Cavalry units of the 1st World War

[Robert Dunlop]

A couple of quotes from Holmes by officers looking back:

an officer of 1st Sumskii Hussars (Russian):

Lt Gen von Poseck, Inspector General of the German Cavalry:

Thank you for the details of the quotes. I can't speak to the Russian cavalry but, as we will come to see, it is not appropriate to generalize from a personal anecdote to the performance of a national cavalry overall. The dangers of this type of inference have been exposed with Bloem's work on Mons, for example.

As to von Poseck's comment, does Holmes provide the source please? I would like to check the meaning of 'larger units' in the original. Thanks.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The continental cavalries would almost certainly been aware of the Brit experience but chose to ignore it.

What evidence do you have that the cavalry in other countries chose to ignore the British experience in South Africa? There were a number of positive reasons for going with lighter weight modern carbines. Note that later war stormtroopers often resorted to the carbine in preference to the rifle.

It is not correct, IMHO, to suggest that 'the use of carbines also shows they were not serious about dismounted action'. Cavalry were well trained in their use. The devastating fire that stopped the German cavalry in their tracks at Haelen came almost exclusively from Belgian carbines.

Typically regarded as a short range weapon, it is interesting to note the example of dismounted firing of carbines in the German cavalry training manual. When a dismounted troop was required to fire on the enemy, the troop NCO would call out the range. The troopers would then adjust the slide on the sights accordingly. In the example given, the range was called as "800m", which might come as a surprise. Carbine fire was most effective at shorter ranges, which was true for the rifle as well.

An interesting anecdote on the effectiveness of German carbine fire during the battle of Moy, when British cavalry faced off with their counterparts:

"The Brigadier, who had now arrived on the scene, having been away attending a conference at Corps Headquarters, issued further instructions to the Royal Scots Greys and 20th Hussars with a view to dealing with two more regiments of the German Cavalry Brigade which was now discovered to be attacking us. As soon as "A" and "B" Squadrons had reached their position, the Commanding Officer gave "C" Squadron orders to mount, intending to move them forward to a fresh position near the enemy, as although the Germans were still maintaining a brisk and accurate fire [with carbines] from the crest of the ridge, the diversion created by the appearance of our two squadrons on their left flank would, he thought, enable "C" Squadron to effect a further advance without difficulty".

From the book 'Chasseur of 1914', illustrating the defensive and offensive capabilities of French light cavalry armed with carbines and supporting by MG fire, from the Battle of Yser 1914:

'Then, dominating the tumult, we heard their trumpets sounding the short, monotonous notes of the Prussian charge.

I leaped back into the trench.

"Independent fire!"

The whole French line burst into a violent and deafening fusillade [of French carbine fire]. Each man seemed full of blind rage, of an exasperated lust for destruction. I saw them take aim rapidly, press the trigger, and reload in feverish haste. I was deafened and bewildered by the terrible noise of the firing in the narrow confines of the trench. To our left, the machine-gun section of my friend F. kept up an infernal racket.

But the German line had suddenly dropped to the ground. Would they dare to come on again? We hoped so with all our hearts, for we felt that if we could keep our men in hand, and prevent them from firing at random, the enemy could never get at us. But, above all, it was essential to economise our ammunition, for if we were short of cartridges, what resistance could we offer to a bayonet charge with our little carbines reduced to silence?

The Germans must have been severely shaken, for they seemed afraid to resume the attack. Nothing was moving in the bare plain that stretched before us. During this respite an order came from the officer in command, passing from mouth to mouth:

"Hand it on: No firing without the word of command."

Then silence fell on our trenches, heavy and complete as on the landscape before us. Suddenly, on the place where the enemy's riflemen had thrown themselves on the ground, we saw a slim shadow rise and stand. The man had got up quietly, as if no danger threatened him. And, in spite of everything, it was impossible not to admire the gallantry of his act. He stood motionless for a second, leaning on his sword or a stick; then he raised his arm slowly, and a hoarse voice yelled:

"Auf!" [up!]

Other voices repeated the word of command, and were answered by renewed "hurrahs!" Then the heavy line of riflemen sprang up and again rushed towards us:

"Fire! Fire!"

