Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical

[AlanCurragh]

As suggested, I'm going to move this to "Other" - Mike, perhaps you could repost the link to the original book back in Virtual Library?

Thanks

Alan

[JimSmithson]

Steenie

Can I ask which of Bernardi's books you mean by Reiterdienst? I have read his "Deutschland und der nächste Krieg" and "Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Kriege" from the Deutschen Nationalbibliothek in Leipzig but couldn't place your title. I checked on the library's catalogue and it is not there (most of his post war books by the way are not of great interest). I can't find a German reference to it anywhere. Is it an article from another publication? If so I would love the reference.

Jim

[steenie]

Jim,

I wish I could speak German but on the other hand I am not that disciplined to learn another language lol

'Cavalry in war and peace'

[Robert Dunlop]

steenie, thanks for your summary on von Berhardi. I have to respectfully disagree with the high level analysis that you provided, FWIIW. I wouldn't describe his works as being in a 'state of confusion'.

Robert

[steenie]

Robert,

Surely respectful disagreement is the basis of all good discussion. It is when disagreement becomes disrespectful that it is time to stop.

[truthergw]

The disadvantage of cavalry with a rifle as against infantry is not the level of accuracy, as it is well known, the cavalry did very well in shooting competitions. The main factor was the amount of muzzles the cavary could bring to bear as against infantry. Atleast a third of a cavalry regiment was tied up holding the horses for the rest to dismount and engage (one man held 3 horses). There was also more lost having to guard those dismounted holding the horses. This meant that nearly half of the men available were out of action looking after the horses. I would also hazzard a guess (and I am making an assumption), that infantry, by the fact that they committed more effort in training with the rifle than the cavalry, who had lots of other things to train in besides, probably could get more rounds off per minute per man.

A cavalry patrol would carry out it's function without dismounting. Using cavalry to move fast and hold ground until the infantry got there would not require holding horses in that way. The mounts would be tethered. Musketry standards were the same for cavalry and infantry. Only in exceptional circumstances would men actually fire 15 aimed rounds a minute. That was a training exercise as much as anything. That is what machine guns are for and cavalry carried theirs with them. Moving bodies of men across open ground, fast and reliably and able to fight when they got there required cavalry. If infantry could cover the intervening ground then so could cavalry and a lot faster. Forget arme blanche and shoulder to shoulder charges. That was not what cavalry were for and it had not been for years. Have a look at what Sordet's cavalry did in 1914 when he may well have saved French's bacon and what the Entente cavalry did in 1918 during the 100 days.

[Steven Broomfield]

Regarding the cavalry's ability to fire 'rapid', this from the History of the 11th Hussars (discussing the period around 1912:

A noticeable change at this time was the great advance which was made in rapid fire. As most continental powers could put into the firing-line far more men than we could, our aim was to counteract this disadvantage in numbers by training our men to fire a much greater number of rounds "rapid" with fair accuracy. This innovation added considerably to the standard required, but that it was well worth the trouble was proved on the first day of fighting in the War.

I will also add this comment from the book:

(After the South African War): The process of improvement was not allowed to slacken when the South African War was over and when the regiment was home again. For the next ten years it continued with increasing zeal. The brigadiers and inspectors of cavalry were men who had achieved success in war, and they trained their commands on the lines which they had found to work in war....As a result of all these influences, the 11th Hussar at Aldershot in 1914 was going through a much more elaborate course of training than did his predecessor of 1890.

I'm a newcomer to looking at cavalry in the GW, and I have to say that what I have read has, generally, opened my eyes to a lot of misconceptions. The 11th Hussars, at Nery (for example) fought an exemplary rearguard action (with the Bays and the 5th DG), taking over 70 prisoners and 8 guns. Without the training (in all aspects of their art) they had received, this was not going to have been possible.

[steenie]

I am sorry to say, there is nothing in any British manual on cavalry that propounds shooting (rifle), from horseback. It wasn't done. True Grit wasn't a style adopted. As for tethering. . .no. If you want your cavalry to end up as infantry after the first volley that is the way to do it.

