Haig. Master of the Field

[truthergw]

I have searched but find no previous review. I suspect I am simply not searching properly. Anyway, I am enjoying this book by Haig's Director of Operations. It concentrates on 1917 and 18. Written in 1950s it is more or less an expansion and commentary on the relevant volumes of the Official History by a man who was then the last surviving member of Haig's staff. Butchers, bunglers and donkeys fans should give it a wide berth. It will annoy them intensely.

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, it is an interesting read as you say. Having studied Third Ypres in some detail, there appear to be some inaccuracies in Davidson's accounts. Worth reading but it cannot be considered a definitive source. Given Davidson's position, I was hoping for more.

Robert

[John(txic)]

This may help:

http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/book-reviews/103-generals-admirals/1593-haig-master-of-the-field.html

[George Armstrong Custer]

I'm sorry you regard Davidson's book as something of a disappointment, Robert, as I take the diametrically opposite view of it as a source - or, to be more accurate, a distillation and assessment of sources from one with a unique position of insight and knowledge of the events described.

I'm sure you'll agree that it's not often that any single account can aspire to be 'definitive', and this book does not. But Tavish Davidson's book is, in my opinion, an absolutely vital piece of the jigsaw for anyone trying to assemble as complete a picture as possible of Haig's role as C-in-C - despite the nearly six decades of research subsequent to its original publication, and against which every detail of it can be measured today.

Whilst I'm aware of points of detail in parts of Davidson's account which would have benefited from the addition of footnotes written in the light of subsequent research, I find that Davidson's account stands the test of time well as a corrective to those who've denied the cumulative effect of Third Ypres on holding the balance level in 1917, and on the outcome of the German final throw of the dice the following March, or who've argued that everything was hunky dory and sorted as far as French morale was concerned by the end of summer 1917. What is also made quite clear is the wider strategic considerations of 1917 in so far as Great Britain's Russian and Italian allies were concerned, and which Haig was concerned with in discussions at the highest levels as he made his military decisions throughout Third Ypres. Davidson is very good, too, on explaining the much misunderstood doctrine of a dual approach of wearing out whilst maintaining a meaningful potential for penetration and exploitation, and the difficulties inherent in striking the right balance in practice. On Haig's role as C-in-C in so far as how he fulfilled it in respect of his Army and Corps commanders is concerned, and as it was impinged upon politically - both domestically and from his Allies - I have found nothing of significance in my own research which conflicts with Davidson's assessment. Knowing a little of your ongoing research interests, Robert, I assume your mention of inaccuracies in Davidson refer in particular to his references to the Gheluvelt Plateau, and I'd certainly be interested in reading of the discovery of any serious errors in Davidson arising from your own research into this when you publish.

This is an important book which, as Douglas Scott ruefully notes in his Preface to the 2010 reprint, is often cited with little evidence that it has actually been read by the authors doing so.

George

[truthergw]

This may help:

http://www.westernfr...-the-field.html

Thank you for adding that link, John. I am relieved and surprised that there seems to be no earlier review on GWF. The link is to a substantial review by a dodgy geezer person not unknown to some of us here on the GWF.

[George Armstrong Custer]

The link is to a substantial review by a dodgy geezer person not unknown to some of us here on the GWF.

I'll get you - and it'll look like a bloody accident!

As a matter of fact, that review first appeared on the new FB Great War Book Reviews page - which also carries some excellent reviews by other names which are not unknown on the GWF:

Great War Book Reviews Page

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, George. I wouldn't describe Davidson's book as a disappointment. That would be too negative. I enjoyed reading it. As you rightly point out, Davidson was able to provide some very important insights. I just wanted to flag that there are some inaccuracies. These do not detract from the overall contribution of the book.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Knowing a little of your ongoing research interests, Robert, I assume your mention of inaccuracies in Davidson refer in particular to his references to the Gheluvelt Plateau, and I'd certainly be interested in reading of the discovery of any serious errors in Davidson arising from your own research into this when you publish.

George, you are quite right. I will review my notes and update you when I get a chance.

Robert

[truthergw]

George, you are quite right. I will review my notes and update you when I get a chance.

Robert

Watch him, Robert. He can get narked if you upset him.

[Chris_Baker]

My review, for what it is worth:

This is an important book in the historiography of the Great War and well merits its selection as a Pen & Sword Military reprint. First published in 1953, it was written by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s former Director of Operations Major General John “Tavish” Davidson as a corrective to what he saw as ill-judged criticism of the long-since dead Haig. Davidson had been in a position to observe much of what went on at GHQ in the years 1916 to 1918 and to form for himself a view of Haig’s abilities and performance, as well as of those in British and Allied government and military circles with whom he came into contact.