Once more our trenches belched forth their infernal fire. We could now plainly see numbers of them fall; then they suddenly threw themselves on the ground just as before. But instead of crouching motionless among the beetroot they began to answer our fire. Innumerable bullets whistled about us. I noted with joy that my men remained perfectly steady; they were aiming and firing deliberately, whereas at other points the fusillade was so violent that it cannot

have been efficacious. I was very glad not to have to reprove my brave Chasseurs, for the uproar was so terrific that my voice would not have carried beyond the two men nearest to me. I calculated the number of cartridges each of them must have in reserve; twenty-five, perhaps thirty. How would it all end? I was just thinking of ordering my troop to cease firing, in order to reserve my ammunition for a supreme effort, if this should be necessary.

But something happened which checked this decision. F.'s machine-guns must have worked fearful havoc among our assailants, for suddenly, without a cry and without an order, we saw them rise and make off quickly right and left in the fog.

[some time later, when the unit had been withdrawn from the line] ...between two explosions, in spite of the noise of the German bullets, we distinctly heard the crack of our carbines.

"Our men are fighting!"

We all understood, and with one bound we were up and running frantically through the wood. How was it that none of us were killed? How did we manage to escape the shells and bullets which were cropping the branches and felling the trees around us? I shall never understand or forget this experience.

When at last we sprang breathless into our trench after what had seemed an interminable race, the tumult had died down again and only occasional shots broke the nocturnal calm. The reason of the sudden renewal of the fighting was given at once by F.

"Bravo!" he cried; "we have retaken the infantry Chasseurs' trench!"

This was a great consolation to us, for we were all full of regret at the loss of this little piece of ground. It had prevented us from feeling quite satisfied with our day.

Now all was well. Our task was accomplished."

Here is an account of the German 15th Dragoon Regiment, from von Poseck. It describes their dismounted action against British infantry near Richebourg-St Vaast:

"Finally, in the early afternoon, the regiment had driven the adversary entirely out of the village, and fully established in the temporary fortifications on the west edge of the village.

Only for a short time were the troopers to breathe in their new positions, for soon (5.30 pm) a strong counter-attack was launched. English reinforcements had been brought up to assist their French allies. In close brown ranks the enemy advanced from the poplars and assaulted our lines.

The cool, well-directed fire of the dragoons, assisted by the steady machine-gun action of the infantry on our left, thinned the English ranks and halted the advance. The enemy line from 150 to 200 metres away, sought shelter in the natural low ditches along the streets. Lacking trench tools, they dug up with their hands the urgent protection for their exposed line."

Now for an account of the German 16th Hussars, during their attack on Tournai in 1914:

"In the following street fighting, everyone had opportunity to show what he had learned in his earnest peace time training. Each subaltern and Hussar had to depend upon himself. House after house had to be wrested from a stronger enemy.

A platoon of the 4th Squadron was successful under the leadership of the squadron commander in working its way rapidly to the railroad station. A strongly held switch control house was attacked, but the small valorous group found that it was surrounded by a strong French infantry force. With controlled deliberate [carbine] fire the Hussars

defended themselves. The other squadrons soon reached the station, which in spite of strong enemy resistance was taken by vigorous attack of the 1st [coming up from reserve] and 4th Squadrons. Lt Stever had given his life in the house to house fighting. An approaching Jäger company was directed to attack the strongly defended bridge. It too was soon taken. The 2nd Squadron was also successful in its hard fought advance."

The German 1st Hussar Regiment in 1914:

"At 8 o'clock in the morning, the 3rd Squadron was sent forward in reconnaissance while the regiment halted to the south-east of Hordain. The squadron sent forward, which had only two platoons, came, without being observed, on an enemy column, three companies strong marching on Iwuy, and with 40 men concealed behind a neighbouring crest, opened fire [with cavalry carbines only] on the unsuspecting enemy at 300 metres.

A great panic took place among the enemy, a number of draught-horses were struck and the column suffered connsiderable loss. Gradually, however, the French got a machine gun in position and attacked the squadron which was much inferior in numbers. In the sharp engagement which followed the squadron suffered heavy losses and towards 10

o'clock its position was somewhat critical.

Just then, however, the remainder of the regiment arrived at the gallop in squadron column on the left flank. At the same time a mounted battery opened fire on Iwuy from Avesnes-le-Sec. One and a half dismounted squadrons came into the fight while the remainder of the regiment attacked the enemy to the east in the flank. The resistance of the enemy battalion, whose leader, a lieutenant-colonel was killed in the course of the fight, gradually diminished. All who were not able to flee surrendered to the hussars. The [French] losses were very great [and] 400 men of a territorial regiment and 4 machine guns fell into our hands."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Dismounted may have been taught pre-1914 but hadn't changed the culture, no matter what the doctrine might be saying. Any modern student of corporate behaviour would recognise this - talk the talk by all means, walk the walk, ha ha.

