Ludendorff: The Tragedy of a Military Mind

[RodB]

I'm halfway through the English translation of this book published in 1930. His main thesis appears so far to be that The German civilian leadership, in the shape of Bethmann Hollweg and then Michaelis, together with the Reichstag members, abdicated their responsibility for moral and political leadership during the war, leaving Ludendorff to (relectantly ?) assume this burden along with the military burden. The implication appears to be that Ludendorff was a great General, but as a specialist needed equally great political leaders to realise his full potential. Tschuppik compares Bismarck, who had the moral courage to trust his instincts in 1871 and override the Generals in bringing the war with France to a necessary close, with the political leadership in 1914-1917 who realised the war could no longer be won but abdicated responsibilty to make peace to the Generals, who by definition would demand a victorious peace as the only possible outcome.

This is pretty much the conclusion I had already come to myself. What do others think ?

[SiegeGunner]

Rod, have you got this book as a free online download? It sounds exactly the sort of book that appears on the sites that forum pal Skipman trawls for out-of-copyright books on aspects of the Great War. If so, could you please post a link.

I think it will always be a moot point whether the civilian administration abdicated responsibility of its own volition (or lack of) or was pushed aside by Ludendorff. Time ran out for the Germans before the situation could evolve further, but I have the impression that Ludendorff was more of an Oliver Cromwell than a potential Führer. There was a not dissimilar situation in Japan towards the end of WW2, but the Emperor retained more respect and authority at that stage than the Kaiser did by 1918. I don't think there is much point in regretting that Germany did not have a Bismarck figure to make a better job of ending the war, because if there had been such a figure Germany would probably never have got into a war in the first place.

[Halder]

I have a feeling it's not out of copyright, Mick, as there was a reprint in the mid-70s.

Never quite understood how Ludendorff's never been the subject of a decent, recent biography, but not so Hindenburg (e.g. Pyta, von Hoegen), although they seem more interested in him as a politician than as a general/war leader...

[RodB]

Rod, have you got this book as a free online download? It sounds exactly the sort of book that appears on the sites that forum pal Skipman trawls for out-of-copyright books on aspects of the Great War. If so, could you please post a link.

I think it will always be a moot point whether the civilian administration abdicated responsibility of its own volition (or lack of) or was pushed aside by Ludendorff. Time ran out for the Germans before the situation could evolve further, but I have the impression that Ludendorff was more of an Oliver Cromwell than a potential Führer. There was a not dissimilar situation in Japan towards the end of WW2, but the Emperor retained more respect and authority at that stage than the Kaiser did by 1918. I don't think there is much point in regretting that Germany did not have a Bismarck figure to make a better job of ending the war, because if there had been such a figure Germany would probably never have got into a war in the first place.

My copy is a paperback facsimile reprint by Kessinger (www.kessinger.net). I think they print on-demand, as my copy is dated 19 August i.e. just after I ordered it.

The other thought I had was that Germany had virtually no tradition of global politics, whereas Britain and France had several hundred years of maritime and global war and politics to draw on. Hence British and French politicians could draw on deep knowledge of forming alliances, strategic thinking, what works and what doesn't in big conflicts, whereas all German thinkers coulkd draw on was 1866 and 1870, and possibly the Napoleonic Wars - all just European conflicts and fairly localised. Bismarck didn't even want colonies. So I was thinking that Germany would always lose the political and strategic war through lack of tradition and experience, even without having only second-rate minds (according to Tschuppik) available. ??

[Ken S.]

Personally from what I've read about I wouldn't consider his theories as having much validity.

Incidentally, the author died in 1937, and therefore the copyright has expired.

[Borden Battery]

Here is something related - from Archive.Org. Borden Battery

Ludendorff's Own Story, August 1914-November 1918: The Great War Volume 1 (1919)

CEF Study Group – Oct 2010]

http://www.archive.org/details/ludendorffsowns04ludegoog

Ludendorff's Own Story, August 1914-November 1918: The Great War Volume 2 (1919)

CEF Study Group – Oct 2010]

http://www.archive.org/details/ludendorffsowns01ludegoog