It was one of the reasons that Major Meyer, the Riding Master at the Maidstone Military School of Equitation, in the mid C19th introduced the current way of mounting and dismounting called 'quickest and best' . The cavalryman doesn't use the stirrup but vaults on and off, to speed the ability of the cavalry to engage dismounted and get away smartly.

If you want to give it a go, I am happy for you to sight and fire an smle from a horse and see what you hit. Mind you, if you have provenance of such an action and it being a success I am willing to learn

As for moving across rough country, it is not the case that a mounted horseman can go where a man on foot can go. Why else would Haig have so many men tied up putting in cavalry roads in the hope of making the G. A cattlegrid says it all.

I agree with you about forgeting the arme blanche by this time in the development of modern war. i have been saying that all the way through this thread

[steenie]

With regard to your comment on the continual updating and improvement of the cavalry arm with the changes between 1890 to 1914 in training, this is reflected in the speed at which adjustments in the cavalry manual of the time was being made. We have Cavalry Training 1912, then, in no time, taking into account things learnt in the war we get Cavalry Training 1912 (1915). It must never be thought that cavalry was not always at the forefront of innovation and making 'adjustments' to address the changes of modern war.

Good aint it!!!

I'm a newcomer to looking at cavalry in the GW, and I have to say that what I have read has, generally, opened my eyes to a lot of misconceptions. The 11th Hussars, at Nery (for example) fought an exemplary rearguard action (with the Bays and the 5th DG), taking over 70 prisoners and 8 guns. Without the training (in all aspects of their art) they had received, this was not going to have been possible.

[PMHart]

Hi Steenie,

We have now been through a collective learning process where we can all just about read and understand George's reply to you - which I think you didn't bother reading and charmingly described as pompous. You will surely now see it would have saved you and a great many other people a lot of trouble enlessly arguing in circles about the role of cavalry.

Pete

PS If you have problems with some of the longer words I can help if you PM me! We don't want to bore any more people!!!

Your cavalry drill manuals re-enactment groups sound fascinating, Steenie, and I wouldnt argue with your right to your opinion on the evolution, doctrine and utility of the British cavalry up until and during the Great War, even though I would disagree with most of what you say.

French certainly cut his teeth, as you put it, in the South African war, but Haig had already seen mounted active service in the Sudan in 1898. The idea that cavalry doctrine in the Great War was something taken there unchanged from South Africa by French and Haig is simply not true, and ignores the practical doctrine for cavalry which was developed and modified as a response to modern firepower over several decades, and by many cavalry officers, prior to and beyond 1914. A knowledge of this process makes your assertion that the cavalry of the Great War wanted to get back to using the sword on each other completely unsustainable. You seem fixated on the idea of the cavalry of the Great War being synonymous with the sword, yet this ignores the realities of how the cavalry had evolved for integration into all arms warfare during the Great War. As Ive already alluded to, this process began decades earlier. For example, in January 1898 Haig spent part of his leave before going to Egypt as part of Kitcheners Sudan campaign at the Royal Ordnance Factory at Enfield learning the mechanism of the Maxim machine gun. Three months later, following the ambush of a Cavalry Brigade reconnaissance by Dervishes, Haig included the following in his report: "The Horse Artillery against enemy of this sort is no use. We felt the want of machine guns when working alongside of scrub for searching some of the tracks." Nine year later, in 1907, Haig would state that The true conclusion seems to be that even as a battle is only an incident in many months of campaigning, so a charge, though a very prominent part, is only one part of the function of the Cavalry, and efficiency in the use of the rifle is absolutely essential, as it will be in more frequent use. In his Review of the Work done during the Training Season 1912, Haig requested that more senior cavalry officers attend the musketry training course at Hythe, to learn the practical application of rifle fire to suit various tactical conditions. He also exhorted that the cavalry should learn how to use machineguns more effectively: More attention should be paid to the handling of cavalry machineguns when brigaded. Their drill and manoeuvre should, before departure to practice camp, attain a high standard of efficiency. As a result of such advocacy over the preceding decades, by 1918 the Cavalry Corps had a firepower capability commensurate with the rest of the BEF. From late August of that year, it included a cyclist battalion, the two Household battalions of motorised machine-gunners, an attached infantry brigade in buses, and a mixed artillery brigade including four 18-pounders and two lorry-towed 4.5-inch howitzers. All of which makes ludicrous the idea that the British cavalry of the Great War were somehow fixated with getting to grips sword to sword with the enemy.