FWIIW, I have no problem with the idea that a doctrine may not have been translated into effective action. If we say this applied to continental cavalry on the basis of some anecdotal accounts, then we should examine anecdotal accounts of British cavalry too:

"A" Squadron, 15th Hussars, 24th August 1914:

"A Squadron received orders to bridge the gap [between the two columns of 3rd Division]. [A] troop, after two encounters with the hostile cavalry, succeeded in... gaining touch with the 5th Division. Primed with all the latest information they returned to rejoin their own division, which they succeeded in doing just before evening. When

they reported to the Headquarters of the 3rd Division, they were informed that the rest of the squadron had been practically annihilated.

The remainder [of A Squadron had] prepared to follow in the same direction, but at this moment the flanking patrols galloped in, with the information that strong parties of hostile cavalry were on the move in all directions. A further reconnaisance, however, showed that directly our Hussars appeared the enemy patrols retired into the village of Blangies. All ranks were filled with the greatest desire to meet the enemy with cold steel; Lt Whittle gave the order to draw swords, the squadron formed line of extended files, and galloped for the village. As was anticipated, the place was not held by the enemy. When the enthusiastic horsemen reached the edge of the village, it was found necessary to alter the formation in order to proceed down the main street, for the houses were surrounded by enclosed gardens, the squadron therefore formed column of fours, and galloped through the village. On reaching the northern edge, it was found that the street continued, and that is was quite impossible to deploy. Nevertheless, the excited column continued to sweep on, until the leading files reached a barricade which had been erected across the village street. A check now ensued, when suddenly from the surrounding houses a deadly machine-gun fire was opened upon the unfortunate squadron. Caught in an ambush, escape was impossible, and the men were shot down in the narrow street like rats in a trap. In a few seconds the road became blocked by fallen men and horses. Here and there a few men were enabled to leap the barricade and gallop on towards Offignes, but the enemy had a second barricade behind their first, which accounted for those who escaped."

15th Hussars, 7th September 1914:

"A Squadron marched along the banks of the Grand Morin and through Coulommieres. One patrol, proceeding on reconaissance duty, penetrated to a considerable degree amongst the enemy's columns, where it encountered two German motor lorries, making the best of their way to the rear. The patrol... attacked the enemy at once. Unfortunately for the 15th Hussars, upon each lorry there was a machine gun, and with these the enemy opened fire upon the adventurous patrol [which] sustained considerable casualties."

The worst example, in terms of scale, was the attack at Audregnies. Here is an account from the 4th Dragoons perspective:

The 4th Dragoons arrived in the vicinity of Audregnies, halting in a stubble field near the railway station. The 4th Lancers were on the right, a little in advance. At around 12.30 pm, as Lt Chance of A Squadron [4th DG] recalled:

"Bull Allenby turns up, nods at Oldrey and rides off. 'Get girthed up' says Oldrey, 'Stand by your horses, prepare to mount, mount!' The commands are rapped from troop to troop and 'walk-march' follows. There is a whee-thump of shells and a crash of house tiles from the village ahead."'

If each squadron had a designated purpose in the attack, it became hopelessly lost in the excitement of the now famous charge. It was almost the entire Regiment of 9th Lancers which went into action first, with the help of a few men of the 18th Hussars. They attacked to the right of the Roman road, closely supported by the 1st and 2nd Troops of B Squadron, 4th Dragoon Guards. The two troops charged along the road in an attempt to seize a house variously refered to a cottage or a farm, which lay on the outskirts of the village of Baiseux. Coming under almost immediate shell, rifle and machine gun fire, both were forced to take cover, though not before a dozen or so casualties were sustained.

The direction of B Squadron's attack was now followed by at least two Troops of C Squadron, which, in charging to support B Squadron, managed to reach the house, before being swept off the right by the intense German fire. Moments later, A Squadron attacked, making for the north-east efge of the billage, where the 4th Dragoons' Machine Gun Section gave covering fire. A Squadron, with the remaining Troops of C Squadron galloped out and across the open fields in front of Audregnies, and were cut down.

