Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical

[George Armstrong Custer]

During the Civil War after a slow start of around 18 months the U.S. Cavalry mainly functioned as mounted infantry -- their horses were for getting them to the scene of action, and once they got there they dismounted and fought with their carbines.

The influence of the American Civil War on the evolution of British cavalry doctrine in the years up to the Great War is a very real one. Not for nothing was one of the most influential voices in the reform of British cavalry doctrine, G F R Henderson of the Army Staff College, a student of the ACW, whose 1898 book Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War is still a widely respected study. However, Henderson challenged the view that Civil War cavalry were mainly mounted infantry - a view, as Stephen Badsey has pointed out, which is supported by Stephen Z. Starr's fantastic 3 volume The Union Cavalry in the Civil War (1979-85). What Henderson wrote, in 1902, of the breakthrough docrine that was develped in the ACW, and which to a large extent was adopted by the British cavalry in the lead up to the Great War in combination with their own experiences in South Africa, was this:

"Their cavalry, in the beginning, was formed, as far as possible, on the European model. But before long it became a new type. It could manoeuvre sufficiently well for all practical purposes. It was exceedingly mobile. It could charge home with sabre or the revolver. In addition, it was so equipped that it could fight on foot as readily as in the saddle, and it was so armed and trained that when dismounted it was little inferior to the infantry [...] The instances of cavalry charging infantry are so numerous as to disprove the common belief that the American horsemen were merely mounted infantry. The truth is that the Americans struck the balance between shock and dismounted tactics. They were prepared for both, as the ground and the situation demanded; and, more than this, they used fire and l' arme blanche in the closest and most effective combination, against both cavalry and infantry. Due respect was paid to individualism. The veteran trooper, when in the last years of the war he attained the proficiency at which his great leaders had always aimed, was a good shot, a skilful skirmisher, a good horseman, and a useful swordsman."

It can readily be seen how Henderson's depiction of the doctrine evolved in the ACW ties in with the point I made in my last post about Haig's recognition that the way to go about this was to train skilled cavalrymen - ie horsemen - as efficient infantry, rather than putting infantry who were less than fully skilled in horsemanship onto horses for mobility. In 1903, when Lord Roberts sought to abolish the lance for cavalry (something Haig had already advocated being replaced by 'a good hog spear'), he argued that the day of cavalry 'shock' were over, citing French failures in the Franco-Prussian war. In response, Haig wrote a memorandum which made clear that the cavalry reformers were wholely supportive of the idea of firepower being a part of the continued shock value of cavalry capability. Haig firstly pointed out that Roberts' pointing to French cavalry failures in 1870 ignored the Prussian successes. On the French failures, Haig noted "What does that prove? That German cavalry were better trained and better led than the French, and again the French, in having a better carbine, were better armed." Haig then moved on to point out how the ACW doctrine of cavalry in an era of increasing firepower was the template for subsequent and ongoing British doctrinal developments:

"We do not wish to deny that the firearm is a useful weapon. What Lord Roberts says about the American Army in a matter of combination of fire and shock admits our entire contention. We maintain that shock action can produce important effects and particularly in combination with fire action that the sphere of usefulness of cavalry action is increased."

During the Great War the periods which admitted the use of cavalry on the Western Front, 1914 and 1918 in particular, demonstrated the validity of this prognosis in an era when reliable and fast mechanised means of moving troops about a fluid battlefield still did not exist.

Thanks George. Full price for the Badsey, then. Hope Mrs B never finds out.

And not much to choose between Amazon and Waterstones online I'm afraid, Steve; I see it's at £33.25 on the former and £33.29 on the latter. As you grit your teeth in anticipation of the consequences of purchasing a copy, you can at least comfort yourself that you are enduring it for what is genuinely an essential title to own. Does that help? No, I thought perhaps not....

P.S. I recently purchased a copy of Haig's Cavalry Studies on E-Bay as I believe did George the week before - both in decent nick and very cheap too!!!! Excellent! <strokes imaginary cat and smirks>

[/quote

Yes, bagging two first editions of 'Cavalry Studies' a week apart at £26 and £32.51 respectively was remarkable, wasn't it! I wish you'd leave your imaginary pussy alone, though.....

George

[truthergw]

This discussion is very interesting but would be all the better of re-convening in another sub forum in it's own thread. Pakenhham mentions how bad mounted infantry were in the South African war.

