Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical

[phil andrade]

Sheffield is depicted as the heir to Terraine, but wasn't Terraine the heir of Falls, who, in turn, was the succesor to Edmonds ?

I ask about this because I'm interested in the historiography of the anti ee- aww school, and would like to trace its provenance.

Cyril Falls wrote his history of The Great War several years prior to publication of Terraine's biography of Haig : he criticised Haig's premature use of tanks, but repudiated most of his denigrators with the words "....most of the attacks on Haig have come from those without either knowledge or imagination."

Now I must browse through Falls's book and see if he has anything to say about Haig the cavalryman.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Thanks Ian, I feel my contribution has been vital

Great thread, with some very fine posts.

Cheers Mike

[charlesmessenger]

George

All I know (from GS) is that the "always a place for the well bred horse" quote wasn't a Basil invention as such but some very deliberate editing he carried out on a speech DH made to the Royal Veterinary Society. The context was improvement in veterinary science - i.e. WW1 horses were better quality than the Boer War ones. He was talking about the integration of cavalry with tanks & machine-guns. I understand that Basil used it in 1958 in “The Tanks” with some careful edits – missing out the integration of tanks & machine-guns - presumably to make DH look like a "typical" cavalry officer.

It would be nice to prove the provenance of the above.

Regards

Brian

From a January 2008 posting by Clive Maier:

On 4 June 1925, Haig was presented with the diploma of honorary associate of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons. His remarks were recorded the next day in The Times. Once again, the speech was reported rather than quoted verbatim, and once again the style suggests a near-verbatim account with a shift of tense. Haig’s reported remarks included the following.

Some enthusiasts today talked about the probability of horses becoming extinct and prophesied that the aeroplane, the tank, and the motor-car would supersede the horse in future wars. But history had always shown that great inventions somehow or other cured themselves; they always produced antidotes, and he believed that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future were likely to be as great as ever. How could infantry, piled up with all their equipment, take advantage of a decisive moment created by fire from machine-guns at a range of 5,000 to 6,000 yards? It was by utilizing light mounted troops and mounted artillery that advantage could be taken of these modern weapons. He was all for using aeroplanes and tanks, but they were only accessories to the man and the horse, and he felt sure that as time went on they would find just as much use for the horse - the well-bred horse - as they had ever done in the past. Let them not be despondent and think that the day of the horse was over.

Charles M

[Brian Curragh]

Charles

Thank you for that - I will check out the Times Archive to see if they have the full article.

Regards

Brian

Postscript edit - the source is The Times, Friday, Jun 05, 1925; pg. 8; Issue 43980; col D : The Cavalry Arm. Lord Haig On Value In War.

[Anthony Pigott]

It would be really good to nail the primary source for this Haig 'quote'. It has been attributed to a variety of occasions without ever being substantiated to my knowledge. It was discussed in an earlier thread:

http://1914-1918.inv...22&fromsearch=1

which also had some valuable discussion on the role and effectiveness of cavalry in the Great War (amongst some not so valuable Haig myth stuff).

Regards

Anthony

[truthergw]

It seems to me that Charles has indicated the source and Brian has confirmed it.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Excellent, Charles, nice to have that pinpointed.

Having now read the entire 'Times' report I see that the occasion was the awarding by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons of Honorary Diplomas of the RCVS to Field Marshals Haig and French. French had since died and Haig pays tribute to him. Haig himself was no longer a serving soldier, though by convention a Field Marshal remains on the active list until death.

Reading the newspaper summary of Haig's speech to the RCVS it seems that he confirms what has been noted more than once on this thread - that the day of the military horse was not yet finished. In that he was correct - the horse and the cavalry arm would survive Haig's own death in 1928 by over a decade and another world war. There's more than an element in that speech, however, which is designed to reassure an army veterinary service which would itself be largely redundant with the demise of the military horse!

George

[Anthony Pigott]

It seems to me that Charles has indicated the source and Brian has confirmed it.