During this attack several men were seen to plummet head first into a narrow, fifteen-foot deep cutting which ran across the line of charge, while those that got past were quickly forced to arc eastwards by a torrent of fire coming from the direction of Quievrain.'

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon,

An impressive set of examples Robert. I've just re-read the early part of Grasset's "La Guerre en Action - Ethe" to try and shed some light on why such an educated soldier as Hautecloque could have ordered the vain-glorious charge (It was Weygand who he was second in class to at St Cyr). I think it was borne out of frustration: he had continually sought contact with the 19e Uhlans since the early hours and apart from a few minor encounters hadn't engaged them. His main objective was reconnaisance towards Etalle and St Leger but he was stalled in his task until the supporting infantry could clear a way through the Bois Lefort, NE of Ethe. Grasset notes that he was often reported as informing his young officers "de toutes les fautes que peut commettre un chef de cavalerie a la guerre, une seul est infamante: l'inaction".

[Robert Dunlop]

As an aside, I have been looking through a few Indian-related histories.

Thank you, Steven. It is great to have these different perspectives.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I've just re-read the early part of Grasset's "La Guerre en Action - Ethe" to try and shed some light on why such an educated soldier as Hautecloque could have ordered the vain-glorious charge (It was Weygand who he was second in class to at St Cyr). Grasset notes that he was often reported as informing his young officers "de toutes les fautes que peut commettre un chef de cavalerie a la guerre, une seul est infamante: l'inaction".

Great to have these additional insights from the French perspective, Steve. Thank you very much. The infamy of inaction was not restricted to the French cavalry

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

Robert (and all): this is turning into a really interesting thread. I shall have a further look in the Indian histories I have later in the week. However, Maunsell has this to say, while discussing the successful campaig in Paletsine in 1918:

"If one analyses wastage, it will, not infrequently, be found that ignorance of officers ordering out cavalry has more to do with it than bad horsemastership in the cavalry itself. The case of Sordet's Cavalry Corps, in August 1914 was an exception, for the French horsemastership was abominable, and there was no reason why the animals should not have been fit at the very outbreak of war.

We have, on the other hand, the historic example of Pope overworking his cavalry in a quite unnecessary manner in the Second Bull Run campaign, witht he result that they could do nothing when the supreme effort was required.. In South Africa it was a pretty generally known fact that many of the failures were due to trying to work with large numbers of badly mounted men, the majority of whom, moreover, knew nothing about horses, in preference to a more limited number well mounted and who understood them."

He then goes on to discuss feed and supply of horse fodder, but then goes for High Command. In particular he is scathing about senior officers who have not a sufficient experience of using cavalry: it goes to points discussed elsewhere, that cavalry-trained officers may well have had a better 'broad brush' approach to commanding what would now be called "Combined Operations".

His last point is pertinent, I think:

"A bad cavalry, given a resolute and sound direction, will do better than a good cavalry indifferently directed by the higher command.

The Napoleonic cavalry, as such, were not one whit better than the Prussian or Austrian, but had the enormous advantage of a genius as commander-in-chief."

[KennethB]

Steven, Steve, and Robert,

This is indeed covering some interesting ground. I can't thank you guys enough, please keep the information, perspectives, and insights coming.

Precedence is the term given to the hierarchy of units - it was (and is) very important that everyone knows who's top.

Not to stray from the direction we are going, just a really quick question on precedence again. I know that Cavalry took precedence other infantry. How does it go from there? Is it wrong to conclude that artillery would follow, then TF, then New Army, and lastly other branches? Also within the TF, did the Yeomanry come before infantry?

Thanks,

Ken

[Robert Dunlop]

I shall have a further look in the Indian histories I have later in the week.

Steven, does this include the expensive book, the purchase of which threatened you with living in the garage?

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

Steven, does this include the expensive book, the purchase of which threatened you with living in the garage?

Robert

Indeed, and the even-more expensive history of the 19th KGO Lancers that (I think) she doesn't know about I got caught, recently, by my elder daughter, browsing in a bookshop. She told me in no uncertain terms i wasn't buying said volume. Then, as walked back to the car she told me also not to try and sneak it ito the house. "We know you do it. We just don't know how often, how many or how much." Blasted wimming - so underhand; how do they find these things out? They gang up on a chap.