The core of the work, although it also covers 1918, is concerned with the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917. It is a counter-blast, unashamedly set out to restore Haig’s reputation against much criticism. It is important to understand the timing of Davidson’s book. The Passchendaele volume of the Official History had been published in 1948, generally supportive of Haig and the campaign but one of the weaker volumes and at a time when the world was rebuilding after WW2. The 1960′s “Lions led by donkeys” and “Oh what a lovely war” were as yet far into the future, and there was as yet no sign of the current-day obsessions with the Somme. Passchendaele was seen, and had been seen since 1917, as the lowest ebb of the war: wrong-headed, futile, appalling, and leading to such statements as “Why has Haig not been recognised as one of England’s greatest generals? Why, as a national figure, did he count far less than Lord Roberts, whose wars were picnics by comparison? The answer may be given in one word:- Passchendaele”. (News Chronicle, 25 March 1935).

Davidson set out to defend Haig’s position and reputation and as such the book contains few negative points. His prime theme is that under Haig there were four key military victories over the German Army that led to their ultimate defeat, with the battle of Broodseinde (4 October 1917 and a vital day in the Passchendaele campaign) being the first. (The others being the defeat of the Kaiserschlacht on 21 March 1918; Amiens on 8 August 1918, and the breaking of the Hindenburg Line in late September 1918). Passchendaele, of which Broodseinde was one of the more successful phases, was born from two key strategic goals: first, the clearance of the enemy from Flanders and the recapture of the Belgian coast but second to keep France in the war. Davidson explains in considerable detail just how fragile the French Army was by mid 1917 and to what lengths the news of its mutinous condition was kept from the public, the army and the enemy. He is under no illusion that Haig understood the implications clearly and that Passchendaele was fought principally to attract German attention. He defends Haig’s strength in pressing for the offensive and his dogged determination to see it through. Davidson touches on but sweeps past some of the points for which Haig has been criticised. Most notably these are his choice of Gough to command the over ambitious opening assault and the latter’s failure to aim to capture the Gheluvelt ridge, as well as Haig’s fateful move of 7 October 1917 to keep the offensive going despite advice from Gough and Plumer that they would welcome a decision to close it down. It was surely that decision that committed hundreds of thousands to the misery of a battle in mud and to the deaths of many for a questionable tactical objective of slightly higher ground, and remains one of the primary points of criticism of Haig’s command. Davidson argues that the army was buoyed by Plumer’s recent successes in limited-objective “bite and hold” operations and that pressure from the French was persistent and urgent.

Davidson goes on to cover Haig’s role during the political tussles of early 1918, of Lloyd George’s undermining of his position and deliberate retention of reserves at home, of the relations with France as German offensive intentions become clear, and the changed position once Foch was installed as Generalissimo. His coverage of Amiens, the Hindenburg Line and the rest of the “hundred days” is absorbing if inevitably short in a work of only 137 pages.

“Haig: Master of the field” is a most interesting work and makes the pro-Haig case as well as any. For those who remain unconvinced, it is worth bearing in mind that his designation as master of the field was not by a loyal subordinate or the British press, but by his former enemy: it is a quote from “Heerfuehrer des Weltkrieges” in 1939.

[Nasco12]

I have recently read this. Some thoughts:

 

How good a witness is he? On the one hand: he was there. He was meeting Haig on a daily basis and if anyone was aware of the C-in-C's thinking it was him. I can't - off the top of my head - think of a better witness. On the other hand there is the question of loyalty. Soldiers - by and large - are loyal to one another. It is quite possible that his remarks were heavily influenced by that loyalty. On the same hand there is time. The book was published over 30 years after the war and shortly before he died. It is perfectly possible that his memory was playing tricks with him.

 

While I was not surprised to learn that Davidson was pushing "bite and hold" tactics I was very surprised to read that, initially, his advice was rejected by Plumer.

 

A constant theme of this book - one that is repeated again and again - is that the French were in a dreadful state after the Nivelle Offensive and the British had to attack in order to prevent the Germans from either becoming aware of France's weakness or exploiting it. The question is: were the French really in such a state and were the Germans really so ignorant of it? How many deserters, prisoners and trench raids do you need to determine that morale is bad? I don't buy this but I can just about buy the argument that British efforts around Ypres prevented the Germans from taking the iniative. But it does raise the question why they failed to concentrate their efforts on the French when they had the chance in 1918.

Edited 29 April , 2017 by Nasco12