Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical

[truthergw]

I suspect that the reason that motorisation did not proceed as fast as it might have was almost purely financial. There was a great run down of all arms after the war. Inevitable given that the army in 1918 was by far the largest ever fielded by UK. There was also the great depression and the understandable drive toward peace and away from all things warlike. It was a wonder that any refit was undertaken at all. However, as you say that was all in the future and off topic.

[JimSmithson]

Glad to see this thread stabilise somewhat. Just two points from me:

Firstly there have been a few comments about the cavalry in the following up of the German retreat in early 1917. This is, unfortunately, one of those areas of study crying out for a really good piece of work. The little I can glean from the OH is a series of small actions by all arms, in comparatively open countryside, led by many junior officers who for the majority of their experience had been peering over the top of a trench. Quite a steep learning curve for them I am sure. Cavalry played an important role in these actions but I have not seen many sources which have thoroughly investigated its use. Anyone up for a book or a thesis!

Secondly an additional element of interest out of those minutes I quoted in an earlier post to add to the points on complaints about the strain on transport that the cavalry were seen to be:

"The Prime Minister pointed out that the Cavalry question vitally affected shipping, and that , in view of the shortage of shipping, he hoped that every effort would be made to economise the requirements of our Army in the matter of horses and their maintenance. It would be most helpful if some of the ships now utilised in the transport of horses and hay could be used for the purpose of bringing over American troops. Lord Curzon added that it would appear that the character of warfare during the ensuing few months would present

fewer opportunities for the use of Cavalry. Sir Douglas Haig stated that once the Cavalry had been disbanded it would be very difficult to build up again so highly - trained and technical an arm, and it would require many months before the Cavalry, once dissipated , could be recreated." CAB 23/44B

If anyone wants a very interesting read (and has some considerable time on their hands) then I suggest finding and downloading CAB 23/44B. It is the most remarkable collection of documents, beginning 1917 and going to 1923 consisting of mainly documents that were not published and only seen by the War Cabinet members. Topics range from; the discussion on the Western Front from which the quotes above are taken, so secret that there are instructions on their distribution and use, through the discussions surrounding the Russian Revolution, after the War a fascinating insight into the behind the scenes discussions during Versailles and the discussions with the Arab states over promises made by the British and involving the Emir Feisal.

Jim

[PMHart]

Hi chums,

Now that the children have left in high dudgeon to play horsey you may be interested in these quotes from two cavalrymen I interveiwed who were involved in the patrols after the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917.

The first is Trooper John Fell who was in a four man patrol towards Vermand, 21/3/1917-30/3/1917.

Everything had been devastated. There wasn't a building that wasn't a heap of brick rubble, trees had been cut down and were lying across the road, telegraph poles cut down, any major road intersection had been mined and blown up. We rode in the shape of a diamond, one man in the front, two on each side and one behind. The officer in charge would be in the middle. It covered the ground and gave us the best lookout. We were approaching a village and right in the middle of the road was a lovely German dress helmet, all shiny-black with metal facings. Just the thing to pick up for a souvenir! But we had been warned that things like that would be booby-trapped - so I gave it a wide berth! A very funny thing, as I got near the village, everything was quiet and a ghostly sort of atmosphere with all the devastation. Then I heard an intermittent sort of moaning sound. It rather worried me because it sounded as if somebody was in pain. As I got nearer it got louder, and louder, and eventually I found that all it was an old door hanging on a rusty top hinge and the little breeze was causing to sway. Just a heap of rubble - no buildings standing. Trooper John Fell, C Squadron, 1st Surrey Yeomanry

We came to a stream of water, about 15 feet wide. The water was running rather fast and as far, as I could make out, it was running over brick rubble. I put old Roger to the water to go across and he wouldn't have anything to do with it - he wouldn't go into that water. Which rather surprised me because he'd never given me that sort of trouble before. Nothing I could do would get his forefeet into the stream. Eventually I bent right down over his shoulder to see if there was any reason for it. There in the brick rubble, obscured by the rippling water was coils and coils of barbed. wire. I couldn't see it but he could. If he'd got his forefeet in that I wouldn't like to think about the result! Trooper John Fell, C Squadron, 1st Surrey Yeomanry

Fell then found himself out of sight of the rest of the patrol.

I was going through a wood. It was fairly clear, not much undergrowth, but the top hamper of the trees obscured the light. It made the whole place a bit dismal and ghostly. Whether it as the spooky atmosphere but I suddenly had a premonition that something was going to happen. It suddenly occurred to me that the most likely thing was that we could run into a patrol of German cavalry, Uhlans, armed with lances. It suddenly struck me that I'd never had any instruction about defending myself against an attacks with a lance. When I left the wood I should be going over and area of grass land, immediately on the other side was another wood. On the right was what I took to be a sunken road or demarcation ditch about 500 yards distance away. I started over the open space and it suddenly struck me it was a new line of trenches. My first reaction was to turn round and report this to Mr Kidd. I got about half way round and suddenly something smacked into the back of my left arm. It wasn't painful particularly but it was a pretty hard whack. At that same moment Roger sprang up on his air on his hind lines, twisted round and set off at a mad gallop. The bullet went right through the back of my elbow and it went right up the arm and came out of the wrist - severed all the muscles and nerves - it was a hell of a mess! My left arm was completely paralysed I looked down and saw a mass of blood, over everything - my forearm, britches, tunic, the saddle and the horse's shoulders. Then I began to feel faint, I suppose it was the loss of blood or sheer fright. I must get at my water bottle to have a drink of water. I tore my bandolier off, I threw my rifle away, but I never got that water bottle - I began to pass out. Trooper John Fell, C Squadron, 1st Surrey Yeomanry

He was found and evacuated by his comrades.