[Herekawe]

Happy New Year everyone.

So the Badsey book is the one of those of us with a developing interest in the topic to get? Any other recommendations?

Despite my own interest in horses I admit that when I joined the Forum I didnt think the topic of Calvary on the Western Front would be one to cause so much controversy, I imagined it was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914. I must admit I am not seeing a lot at this stage to make me change my viewpoint - though that could come - most of what is written about on these threads is about the theory of Calvary (experience gained by looking backwards to other or previous wars) not about what actually happened in practice. A few successful attacks in a long war may not actually justify the cost of keeping Calvary in the field.

I am not sure if the Calvary/Tanks comparison is always valid. A Whippet tank is not as fast as a horse but as long as you put petrol, oil, grease spare parts into it should just keep going - its a machine after all. There is always talk about the unreliability of Great War motor bikes, armoured cars and tanks but what about horses, horses get injured, tried, frightened, hungry, sprains, stone bruises, wounds etc. While Amiens saw a large drop in availablity of tanks over the first few days of the battle they also covered a bit of ground and adsorbed a lot of punishment far more than Calvary could have sustained. Comparative figures for the amount of available calvary would have been interesting, compared with what they actually had acheived.

Finally I find the suggestion, in George's post from Badsey, paraphrased "calvary extended the limit of the advance from 5,000 to 10,000 yards... clean through into open country" to be interesting. Does Badsey give a source for that claim, seems like they saved the day, and if true why didn't they just keep going, swinging behind the German lines, living off the land and captured fodder etc as I have been told in other threads they are quite capable of doing?

I suspect that after a big day like that the poor old neddies would be tired and ready for a brush down, fodder and rest so just as tied to their supply lines as the motorised vehicles and needing as much maintenance.

James

[Guest]

This discussion is very interesting but would be all the better of re-convening in another sub forum in it's own thread.

Feel free to start a thread Tom, after all, we shouldn't be talking/arguing in the Library shhhh!

Mike

[JimSmithson]

See what you have done Mike with all this looking up sources and telling everyone about them - you should be ashamed of yourself!

Jim

[Guest]

See what you have done Mike with all this looking up sources and telling everyone about them - you should be ashamed of yourself!

Jim

Sorry, it's all my fault. Forgive me sob.sob

Mike

[truthergw]

Happy New Year everyone.

So the Badsey book is the one of those of us with a developing interest in the topic to get? Any other recommendations?

Despite my own interest in horses I admit that when I joined the Forum I didnt think the topic of Calvary on the Western Front would be one to cause so much controversy, I imagined it was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914. I must admit I am not seeing a lot at this stage to make me change my viewpoint - though that could come - most of what is written about on these threads is about the theory of Calvary (experience gained by looking backwards to other or previous wars) not about what actually happened in practice. A few successful attacks in a long war may not actually justify the cost of keeping Calvary in the field.

I am not sure if the Calvary/Tanks comparison is always valid. A Whippet tank is not as fast as a horse but as long as you put petrol, oil, grease spare parts into it should just keep going - its a machine after all. There is always talk about the unreliability of Great War motor bikes, armoured cars and tanks but what about horses, horses get injured, tried, frightened, hungry, sprains, stone bruises, wounds etc. While Amiens saw a large drop in availablity of tanks over the first few days of the battle they also covered a bit of ground and adsorbed a lot of punishment far more than Calvary could have sustained. Comparative figures for the amount of available calvary would have been interesting, compared with what they actually had acheived.

Finally I find the suggestion, in George's post from Badsey, paraphrased "calvary extended the limit of the advance from 5,000 to 10,000 yards... clean through into open country" to be interesting. Does Badsey give a source for that claim, seems like they saved the day, and if true why didn't they just keep going, swinging behind the German lines, living off the land and captured fodder etc as I have been told in other threads they are quite capable of doing?

I suspect that after a big day like that the poor old neddies would be tired and ready for a brush down, fodder and rest so just as tied to their supply lines as the motorised vehicles and needing as much maintenance.

