Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical

[Steven Broomfield]

Steenie, I'm currently reading, as mentioned before, the Badsey book referred to in many posts. I'm by no means an expert on this matter (my interest is rather more with the Indian cavalry than the British), but I am finding it a fascinating and illuminating read. It is certainly opening my eyes not only to the actualities of cavalry in 1914-18 period, but also to the work done in the late 19th century to the outbreak of the Great War in determining what cavalry was actually for.

I remarked in a different thread on this Forum to comments in the history of the 18th Lancers (IA) of their experience of Haig when Inspector of Cavalry in India in the early 20th centurty; it was apparent from that volume (written in the 1920's) that Haig, amongst others, was putting a lot of thought into cavalry training and development. Mentions is made in the same book about something based on Cossack tactics - the swarm, in which the cavalry would surround and harrass an infantry force. Bonkers, but it was tried - whether it was good or bad, it is apparent that a lot of tactical thought was going on.

I hope this isn't being anti-social, but your work in preserving the memory of light cavalry is laudable and as I know nothing of horses, handling, tack, etc, etc, I am delighted your work is going on. However, the tactical use and handling of cavalry and other mounted troops is perhaps a different subject, and I would urge you to (if you've not already done so) get your hands on a copy of Badsey's book.

[steenie]

Steenie, I'm currently reading, as mentioned before, the Badsey book referred to in many posts. I'm by no means an expert on this matter (my interest is rather more with the Indian cavalry than the British), but I am finding it a fascinating and illuminating read. It is certainly opening my eyes not only to the actualities of cavalry in 1914-18 period, but also to the work done in the late 19th century to the outbreak of the Great War in determining what cavalry was actually for.

I remarked in a different thread on this Forum to comments in the history of the 18th Lancers (IA) of their experience of Haig when Inspector of Cavalry in India in the early 20th centurty; it was apparent from that volume (written in the 1920's) that Haig, amongst others, was putting a lot of thought into cavalry training and development. Mentions is made in the same book about something based on Cossack tactics - the swarm, in which the cavalry would surround and harrass an infantry force. Bonkers, but it was tried - whether it was good or bad, it is apparent that a lot of tactical thought was going on.

I hope this isn't being anti-social, but your work in preserving the memory of light cavalry is laudable and as I know nothing of horses, handling, tack, etc, etc, I am delighted your work is going on. However, the tactical use and handling of cavalry and other mounted troops is perhaps a different subject, and I would urge you to (if you've not already done so) get your hands on a copy of Badsey's book.

Steven,

Thankyou for a pleasant reponse. I agree with you I should get a copy of Badsey and I will.

I am currently reading a work about Nolan, who as you know, was the Riding Master of the 15th when stationed in India. A very interesting work.

As for a work really worth getting, as it puts to bed the ludicrous idea that horseflesh and swords can stand against modern bolt action rifles and machine guns is 'German Influence on British Cavalry (1911)' by Erskine Childers. It is a lucid work that damns the German school as propounded by Gen von Bernadi and his work 'Reiterdeinst', and French's endorsement of such stupidity. It is interesting that Roberts totally supported Childers in this view. It is an interesting work, as he draws from sources of the failure of cavalry to be anything else but reccon if their chosen weapon is the arme blanche as far back as The Crimea, The Indian Wars, The Japanese War in Manchuria and the war in South Africa.

If we look to the losses sustained by cavalry in almost every engagement they were put to in the Great War, we see levels of loss that made the Charge of the Light Brigade look like a walk in the park. As cavalry is not just a man and a horse, but a highly skilled horseman on a highly trained remount, it means that even if the loss of life was acceptable, the options to replace them with trained replacements became a nonsense.

With regard to your comment to the tactical use of cavalry and its nuts and bolts being a different thing to the grande plan of things, I totally agree. Nonetheless, I believe without a knowledge of both any gained on one facet will lead to assumptions that maybe false. By the same token, because one has a knowledge of one, it would be foolhardy by others to think that this would preclude knowledge of the other.