And here is the second Trooper Robert Cook

We went on to this village and it started snowing like blazes. We went off down to the right-hand side and the others went on the left-hand side. We got into the village at the bottom, close by a little stream. The place was full of bricks, walls knocked down so we were dismounted. The Colonel and I, we were going to walk up through the village. Suddenly a machine gun blasted out and the odd bullet came round our way. We decided to get out! We went out galloping over a long ploughed field and my horse suddenly went down, he might have put his foot down or he might have had a bullet in the heel or anywhere – Bang! I was crouched down in the saddle, trying to make a small target of myself - the bloody horse the whole saddle slipped off. But my rifle didn’t slip off it stuck in the holder. Joey, my bloody horse turned off to the left, sort of going to Germany to get his lunch! Bill Cole waited a long time to try and get me on board, but I couldn’t mount his horse, I said to Bill, “****** off!” I got down in this lane, ran along it a decent way and then cut across, the way they went, a big long ploughed field. Half way across the Germans started firing at me. I was right in the open so I ‘died’; threw myself down and ‘died’ a death facing the enemy so to speak! Not being at all brave over this! Then I got up again and chased off. Trooper Robert Cook, C Squadron, 1st Surrey Yeomanry, III Corps

He commented further on the photos taken and now at the IWM....

No cameras were allowed and none were concealed so there were no photographs at all. The official photographer came along to us and we had to redo it for his benefit. They arranged everything very nicely; they put the odd German helmet about and we did what we could to make it as ‘live’ as possible! Trooper Robert Cook, C Squadron, 1st Surrey Yeomanry, III Corps

Cheers,

Pete

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Pete. Independently I have read several anecdotal accounts and studied war diaries around the actions involving cavalry during Operation Alberich.

Robert

[Brian Curragh]

Gary Sheffield's comments on cavalry - taken from an interview published this week on History.Net here

"As for cavalry, along with many other thinking officers he continued to believe it had a battlefield role, and events on the Western Front (especially in 1918) and elsewhere, notably [Field Marshal Edmund] Allenby's campaign in Palestine, show he was right. Haig was undoubtedly too ambitious in some of his plans for use of cavalry, but that is not to say he was entirely wrong to use them."

Brian

[Robert Dunlop]

I have to respectfully disagree with Sheffield's comment about Haig being too ambitious in some of his plans. Allenby's campaign in Palestine, most notably Megiddo, was dependent on the timely availability of cavalry in the right place. If Megiddo had failed then no doubt Sheffield would say that Allenby had been too ambitious. Haig consistently ensured that his commanders planned for cavalry to exploit opportunities. In the end, there was no Megiddo on the Western Front. Had the Germans collapsed, there might have been.

Commentators like Sheffield have failed to grasp the way in which Haig oversaw the planning of operations. Haig was a superb scenario planner. He considered various options at the same time, ensuring that planning covered the different options.

Robert

[George Armstrong Custer]

you may be interested in these quotes from two cavalrymen I interveiwed who were involved in the patrols after the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917.

Thanks for those, Pete, nice to have the voice of real cavalrymen appear on this thread. Did you ever interview any former cavalrymen or tankies who'd had personal experience of the, often less than successful, attempts to co-ordinate operations between the cavalry and the Whippets in 1918?

George

[George Armstrong Custer]

I have to respectfully disagree with Sheffield's comment about Haig being too ambitious in some of his plans. [...]

Commentators like Sheffield have failed to grasp the way in which Haig oversaw the planning of operations. Haig was a superb scenario planner. He considered various options at the same time, ensuring that planning covered the different options.

I entirely agree, Robert, and this opens up all sorts of questions which lead us into an analysis of the historiography, which might offer clues as to some of the reasons why we find failures of understanding, or examples of obtuse interpretation. from influential figures from whom we might not expect it.

In terms of the original and ongoing research which has enabled a transformation in our understanding of the evolution and achievement of the British Armies, the historiography of the Great War unquestionably owes a great deal to professional academic historians such as Gary Sheffield and the university-and Sandhurst based military history establishment. Having said that, I also believe that some members of this highly influential establishment remain, to some extent at least, hidebound by aspects of the old orthodoxies which their own research has otherwise helped to dispel. There’s undoubtedly a certain irony in that.