James

New machinery with inexperienced manufacturers and operators, e.g. tanks, have a habit of breaking down. Motor cars, trucks and aeroplanes were very unreliable until well after WW2. A trip of over 100 miles without running repairs was a rarity well into the 1950s. There was a vast reservoir of knowledge and experience on how to handle horses and get the most out of them. Most men knew about horses in the same way most of us know about cars. The first tanks could not keep up with soldiers on foot, never mind horses. Finally , has it occurred to you to wonder why the armies of all the combatants were too stupid to realise that cavalry was a bad idea? Have you wondered why even after the Great war had finished, armies all over the world, from Japan through the Soviet Union, Europe and the Americas up to WW2 saw cavalry units deployed in their thousands? As far as what Badsey says about cavalry, before criticising or questioning a book I always find it a good idea to read it.

[truthergw]

Feel free to start a thread Tom, after all, we shouldn't be talking/arguing in the Library shhhh!

Mike

I'd rather that the guys with a real interest in and knowledge of cavalry would get it off the ground. It is in danger of getting lost here in a sub-forum of a book section. I thought it deserved a higher profile.

[Guest]

" It is in danger of getting lost here in a sub-forum of a book section. I thought it deserved a higher profile. "

I agree.

Mike

[Robert Dunlop]

Despite my own interest in horses I admit that when I joined the Forum I didnt think the topic of Calvary on the Western Front would be one to cause so much controversy, I imagined it was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914. I must admit I am not seeing a lot at this stage to make me change my viewpoint

James,

Thanks to the British and Canadian cavalry, the New Zealand Division was not overwhelmed when it reached the Somme in 1918

Robert

[Herekawe]

New machinery with inexperienced manufacturers and operators, e.g. tanks, have a habit of breaking down. Motor cars, trucks and aeroplanes were very unreliable until well after WW2. A trip of over 100 miles without running repairs was a rarity well into the 1950s. There was a vast reservoir of knowledge and experience on how to handle horses and get the most out of them. Most men knew about horses in the same way most of us know about cars. The first tanks could not keep up with soldiers on foot, never mind horses. Finally , has it occurred to you to wonder why the armies of all the combatants were too stupid to realise that cavalry was a bad idea? Have you wondered why even after the Great war had finished, armies all over the world, from Japan through the Soviet Union, Europe and the Americas up to WW2 saw cavalry units deployed in their thousands? As far as what Badsey says about cavalry, before criticising or questioning a book I always find it a good idea to read it.

What I asked is for information to clarify what Badsey is saying in the section which was quoted. I am not questioning the book - I will get a copy and read it. Do you have any information to support this Amiens comment from another source - I cannot find much in the books about 1918 I have.

Reality is the horse was gone after WW1. Yes there were people who understood and could get the best out of them, but even those people all brought cars, motorbikes, tractors and trucks as soon as they could afford one. Sure there were some areas better suited to horses, preferably wide open spaces, but are you suggesting Calvary maintained its premier role through to WW2? I believe the next BEF was basically a motorised force - 21 years later. So the British army voted with its feet.

I will take your comments re vehicle reliability with a grain of salt. Certainly vehicles were less reliable, needed plenty of preventative maintenance and prone to overheat when thrashed etc but I don't remember them being that bad.

James

[Pete1052]

During the Civil War George Custer's occasional antagonist John S. Mosby didn't carry a saber, although there is a studio photo of hin with one that was probably a photographer's prop. Mosby is supposed to have said that he couldn't think of a good use for a saber other than for roasting a piece of meat over a fire. Many of Mosby's engagements while mounted involved revolver fire at extremely close range that blurred the distinction between legitimate combat and murder; thus the shock action of cavalry could be achieved without the use of sabers, which were becoming increasingly anachronistic with every passing day. Why otherwise intelligent cavalrymen continued to defend the efficacy of the saber as a weapon between 1900 and 1935 is anyone's guess. In an indirect way GFR Henderson's writings about American cavalry were a tacit admission that they often fought while dismounted using their carbines.

[Herekawe]

James,

Thanks to the British and Canadian cavalry, the New Zealand Division was not overwhelmed when it reached the Somme in 1918

Robert

Thanks Robert.

There is a dearth of information about Calvary in the local library, but will follow up as I get time.

Regards

James

[truthergw]

......................

Reality is the horse was gone after WW1...................

James

Don't take my word for it. Have a poke around the internet to see how many horses were used by the German Army and the Red Army in WW2. Have a look at an auto repair manual of circa 1930, a decade after the war to see what the realities of motoring were even then. Read about the actual numbers of tanks which made it to the start lines then reached the first objective in 1918.