Yes indeed. I hadn't seen the postscript when I posted.

Anthony

[phil andrade]

In that he was correct - the horse and the cavalry army would survive Haig's own death in 1928 by over a decade and another world war.

An episode from the Second World War, chronicled by Martin Gilbert

On August 23 [1942], at Izbushensky, in the great bend of the River Don, six hundred Italian soldiers of the Savoy Cavalry charged on horseback against two thousand Russians armed with mortars and machine guns. The Italians, using sabres and hand grenades against mortars and machine guns, put the Russians to flight.

Phil (PJA)

[Brian Curragh]

In the post Anthony refers to - "Haig's Book Review" - he gives the source for the Liddell Hart "edit"

- BH Liddell-Hart, the Tanks, Cassell, London 1959 vol I p 234

Anyone got a copy to hand which would supply what Basil actually said?

Regards

Brian

[salesie]

salesie, best to steer clear of tactical considerations . Meggido was not a 'cavalry' battle. It was, however, a major battle in which British and Dominion mounted forces achieved a break-out (thanks to the preparatory work of the artillery, infantry, naval gunfire support, aerial reconnaissance, intelligence deception measures, etc, etc). The break-out resulted in the Ottoman 7th Army retreating post-haste, which enabled the air force to destroy some of the retreating transport (but not 'bombing the retreating Ottoman 7th Army to destruction'). In other words, it was the direct threat of the cavalry that opened up the opportunity for the air force.

Just to be clear, Allenby's triumph at Megiddo would not have happened if he had not ensured the cavalry was in place to exploit the break-through. If the break-through had not occurred then the cavalry would have sat around waiting for the 'G', and commentators would be saying that Allenby was just as overly optimistic as Haig was.

Robert

I think that the RAF did a lot more than destroy some of the retreating Ottoman 7th Army's transport, Robert.

From what I recall when reading about Megiddo some years ago, the line of abandoned and destroyed Turkish transport stretched for quite a few miles, with the survivors of the many bombing and strafing runs being scattered and leaderless; for all practical intents and purposes the Ottoman 7th army was destroyed as a coherent fighting force by airpower. Which in itself was a good thing because a British Corps (XX?) had been delayed and may not have been in position to cut-off the 7th's line of retreat.

That said, I do take your point that the opportunity which developed for the RAF was the direct result of cavalry work, and that an "overly-optimistic" tag may also have been levelled at Allenby if failing at Megiddo (though, given the terrain and type of warfare in Palestine, this tag would be much harder to justify for Allenby). Perhaps part of Broomer's post sums it up quite neatly, "With the Turk, one could usually afford to take liberties - but never with the German."

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Dear All

Please find the attached for your interest. It relates to 35 Sqn. RFC in 1917 and from AIR 1/1512/204/58/23 'Royal Flying Corps with the Cavalry Corps' document from TNA.

Interesting document, Mike, which shows the newest service, the RFC, with the most cutting edge mechanical technology of the day, utilising horse power for its support personnel. An incongruous juxtaposition to some modern eyes, perhaps, but very illustrative of what was a rather more extended cross-over period than some imagine, in which nascent mechanisation was not yet capable of fully replacing the old arms.

The RFC was also one service which attracted its share of what became something of a drain of some of the best cavalry officers from their regiments once the the period of largely trench bound attrition in 1915-16 became established in the middle years of the war. Crozier, in his 'A Brass Hat in No Mans Land' [p 177] relates a conversation with a corps commander during Cambrai on 22 November 1917:

"On that day, a corps commander, through whose formations we pass, confides in me his innermost thoughts in response to my question 'what of the chances?' 'We have done wonderfully,' he says, 'the successes of the first two days have far exceded our most liberal expectations. All now depends on you and the cavalry; you are to attack Bourlon Wood tomorrow; can you take it? And, if so, can the cavalry break through? Those are the answers to your question,' he adds. 'We'll take the woods on our heads,' I say. 'I'm glad to hear it,' answers the lieutenant general; 'but I fear the cavalry have lost their thrusters, they have gone to the Tanks, the Flying Corps and the Infantry.' "

Later [p 179], Crozier notes that:

"The cavalry did not go through. Is the corps commander right? Have they lost their thrusters?"