In 2008, Huw Strachan wrote that “Sheffield is the heir of John Terraine, who memorably and provocatively subtitled his 1963 biography of Haig “the educated soldier”. Sheffield was indeed at one time seen by many as a natural successor to John Terraine but, in my opinion, as his academic star has risen as Professor of War Studies at the University of Birmingham he seems to have become increasingly equivocal in his endorsements of Haig. Alongside this there is some evidence in his writings of an apparent – and inexplicable – ignorance or dismissal of the closely related subject of the evolved role of cavalry, particularly in 1918.

What most tenured military historians have been moving towards over the past couple of decades, of course, is a greater than ever in-depth appreciation of the so-called 'learning curve'* which had left the BEF the best army in the field by 1918. In doing so, however, it concerns me that some seem to be increasingly edging towards divorcing Haig from that achievement. Whilst it's of course unsustainable to see the hand of one man in all the tremendous changes on a vast scale undergone in manpower, training, integrated all-arm tactics, logistics and the technology of war between 1916-18, it would be equally ludicrous to edge towards suggesting that it all happened independently of, or even despite, the man who not only oversaw it all but sanctioned and drove it forward through the whole of that period. To do so comes parlously close to the old calumnies which held Haig responsible for any British reverses whilst success was achieved despite him. In this respect a 1944 diary entry by Erwin Rommel could as well have been penned by Haig in 1918: “What will history say in passing its verdict on me? If I am successful here, then everybody else will claim all the glory…But if I fail here, then everybody will be after my blood.”

When Sheffield wrote in an article for The Times on 7 November 2009 that "Haig remains a controversial figure, his victories in 1918 needing to be put in the balance alongside the Somme and Passchendaele," it seems to me that he is suggesting that the victories of 1918 were somehow separate from, rather than a consequence of, 1916 and 1917. Yet without the unrelenting hammerings it sustained on the Somme and Third Ypres the German field army would have been a much tougher nut to hold in March 1918 and to crack between August and November. And like him or loath him, the hand at the helm that kept that pressure turned up through that whole period, despite the best efforts of Lloyd George, was of course Haig. In the same article, Sheffield states “I must declare an interest here: I am completing a biography of Haig that is moderately sympathetic to the man." ‘Moderately sympathetic’? Good grief – is that the most he can rise to? A case of damning with faint praise, and surely an end to the idea that Sheffield is the ‘natural successor to John Terraine’.

We have seen Sheffield’s rather mealy mouthed assessment of Haig and the utility of cavalry in Brian’s useful link. In his 2001 ‘Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities’, Sheffield both dismisses and then ignores the role of the British cavalry on the Western Front (p 102):

“Not only were the armies of the era of the Great War virtually unique in history in lacking effective voice communications, they also lacked an instrument of exploitation. Throughout history, most armies […] have been composed of a triad of three arms: infantry [...] , artillery […], and a mobile arm. […] The events of 1914 -18 were to demonstrate that under the conditions usually pertaining to trench warfare, a combination of barbed wire and modern weapons rendered cavalry obsolete. As we shall see, the tank introduced in 1916 was incapable of taking up traditional cavalry roles, thus there was a leg missing from the stool.”

Well, actually, the evolved and integrated cavalry arm ensured that there wasn’t a ‘leg missing from the stool’ in an era when efficient mechanized technology still hadn’t caught up with that of firepower. The stool may have been a bit wobbly during this interim, but it was still capable of weight bearing. But you’d never know that from Sheffield’s account of the British success at Amiens on 8 August 1918 (ibid, pp 200 – 202), which he manages to do without mentioning the fact that cavalry were even present, let alone that this was, in Paul Harris’ words, “the British cavalry’s most successful day of the whole war on the Western Front […] They played a significant role in maintaining the momentum of the Fourth Army attack and carrying it rapidly to the Amiens Outer Defence Line.”

Sheffield comes from the last generation of Great War academic historians who came into the subject believing the calumnies which had been propagated by Liddell Hart and his followers over decades. As he concedes in the Preface to the edition of Haig’s Diaries which he co-edited with John Bourne in 2005, “Originally we shared the common view of Douglas Haig as the classic ‘donkey’. Now, while we are not blind to Haig’s faults and the mistakes he undoubtedly made, we recognize the ‘donkey’ image for the unfair and ludicrously inaccurate caricature that it is.” What Sheffield doesn't say, however, is that the evidence allows us to go much further in dispelling the myths than merely debunking the 'ludicrously inaccurate caricature' which was only the most extreme part of the armoury of the 'Lions led by Donkeys' brigade. And just as some of those distinguished Great War historians who began their careers as disciples of Liddell Hart cannot quite bring themselves to entirely repudiate that old fraud despite the evidence of researchers like John Mearsheimer,** so many cannot entirely bring themselves to accord Haig credit without on each occasion they do so offering a negative caveat. I am not talking here of sadly deranged individuals like Denis Winter here but of tenured academics who are quite aware of the evidence that Haig’s achievement was stupendous and unique in British military history. Many from this university- and Sandhurst based military history establishment are the ones whose research has uncovered much of this evidence in Haig’s favour. Yet despite this, such is the shadow of the Liddell Hart orthodoxy that a nod to its calumnies still too often takes the place of balance in their published accounts. It is as if academic credibility within that community depends upon continuing to leaven any positive account of Haig with a whiff of donkey crap.