[MikeMeech]

All

I don't want to repeat various arguements about the British Cavalry on the Western Front, this has been done already and of course David Kenyon's 2007 Ph.D Thesis 'British Cavalry on the Western Front 1916-18' covers this in great detail. He summed up with (page 305): "...the cavalry was mostly unsuccessful at the operational level." but also (page 306) that: "...when it was offered the chance to get into battle, acquitted itself well, and showed that at brigade and regimental level it was an effective fighting arm." The whole work needs to be read to see how those conclusions were made. However, we have to face the usual problem of the First World War in that it was a conflict that took place in a time of great technological and operational change. 'Old' methods of warfare were still there (and still valid in some cases) and the 'new' ways were coming in (but not totally up to the task). The use of tanks with cavalry, and the problems involved, has been mentioned and shows this to some extent. The cavalry up to the end of the war would be useful, in the right circumstances. This did mean that their use would have planned for if these circumstances arose, it could be considered a dereliction of duty if the staff failed to do this. What we see in WW1 is 'technology' added to an arm, eg. machine guns introduced in greater numbers to infantry and cavalry units (for greater firepower in dismounted action). Also aviation played its part with the artillery, infantry and cavalry as a 'modern' add on. From probably 1915 documents were drawn up on the procedures for aircraft operating with cavalry which were renewed regularly up to the end of the war. (For those that are interested I had an article on this subject published in Cross & Cockade International, Autumn 2009, Vol. 40/3. 'Development of Cavalry Contact Patrols, 1915-1918.) During the advance to the Hidenburg Line in 1917, 9 Sqn. (BE2e) RFC operated with the 5th Cavalry Division while 15 Sqn. (various BEs) supported the Lucknow Cavalry Brigade. During the Somme 18 Sqn. (FE2b). was the dedicated cavalry support squadron (hence the Pegasus Rampant on its squadron badge as worn on its Chinooks today). In 1917 35 Sqn. (FK8) was given this role and by 1918 to the end of the war 6 Sqn. (RE8) had taken on this task. What was common to all was that they had to have some mobility to move forward (or retreat) with the cavalry. RFC ground teams would be attached to the cavalry for signalling and some servicing of the aircraft. Although these teams would be equipped with motor vehicles it was considered necessary that the officer and signallers could ride and fuel (and some spares) could be carried in horse drawn G.S. wagons if the terrain was unsuitable for motors. The fitter and rigger also had to be able to ride in 1917 (early form of servicing commandos). It appears 6 Sqn. went over to fully motorised transport during 1918. The squadrons were to perform all the corps' type tasks; reconnaissance, artillery co-operation, contact patrols, photography and ground attack. It appears from the available AIR 1 documents that a lot of thought, planning and trials went into this use of a 'new' arm with the 'old'. Also ideas and technology were passed between Theatres, eg. in the Middle East 14 Sqn. had tried out the 'message pick up hook' (much used between the wars) with cavalry units. The paper work and drawings were sent to 6 Sqn. on the Western Front in 1918 so they could do their own experiments. So in at least some ways we cannot say the cavalry was a unchanging organisation that did not try to adapt, we can say that the Western Front battlefront was a difficult situation for using the cavalry and, of course, the other arms!

Mike

[steenie]

Mike,

Nicely written and true.

[Pete1052]

A company of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, J.E.B. Stuart's first command during the Civil War, recruited heavily in the Gerrardstown area where I live. A relative with my Mom's maiden name raised and commanded the Litte Fork Rangers, officially known as Company D, 4th Virginia Cavalry. It provided a security detachment for Gen. Pierre Beauregard and President Jefferson Davis at First Manassas. In 1862 he is said to have sabered a Union officer at the battle of Williamsburg and commanded a squadron of the 4th Virginia during Stuart's famous ride around the Army of the Potomac. A great-grandfather of mine was in the U.S. Cavalry during the Spanish-American War but never got any closer to the Spanish than Camp Lewis, Washington. Grandma told me in later life he'd drive her Mother nuts when he'd get out his Army-issue Colt .45 revolver and fiddle around with it when he was halfway through a bottle of whisky.

[Robert Dunlop]

As for a work really worth getting, as it puts to bed the ludicrous idea that horseflesh and swords can stand against modern bolt action rifles and machine guns is 'German Influence on British Cavalry (1911)' by Erskine Childers.

You will find that Badsey's book puts Childers' work into a different perspective.

There were several examples where cavalry were able to best infantry armed with modern bolt action rifles and machine guns. The key was concomitant suppressive fire and open ground with no wire or other major obstacles. These conditions occurred, for example, during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and during Operation Michael.

