-piece and jaw of No. 2’s horse. No. 3 will shorten up the reins of the led horses as far as practicable. Unless this is done good leading cannot be insured.

The horses will be left in charge of an officer or N.C.O., who is responsible, that –

1. Precaution is taken against surprise.

2. Constant communication is kept up with the firing line.

3. Unless there is ample cover they are not to be in the line of fire in rear of the dismounted men, but, if possible, removed to a flank.

4. The horses of each section are kept distant, with their heads towards the firing line.

S. 149. Dismounting to a Flank.

If it be required to dismount to the flank when in column of route (i.e., column of sections), Nos. 1, 2 and 4 dismount and give their horses to No. 3, who will not advance in this instance.

S. 150. To Mount.

The horses will be brought up and halted close to the men who will remain steady until the command, or signal ‘Mount”, when they will run rapidly to their horses, mount independently, and take their places in the ranks.

As soon as the Nos. 3 have released the horses, they will move up two horses’ lengths, and the sections will reform on them.

Note: - As a general rule, the horses will be brought to the men.

S. 151. Drill and Manoeuvre of Led Horses.

They should be exercised by word of command or signal, and accustomed to move at the trot or gallop in line of column.

A horse must be taught to lead well, and should be frequently exercised over bad ground, the man leading by reins drawn over the horse’s head. The Nos 3 mounted will be frequently practised in leading the horses of their sections.

If a horse will not lead at first, he can be easily taught if followed by another man with a whip.

The horses should also be practised in being led by the men dismounted, each man taking his reins over and placing his arm through them. Blank ammunition should occasionally be fired in this position.

S. 152. Explanation of Movement.

It is of the utmost importance that the object of an intended movement should be fully explained to all ranks before an action takes place, and the few moments so employed will be more than repaid by the results gained from intelligent action.

The following is in reference to a question raised regarding the appropriate bugle calls for the Light Horse. I earlier made brief mention to the Brigade drill carried out on Wednesday 5/5/1915, out from Heliopolis Camp along the Old Roman Road, near the old Crusader Watch Tower.

John Hamilton, in his book “Goodbye Cobber, God Bless You” quotes Lt Col Alexander White, C.O. 8th LHR, on this incident, and it makes point to the trumpet calls for Field Operations.

“Of course I saw the ridiculous side of it and laughed till I cried. Two thousand men and horses tearing over the desert, the dust was awful. The Bullant in charge, (Brigade Major Jack Antill) the Old Man away for a couple of days (Colonel Frederick Hughes).

Suddenly a weak trumpet call in the distance. Goodness knows what it meant. The C.O’s tearing around in circles for orders, squadron leaders cussing, troop leaders passing rude remarks. The Bullant surrounded by trumpeters telling them off like fun for not sounding the right call. The men and horses wondering what on earth was happening…gee it was a circus.”

ROUTINE ODER No. 218. 8th LIGHT HORSE REGT. A.I.F. 6th May 1915. Heliopolis: -

3. BUGLE CALLS – It is necessary that Officers and N.C.O,s be familiar with all bugle and trumpet calls; such instruction to be arranged for. For the purpose of accustoming their commands to take part in Brigade drill, Officers commanding units will practice the Squadrons and Regiment to manoeuvring by trumpet call. The following particularly to be practiced: -

Attention, March at ease, walk march, Trot, Gallop, Halt, Section right, Section left, Troop half right, Troop right wheel, Troop half left, Troop left wheel, Sections about, Mount and Dismount, etc.

5. TRUMPETERS – The trumpeters of the Brigade will be instructed under Senior Trumpeter Sergeant in Field Calls. It was noticed on Brigade Parade yesterday that they knew little or nothing of these calls. Trumpeters are very backward and every attention is to be paid till they are perfect in sounding the calls, not only at the halt, but on the move mounted. The trumpeters will be inspected by the Brigade Major early in the coming week.

This never eventuated; events overtook the Brigade with orders to prepare for active service as dismounted infantry at Gallipoli. All training turned to preparation for fighting on Gallipoli with infantry tactics.