Ken: artillery takes precedence over cavalry - the guns take up position on the Right of the Line. I'll have a look this evening and post details if someone doesn't jump in first.

[Robert Dunlop]

I have a few such regimental histories as well No daughters though.

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

For a small fee, I could arrange a transfer. it would have to be a small fee: I can't afford too much - books to buy, you know.

Anyway, for Ken, precedence (as far as I can tell)

Household Cavalry

Dragoon Guards

Other cavalry (Dragoons, Hussars, Lancers)

RTR (modern, of course - post GW)

Royal Artillery

Royal Engineers

Royal Corps of Signals (also post GW)

Foot Guards

Line Infantry

Rifle Brigade

Royal Marines (though if parading with Army, take precedence after the Royal Berkshire Regiment)

ASC

RAMC

RAOC

RCMP

RAVC

The precedence of individual regiments comes, generally, from date of raising within their 'section', so (for example) the 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys) were raised in 1681, with the next senior regiment (3rd Hussars) coming along in 1685. The system was the same for the infantry - 21st Foot (Royal Scots Fusiliers), 1678, 22nd Foot (Cheshire Regiment), 1689.

There are a lot of publications available to outline all this stuff, but off-hand i can't think of anything in print that I know of, as all my stuff is quite old. Have a potter in Waterstone's, or start a thread in the Book Review section of the Forum for recommendations.

[KennethB]

Steven,

Thanks very much!

Ken

[nigelfe]

Poseck, M von The german Cavalry in 1914 in Belgium and France, Berlin, 1932

Given his position I rate potentially rate him highly as a source, but without reading the book to get a feeling for his attitude can't pass a reliable judgement.

What I would advise is to treat anything appearing in personal accounts (and unit ones for that matter) about the enemy in an action (invariably an interpretation based on partial and partially erroneous information) with great suspicion, particularly when they were inexperienced on the battlefield (as they mostly were in summer 1914) unless you can be sure that they've carefully reconciled the accounts from both sides, and ideally done some analysis (eg exactly what killed men). Accounts of their own actions are a somewhat different matter.

If the British cav and artillery found carbines to be deficient and re-equipped then there was clearly a problem.

[Steven Broomfield]

Interesting sidelight on pre-1914 cavalry training; this from The History of the 19th King George's Own Lancers (by General Sir H Hudson, GCB, it's the history of the 18th KGO Lancers and 19th Lancers (Fane's Horse), amalgamated in 1921 - and verypossibly the best book ever written!). It deals with training in India in the period around 1907. Hudson discusses training generally, including "A craze set in for dismounted work. In some regiments even of Indian cavalry the men were hardly ever exercised in any other way." Then discussion of a (very) novel style of warfare:

"...a new form of mounted warfare, said to be popular with the Cossacks, also irregular cavalry. It was what was called the 'Larva' attack formation. In theory it was easy. The regiment scattered itself over a wide stretch of countryand, surrounding the unsuspecting and apparently helpless infantry, swooped down on them like a swarm of hornets, each individual mounted man steering his own course. It was held by the advocates of this form of attack that it confused the infantry, who did not know when or where to direct their fire. The drill was simplicity itself - the simple command 'Larva!' and there you were; but the trouble in peace time was to get an enemy with whom to rehearse: they said it was too dangerous when you were yourself limited to blank cartridge. It died a natural death."

Then:

"Soon came the news that Haig, then a Colonel but made a local Major general for the purpose, was to be the next Inspector-General of Cavalry. He had won success in South Africa, so he was sure to be an advocarete of dismounted action. But nothing of the kind. He went on the principle that cavalry had to be the eyes, ears and shield of the army, and that as the enemy's cavalry would probably be working with a similar idea, the first thing was to knock it out, so that it became deaf and blind whilst our own force retained all its faculties. After that its role would be to assist the dismounted troops in every possible way and to complete a successful attack by turning it into a rout. So the mounted attack by cavalry must still be practised, but always as an end to some tactical idea. He did not weary himself, or those he was inspecting, with minutiae of detail; he was no doctrinaire, but preferred to deal with each situation on its merits rather than by the application of some sterotyped formula."

Quite an interesting sidelight on Haig as a trainer and developer of ideas, and an interesting line on how tactical development was being addressed in India before the war. Some ideas might not have been great ones, but theyr were thinking and moving forward.