This technique is revealed in Paul Harris’ truly inept 2008 biography of Haig, which concludes that “It seems impossible to make the case for Haig as one of history’s great generals. In relation to most of the war it is difficult to see him as a good one.” When I published a source based critique on a specific part of his book,*** Harris’ response, rather than offering anything in the way of new evidence in support of his conclusions or to refute the evidence I deployed against them, Harris instead took the time-honoured route of Haig iconoclasts when their assertions are confronted with evidence-based analysis. That is, instead of responding with a reasoned rebuttal to criticisms of their work, they seek instead to undermine the credibility of the critic by specious suggestions that anything positive written about Haig without a critical caveat is tantamount to blind ‘hagiography.’ Certainly Harris ensures that in his biography any unavoidable mention of anything to Haig’s credit has a negative rider appended to it. So, for instance, on p. 533, Harris concedes that the evidence supports the view that

"Most of Haig’s basic attitudes and beliefs, therefore, were not bad ones by contemporary standards, perhaps not even by modern liberal standards."

Yet he immediately seeks to undermine this by going on to declare:

"But this is not a hagiography and he was no saint."

It is difficult to see why Harris should think that simply conceding that Haig’s core attitudes and beliefs have stood the test of time rather better than those of many of his contemporaries should be mistaken for hagiography or saintliness. As it is, lest any of his readers should make that mistake, Harris’s detrimental caveat that Haig “was no saint” is justified by the rather tangential and obscurantist assertions that

In his youth he [Haig] had no particular vocation, and, while he was probably of somewhat above-average intelligence, his academic aptitude was, perhaps, too limited for the learned professions.

And so it goes on.

By criticising aspects of Sheffield and Harris’ work I do not intend to suggest that, by comparison, Terraine was infallible, either in his methodology or in his conclusions. Indeed, where Sheffield omits any mention of the cavalry’s role at Amiens, Terraine gives an entirely inadequate one in 'The Educated Soldier' [ p 456]. One should bear in mind, however, that Terraine’s ‘Douglas Haig The Educated Soldier’ is now approaching fifty years old. The key to Terraine is that, unlike Sheffield, he basically did very little archive work, apart from Haig's diaries, which Dawyck Haig gave him access to before depositing them with the NLS. But he was masterly at analysing and using secondary works. However as those secondary works have been reassessed through subsequent research, so have parts of Terraine's work become dated. His place as an historiographical watershed in evaluating many aspects of Great War remains invulnerable, though.

The ongoing misconceptions about the scale of Haig’s achievement as C-in-C and the utility of cavalry are, for obvious reasons, inextricably linked. As this thread has shown, the evolution of the British cavalry in the decades long hiatus between developments in firepower and the advent other fully functioning battlefield technologies was a complex one to which Haig was but one contributor. But once he became C-in-C in December 1915 he became central to the question of the continued utility of the cavalry and, indeed, to the arm’s very survival. As the examples which I have given from Sheffield and Harris illustrate, the misconceptions on both Haig and the cavalry are fault lines which continue to a greater or lesser degree to run through the work of current academic historians – even amongst those whose reputations and general stance on the BEF’s performance in the Great War might suggest otherwise. I do regret the fact that in this particular respect Sheffield has failed to live up to the expectations of some of us - it is not as if the sources are not there to support more than what has become his increasingly luke-warm academic appreciation of Haig's achievement and all of the means by which it was gained. Only when enough historians have the guts to recognise and establish that achievement without embarrassed equivocation can we at last move on to a critical analysis of the means by which it was brought about, with research such as that of Badsey and Kenyon on the cavalry being put into its proper context.

George

*My own preferred analogy for this learning process would be a plural ‘learning roller coasters’, conjuring up the image of two roller coasters, a German and an Allied one, sitting side by side. As the track of one roller coaster peaks on a high point, as that side develops a technical or tactical ascendancy, it will be reflected in a corresponding trough on the other and vice versa – whilst periods of stalemate are represented by coinciding peaks or troughs on both roller coasters.

** See, for instance, Brian Bond’s ‘Liddell Hart A Study of His Military Thought’, and contrast it with Mearsheimer’s far less forgiving interpretation of the evidence in his ‘Liddell Hart and the Weight of History’.

*** Also accessible online HERE.

[Andrew Hesketh]

May I just say how appreciative I am of the quality and detail of so many contributions. This thread is providing a really good read.

[salesie]

I've followed this thread as an interested spectator, not least because my detailed knowledge of the cavalry arm of the BEF was somewhat less than limited (but has been greatly improved by following this thread). And, although I have no particular axe to grind vis-a-vis Gary Sheffield et al, I feel a need to explore this criticism of Sheffield's words a little further.