As to your comment regarding Haig putting great effort into facilitating the movement of cavalry 'even' after Cambrai, this was something which paid off during both the German March offensive, and the Allied advance to victory during the Hundred Days in 1918. Because of government reductions in the cavalry throughout the war, the want of cavalry during the last year of the war was a real handicap at a time when all means of enhancing the mobility of the British armies were being seized by its commanders. Despite this, on 24 March, the third day of the great German offensive, a composite squadron of the 6th Cavalry Brigade demonstrated the continued utility of cavalry by carrying out a successful charge against enemy machine guns near Villeselve. Lt J. B. Bickersteth, MC, noted that the Squadron took 107 prisoners, with between 70 -100 Germans being sabred. The Squadron sustained some 73 casualties out of a contingent of 150, but comparatively few of these were killed. Writing in 1919, Bickersteth summed up the engagement as follows:

The whole operation though small in itself is a brilliant proof of what cavalry can do when they have the chance of being used in their proper capacity. Probably no better example of the value of shock action could be found in the history of the whole war. The manoeuvre gave the infantry renewed confidence, and they were able to push forward their line well beyond the limits of the charge, thus enabling the remnants of two battalions who had been fighting near Cugny to retire on Villeselve and reform.

And at Amiens the British cavalry proved that, in offensive as well as defensive battles of movement, and in the absence of all-terrain APC vehicles, it was still the fastest way of moving armed men about a battlefield as an integrated part of the new technological all-arms warfare. In 1918, a Whippet tank still had a cross-country speed of only about half that of cavalry horses. In criticising Haigs retention of a cavalry capability it is too often forgotten just how much in its infancy the motorized armour which would eventually supersede it was during the Great War, both in terms of performance and reliability. John Terraine has pointed out that at the start of the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, the British deployed 342 Mark V tanks and 72 Whippets. Their contribution cannot be gainsaid. But on 9 August only 145 were still fit for action; on 10 August, 85; on 11 August, 38, with just 6 being able to fight on 13 August. By contrast, Stephen Badsey notes that, at Amiens, Rawlinson [at Haigs behest] employed the cavalry to follow up the first infantry attacks and to gallop forward to hold positions while the reserve infantry caught up, extending the days advance from about 5,000 to 10,000 yards, clean through the depth of the German defences into open country. On the way the cavalry delivered several successful charges of regimental size, overrunning both guns and machine guns. The infantryman Rawlinsons judgment was that the cavalry had done splendid work. The cavalry, reduced in size through cutbacks though it was, kept harrying the retreating German army to the end, restricted only by the inability of the rebuilt railway supply lines to keep pace with them. On 9 November, Haig noted that All Corps commanders are asking for more cavalry.

The nature of trench warfare without flanks to turn naturally restricted the opportunities for the use of cavalry in 1915, 16 and 17 though, as at High Wood on 14 July 1916, the cavalry demonstrated that it could successfully albeit temporarily capture a piece of critical ground. But they performed invaluable work in the retreat of 1914, and due to the insistence by Haig upon the retention of the arm, were on hand to play their part in the re-establishment of semi mobile warfare in 1918, a period in military affairs when advances in firepower still easily outstripped developments in other nascent battlefield technologies such as the tank.

George

[steenie]

I was just thinking that this thread had got onto an even and gentlemanly keel. Even truthergw and I had got to discussion in an enjoyable way. Then, you come out with your only second contribution to this thread both consisting of snide comments which have no input to the cavalry discussion. If you have nothing constructive to add, why say anything? Never mind, if putting up such comment makes you feel good then good for you but I won't be part of it.

As my friend Phil_B said in his last comment on this thread:

'Yes, indeed. It`s my policy to vacate a thread in which replies have become unpleasant rather than engage in personal attacks.'

See Yar!!

Hi Steenie,

We have now been through a collective learning process where we can all just about read and understand George's reply to you - which I think you didn't bother reading and charmingly described as pompous. You will surely now see it would have saved you and a great many other people a lot of trouble enlessly arguing in circles about the role of cavalry.