As for the works of von Berhardi and the likes, they were widely read and respected by many of their British counterparts. Von Bernhardi provided some very interesting insights that were played out in WW2. His books are worth reading if you get the chance.

Robert

[Pete1052]

Speaking of how motorized and mechanized equipment is prone to breaking down and malfunctioning, my first assignment to a U.S. Army combat unit in 1978 was to an M107 175mm self-propelled gun battalion in Germany. When we retubed to the M110A1 eight-inch howitzer barrel in around 1980 I believe it made us the next-to-last 175 unit in the history of the U.S. Army. A few months later when I was battalion motor officer a guy wearing an Afrika Korps-style hat with the Deutsche Bahn logo walked in my office one day and asked if he could measure one of my howitzers so he could better plan their rail transport for our field exercises at the Grafenwoehr training area in Bavaria.

When I showed him the dimensions of the weapon system in the operator's maintenance manual he laughed because whoever had made the metric conversions had screwed them all up. I led him to one of our howitzers and told him to have at it. His Afrika Korps hat-wearing crew got to work with tape measures and plumb bobs. When one his men pointed to a steadily-increasing puddle of hydraulic fluid forming under an adjacent howitzer I began to explain how the hydraulics of the lock-out system worked. The top guy said, "Ah, leutnant, you do not haff to tell me, I commanded a battery of 88s in Russia!"

[Robert Dunlop]

There were several examples where cavalry were able to best infantry armed with modern bolt action rifles and machine guns. The key was concomitant suppressive fire and open ground with no wire or other major obstacles. These conditions occurred, for example, during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and during Operation Michael.

The principles behind this type of cavalry attack were outlined on pp. 66 to 69 of 'Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical'. Unfortunately, the illustration has not been reproduced in the online version. It shows the positioning of horse artillery on one flank, which takes the enemy cavalry under fire. This enables the 'friendly' cavalry to advance and strike. Although the enemy was cavalry in the study, the same approach could be (and was) applied to isolated enemy infantry. The use of MGs and automatic rifles, notably the Hotchkiss, provided similar and/or additional suppressive fire. On occasions during cavalry actions on the Western Front, this was supplemented by musketry provided by other cavalry troops in support. Some of the advances against German rear guards made by British and Canadian cavalry during the Battle of Amiens, for example, were made in this way.

Robert

[steenie]

Robert,

I have just written a tome on the erratic nature of von Bernardi's work 'Reiterdeinst' and his continual erosion of his own argument throughout. Just as I was sorting out the spelling, the bloody thing blanked . As I can't live that long, I am going to spare you me re-typing it all .

Happy New Year by the way!!

[George Armstrong Custer]

You will find that Badsey's book puts Childers' work into a different perspective.

Indeed it does, Robert. And as you will know, Badsey's research also utilised David Kenyon's thesis for Cranfield University on British cavalry on the Western Front, which Mike Meech has given a fine precis of. In his Preface, Badsey expresses the hope that Kenyon's thesis would be written up as a future book in the same Birmingham Studies in First World War History series as Badsey's own 'Dotrine & Reform.' No sign of that yet, but something to look forward to - although Kenyon's actual thesis can in the meantime be accessed online here: British Cavalry on the Western Front 1916 - 1918. Both Badsey and Kenyon, of course, take the line that there was a continued utility for a cavalry arm during the Great War under those circumstances which doctrinal reform had made provision for. And as you've noted, Badsey's deconstruction and demolition of Childers' book - contradictory, redundant, and overtaken by developments in cavalry doctrine before it was even published - puts that polemic into its proper place.

After his having cited Childers as an authoritative source for his earlier conclusions on the utility of cavalry by the Great War to the effect that "they couldn't face modern weaponry" and continually wanted to "get back to the open field of opposing army's cavalry using the sword on each other in the charge", and that it was ludicrous to suppose that cavalry could take on "modern bolt action rifles and machine guns", I am interested to see Steenie now endorsing Mike's positive review of Kenyon's thesis as "true." You can hardly see the join in the shift in position from the opinions he originally posted here. Perhaps we could better understand what your position is Steenie if, instead of talking about a 'tome' which you've lost before posting, you actually join us in giving a reasoned and referenced summary on just what your conclusions on the utility of cavalry in the Great War now are? As a specialist on cavalry who is a member of the 'Northamptonshire Yeomanry', President of the International Cavalry Association, and Chairman of the Light Cavalry Association GB, I imagine that your knowledge of the sources on which you've based your conclusions will be far more extensive than most of us here.