[SiegeGunner]

Pete's representations about the use of revolvers are no doubt correct, but I suspect that cavalrymen still felt more secure knowing that they had a sabre as well, just as infantrymen were reassured by possessing a bayonet. At worst, when all else was exhausted, it was less helpless than dying empty-handed.

[Pete1052]

I suspect that in the minds of many officers the willingness of soldiers to use cold steel to close with and destroy the enemy became synonomyous with them having an aggressive fighting spirit, hence all of the emphasis on bayonet training during the world wars. There is a psychological effect about seeing a determined enemy advancing with bayonets fixed that makes guys run away, even though gunshot wounds are every bit as fatal. When armies are called out to quell civil disturbances -- generally not a good idea, given what happened at Bloody Sunday and Kent State -- fixed bayonets often persuade rioting people to cease and desist.

(Cold steel notwithstanding, soldiers and military units are blunt instruments trained to kill everyone not dressed like them; to use them to subdue one's own people during domestic riots often leads to much more serious incidents than the ones they were sent there to quell.)

[Steven Broomfield]

I will take your comments re vehicle reliability with a grain of salt. Certainly vehicles were less reliable, needed plenty of preventative maintenance and prone to overheat when thrashed etc but I don't remember them being that bad.

James

Sadsly I'm at work so can't look things up, but surely in August 1918 a large number of tanks broke down on the first day of the offensive? Few, I believe, were knocked out by enemy action, but the numbers available on the second and subsequent days was a steep downward slope. Similarly, Australian m.g. teams carried into action by de-gunned Mark V's were all but useless when they de-bussed thanks to the fumes and trauma of the journey, whereas a horse soldier could fight on.

I think the technology (and the tactical nouse) surrounding tanks and other vehicular fighting machines in the GW always made them difficult to use with a huge of certainty.

[Pete1052]

Maybe, but tanks and motor vehicles were the future, not horse-mounted formations. I was a battalion motor officer in two field artillery battalions so I'm keenly aware of the maintenance and spare parts issues that are involved in keeping these units functioning. It seems to me that people in this thread are defending the indefensible, which is to say that during the Great War the days of horse cavalry were numbered, not yet over forever, but almost.

[Herekawe]

Sadsly I'm at work so can't look things up, but surely in August 1918 a large number of tanks broke down on the first day of the offensive? Few, I believe, were knocked out by enemy action, but the numbers available on the second and subsequent days was a steep downward slope. Similarly, Australian m.g. teams carried into action by de-gunned Mark V's were all but useless when they de-bussed thanks to the fumes and trauma of the journey, whereas a horse soldier could fight on.

I think the technology (and the tactical nouse) surrounding tanks and other vehicular fighting machines in the GW always made them difficult to use with a huge of certainty.

In my remark I was referring to the comment by Truthergw that in the 1950s we couldn't drive 100 miles without probably needing running repairs.

No argument (read my original post #28) that the 1918 tank or armoured car was unreliable, and that availability dropped rapidly after day 1 at Amiens. I am suggesting that Calvary units would be used up just as quickly as armoured units even facing proportionately less defensive fire.

James

[Pete1052]

Well, I'm sure glad Ike was over Monty, if Brit guys in 2011 still think horse cavalry was the way to go.

[George Armstrong Custer]

No argument (read my original post #28) that the 1918 tank or armoured car was unreliable, and that availability dropped rapidly after day 1 at Amiens. I am suggesting that Calvary units would be used up just as quickly as armoured units even facing proportionately less defensive fire.

Happy New Year to you too, James. What you actually said was "While Amiens saw a large drop in availablity of tanks over the first few days of the battle they also covered a bit of ground and adsorbed a lot of punishment far more than Calvary could have sustained." Yet like all your other assertions to date you provide zero references for what, in their absence, remains just your unsubstantiated opinion.

Does Badsey give a source for that claim, seems like they saved the day, and if true why didn't they just keep going, swinging behind the German lines, living off the land and captured fodder etc as I have been told in other threads they are quite capable of doing?

You've made your points with so much scepticism of what has been posted here that it would be nice to have had you give some sources of your own as a basis for your own assertions. Even so, I'll make a couple of points in response – though I’m not prepared to waste my time by getting into a cycle of making sourced responses to a string of unsubstantiated opinion from you.