Pete

PS If you have problems with some of the longer words I can help if you PM me! We don't want to bore any more people!!!

[truthergw]

I am sorry to say, there is nothing in any British manual on cavalry that propounds shooting (rifle), from horseback. It wasn't done. True Grit wasn't a style adopted. As for tethering. . .no. If you want your cavalry to end up as infantry after the first volley that is the way to do it.

It was one of the reasons that Major Meyer, the Riding Master at the Maidstone Military School of Equitation, in the mid C19th introduced the current way of mounting and dismounting called 'quickest and best' . The cavalryman doesn't use the stirrup but vaults on and off, to speed the ability of the cavalry to engage dismounted and get away smartly.

If you want to give it a go, I am happy for you to sight and fire an smle from a horse and see what you hit. Mind you, if you have provenance of such an action and it being a success I am willing to learn

As for moving across rough country, it is not the case that a mounted horseman can go where a man on foot can go. Why else would Haig have so many men tied up putting in cavalry roads in the hope of making the G. A cattlegrid says it all.

I agree with you about forgeting the arme blanche by this time in the development of modern war. i have been saying that all the way through this thread

I did not suggest that cavalry fired from horseback. Ideally a cavalry patrol will never fire at all. That is not their function. Cavalry needed bridges to cross trenches. As far as crossing open ground or proceeding along roads, cavalry will go where a fully equipped infantryman can go, faster and much further and be able to dismount, tether his horse and fight an action when he gets there. That is not surmise, it is fact. Repeated again and again. In 1914, Sordet's cavalry which was much less advanced than the British, covered 100s of kilometres in weeks. They crossed from one flank to the other, penetrated forward then gave cover to the left flank as the BEF retreated from Mons. Almost every day fighting in rearguard action. No infantry unit could have offered anything like that support. Major Meyer would appear to have been the Riding Master about the time of the Crimean War? The British Army learned a lot between then and the Great War. They went through at least two major reforms in that time. They were observers in the Franco-Prussian, Russo-Japanese Wars and The American Civil War. They evolved tactics and strategy in the ' Boer' War which defeated a nation of men born to the saddle and practised shots. I do not understand the reference to Haig and cattle grid.

[George Armstrong Custer]

It must never be thought that cavalry was not always at the forefront of innovation and making 'adjustments' to address the changes of modern war.

Good aint it!!!

Really? What happened to the asertions with which you entered this thread? You remember - the ones where you told us about "the vaunted, but by 1914 usless Charge against Infantry". And your claim that although the cavalry "couldn't face modern weaponary, [this] didnt stop all sides, continually wanting to get back to the open field of opposing army's cavalry using the sword on each other in the charge." And how about your assertion about "the ludicrous idea that horseflesh and swords can stand against modern bolt action rifles and machine guns"? Now that several examples of evolutionary cavalry success in the face of the very battlefield technology that you've pooh-pooh'd as 'ludicrous' have been given on this thread by myself and others you suddenly claim, without missing a beat, that "It must never be thought that cavalry was not always at the forefront of innovation and making 'adjustments' to address the changes of modern war."

You told us that you composed a long and learned post on a German doctrinal work, but that you unfortunately lost it before you could hit the post button. When asked to summarise it by Robert you come out with a paragraph of what is, to put it politely, utter nonsense given that you claim to have studied von Bernhardi's 'Cavalry in War and Peace'. Where, by the way, did you get the 'Reiterdienst' title from, if you have no German and, presumably, read his 'Cavalry in War and Peace' in the English translation?

The penny having finally dropped as to just how way off beam your posts here have been about the reality of British cavalry doctrine and practice up until and during the Great War, you now resort to adopting the arguments and evidence which have been deployed against you as if they have been your own throughout. Whilst this has a certain amusement value, it is in fact a waste of the time of people who have invested some effort into contributing sustainable arguments to this discussion. The role of the cavalry in the Great War is one of the last of the great myths and misunderstandings propagated by Liddell Hart and his acolytes to fall. It's therefore an important subject for discussion on a forum such as this. Too important to be hijacked by someone trailing on all their posts a list of Chairmanships of supposedly cavalry related organisations. As far as I can tell, these are organisations of your own creation and whose membership is unknown, though from their lack of profile or mention on the web this would appear to be minimal. And even if they weren't, one might reasonably expect the Chairman of such purportedly specialist cavalry organisations to know considerably more about the period they are claiming to represent than you have demonstrated here.