Sheffield said in the article, "As for cavalry, along with many other thinking officers he continued to believe it had a battlefield role, and events on the Western Front (especially in 1918) and elsewhere, notably [Field Marshal Edmund] Allenby's campaign in Palestine, show he was right. Haig was undoubtedly too ambitious in some of his plans for use of cavalry, but that is not to say he was entirely wrong to use them." Then Robert and George disagreed with this appraisal. George on the grounds that certain academics always seem to take the edge off of any praise they have for Haig by the concurrent use of criticism, and Robert on the grounds that such criticism by Sheffield is unwarranted because Haig was a "scenario planner" and planned for alternative scenarios at the same time, and used the lack of a battle of Megiddo on the Western Front to reinforce his point.

Now, it seems to me that, on the face of it, there was nothing in the quote to warrant this level of criticism of Sheffield - it seems to me that this quote pretty much supported those who, rightly in my opinion, defended the decision to retain a cavalry force right to the end of the war. So I have to ask George and Robert, are you aware of the specifics underpinning "Haig was undoubtedly too ambitious in some of his plans for use of cavalry..."? Can you explain which plans does Sheffield regard as "too ambitious", and which events does he regard as showing that Haig "was right" to believe that cavalry had a battlefield role on the Western Front?

I'm not trying to score any points here, just trying to better understand this criticism of Sheffield by asking for more detail.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Sheffield said in the article, "As for cavalry, along with many other thinking officers he continued to believe it had a battlefield role, and events on the Western Front (especially in 1918) and elsewhere, notably [Field Marshal Edmund] Allenby's campaign in Palestine, show he was right. Haig was undoubtedly too ambitious in some of his plans for use of cavalry, but that is not to say he was entirely wrong to use them." Then Robert and George disagreed with this appraisal. George on the grounds that certain academics always seem to take the edge off of any praise they have for Haig by the concurrent use of criticism, and Robert on the grounds that such criticism by Sheffield is unwarranted because Haig was a "scenario planner" and planned for alternative scenarios at the same time, and used the lack of a battle of Megiddo on the Western Front to reinforce his point.

No, there's not two different criticisms of Brian's Sheffield quote going on, Salesie. If you note the start of my post, I agree with Robert's reasons for his critiquing of that piece.

What my post does is go on to look for an explanation for some of Sheffield's writings on Haig and cavalry utility on the Western Front, given that he was widely regarded as Terraine's successor (not, by the way, an accolade I think he'd thank you for. Despite his admiration for his achievement in changing perceptions, Sheffield has made clear the differences in approach between himself and the populist academic 'outsider' Terraine). In my post, I identify some patterns within a certain circle of academic military historians and give some of my personal reasoning on how that came to be - largely that a generation of groundbreaking research is still leavened by elements of their earlier belief in Liddell Hart and his disciples version of the Great War. The criticism I make in that respect is restricted to specific areas of Sheffield's work, and I note he and his generation's contributions to the achievement of the BEF in the Great War. Nor, I'd point out, are my criticisms confined to Sheffield; indeed, they include Haig's greatest defender, John Terraine.

This wasn't meant as a hatchet job on Sheffield or anyone else, though I appreciate that you may not be implying that it was. Rather, it is an exploration of how - sometimes subtly, sometimes less so - the old calumnies still insinuate themselves into the work of those who grew up with them, despite the emergence of so much new evidence to the contrary. It is not that long ago that saying anything postive about Haig's command was to invite academic ridicule and loss of credibility. Some of those attitudes still have an - albeit much reduced - resonance in certain corridors of academia today.

George

[salesie]

No, there's not two different criticisms of Brian's Sheffield quote going on, Salesie. If you note the start of my post, I agree with Robert's reasons for his critiquing of that piece.

What my post does is go on to look for an explanation for some of Sheffield's writings on Haig and cavalry utility on the Western Front, given that he was widely regarded as Terraine's successor (not, by the way an accolade I think he'd thank you for. Despite his admiration for his achievement in changing perceptions, Sheffield has made clear the differences in approach between himself and the populist academic 'outsider' Terraine). In my post, I identify some patterns within a certain circle of academic military historians and give some of my personal reasoning on how that came to be - largely that a generation of groundbreaking research is still leavened by elements of their earlier belief in Liddell Hart and his disciples version of the Great War. The criticism I make in that respect is restricted to specific areas of Sheffield's work, and I note he and his generation's contributions to the achievement of the BEF in the Great War. Nor, I'd point out, are my criticisms confined to Sheffield; indeed, they include Haig's greatest defender, John Terraine.

This wasn't meant as a hatchet job on Sheffield or anyone else, though I appreciate that you may not be implying that it was. Rather, it is an exploration of how - sometimes subtly, sometimes less so - the old calumnies still insinuate themselves into the work of those who grew up with them, despite the emergence of so much new evidence to the contrary. It is not that long ago that saying anything postive about Haig's command was to invite academic ridicule and loss of credibility. Some of those attitudes still have an - albeit much reduced - resonance in certain corridors of academia today.

George

You're right, George, I wasn't insinuating this criticism was a "hatchet job". And I agree that the "ee-aw" brigade's dogma still has a mighty grip on many common, and not so common, perceptions of how the Great War was fought (as I've said many times on this forum I regard the phrase "Lions led by Donkeys" to be not just an oxymoron but an insult to the intelligence of the men of all ranks who actually fought the war). What I'm trying to do, given the quote of Sheffield's is so generalised, is to better understand the specifics of his "too-ambitious" phrase and how its juxtaposition with "Haig was right to believe that cavalry still had a battlefield role" can be maintained.