Firstly, what makes you think that the British had any need for their cavalry to 'save the day' for them at Amiens on 8 August 1918? I can't see anything in the Badsey quote I gave which would imply that.

Your idea that the quote I gave from Badsey implies that the British cavalry could have just kept going behind the German lines shows a complete misunderstanding of two things. Firstly, you obviously do not understand that the German defences which Badsey refers the cavalry as going through into open country are the enemy's positions along the old Amiens outer defences, and their place as objectives in the plan for the first day of the co-ordinated all-arms battle. These defences themselves consisted of outer and inner defences, the inner being essentially a series of disconnected posts. Behind these the enemy held the outer defences of the old Amiens defences. The cavalry went through both which was the second and third stages of the first days objective. Rawlinson's plan called for consolidation as each stage of the advance was achieved. Secondly, you fail to grasp what Badsey is describing in the quote I gave. If you read it, you will see that he is not describing a series of unilateral cavalry charges leading to a breakthrough by the cavalry to the enemy's rear. What he describes is all-arms combat in action - ie the cavalry are working in conjunction with the infantry. Rawlinson sends in the cavalry closely behind the first infantry assaults, which were supported, where available, by the tanks and preceded by the artillery barrage. The first infantry assaults take and hold the first line objectives. The cavalry then gallop through to take and hold positions further forward than the first infantry assaults, thereby extending the advance (in this they were assisted by light tanks, though as you will discover when you read Badsey, this area of all-arms co-operation was certainly not unproblematic, not least due to the speed differentials between the cavalry and the light tanks and the attitude of many in the Tank Corps). This extension of the initial advance is consolidated when the reserve infantry follow through to these advanced positions held by the cavalry. By this means the cavalry, working in tandem with successive infantry attacks, take the advance through the German outer defences before Amiens. The cavalry advanced some 23 miles from their points of concentration on the first day.

If you're keen to look at sources for this other than Badsey, have a look at Haig's ‘Despatches’ [pp 258 – 261, 327 – 328] and 'The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days August 8th to November 11th 1918' by the Fourth Army's MGGS, Major General Sir Archibald Montgomery [pp 44 – 46]. You may, of course, be one of those who automatically reject anything written by Haig or any other general. OK, to avoid accusations, however specious, of bias in the sources I reference, let’s have a look at what my old chum J P Harris, who is certainly no fan of Haig, has to say:

“For the attack of 8 August the Amiens Outer Defence Line [was] the ultimate objective for the Australian and Canadian Corps […] It was between 10,500 and 14,000 yards from the start line. Even if German resistance turned out to be weak any body of troops was bound to become tired if they tried to cover all of this distance in a single day’s attack. Fourth Army had thus always intended to do the operation in a series of three bounds, with pauses for consolidation after each. In the final version of the plan the first bound varied from 3,500 to 4,000 yards. This was about the limit to which the field artillery could deliver an effective creeping barrage and if a rapid advance could be made to this depth, much of the field artillery that the Germans had in the attack sector would be overrun. [Once this first line was reached] the cavalry role was to pass, as soon as seemed possible, through the leading elements of the Canadian and Australian Corps and to secure the Amiens Outer Defence Line ahead of the infantry [reserves]. […]These reserves would then ‘leap-frog’ to make the next bound of between 2,000 and 5,000 yards. […] The two battalions of Whippet tanks were put under Cavalry Corps command, but from each battalion one company of 16 tanks was to accompany the leading troops of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, thus coming under the Australian and Canadian Corps commanders respectively during at the start of the battle. [….] This was the British cavalry’s most successful day of the whole war on the Western Front […] They played a significant role in maintaining the momentum of the Fourth Army attack and carrying it rapidly to the Amiens Outer Defence Line [ie the 10,000 yards mentioned by Badsey]. The cavalry certainly took well over 1,000 prisoners on 8 August, probably as many as 3,000, as well as numerous guns. One regiment, the 5th Dragoon Guards, of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, in 1st Cavalry Division, took about 600 prisoners in a single incident, intercepting a trainload of reinforcements between Vauvillers and Framerville. One reason for the relative neglect of the cavalry achievement in some accounts of the battle may be an administrative factor. Counts of prisoners were officially recorded as corps ‘cages’. The cavalry at Amiens, however, did not employ cages of its own but handed all prisoners over to the nearest infantry division. Cavalry were supposed to obtain receipts for prisoners handed over to infantry formations but under the pressures of battle this was not always done. It seems that all prisoners taken by the cavalry on 8 August 1918 were thus officially counted as prisoners of the Dominion corps. Not wishing to be encumbered with captured guns, the cavalry seems to have left these too to be secured by the Dominion infantry.”