You screeched at me that you were not a re-enactor when I responded critically to the lack of factual content in your initial post on this thread. At the same time you were telling us that you were the man for anyone interested in "mounted cavalry for real as against reading about it", because "I am the President of the International Cavalry Association." You're not a cavalryman, Steenie - don't insult the memory of those who were. As to your not being a re-enactor, that's not what you were saying here - though it has to be said that you can't seem to make up your mind as to whether you'd accept being called a 'living historian':

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=55243&view=findpost&p=1177212

You now quote a line from your chum PhilB about vacating a thread, which he used when it was suggested to him that he might consider doing some of the research and drawing of conclusions which he continually expects others to do in response to his 'questions'. Well, I hope you mean that, because without the nonsense you've been interjecting this could be a really interesting and informative thread on what is still a grossly misunderstood aspect of the Great War. My first response to you on this thread critiqued the content of your post, not you. Your response was personal abuse, which you've sustained as a response to myself and others whenever it suits you. When anyone responds to this you attempt to claim that it is meek and gentle you who is under attack. I suggest that you do indeed stop wasting everybody's time, Mr Chairman.

George

[PMHart]

As my friend Phil_B said in his last comment on this thread:

'Yes, indeed. It`s my policy to vacate a thread in which replies have become unpleasant rather than engage in personal attacks.'

See Yar!!

And so Steenie rides off into the sunset after making a series of personal attacks and without ever answering a single one of George's points. But then bluster always was a cavalryman's defining trait!!!

Pete

[phil andrade]

Please provide statistics about the size of the BEF's cavalry contingent in August 1914 compared with its size at the end of the war.

It would be instructive to see how it compares in relative terms.

John Terraine made a striking observation when he wrote that, for the British, the war on the Western Front ended - as it had begun - with a cavalry action.

In 2006, at the International Conference at Canterbury commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Somme, I remember a lecture by David Kenyon (?) about the role played by the British cavalry at High Wood on July 14th 1916. He emphasised that it was an effective and modernised branch of the army, equipped with machine guns and manifestly able to inflict damage and exploit advantage.

I know next to nothing about horses, but imagine that the maintenace of a large cavalry establishment is time consuming, labour intensive and very demanding of space and money. Looking after the horses, finding and transporting hay for their food, keeping them shod, etc. etc....doesn't this amplify logistical problems ? I have also read that it increases the danger of tetanus.

With or without cavalry, horses were essential for the artillery, so to a degree their presence was unavoidable.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Please provide statistics about the size of the BEF's cavalry contingent in August 1914 compared with its size at the end of the war.

It would be instructive to see how it compares in relative terms.

John Terraine made a striking observation when he wrote that, for the British, the war on the Western Front ended - as it had begun - with a cavalry action.

In 2006, at the International Conference at Canterbury commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Somme, I remember a lecture by David Kenyon (?) about the role played by the British cavalry at High Wood on July 14th 1916. He emphasised that it was an effective and modernised branch of the army, equipped with machine guns and manifestly able to inflict damage and exploit advantage.

I know next to nothing about horses, but imagine that the maintenace of a large cavalry establishment is time consuming, labour intensive and very demanding of space and money. Looking after the horses, finding and transporting hay for their food, keeping them shod, etc. etc....doesn't this amplify logistical problems ? I have also read that it increases the danger of tetanus.

With or without cavalry, horses were essential for the artillery, so to a degree their presence was unavoidable.