When I first read the quote, I saw it as saying that Haig had human failings, but was right overall (which I agree with) - but when your criticism followed it, I thought there may be more to the quote than meets the eye, I thought it may have a wider context (in specific terms) that you and Robert were aware of.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

You're right, George, I wasn't insinuating this criticism was a "hatchet job".

Thought so - I knew a cantankerous Yorkshire git like you'd have called a spade a f***ing shovel if you'd had something to say on that!

I thought there may be more to the quote than meets the eye, I thought it may have a wider context (in specific terms) that you and Robert were aware of.

There is. But as the genesis of the thinking on this is Robert's, and I happen to know that he's currently working specifically on that for publication elsewhere, I'll leave it to him as to how far he'd like to see it taken here.

George

[Brian Curragh]

George

Your post (#108) is of your usual excellent standard - I do think, however, you are being slightly harsh when you refer to Gary's "ignorance or dismissal of the closely related subject of the evolved role of cavalry".

I need to declare an obvious interest here - Gary has been the Module Tutor for our last term which focussed on "Training, Tactics & Technology" - and he will also be marking my essay in the next few weeks!

At our last Saturday School in December, Gary gave a lecture on the various elements of the all-arms battle that was fought in 1918. From my notes, his comments on the utility of cavalry - and I am condensing his comments heavily here - were along the lines that while the traditional view of cavalry was that they were "clearly obsolete" in the Great War, the recent works by Stephen Badsey & David Kenyon had successfully challenged this and the current view was that cavalry were used effectively by adapting them to the new environment of 1918. I wouldn't say he was dismissing them - they were very much one of the arms available to Haig & GHQ.

He also fairly vigorously demolished the slant that had been placed on Haig's "always a place for the well bred horse" comment [bTW you don't have a source for this by any chance?] and laid the blame squarely at Liddell Hart's door for starting that particular hare running.

He has equally been positive about my examination of the Queen's Own Oxfordshire Hussars as a dissertation for the MA. Hopefully I will be able to offer a more considered view after completion of that exercise.

So no hard evidence I am afraid just the impression I got from hearing him talk. We may well get a better idea of his views when "The Chief" comes out later this year.

Regards

Brian

[George Armstrong Custer]

[...] I do think, however, you are being slightly harsh when you refer to Gary's "ignorance or dismissal of the closely related subject of the evolved role of cavalry". [...]

At our last Saturday School in December, Gary gave a lecture on the various elements of the all-arms battle that was fought in 1918. From my notes, his comments on the utility of cavalry - and I am condensing his comments heavily here - were along the lines that while the traditional view of cavalry was that they were "clearly obsolete" in the Great War, the recent works by Stephen Badsey & David Kenyon had successfully challenged this and the current view was that cavalry were used effectively by adapting them to the new environment of 1918. I wouldn't say he was dismissing them - they were very much one of the arms available to Haig & GHQ.

A fair and interesting point on Sheffield's current stance, Brian, which you're obviously in a better position than me to know. I was basing my assessment, of course, on what he wrote (and didn't write!) on cavalry in 'Forgotten Victory'. This, as you'll know, was published in 2001 - ie 7 years before Badsey's PhD work on cavalry was published as 'Doctrine & Reform'. I'm glad to hear he's now embraced that work, which hopefully bodes well for his forthcoming Haig biography - though as Robert has pointed out, some of what he says in that HistoryNet.com interview remains problematic. I also noted a certain equivocalness in his answer to the question of 'Was Haig a butcher?' But we'll wait for the book - which I note that he's retitled as 'The Chief', from the 'Douglas Haig, The British Army and the First World War' which was scheduled for publication in February last year before being pulled (it's still listed under that title on Amazon). Doubtless the latter title was felt to be too close to Paul Harris' dud of two years ago! Sheffield's book will undoubtedly be immeasurably more favourable to Haig than Harris', and I hope that in it he can now bring himself to show the same courage as Terraine in painting a portrait which the mass of positive evidence - more than Terraine ever had access to - fully supports, only inserting caveats where they too are equally supported by hard evidence.

I didn't know that the there's "always a place for the well bred horse" comment was one of Basil's inventions, but having sourced innumerable popular Haig myths to that source (in particular to his alleged 'talks with Edmonds' and others), I can well believe it.

George

PS - I would print your last post off and show it to Gazza, it should guarantee you Honours at least, mate!

[salesie]

Thought so - I knew a cantankerous Yorkshire git like you...

George

Flattery will get you nowhere, George.

I certainly wouldn't want Robert to compromise any work before publication - but if worried about such a thing, perhaps not dropping hints that you two know something we don't may be the best policy to avoid "leaks"? Looking forward to reading anything that Robert may publish in the future.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Stop being a conspiracy theorist, you! Actually, Robert's post gave the scenario planning analogy at the heart of his theory, and briefly summarised the nub of that approach as ensuring that planning covered the different options. I'll leave it up to him how far he wants to expand on his thinking on that at this point.