The cavalry were alert to the problem of its officers looking for opportunities for action in other arms during those middle years of the war. Badesy [p 272] quotes Archibald Home, CSO of the First Cavalry Division in October 1915:

"[W]e all get restless, young officers [who] feel that they are not pulling their weight and want to go where there is more fighting. It is only natural - yet one does not want to lose the best cavalry soldiers we have got."

Badsey [ibid] goes on to describe how the flow of keen for action officers from the cavalry was halted by the end of 1916:

"The cavalry were highly conscious of this problem, including many officers and men lost to the Royal Flying Corps and to the new Tank Corps, some as volunteers and some simply posted to branches considered to have a higher priority. At the end of 1916 Haig issued a circular order to the cavalry that 'in future no applications for transfers of officers or NCO's to other branches of the service are to be entertained.'"

George

[Steven Broomfield]

Lumley, in The 11th Hussars, 1908-32 outlines the services of the 35 officers on the strength of the regiment in 1914.

Five became Generals; four were killed in 1914; 5 died later in the war, all serving away from the regiment (two on Divisional Staffs, one with the RFC, and two with infantry battalions). Sixteen others saw service outside the regiment - 8 in various Staff posts, two with infantry battalions, two with the tanks and the rest scattered amongst the MGC or other cavalry regiments. Only 5 officers served the entire war with the regiment (although all were away wounded at some point).

88 other officers joined the regiment for varying lengths of service, making a total of 123 officers serving during the war.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Returning to the more "operational" level, I've been looking through some regimental histories, and hope the following might be of interest. These two (Indian) regiments took part in the follow-up to the german withdrawal in early 1917.

Thanks for those Indian references from 1917, Steve, most interesting. I thought the quote from Maunsell particularly telling about the nature of the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line - "... we were not following up a beaten enemy - he was anything but beaten."

I've already given a reference to one action - Villeselve - from Bickersteth's 'History of the 6th Cavalry Brigade 1914-1918', and will supplement your selection from the Indian histories with a couple more when I get a moment. Interesting to note that Badsey states that the latest research identifies at least 20 British cases of arme blanche charges and combat on the Western Front 1916 - 1918. As he notes, "The use of cavalry on such a small scale [beginning with High Wood on 14 July 1916] could not be in any way decisive, but such charges gave them an additional role, and paved the way for developments later in the war."

George

[Steven Broomfield]

regarding Megiddo, the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse) led the line, and Whitworth's history of the regiment is understandably detailed. Without typing out tracts of print, it seems that a lot of the success of their charge was due to individual initiative, by both British and Indian officers. Captain D S Davison was in command of the regiment and was made aware, shortly after 0530 on 20th September that the Turks were moving to occupy the head of the pass (Musmus Pass). The Turkish outpost line had been captured, and Davison was sure the main body were not aware of this, so an immediate attack was in order, before the Turks had a chance to find ground of their choosing. As he said in his report: The great value of surprise and mobility, and the moral effect of the lance were clearly exemplified in this action..

C Squadron (the lead squadron) had dismounted their mg troop (under RM Mukand Singh) and were engaging at 800 yards while the remainder of the squadron concentrated with a view to moving round the Turkish right flank. A Light Armoured Motor Battery were also engaing. It was apparent to Davison that an estimation of 80 Turks was well under-estimated..