Phil (PJA)

Certainly, care and maintenance of cavalry mounts consumed lots of resources. So did that of tanks, guns and even infantry. Perhaps we could approach your point from another direction. Could the resources consumed by cavalry have been better employed? I think that cavalry had a function which could not be performed by any other arm during the Great War. Although tanks are now seen as replacing cavalry, that was not their initial role which was to crush wire and suppress machine guns. To a great extent, a primary role of cavalry was scouting. That is, fast, long range patrol, behind enemy lines where possible, to gather intelligence. That role was taken over by aircraft, not tanks. Neither tanks nor aircraft had reached the level of performance and reliability to allow them to replace cavalry. Another important role was the ability to deliver relatively fresh troops some miles from their start point where they could hold tactically important points until support arrived. That function was not superseded until the advent of armoured brigades and their like with tanks, APCs , SPGs and air support in the Blitzkrieg of WW2. As you point out, horses were the common mode of transport between railhead and rear lines and I have seen figures which demonstrated that the feed for cavalry was a small proportion of the feed required for all horses. I cannot find the figures but I am confident George or Robert will have them to hand.

[Guest]

Another interesting book.

With the cavalry in the West

Page 146

" About 7 o'clock we moved on to Villers

Faucon, where we stayed until midday. At

that hour we moved off at a fast trot to a spot

about half-way down the valley which runs

from La Vacquerie to Masnieres. The infantry

and tanks had reached their objectives

and some cavalry had gone through. Several

villages had been captured and also guns and

prisoners ; some of the gunners had actually

been charged and killed with the sword "

Mike

[George Armstrong Custer]

I have seen figures which demonstrated that the feed for cavalry was a small proportion of the feed required for all horses. I cannot find the figures but I am confident George or Robert will have them to hand.

Ah, statistics! This from my REVIEW of the Badsey book:

"Statistically, Badsey’s book reveals some telling facts – particularly in respect of refuting contemporary political suggestions that the retention of the BEF’s cavalry prior to 1918 was an unsustainable drain on resources:

“The cavalry’s requirements made up only a small fraction of the Army’s demands, which included 5,919,427 tons of oats and hay shipped across the English Channel during the war compared with 5,269,302 tons of ammunition [....]”

Badsey goes on to note that during the war the British army purchased 1,248,323 horses and mules, but only 174,665 of these were riding horses.

Following on from this, Badsey details how, on 23 November 1916, Haig appeared before the War Committee on the question of reducing Britain’s cavalry capability. Haig pointed out that the three cavalry divisions consumed about 100 tons of all types of supply per day, which in context was a negligible amount. Indeed, as Badsey points out, one of Haig’s problems during the ‘Hundred Days’ was precisely the weakness of the Cavalry Corps. As of 1 March 1918, the strength of the British cavalry arm in all combat theatres was 15, 755 in total – a mere 1.65% of all fighting troops. To put that in context, the RFC’s strength on the same date was 31, 092 or 3.24% of all combat troops, whilst the Tank Corps had 10,072 or 1.05%. But Badsey also makes the point that by 1918 the Cavalry Corps, like the rest of the BEF, “had also come to rely heavily on firepower. From late August onwards it included a cyclist battalion, the two Household battalions of motorised machine-gunners, an attached infantry brigade in buses, and a mixed artillery brigade including four 18-pounders and two lorry-towed 4.5-inch howitzers."

George

[truthergw]

Ta, George.

[phil andrade]

Thank you, George.

A lot of distorted and stereotypical perceptions need to be reconsidered, I reckon.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Certainly, care and maintenance of cavalry mounts consumed lots of resources. So did that of tanks, guns and even infantry.

That's a well made point, Tom. And just as trained cavalrymen took time to train and replace, so too with, inter alia, tank crews. There's a note in Haig's diary for 19 March 1918, referring to a lunchtime discussion with Churchill, who was visiting GHQ. In this, Haig pinpoints the flaw - beyond the limited capabilities and reliability of the tanks - in Churchill's typically off the cuff scheme for an en masse replacing of men with machines:

"Churchill has written a Paper urging the reorganisation of the Army so as to employ mechanical appliances to take the place of men, because we are lacking in manpower. He stated that with the approval of the War Cabinet, he was proceeding with the manufacture of a large number of tanks (4,000). This is done without any consideration of the manpower situation and the crews likely to be available to put into them!"

George

[Steven Broomfield]

Following on from this, Badsey details how, on 23 November 1916, Haig appeared before the War Committee on the question of reducing Britain’s cavalry capability. Haig pointed out that the three cavalry divisions consumed about 100 tons of all types of supply per day, which in context was a negligible amount. Indeed, as Badsey points out, one of Haig’s problems during the ‘Hundred Days’ was precisely the weakness of the Cavalry Corps.