George

[Brian Curragh]

George

All I know (from GS) is that the "always a place for the well bred horse" quote wasn't a Basil invention as such but some very deliberate editing he carried out on a speech DH made to the Royal Veterinary Society. The context was improvement in veterinary science - i.e. WW1 horses were better quality than the Boer War ones. He was talking about the integration of cavalry with tanks & machine-guns. I understand that Basil used it in 1958 in “The Tanks” with some careful edits – missing out the integration of tanks & machine-guns - presumably to make DH look like a "typical" cavalry officer.

It would be nice to prove the provenance of the above.

Regards

Brian

[Robert Dunlop]

Looking forward to reading anything that Robert may publish in the future.

salesie, meanwhile you can review the discussion that you and I had on this same issue here. In addition to Third Ypres, commentators frequently cite the battles of Neuve Chapelle, Somme (two occasions), Arras, and Cambrai as examples where Haig was too optimistic about the use of cavalry.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, meanwhile you can review the discussion that you and I had on this same issue here. In addition to Third Ypres, commentators frequently cite the battles of Neuve Chapelle, Somme (two occasions), Arras, and Cambrai as examples where Haig was too optimistic about the use of cavalry.

Robert

Thanks for that, Robert.

I remember that particular discussion very well indeed (looking at the minutiae of tactical/operational considerations, and whether or not the "bigger strategic picture" should be considered when drawing conclusions from any analysis of them). But, I do see that thread as being a little different to this one in essence i.e. this thread has a somewhat narrower focus on just one arm of the BEF. That's why I found your Megiddo analogy a bit confusing - cavalry (both regular and irregular) did play an important role in that battle, but, from memory, didn't the RAF also play a vital role, not least in bombing the retreating Ottoman 7th Army to destruction? Which would suggest to me that Megiddo was much more than a cavalry battle alone, and therefore had at least something in common with the all-arms battles of the hundred-days?

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

All I know (from GS) is that the "always a place for the well bred horse" quote wasn't a Basil invention as such but some very deliberate editing he carried out on a speech DH made to the Royal Veterinary Society.

Unless you get it first from Sheffield, Brian, I'll take a look for a copy of a speech by DH to the Royal Veterinary Society next time I'm looking at the Haig Papers in Edinburgh.

Basil taking a comment out of context and then adding arms and legs to it so that it appears to say something entirely different from what was originally intended is nothing new - I've found many examples of that technique in the Liddell Hart Papers in reference to Haig. At one point he got quite chummy in correspondence with Charteris. Until, that is, Basil wrote saying that they seemed to be singing from the same hymn sheet about Haig, before going on to extrapolate something that wasn't there in observations which Charteris had made. The penny finally dropped, and Charteris clearly realised that he was being used to bolster Basil's agenda. He fired off a long letter setting out quite clearly that his expressed views on Haig were entirely positive and that Basil ought not to misconstrue or misrepresent them. Some authors continue to unquestioningly repeat in their own work certain of Basil's manipulations of what other people actually said about Haig (including, it must be said, Sheffield!)

On the "always a place for the well bred horse" as quoted by Basil in 'The Tanks', I'd be interested to know the full context in which it appears in that work. I don't have a copy to hand, so if anyone reading this thread does, I'd be grateful if they'd post it. It is certainly extremely close to other statements on horse breeding which Haig is known to have made. In particular an Introduction which he wrote in September 1918 for Captain Sidney Galtrey's 'The Horse and The War', in which he says:

"I hope that this account of our Army horses and mules will bring home to the peoples of the British Empire and the United States the wisdom of breeding animals for the two military virtues of hardiness and activity; and I would add that the best animals for Army purposes are also the most valuable for agriculture, commerce and sport."

Whilst we can't say for sure until we track it down, it seems to me far more likely that anything which he said in a speech to the Royal Veterinary Society about horse breeding was in a similar context, rather than the pejorative spin which Basil tried to give it. Horses and mules, after all, would remain a vital transportation component in European armies until after the start of the Second World War, including the supposedly mechanised Wehrmacht which rolled into France in 1940 - as Basil well knew. The Germans also, of course, deployed cavalry divisions in Russia after 1941, particularly on anti-partisan operations. It says something, I think, that even with the % of national wealth spent by Nazi Germany on rearming their armies, they remained so heavily dependent logistically on the horse. So subsequent events demonstrate that Haig's talking about breeding horses for military purposes in the mid-1920's was not the unique anachronism which Basil tried to spin it as thirty years later in his ongoing attacks against him.

George

[Steven Broomfield]

Returning to the more "operational" level, I've been looking through some regimental histories, and hope the following might be of interest. These two (Indian) regiments took part in the follow-up to the german withdrawal in early 1917.

Maunsell, Prince of Wales's Own, The Scinde Horse, referring to the 36th Jacocob's Horse: On March 19th, the regiment was working with infantry on St Leger, Croisilles and Boyelles. Maunsell comments:

"... we were not following up a beaten enemy - he was anything but beaten. There was little object trying to rush him seriously, for such action would lead to heavy loss with no compensating advantage.