[truthergw]

Interesting sidelight on pre-1914 cavalry training; this from The History of the 19th King George's Own Lancers (by General Sir H Hudson, GCB, it's the history of the 18th KGO Lancers and 19th Lancers (Fane's Horse), amalgamated in 1921 - and verypossibly the best book ever written!). It deals with training in India in the period around 1907. Hudson discusses training generally, including "A craze set in for dismounted work. In some regiments even of Indian cavalry the men were hardly ever exercised in any other way." Then discussion of a (very) novel style of warfare:

................................................................................................

Quite an interesting sidelight on Haig as a trainer and developer of ideas, and an interesting line on how tactical development was being addressed in India before the war. Some ideas might not have been great ones, but theyr were thinking and moving forward.

As you say, Steve, very interesting insight into training pre-war. I was struck by reading it that the training was for open warfare where men expected to be able to surround bodies of infantry or at least outflank them. The same notion prevailed in infantry training at every unit strength. It was as if the Russo Japanese war had never happened. Commanders from every European army had had observers there. These observers would appear to have written their reports then promptly filed and forgotten them. Even the Russians seem to have learned nothing from their defeat.

[Robert Dunlop]

Poseck, M von The german Cavalry in 1914 in Belgium and France, Berlin, 1932

Thanks for double-checking. The quote is from page 232 of the English translation. In the original, von Poseck used the term 'größeren Verbänden'. The term does not help to understand more precisely what is meant by 'larger units', as translated by Strecker, Koch, Gordon-Smith and Hesse.

The term is used elsewhere. In the Introduction, von Poseck mentions 'größen Verbänden' again. The English translation reads:

"The cavalry, it is true, had no chance of riding down the enemy in close mass attack, with lowered lances. Neither the Belgians, French nor English ever accepted the cavalry fight of closed [possibly an incorrect translation of 'geschlossene' which, I think, would be better translated as 'self-contained' in the context of cavalry] divisions offered by us often enough. Nor did they ever themselves dare attack us mounted in big formations ['größen Verbänden']. Nevertheless our careful education with horse and lance has not been in vain. It was of great service in reconnoitering."

The juxtaposition of 'divisions' ['Divisionen' in German] with 'big formations' suggests that von Poseck is referring to more than a regiment. There is a further clue that supports this inference.

Immediately after the quote you provided from Holmes' book, von Poseck continued:

"The demands made in this connection [firing practice in larger units] by General von Bernhardi time and again before the war had unfortunately not been sufficiently heeded."

Von Bernhardi wrote several books before the war, some of which were translated into English. One was translated as 'Cavalry in War and Peace'. In this book, he noted:

'The squadron is the tactical unit when fighting either with the arme blanche or the rifle.'

Von Bernhardi then went on to plead the case for greater training at regimental, brigade and division levels. This is consistent with his comment in 'Cavalry in Future Wars':

"The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those units whose employment will be principally called for in modern War, and the principle of the offensive must be steadily kept in view."

The questions that arise are:

1. To what extent did German cavalry training change in light of von Bernhardi's (and other authors') writings (bearing in mind that these were widely read in English at the time they were written, prompting Erskine Childers to write his diatribe about 'German Influence on British Cavalry')?

2. To what extent (and when) did British cavalry train 'larger units' in the way that von Poseck was lamenting, especially at the level of the cavalry division?

Too late to answer these questions tonight (for me at least).

Robert

[KennethB]

A few thoughts from a little fish swimming in deep waters!

Good afternoon,

An impressive set of examples Robert. I've just re-read the early part of Grasset's "La Guerre en Action - Ethe" to try and shed some light on why such an educated soldier as Hautecloque could have ordered the vain-glorious charge (It was Weygand who he was second in class to at St Cyr). I think it was borne out of frustration: he had continually sought contact with the 19e Uhlans since the early hours and apart from a few minor encounters hadn't engaged them. His main objective was reconnaisance towards Etalle and St Leger but he was stalled in his task until the supporting infantry could clear a way through the Bois Lefort, NE of Ethe. Grasset notes that he was often reported as informing his young officers "de toutes les fautes que peut commettre un chef de cavalerie a la guerre, une seul est infamante: l'inaction".

Could this not be an example of "offensive a l'outrance" (A World Undone, G Meyer)and the French idea that offence was everything and that the will to conquer could carry a battle to victory? Simply put, the French trying to out will the Germans regardless of the tactical disadvantage?