George

[Steven Broomfield]

On occasions during cavalry actions on the Western Front, this was supplemented by musketry provided by other cavalry troops in support.

Robert

Which explains why, pre-war, so many British cavalry regiments had outright majorities of men qualified as First Class shots. Musketry training was very important, because good, accurate and rapid shooting was a vital skill for British cavalry.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Absolutely, Steve, and as you'll know from Badsey' review of the years 1880 -1918, that was no accident but an integral part of a cavalry doctrine which was developed over those years by the British to fill what we can, with the benefit of hindsight, see as a hiatus in the fully effective development of military technologies, apart from those of artillery and smallarms firepower. Whatever other very real benefits they had in 1918, tanks were not yet an effective means of exploitation in a mobile battle with an enemy in retreat. At that period in technological evolution that role was still best served, albeit imperfectly, by the cavalry, equipped and trained to operate in an all-arms capacity alongside artillery, armour, infantry and aircraft. The utility which the cavalry did posses in 1914 - 18 justifies, I think, Badsey's conclusion that "Too much cannot be claimed for the officers who developed British cavalry doctrine between 1880 - 1918, except that broadly they got it right when many got it wrong, and at a time when many errors were made in forming other military doctrines."

As Haig wrote of the lack of cavalry available to the Germans in their great March offensive of 1918:

“Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task.”

Sidney Rogerson, author of the magnificent 'Twelve Days On The Somme' and 'The Last Of The Ebb', was a more junior eyewitness to the British retreat before the German 1918 offensive, and an infantryman at that. Yet his view fully supports that of Haig quoted above:

"It was a crowning mercy that [the Germans] had no cavalry. How many times during the retreat did we thank heaven for this! The sight of a few mounted men in the distance would at once start a ripple of anxiety...Cavalry was the one factor which would have smashed the morale of the defence in a twinkling."

George

[squirrel]

Which explains why, pre-war, so many British cavalry regiments had outright majorities of men qualified as First Class shots. Musketry training was very important, because good, accurate and rapid shooting was a vital skill for British cavalry.

Pre war the Brtish Cavalry had a higher percentage of first class shots than the Infantry and we are aware of the reputation that the latter enjoyed.

[steenie]

Custer

Why do you pour vitriol in such copious amounts? It is not a charming thing. You seem very angry about something. I think Churchill said 'the outside of a horse is good for the inside of a man' maybe you need to get on a horse and chill instead of just talking about it. It may give you a better and higher perspective. Maybe as I do ride, this may explain my basic alpha wave mind set and good will to all.

As for me making a shift. Indeed, I am known for my flexible nature and always willing to make such. However, I think my shift in this instance is only in your febrile mind for it surely isn't in mine.With regard to your last sentence, I wouldn't want to think, that due to my enthusiasm of the subject it would in some way give me an opportunity to lord it over others. Nonetheless, i thankyou for your kindness in assuming that as I have dedicated a high percentage of my life to the subject, I may have more to offer than most. However, as for sharing it with your ilk, I would rather boil my head in vinegar

By the way, if you speak as you punctuate (look to your first sentence), when do you come up for air?

After his having cited Childers as an authoritative source for his earlier conclusions on the utility of cavalry by the Great War to the effect that "they couldn't face modern weaponry" and continually wanted to "get back to the open field of opposing army's cavalry using the sword on each other in the charge", and that it was ludicrous to suppose that cavalry could take on "modern bolt action rifles and machine guns", I am interested to see Steenie now endorsing Mike's positive review of Kenyon's thesis as "true." You can hardly see the join in the shift in position from the opinions he originally posted here. Perhaps we could better understand what your position is Steenie if, instead of talking about a 'tome' which you've lost before posting, you actually join us in giving a reasoned and referenced summary on just what your conclusions on the utility of cavalry in the Great War now are? As a specialist on cavalry who is a member of the 'Northamptonshire Yeomanry', President of the International Cavalry Association, and Chairman of the Light Cavalry Association GB, I imagine that your knowledge of the sources on which you've based your conclusions will be far more extensive than most of us here.