In your first post, you assert that cavalry on the Western Front "was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914." Yet in a follow up post you say "Reality is the horse was gone after WW1." So which is it, then? When Robert gave an example which corrected your misconception about the utility of cavalry on the Western Front your response was to say that you didn't know this because you have a dearth of information on the cavalry in your local library. So why make assertions on a subject upon which you admit you have basically no information? You give no sources in support of your assertions, and yet demand that the sources given by others be supplemented by other supporting sources.

If you have no sources to offer as a basis for your views on the cavalry, do you have any which lend support to your idea that the tanks and armoured cars of 1918 were more reliable and capable than some here have indicated? I have already quoted Terraine's statistics on the rapid reduction of effective tanks at Amiens from 342 on 8 August to just 6 by 12 August. On the Whippets which were in theory supposed to be working hand in glove with the cavalry, Paul Harris’ conclusion is that “[the] cavalry – Whippet co-operation idea was not a great success. The mobility characteristics and vulnerabilities of these instruments were too dissimilar. When the going was good the Whippets had difficulty keeping up with the cavalry and in general they made little impact in this battle.” As noted earlier, Badsey, too, identifies the difficulties in co-ordination between the cavalry and the Whippets, ascribing some of these at least to the problems the cavalry had in getting proper co-operation from the Tank Corps. As Badsey notes, “Surprisingly, several historians have accepted unquestioningly the Tank Corps’ interpretation of these events.” In addition to this, a very minor historian, in a surprisingly masterly book called ‘1918: A Very British Victory’, was right on the money when, after cataloguing their vulnerability to enemy shells and bullets, mechanical failure, and a propensity for catching fire, he described the state of development of the Whippet tanks deployed at Amiens as very much "a work in progress." Both Harris and our friend the minor historian reference the famous mad maraud behind enemy lines of a single Whippet, ‘Musical Box,’ on 8 August, which caused much localised mayhem. Yet Harris’ conclusion is that “Musical Box’s achievements were much vaunted by British tank enthusiasts between the wars. But its fate could equally well have served as a warning that tanks are very vulnerable when not intimately supported by other arms.” Whilst our chum the minor historian says of ‘Musical Box’ that “To some the episode created a vision of marauding tanks penetrating deep behind the German lines and causing mayhem, but the Whippet was not that weapon of war.”

So, in addition to my original quote from Badsey on the cavalry achievement at Amiens, I have now provided supporting references from senior participants in these events such as Haig and Montgomery as well as from writers who take opposing stances on Haig, such as Paul Harris, John Terraine, and my old mate the minor historian. These references also encompass the unreliability of the armoured support. I am under no illusions, however, that any of this will make any impression upon someone who, whilst admitting to having little or no references to the cavalry, still feels qualified to contradict those who do, and make assertions such as that cavalry on the Western Front “was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914.”

George

[steenie]

Hewekawe, that told you. Makes you wonder about the value of saying anything, when we have such experts who we can just sit at the feet of eh?

[George Armstrong Custer]

Well, I'm sure glad Ike was over Monty, if Brit guys in 2011 still think horse cavalry was the way to go.

This barely merits a response Pete. Show me where anyone on this thread has argued that cavalry was the way of the future after the Great War. It has simply been pointed out, correctly, that the Great War did not see the last of the use of cavalry. As to its use in the Great War, that was a consequence of the continued utility of cavalry on a battlefield not yet dominated by the embryonic and less than reliable mechanisation of the day.

George

[truthergw]

Hewekawe, that told you. Makes you wonder about the value of saying anything, when we have such experts who we can just sit at the feet of eh?

I realise that with all your duties in the cavalry emulator world, you will have little time for reading history but not all the knowledge of WW1 cavalry is to be found on the end of a fork.

[steenie]

I realise that with all your duties in the cavalry emulator world, you will have little time for reading history but not all the knowledge of WW1 cavalry is to be found on the end of a fork.

Ahh I see another who is trying to make a virtue out of being unsociable on a social site lol.

By the way, I do like the word 'Emulator'. Has a certain ring to it. Thankyou.