All that was really wanted was to see where he meant to come to a standstill. If we could cut off small parties or succeed in hustling him with small loss to ourselves, so much the better, but the time for incurring heavy loss to attain great ends was not yet."

Interestingly, the 36th were part of 4th Indian Cavalry Division, and Maunsell comments that the 5th Division, operating further south, had better opportunities as there were fewer lines of defence. He believed that the 4th "...came upon strongly wired lines every couple of miles or so, and all the villages were wired."

Anyway, the advance on the 19th was dogged by enemy machine gun fire and moving along the north valley of the Sensee Valley led to several casualties, and patrols could find no way round the Crissilles.

"It was of interest to watch the skill with which one of these patrols worked, galloping widely extended against the flanks of a suspicious point and drawing fire. The commander was Dafadar Ahmed Khan, subesquently Woordi Major of the 35th. He put in some excellent patrolling that night as well."

Maunsell goes on to describe the series of small actions, patrols and so on. Above all, the work of carrying messages and liaisng with infantry is remarked on: "During the night patrols from both the 36th and 29th brought in regular reports showing that the enemy was still hanging on. The cool precise manner in which these reports were brought in and delivered by the NCO commanding, greatly impressed the infantry. The writer can recall the appearance of the keen, dark faces, under their steel helmets, and the waterproof capes streaming with rain and covered with mud."

Maunsell sums up the tactical points of this period, including:

Liaison: "Cavalry officers should find but little difficulty in liaising with infantry, and should understand that it is up to them rather than the footslogger to do so"

Covering fire: "The value of covering fire, or fire down ready to open, both to give reconnaissance confidence and to distract attention."

Hore holders. "The importance of having some capable and responsible individual with the led horses. The enemy almost invariably started shelling the neighbourhood where they had seen a big group of horses."

And finally:

"In the week we had been operating we had been able to test the training we had received in the past year, and results were highly satisfactory.

A particularly gratifying feature had been the way it had permeated the Indian ranks, and the very high standard of efficiency they had reached.

The keeness and dash of the men had excited comment among all the British troops. We picked up a great deal more ueseful knowledge than we did, on the whole, in operations in Palestine. With the Turk, one could usually afford to take liberties - but never with the German."

The Hudson,History of the 19th King Keorge's Own Lancers, but actually referring to the 18th KGO Lancers (Ambala Brigade, 5th Indian Cavalry Division). He deals with the period slightly more briefly than Maunsell, but describes co-operating with the 48th Division and the occasional action against enemy rearguards. However, his summation is of interest:

"These operations provided one of the few occasions in France in which the regiment was called upon to perform the normal duties of cavalry: to follow up closely the enemy's retirement, not so much with any idea of pursuit - he had got too much start for that - but to keep touch with him, get as close as they could to him, and take up a good position pending the arrival of the infantry. The conditions were most uncomfortable, to put it mildly. The weather was vile - cold, wet, sleet and snow. All villages and woods had been destroyed, consequently both men and horses were out in the open and suffered considerable hardship, but they had done what was required of them.

During these operations the enemy rearguards consisted of infantry with machine guns and a few cavalry. They chiefly occupied villages, some fairly well wired in, others with no obstacles. Some thought that if the policy of caution and avoidance of serious engagement had not been imposed on the troops by higher authority, successful opportunities might - probably would - have occurred for mopping-up considerable numbers of hostile rearguards, who, it would appear, had a wholesome dread of a mounted man, and considered that he should be avoided. Witness an incident related to the fighting at Villers Faucon. A party of German infantry with a machine gun, behind wire, surrendered when ttacked by some mounted men. When asked why he had surrendered, the officer replied, 'What can you do with a horse galloping at you?'"

[MikeMeech]

Dear All

Please find the attached for your interest. It relates to 35 Sqn. RFC in 1917 and from AIR 1/1512/204/58/23 'Royal Flying Corps with the Cavalry Corps' document from TNA.

Mike

[Robert Dunlop]

...cavalry (both regular and irregular) did play an important role in that battle, but, from memory, didn't the RAF also play a vital role, not least in bombing the retreating Ottoman 7th Army to destruction?

salesie, best to steer clear of tactical considerations . Meggido was not a 'cavalry' battle. It was, however, a major battle in which British and Dominion mounted forces achieved a break-out (thanks to the preparatory work of the artillery, infantry, naval gunfire support, aerial reconnaissance, intelligence deception measures, etc, etc). The break-out resulted in the Ottoman 7th Army retreating post-haste, which enabled the air force to destroy some of the retreating transport (but not 'bombing the retreating Ottoman 7th Army to destruction'). In other words, it was the direct threat of the cavalry that opened up the opportunity for the air force.

Just to be clear, Allenby's triumph at Megiddo would not have happened if he had not ensured the cavalry was in place to exploit the break-through. If the break-through had not occurred then the cavalry would have sat around waiting for the 'G', and commentators would be saying that Allenby was just as overly optimistic as Haig was.

Robert

[ander11]

Hi mike, You have come tops on this post , Keep up the good work !!!!

regards

Ian