George

[truthergw]

Ah. I think I have the hang of how this works now. You are allowed to be sarcastic and criticise anyone who disagrees with you but that is not a licence for others to do the same. Does one have to be a chairman of something? I sometimes help out at my local stable. Would that let me have a go?

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon All,

Just two points:

Regardless of the "vitriol" (to quote Steenie) in some of the replies, this has been a very illuminating thread but, as an earlier poster pointed out, is in danger of getting overlooked (as much as any thread that includes a Custer contribution can), hidden away in "Virtual Library". Is it possible for a Mod to move it to somewhere that better reflects the historical content ?

Steenie, did you participate in the Light Cavalry Association recreation of the retreat from Mons last August ?

[steenie]

I don't think I have criticised anyone who hadn't already had a go. But if you feel I have then I am sorry (note the sacasm there?).

As for your question, no.

[steenie]

Steve,

I did have the pleasure of being incharge of a couple of the bounds and was overal organisor of the event. Thankyou for asking.

[Steven Broomfield]

Steenie; I wonder - is there a website for your organisation (the UK one, rather than the international)? I've Googled (they can't touch you for it, you know), but nothing comes up. I'd be interested to know more.

And Mr M, I agree. t would be nice to be moved elsewhere. Maybe the original post could be left here as a guide and the rest shifted?

[steenie]

Steven,

I am afraid not. We didn't see the need for one as our policy is to only invite in individuals or cavalry groups into the LCA GB, indeed the ILCA. The subject does come up on a regular basis at board meetings but there never is a great current of support for one. There are enough websites for us to trawl through of cavalry groups for us to invite them lol.

Besides the normal workings of the groups within the ILCA, currently we are all working hard on the International Cavalry Competition which will be held in Poznan in 2012 (that is when, with any luck, I will get the chop as President lol),. We believe, but I am sure someone will tell me we are wrong, that this will be the biggest cavalry competition seen since the early part of the C20th.

Steenie; I wonder - is there a website for your organisation (the UK one, rather than the international)? I've Googled (they can't touch you for it, you know), but nothing comes up. I'd be interested to know more.

And Mr M, I agree. t would be nice to be moved elsewhere. Maybe the original post could be left here as a guide and the rest shifted?

[Herekawe]

Happy New Year to you too, James. What you actually said was "While Amiens saw a large drop in availablity of tanks over the first few days of the battle they also covered a bit of ground and adsorbed a lot of punishment far more than Calvary could have sustained." Yet like all your other assertions to date you provide zero references for what, in their absence, remains just your unsubstantiated opinion.

You've made your points with so much scepticism of what has been posted here that it would be nice to have had you give some sources of your own as a basis for your own assertions. Even so, I'll make a couple of points in response – though I’m not prepared to waste my time by getting into a cycle of making sourced responses to a string of unsubstantiated opinion from you.

Firstly, what makes you think that the British had any need for their cavalry to 'save the day' for them at Amiens on 8 August 1918? I can't see anything in the Badsey quote I gave which would imply that.

Your idea that the quote I gave from Badsey implies that the British cavalry could have just kept going behind the German lines shows a complete misunderstanding of two things. Firstly, you obviously do not understand that the German defences which Badsey refers the cavalry as going through into open country are the enemy's positions along the old Amiens outer defences, and their place as objectives in the plan for the first day of the co-ordinated all-arms battle. These defences themselves consisted of outer and inner defences, the inner being essentially a series of disconnected posts. Behind these the enemy held the outer defences of the old Amiens defences. The cavalry went through both which was the second and third stages of the first days objective. Rawlinson's plan called for consolidation as each stage of the advance was achieved. Secondly, you fail to grasp what Badsey is describing in the quote I gave. If you read it, you will see that he is not describing a series of unilateral cavalry charges leading to a breakthrough by the cavalry to the enemy's rear. What he describes is all-arms combat in action - ie the cavalry are working in conjunction with the infantry. Rawlinson sends in the cavalry closely behind the first infantry assaults, which were supported, where available, by the tanks and preceded by the artillery barrage. The first infantry assaults take and hold the first line objectives. The cavalry then gallop through to take and hold positions further forward than the first infantry assaults, thereby extending the advance (in this they were assisted by light tanks, though as you will discover when you read Badsey, this area of all-arms co-operation was certainly not unproblematic, not least due to the speed differentials between the cavalry and the light tanks and the attitude of many in the Tank Corps). This extension of the initial advance is consolidated when the reserve infantry follow through to these advanced positions held by the cavalry. By this means the cavalry, working in tandem with successive infantry attacks, take the advance through the German outer defences before Amiens. The cavalry advanced some 23 miles from their points of concentration on the first day.