The above incident highlights an important point to all the training methods that had been employed by the 3rd L.H. Bde from the outset. All fieldwork had been conducted as per the Light Horse Training Manual, orders and direction given by spoken command, hand signals and whistle. The Eb trumpet had not been employed in this role.

There is ample evidence that the general camp calls were sounded by either, or both, Bb bugle and Eb trumpet, such as Reveille, Parades, Lights Out, etc. The only reference to an actual call other than the well-recognized calls has come from one man, when in writing a letter home, notes that he will have to close as the 1st Post (Tattoo) has just been blown.

The proof for the use of the Eb trumpet can be found from the photograph of Major Deeble’s Trumpeters, taken by Signaller James Pinkerton Campbell on board the “Star of Victoria”, the three Trumpeters clearly have the Eb trumpet. (NLA pic – an 23217877-V).

Hope this is of some help.

Jeff

[Robert Dunlop]

Jeff, thank you very much for taking the time to post this material.

With respect to the Imperial Yeomanry, the 1907 'Cavalry Training' issued by the General Staff, War Office, noted:

'Appendix IV.

Instructions for Training of Imperial Yeomanry.

S.207 General Principles.

Imperial Yeomanry should be so trained as to be capable of performing all the duties allotted to cavalry except those connected with shock action. In carrying out their training commanding officers will adhere to the principles contained in "Cavalry Training", as far as they are applicable to their arm; but in doing so they must exercise considerable discretion, bearing in mind the short period available for training. During the annual course of training particular attention should be devoted to instruction in scouting, reconnaissance, fire action dismounted, and detached duties.

S.210 Modifications to "Cavalry Training" necessary for its application to the training of Imperial Yeomanry.

In applying "Cavalry Training" to the training of Imperial Yeomanry, the following modifications will be made:-

1. References made to shock action, swordsmanship, or the use of the lance are to be taken as not applying to Yeomanry.'

Robert

[nigelfe]

A couple of quotes from Holmes by officers looking back:

an officer of 1st Sumskii Hussars (Russian):

"The goal set before us had been the mounted charge, whose most important element was speed, for on the latter largely depended the impact with which we could enter the enemy's formation. And since we had also been brought up to believe that no one was a match for us when it came to hand to hand fighting, our one desire was to reach the enemy's ranks as soon as possible. Once, when we were unhappily fighting dismounted and were pinned to the ground by German fire, I remember our regimental commander rising up and shaking his fists in the direction of the enemy, exclaiming: 'If we could only get to you!"

Lt Gen von Poseck, Inspector General of the German Cavalry:

"The greatest emphasis was placed by us on the skilful grouping of forces in the mounted combat since, at the beginning of the campaign, we calculated more particularly on this kind of fighting . . . Despite the improvements made in fighting dismounted, there was nevertheless a lack of schooling in firing practice in the larger units . . As late as 1913, in France . . special importance was placed on tactical instruction for mounted combat."

I think Holmes makes his point well. The continental cavalries were locked into the tradition of mounted action. Dismounted may have been taught pre-1914 but hadn't changed the culture, no matter what the doctrine might be saying. Any modern student of corporate behaviour would recognise this - talk the talk by all means, walk the walk, ha ha.

The use of carbines also shows they were not serious about dismounted action. Here a quote from Headlam, The History of the Royal Artillery From the Indian Mutiny to the Great War Vol III Campaigns (1860 - 1914). Headlam had been on Robert's staff in S Africa and was a CRA in 1914: "Another point in connection with the range of musketry fire, which specially affected the horse artillery, was the fact that the Boer mausers outranged our cavalry carbines. The cavalry would not, therefore, dismount and engage the enemy in a fire-fight, but depended entirely on the horse artillery for fire effect. This was shown very clearly in the relief of Kimberley, and on several occasions during the invasion of Transvaal. Later the cavalry exchanged their carbines for rifles." The Gunners also traded their carbines for rifles but didn't make them an individual issue, they remained a detachment pool. The continental cavalries would almost certainly been aware of the Brit experience but chose to ignore it.