Ken

[KennethB]

Also,

He went on the principle that cavalry had to be the eyes, ears and shield of the army, and that as the enemy's cavalry would probably be working with a similar idea, the first thing was to knock it out, so that it became deaf and blind whilst our own force retained all its faculties. After that its role would be to assist the dismounted troops in every possible way and to complete a successful attack by turning it into a rout. So the mounted attack by cavalry must still be practised, but always as an end to some tactical idea.

Was this not the traditional role of cavalry? While many grand images of thundering horses riding into a broken enemy exist, they were as I've been cautioned not the norm. Jeb Stuart was the eyes of the Army of Northern Virginia, and as such helped R.E. Lee control how and when battle was fought. Again, being very new to the subject of cavalry in the Great War, am I wrong to assume that the Germans would have the cavalry out in front both screening their movements from the British and the French, as well as letting the army commanders know what forces were arrayed against them. Likewise would not the Allied cavalry be probing for the flanks? At the risk of being an armchair General, should the Allies not have used the cavalry keep tabs on the advancing armies, keeping them in contact while choosing a good defensive location and dictating their own terms of engagement. Am I being too simple here? Sorry if this sounds a bit naive, but wasn't the first stages of the war the kind that favoured cavalry?

Ken

[Robert Dunlop]

What I would advise is to treat anything appearing in personal accounts (and unit ones for that matter) about the enemy in an action (invariably an interpretation based on partial and partially erroneous information) with great suspicion, particularly when they were inexperienced on the battlefield (as they mostly were in summer 1914) unless you can be sure that they've carefully reconciled the accounts from both sides, and ideally done some analysis (eg exactly what killed men). Accounts of their own actions are a somewhat different matter.

I am not quite sure what you are saying here. Do you mean that we can trust the accounts written by cavalrymen about their own actions but we can't trust interpretations made about the enemy? I totally agree with your comment about the need to compare accounts of the same action. I have been slowly collating such examples across a wide range of cavalry actions in the battles of the Frontiers, First Marne, the Race to the Sea, and First Ypres. When I started this process, I was under the very clear impression (based on the histories of the Marquess of Anglesey, to quote one example, and on the anecdotal comments of British cavalry officers) that the British cavalry were significantly superior to their continental counterparts. Three issues stood out, all of which have surfaced in this discussion: non-British cavalry were not trained to fight dismounted (conversely, they only emphasized mounted shock action); they used carbines which were ineffective; and they displayed terrible horsemanship. I will address the latter issue separately. With respect to the other issues, the comparison of British, French and Belgian cavalry versus their German counterparts has been extremely interesting, and very eye-opening. Hence my taking up a different perspective in this discussion.

There is a major issue that arises from attempting to compare both sides of an action. Very often, histories do not cover failures very well. It is rare to read about problems experienced by British cavalry.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Could this not be an example of "offensive a l'outrance" (A World Undone, G Meyer)and the French idea that offence was everything and that the will to conquer could carry a battle to victory? Simply put, the French trying to out will the Germans regardless of the tactical disadvantage?

Ken, the concept is often invoked in respect of French examples. There was a fairly recent thread that examined the concept in some more detail (see here).

Robert

[KennethB]

Thanks Robert,

Look forward to reading that thread, trying to not be influnenced by just one point of view or the common opinion.

Ken

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening Ken,

I'll only comment briefly as I don't want to side-track Robert's current thread. I don't think Lt Col. Hautecloque though of it in that sense. His regiment had been out since 4.00a.m, it had now turned 8.00a.m. His mission was reconnaisance in front of the 7e Division. He was held up, he had "red mist" and ordered the charge to try and break through to the northern valley sides and woods beyond. The only thing that saved more of the regiment from been destroyed was" two by two" the tunnel soon became blocked with bodiesof men and horses.

This is how it looks "today"

Some theoretical questions for Robert and others: how is a charge defined ? Is a handful of horsemen racing after some others a charge or is it only an action specifically ordered by a commanding officer ?and also when comparing fighting mounted and dismounted, what do we mean by fighting ? Actually engaging the enemy or all the other facets of mounted cavalry operations ?

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, not 'my' thread in any way. Some great posts and a really interesting discussion. Great to see the photo of the tunnel, which I had only read about before. Very interesting name, presumably in honour of the charge?