If you're keen to look at sources for this other than Badsey, have a look at Haig's ‘Despatches’ [pp 258 – 261, 327 – 328] and 'The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days August 8th to November 11th 1918' by the Fourth Army's MGGS, Major General Sir Archibald Montgomery [pp 44 – 46]. You may, of course, be one of those who automatically reject anything written by Haig or any other general. OK, to avoid accusations, however specious, of bias in the sources I reference, let’s have a look at what my old chum J P Harris, who is certainly no fan of Haig, has to say:

“For the attack of 8 August the Amiens Outer Defence Line [was] the ultimate objective for the Australian and Canadian Corps […] It was between 10,500 and 14,000 yards from the start line. Even if German resistance turned out to be weak any body of troops was bound to become tired if they tried to cover all of this distance in a single day’s attack. Fourth Army had thus always intended to do the operation in a series of three bounds, with pauses for consolidation after each. In the final version of the plan the first bound varied from 3,500 to 4,000 yards. This was about the limit to which the field artillery could deliver an effective creeping barrage and if a rapid advance could be made to this depth, much of the field artillery that the Germans had in the attack sector would be overrun. [Once this first line was reached] the cavalry role was to pass, as soon as seemed possible, through the leading elements of the Canadian and Australian Corps and to secure the Amiens Outer Defence Line ahead of the infantry [reserves]. […]These reserves would then ‘leap-frog’ to make the next bound of between 2,000 and 5,000 yards. […] The two battalions of Whippet tanks were put under Cavalry Corps command, but from each battalion one company of 16 tanks was to accompany the leading troops of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, thus coming under the Australian and Canadian Corps commanders respectively during at the start of the battle. [….] This was the British cavalry’s most successful day of the whole war on the Western Front […] They played a significant role in maintaining the momentum of the Fourth Army attack and carrying it rapidly to the Amiens Outer Defence Line [ie the 10,000 yards mentioned by Badsey]. The cavalry certainly took well over 1,000 prisoners on 8 August, probably as many as 3,000, as well as numerous guns. One regiment, the 5th Dragoon Guards, of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, in 1st Cavalry Division, took about 600 prisoners in a single incident, intercepting a trainload of reinforcements between Vauvillers and Framerville. One reason for the relative neglect of the cavalry achievement in some accounts of the battle may be an administrative factor. Counts of prisoners were officially recorded as corps ‘cages’. The cavalry at Amiens, however, did not employ cages of its own but handed all prisoners over to the nearest infantry division. Cavalry were supposed to obtain receipts for prisoners handed over to infantry formations but under the pressures of battle this was not always done. It seems that all prisoners taken by the cavalry on 8 August 1918 were thus officially counted as prisoners of the Dominion corps. Not wishing to be encumbered with captured guns, the cavalry seems to have left these too to be secured by the Dominion infantry.”

In your first post, you assert that cavalry on the Western Front "was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914." Yet in a follow up post you say "Reality is the horse was gone after WW1." So which is it, then? When Robert gave an example which corrected your misconception about the utility of cavalry on the Western Front your response was to say that you didn't know this because you have a dearth of information on the cavalry in your local library. So why make assertions on a subject upon which you admit you have basically no information? You give no sources in support of your assertions, and yet demand that the sources given by others be supplemented by other supporting sources.