D Squadron were then brought round the enemy's left flank, and B, who were Gardner's right flan guard co-operated. This truned out to be fortunate, as the Turks were in two lines, the second 300 yards behind the front, which would have caused B some problems had they been unsupported. The OC of B (Whitworth), seeing D about to cahrge, sent one Troop (Jem Sarjit Singh) to guard the right flank and then joined B; he had only 30 lances at this stage.. As tey moved, B were disrupted by a wire fence, Ressaider Jang Bahadur Singh reforming the men as they passed it (and winning an IDSM in the event).

As B advanced (according to Whitworth), they were moving at 15 mph, but as tey got closer the men broke into a hell for leather gallop, overtaking D on their left. Whitworth then goes into some detail of the charge and it seems that B had attacked the support line before D reached the front line which must have been considerably shaken by B's success on their supports

Mukand Singh, on seeing B charge, remounted his troop and charged the enemy front, with some success.

470 prisoners were taken, for the cost of one man wounded and about a dozen horses which had to be destroyed.

Davison's report praises the work of the LAM Battery, which moved to 500 yards from the Turkish left flank and kept up fire until D charged home. It is to their assistance that Davison attributes the regiment's low casualty figure. Only C squadron's Hotchkiss rifles came into action. B's Hotchkiss troop was ordered to join the charge in order to increase the moral effect (remember they had only one Troop of lances), whereas D's Hotchkiss Troop stayed with the squadron, but in the rear, in order to cover the retirement, should one become necessary

Following the action a 30-minute rest was taken, then Gardner's moved on to El Afuleh, where Lieutenant King (A Squadron)'galloped' the village on his own iniative, and 100 German air mechanics, 3 aeroplanes, 10 locomotives, 50 rolling stock and a dozen lorries were taken.

In short it seems that this action was fought almost entirely by relatively junior commanders (a captain was commanding Garder's, and it was Indian officers who supported junior British officers very effectively). Chances were taken when they appeared - Davison decided to attack on his own call because the time seemed right, and Whitworth's squadron was, to all intents and purposes, defying its orders by supporting D Sqaudron in the main attack. It was then a Lieutenant who took the village of El Afuleh without waiting for orders, thus preventing Turlish resistance from stiffening.

It certainly seems to me that (in the Indian cavalry at least) the spirit of the offensive was alive and well. Note, however, that Hotchkiss rifles ("machine guns") were used well and effectively, and that Whitworth took note of hirs role and ensured the flank was protected by Sarjit Singh's Troop. Note also the very effective co-operation between the cavalry and the LAM Battery.

I suspect little of this happened by accident - a good deal of training (mentioned by Maunsell in an earlier post) went into this.

[SiegeGunner]

An episode from the Second World War, chronicled by Martin Gilbert

On August 23 [1942], at Izbushensky, in the great bend of the River Don, six hundred Italian soldiers of the Savoy Cavalry charged on horseback against two thousand Russians armed with mortars and machine guns. The Italians, using sabres and hand grenades against mortars and machine guns, put the Russians to flight.

Just in case we didn't get the message first time that the Russians were 'armed with mortars and machine guns'. Scandalously bad editing.

[phil andrade]

Just in case we didn't get the message first time that the Russians were 'armed with mortars and machine guns'. Scandalously bad editing.

Yes, that did occur to me too...that passage is from Martin Gilbert's Second World War page 355.

Perhaps he was indulging in a form of deliberate over emphasis, in order to increase impact.

Phil (PJA)

[charlesmessenger]

In the post Anthony refers to - "Haig's Book Review" - he gives the source for the Liddell Hart "edit"

- BH Liddell-Hart, the Tanks, Cassell, London 1959 vol I p 234

Anyone got a copy to hand which would supply what Basil actually said?

Regards

Brian

Brian

LH 'quoted' Haig in the context of the prospects for the modernisation of the Army when Milne took over as CIGS in February 1926. He would have to battle against his more conservative contempories:

'The weight of objection that he [Milne] would have to meet was foreshadowed by a protest that Lord Haig made at the time Paris, or the Future of War was published:

Some enthusiasts to-day talk about the probability of horses becoming extinct and prophesy that the aeroplane, the tank, and the motor-car wwill supersede the horse in future wares. I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in future are likely to be as great as ever ... I am all for using aeroplanes and tanks, but they are only accessories to the man and the horse, and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse - the well-bred horse - as you have ever done in the past.