'Charge' had two meanings. One was the process of making physical contact with the enemy with the weapons of shock action: the sword or the lance. The second meaning was very specific: it was the fastest rate at which cavalry were trained to manoeuvre, ie 15 miles an hour, in the last phase of closing to contact. This was triggered by the command 'Charge':

"On the command 'Charge,' swords and lances are brought to the 'Engage' by the front rank, and every man tightening his grip of the saddle, will increase his speed to the utmost with the fixed determination of riding the enemy down.

To produce the greatest effect of which a charge is capable, it must not only be made in the most effective direction, but the troop must have attained its maximum momentum at the actual point of contact; the essentials are firm cohesion, highest speed, and determination to win. Up to the moment of the 'Charge' every horse must be thoroughly in hand, the men must be riding close, and there must be two distinct and well-defined ranks."

Strictly speaking, therefore, a charge was ordered by a commanding officer.

Although there were a few examples of cavalry attempting to fire when mounted, these were very rare. Mounted fighting really means the attempt to contact the enemy with shock action, the close quarters combat (melee) resulting from riding down the enemy, or the pursuit. This involved the manoeuvre phase (getting into position to charge and then advancing to contact) as well as the use of sword or lance. If the enemy was routed (by whatever means), pursuit 'will be characterized by the utmost vigour, and sword and lance will be used with the greatest possible effect with the object of annihilating the enemy.'

Dismounted fighting involved rifle or carbine fire, coupled with manoeuvre including skirmishing and assaulting. Bayonets were not part of the cavalry arsenal. I have read instances of cavalrymen using the lance on foot. Like firing mounted, very rare. British cavalrymen were taught to use the sword on foot, though I don't know of any examples where this occurred as a deliberate dismounted tactic. In practice, when cavalry got involved in dismounted close combat the fighting took on a primitive quality (as it so often did). In one of the quotes above, there is mention of German troopers using their carbines to bludgeon the enemy.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

If the British cav and artillery found carbines to be deficient and re-equipped then there was clearly a problem

...with British carbines and/or the training in their use

Seriously though, here is the German General Staff's view of the Boer War, from the German official history:

"The [british] infantry was armed with the Lee-Metford rifle M/95 [which] thoroughly satisfied modern requirements...

It was not so much the rifle as the carbine which was inferior in the flatness of its trajectory and in accuracy of shooting to the Boer Mauser rifle of .275-inch calibre.

The [british] cavalry, like that of the Continental Powers, was trained first of all in attack, but only insufficiently in the use of the carbine, and, as was the case with the infantry, it had not sufficient facilities for training. The want of these rendered it all the more difficult for the cavalry to understand the tactics of the other arms."

There was, therefore, no question that the Germans understood there were problems with the British cavalry carbine and the training in its use (leaving aside whether their interpretations were correct or not).

As noted previously, von Bernhardi emphasized the importance of dismounted carbine fire. At no point did he argue against the carbine. He noted:

"Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted. At all events they are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and thereby already show a remarkable inclination to conduct the fight, even of cavalry with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a means of mobility, as was the custom of the Boers in Africa."

From all of the reading that I have done on German cavalry thinking, I have not come across a debate about rifle versus carbine. It is not, however, a topic that I have focused on in any detail yet. There was a debate in France, with General de Négrier arguing strongly for French cavalry being re-armed with rifles. He was also arguing that cavalry should be reconstituted as mounted infantry, with no place for shock action. For those French cavalry units that were converted to dismounted units during the war, the carbines were replaced with the Lebel rifle.

From the German perspective, I will end with Lieutenant General von Poseck, Inspector of [German] Cavalry, again. In the book that has been referenced above, von Poseck reviewed retrospectively the problems with the cavalry's equipment in 1914:

"The equipment of the cavalry was deficient. The lack of machine guns, bayonets, intrenching tools, spades, climbing irons, wirecutters and tenting was severely felt in the battles on the Marne, at Lens, La Bassée and on the Lys, where the cavalry was forced to remain in the fighting positions days and nights together, sadly handicapped at the time by the meager ammunition supplies and the lack of field kitchens."

No mention of the carbine as a problem.

The British cavalry suffered in the same way with respect to preparedness for positional warfare.

Jack Sheldon is going to offer some excellent insights into the problems faced by the German cavalry around the time of First Ypres. These will be in his forthcoming book.

Robert