If you have no sources to offer as a basis for your views on the cavalry, do you have any which lend support to your idea that the tanks and armoured cars of 1918 were more reliable and capable than some here have indicated? I have already quoted Terraine's statistics on the rapid reduction of effective tanks at Amiens from 342 on 8 August to just 6 by 12 August. On the Whippets which were in theory supposed to be working hand in glove with the cavalry, Paul Harris’ conclusion is that “[the] cavalry – Whippet co-operation idea was not a great success. The mobility characteristics and vulnerabilities of these instruments were too dissimilar. When the going was good the Whippets had difficulty keeping up with the cavalry and in general they made little impact in this battle.” As noted earlier, Badsey, too, identifies the difficulties in co-ordination between the cavalry and the Whippets, ascribing some of these at least to the problems the cavalry had in getting proper co-operation from the Tank Corps. As Badsey notes, “Surprisingly, several historians have accepted unquestioningly the Tank Corps’ interpretation of these events.” In addition to this, a very minor historian, in a surprisingly masterly book called ‘1918: A Very British Victory’, was right on the money when, after cataloguing their vulnerability to enemy shells and bullets, mechanical failure, and a propensity for catching fire, he described the state of development of the Whippet tanks deployed at Amiens as very much "a work in progress." Both Harris and our friend the minor historian reference the famous mad maraud behind enemy lines of a single Whippet, ‘Musical Box,’ on 8 August, which caused much localised mayhem. Yet Harris’ conclusion is that “Musical Box’s achievements were much vaunted by British tank enthusiasts between the wars. But its fate could equally well have served as a warning that tanks are very vulnerable when not intimately supported by other arms.” Whilst our chum the minor historian says of ‘Musical Box’ that “To some the episode created a vision of marauding tanks penetrating deep behind the German lines and causing mayhem, but the Whippet was not that weapon of war.”

So, in addition to my original quote from Badsey on the cavalry achievement at Amiens, I have now provided supporting references from senior participants in these events such as Haig and Montgomery as well as from writers who take opposing stances on Haig, such as Paul Harris, John Terraine, and my old mate the minor historian. These references also encompass the unreliability of the armoured support. I am under no illusions, however, that any of this will make any impression upon someone who, whilst admitting to having little or no references to the cavalry, still feels qualified to contradict those who do, and make assertions such as that cavalry on the Western Front “was actually pretty irrelevant once machine guns and barbed wire took over after 1914.”

George

Thank you George for this.

Have sifted the seed from the chaff.

James

[Robert Dunlop]

I have just written a tome on the erratic nature of von Bernardi's work 'Reiterdeinst' and his continual erosion of his own argument throughout.

steenie, what a terrible shame that you have lost this effort. I would have loved to read it. What did you regard as 'his own argument'?

Robert

[steenie]

Gen von Bernardi's work 'Reiterdeinst' (translated by Bridges of the Mons to the Marne Retreat fame), is self eroding and is a state of confusion. He is drawn to the romantic idea of the arme blanche and the successes of Frederick The Great's Cavalry, propounding the mass charge over open ground, then, he comes up with the idea that the weapon that demands the control of the batlefield is the rifle and as soon as it is used, whether the other side wants to use the sword or not, they will be forced to answer with the rifle. I do believe, that whilst Childers rips chunks out of von Bernardi and von Bernardi was doing the same to Childers, they were both singing from the same sheet, although von Bernardi was torn by his heart that harked back to the 'good ol'e days of cavalry' and his head telling him the rifle and automatic weapon, not only would but did have the day. If i start talking about the success of the Japanese Cavalry in the Machurian wars using the rifle instead of the sword etc, I will end up writintg the tome again. And to be honest I have other things to do in my life

steenie, what a terrible shame that you have lost this effort. I would have loved to read it. What did you regard as 'his own argument'?

Robert

[truthergw]

In what way is a trained cavalryman with adequate musketry skills at a disadvantage, compared to an infantryman? A cavalryman with proper training can do anything an infantryman can then he can mount up and put his cavalry skills and tactics to use. By the way, even the Kaiser was forced to give up massed charges at the annual exercises quite some time before the war.

[steenie]

The disadvantage of cavalry with a rifle as against infantry is not the level of accuracy, as it is well known, the cavalry did very well in shooting competitions. The main factor was the amount of muzzles the cavary could bring to bear as against infantry. Atleast a third of a cavalry regiment was tied up holding the horses for the rest to dismount and engage (one man held 3 horses). There was also more lost having to guard those dismounted holding the horses. This meant that nearly half of the men available were out of action looking after the horses. I would also hazzard a guess (and I am making an assumption), that infantry, by the fact that they committed more effort in training with the rifle than the cavalry, who had lots of other things to train in besides, probably could get more rounds off per minute per man.