Note that, unlike The Times report, LH adopts the first person, and that he does not cite his source.

Two other points. The German Army was heavily reliant of horse transport throughout WW2 and we Brits sent an entire mounted division to Palestine in 1940.

Charles M

[MikeMeech]

Hi George and all

Just to expand on the previous document I posted here is some detail of the equipment the RFC carried forward with the cavalry.

Mike

[MikeMeech]

All

During 1917 in the Middle East members of the RFC also went forward with the cavalry. One of the units involved in this was 14 Sqn. RFC using BE2e aircraft. I have attached an extract from the 'History of 14 Squadron' (TNA AIR 1/689/21/20/14) which I hope will be of interest.

Mike

[MikeMeech]

Hi All

Reference to Amiens, members may find the attached extract from 'Number 6 Squadron Historical Note' (TNA AIR 1/687/21/20/6) of interest. Squadron Leader Pirie (or rather Major at the time of events) OC of 6 Sqn., is quite an interesting person in relation to the development of Air/Cavalry co-operation. There is quite a lot of correspondance from him on developing procedures and techniques, including the need for a document on the lines of SS 135 Appendix B. I would put him on a par, to some extent, during 1918 with Trafford Leigh Mallory )C 8 Sqn. who was developing the techniques and procedures of Air/Tank co-operation at this time.

Mike

[George Armstrong Custer]

LH 'quoted' Haig in the context of the prospects for the modernisation of the Army when Milne took over as CIGS in February 1926. He would have to battle against his more conservative contempories:

Thanks for unearthing the second part of this question, Charles, which reveals how Basil used the quote from Haig out of context. As you note, by neglecting to mention the source of Haig's quote, Basil changes the context and makes the quote appear to support his portrait of Haig as an arch opponent of military modernisation, and not simply as a reply to the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons after being given an honorary diploma at their annual gathering. By extracting part of what Haig said and placing it in conjunction with a reference to Milne's post-1926 modernisation of the British army, Basil makes it appear that Haig's words are some kind of reactionary official statement against modernisation. Haig wasn't even a serving officer at the time of his talk to the Vets. What Basil also neglects to mention, of course, is that Haig's prediction on the continuing utility of the military horse was essentialy correct. Did Haig over egg that utility for the particular audience to which he spoke at this private function? Of course - playing to their particular audience by tailoring their remarks to their sensibilities is the hallmark of all after dinner speeches. A similar, but more more precise summary of Haig's views was given in this newspaper account of a public speech given in Canterbury four years earlier:

"Lord Haig said he viewed the disbanding of cavalry regiments with professional regret, even while he did not pretend to criticize the financial reasons which have led to their dispersal. He certainly was not among those who hold that cavalry was a dead arm, or that the place of flesh and blood in man and horse could ever be wholly taken by petrol, and machinery. He did not think he was alone in that opinion, either here or abroad. Assuredly the time had not yet come when they could afford to dispense with cavalry. When the lessons of the great war were properly understood they would be found, he was confident, to teach no one thing more emphatically than this - that cavalry was still an essential arm, even in a European war, and more especially to an Imperial Army such as ours.

Let them not think that he disparaged or undervalued the new weapons. Tanks, aeroplanes, and heavy guns and other death-dealing devices that modern science had produced were all alike indispensable, but just as they are all in the end dependent on the man so they had not yet served to eliminate the horse, which, in the hands of a trained cavalryman, was a part of the man. himself. On the other hand, the development of mechanical transport of all kinds, both for the purposes of actual fighting and for supply might well open up new opportunities of usefulness for cavalry by giving them the necessary weight to overcome local and extemporised resistance and by enabling cavalry to continue its effort over greater distances and for longer periods."