George

In November 1916, there would have been five cavalry divisions: as well as the British 1st, 2nd and 3rd, there were two Indian Divisions, the 4th and 5th.

Perversely, these latter two divisions, having performed well in the Advance to the Hindenburg Line in early '17, and having been involved in the counter-attack at Cambrai (in the case of the 5th Division), were sent to Palestine in early 1918. Although they performed very well there, one wonder whether their retention in France for what was to become the last year of the war would have made a greater contribution to victory. The thought of a few regiments of Pathans or Sikhs running amok through demoralised German infantry is something I'd like to see wargamed, if only to settle my curiosity!

[George Armstrong Custer]

In November 1916, there would have been five cavalry divisions: as well as the British 1st, 2nd and 3rd, there were two Indian Divisions, the 4th and 5th.

Yes, sorry for that confusion Steve - I omitted to include that Haig was referring specifically to the three British cavalry divisions in his statement on consumption to the War Committee. I assume that Haig was separating the British cavalry consumption because there was a move on by Curzon, as Chairman of the Shipping Control Board, to get the eleven Indian regiments of the 4 & 5 Divisions packed off to Egypt. If Curzon had had his way in 1916 they would have been sent off to Egypt long before they actually went to Palestine. Curzon's reasoning being that shifting the Indians to Egypt in '16 would save eight ships a year for forage. Haig and Wully Robertson managed to convince the Committee that even the tiny saving that Curzon calculated sending the Indians from France to Egypt would achieve was flawed. A temporary reprieve, of course, for as you say they were gone just when most needed between March - November 1918 - despite Haig's plea to the War Cabinet of 7 January '18 which Jim quoted earlier that "the value and importance of cavalry [was] very great not only in offensive but in defensive operations" which could exploit their superior mobility.

George

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon All,

As in previous "Cavalry" threads we've had, it appears to me that to label the cavalry obsolete during the period of WW1 is somewhat premature: true, the popular image of the charge, sabres drawn, was, apart from a few examples, consigned to an earlier era but the other varied uses, as so well detailed in other posts, still meant that the horse, horse transport and the cavalry provided the best available, widespread "all-terrain" vehicle that the army had.

I think that the real period where the British Army/Government could be accused of "living in the past" and not developing motorised/armoured transport was in the inter-war years (perhaps outside the remit of this Forum), where even in ordinary life the role of the horse waned dramatically as the motor vehicle became more reliable. Perhaps Allenby's successes in the Middle East during WW1 and the increased cavalry role on the Western Front in 1918, coloured the judgment of those in responsibility during the twenties and beyond? Perhaps those who had learnt the lessons of "all arms combat" that were deployed so successfully during the "100 days" weren't in the right positions afterwards to continue that development of the British Army ? (Haig ???)

(or perhaps deep down we all dream of being cavalrymen, with the bugle playing, over the pounding of horses hooves, at the charge, sabres/lances to the fore........even Mr B couldn't resist a "what if !" in his post...... but in reality as Bosquet said "c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre !)

[Steven Broomfield]

Interestingly, Willoughby Norrie was a subaltern with the 11th Hussars (at Nery he took a fairly prominent role). During the course of the war he served in various Staff appointments, including with the tanks in 1918, winning a DSO and two MCs.

In WW2 he was a Lieutenant general in N Africa. Although he performed well initially, his XXX Corps was very badly cut up at Gazala by Rommel; Norrie was sidelined thereafter, even being pretty well dismissed by Monty from the planning staff for Overlord. he ended the war as Governor of South Australia, hardly a front-line role.

Why is this interesting? Possibly it isn't, but I read that Norrie was accused of handling XXX Corps like a cavalry charge!

Maybe Mr Marsdin's point is valid - were all cavalry lessons learned and remembered in the inter-war years? I recall, many years ago, listening to an old soldier talking of his time in the 10th Hussars in N Africa, when he said his Squadron CO charged his Crusader tanks against german anti-tank guns like a cavlry charge ... the Shiny Tenth were all but wiped out in the course of this.