[Steven Broomfield]

As an aside, I have been looking through a few Indian-related histories. Particularly interesting is Colonel E B Maunsell, in his history of The Scinde Horse. Maunsell was a member of the 35th Scinde Horse (amalgamated with the 36th Jacob's Horse after the GW into The Scinde Horse). Maunsell seems a particularly acerbic commentator, and a chapter "The efficiency of the Indian Cavalry at the opening of the Great War, 1914" is particularly relevant.

To sum up, he is quite disparaging of the efficiency of his arm: indeed, the cavalry he felt was far worse than the infantry in terms of training, tactical usefulness, lack of thoroughness and general outlook. He blames this mostly on poor higher command; field work, in particular, he claims was poor (drill was all right, though).

"Regiments appeared to be judged more by the sporting character of their officers than by the latter's professional capacity. It is, indeed, hardly an exaggeration to say that a regiment with a good polo team ... (was) able to snap its fingers at inspecting officers."

However, Maunsell believed most strongly that good officers made a difference, and after time in France, with good leadership, the Indian cavalryman was as good as his British counterpart, and by the time they got to Palestine in 1918 were able to "show the way" to others.

Most interesting are his comments on French cavalry. I'll quote in full.

"At the same time, it is only fair to state that General Barrow* is of the opinion that the Indian cavalry were, even in 1914, ahead of the french, and he saw much of the latter. The French cavarly were trained for shock, pure and simple, and looked down on any dosmounted work as infra dig - the job of mere "pousse caillous". They would not even demean themselves by digging trenches at the First Battle of Ypres. They were, moreover, extremely bad horsemasters and had a very low standard of musketry."

* General G de S Barrow, KCB, KCMG, ex-35th Scince Horse, commander of the Yeomanry Division, and subsequently the 4th Cavalry Division, in the Desert Mounted Corps.

Maunsell was also very scathing about the standard of musketry in the Indian cavalry: "...the ground work in essential matters like musketry was flimsy. Fire control and fire direction may almost be said to have been a closed book."

Not sure what this adds to the discussion: as I said, maunsell was an acerbic critic, but very honest in his appraisal of his men. His comments on the French are interesting, though. I wonder if it possible that although the text books were (insofar as the French went) quite clear, the interpretation of these books might have been less praiseworthy?

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon All,

I suspect all cavalrymen of all countries, deep down, longed to take part in a charge; that is the "glorious" tradition of the cavalry. In WW1 where the opportunity presented itself charges were made (as Robert has pointed out, perhaps more often than we appreciate). That doesn't however mean that they weren't trained to fight dismounted, that they didn't fight effectively dismounted or weren't used to their strengths.

Robert has quoted in great detail from the respective army training manuals but Nigel raises the point that many have made, for example when critically discussing Zuber's analysis of German tactics (and to a certain extent French tactics), there can often be a big difference between theory and practice. I think there are examples of both points of view in that relatively brief period before static trench-warfare set in.

From 22 August alone;

e.g 1.

3e Chasseurs d'Afrique (full time professional cavalry). On 01/09/1870 made a costly charge at Illy, Sedan, losing half of the first wave and a third of the third wave of attacking chasseurs. that charge was made against German infantry supported by artillery. Later the same day they were asked to charge again against German infantry in lines in field ditches and behind hedges, from the plateau above Illy, down to Floing. They asked for confirmation of the order, knowing from the experience of that morning that they would be decimated; confirmation came, they charged and they were decimated.

On 22/08/1914 35 miles away at Rossignol, they initially fought dismounted when the enemy was encountered, firing from behind the vicinale then various peletons were sent to support the artillery and other positions, where they again largely fought dismounted. There was no charge, ordered or made, against the German positions. The situation was similar to Sedan, in that the French troops were getting beaten, almost surrounded but 40 years later no charge was ordered or made against the German positions. Lessons learnt ?

e,g. 2.

Lt Col Hautecloque of the 14e Hussards at Ethe orders the regiment to charge, two abreast, uphill, through a narrow passage under a railway embankment towards German infantry firing from behind cover (ditch and small embankment). His son is killed, the regiment is ravaged and he lives to be killed later the same day. He was second in his class at St Cyr. Lessons learnt ?