After recognising that the technological developments of modern science are 'indispensable', Haig's prediction on the continued use of the military horse and the survival of a cavalry arm over the next twenty years was spot on. Just as his reference to the development of mechanical transport of all kinds opening up new areas of usefulness for the horse is no more than an accurate reflection of what had happened in 1918. And as Mike's interesting series of documents relating to the horse as a support mechanism to the RFC/RAF demonstrate, the reality is that the new techologies continued to depend upon old systems for certain functions during a changeover which was more evolutionary than revolutionary, and measured in years rather than weeks or months. And Haig's statement that even the most cutting edge technology is "all in the end dependent on the man" is surely as true to day as it was when he made it 90 years ago, despite technological advances in military systems which he could never have dreamt of.

George

[Robert Dunlop]

Fabulous, Mike. Thank you very much for the information.

Robert

[George Armstrong Custer]

The cavalry also suffered its reverses on the Western Front between 1916-18, of course. In Jack Sheldon's 'The German Army At Cambrai' there's a tremendously lively if rather melodramatic German account, first published in a regimental history from 1935, of the sudden appearance of cavalry from the Ambala Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division. Leutnant Koch of IR 418 seems to have been one German who had apparently been completely unaware of the presence of British cavalry on the Western Front until they started charging his position on 30 November 1917. The astonishment expressed in his account is palpable, and whilst the massacre which he claims his troops inflicted upon riders and horses is clearly an exaggeration, (which Jack corrects in his footnotes, along with Koch's mistaken idea on the makeup of the Ambala Brigade), his account nevertheless remains of interest, not least on account of his professed almost comical astonishment at being confronted with a cavalry charge, and it would be interesting to compare it to the accounts in any British/Indian regimental histories of this admittedly less than entirely successful cavalry action.

"Suddenly shouts and noise of battle were heard coming from the trench above. A voice yelled excitedly into the dugout, 'Get out, get out, the Tommies are coming!' Rushing out, we saw a large mass of enemy cavalry charging straight at our position. Everybody who could hold a rifle poured fire at the swarms of riders who were closing in with their lances at the ready. Soon our machine guns joined in as well at the rapid rate. Above us, unnoticed amidst the general excitement, shrapnel rounds burst above the strong point. It made for a breathtaking scene of intense battle and the excitement levels were high. A cavalry attack on the Western Front. That was absolutely unknown, unbelievable almost! The attack withered away under the weight of fire. The entire ground to our front was littered with dead and wounded riders and their horses. The losses amongst the cavalry were simply dreadful. Two unwounded riders, one of them leading a wounded horse, were captured and brought to me. To our amazement we saw that they were Indian. One was an officer of noble appearance, his pale face surrounded by a full black beard and the other a corporal of his squadron. Both stood before me dressed in turbans. Bitterly they informed me that the British had held back their own cavalry and, instead had despatched an Indian cavalry brigade on this idiotic attack, which had ended with the complete destruction of the Indian regiments.

We rated their disregard of death with which they had hurled themselves forward at our trenches very highly and gave them due recognition, but this did not ease their sorrow and their anger at the British chain of command. These events marked the end of our short but remarkable involvement in the Cambrai Offensive. An Indian lance and a long dagger, which I still possess, bear silent witness to that day."

Jack's corrective footnote, citing the BOH, to Koch's account states that "This appears to be a reference to the attack of the Ambala Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division. It should be noted that the eyewitness account in this case contains considerable exaggeration. The Ambala Brigade was mixed. It had both British and Indian regiments within its ranks. In addition, the total casualties for the whole of the 5th Cavalry Division from 20 November - 8 December 1917 only amounted to thirty five officers and 376 other ranks. We can, therefore, dismiss references to the destruction of entire regiments as simply wrong."

George

[phil andrade]

The repulse of a cavalry charge is likely to attract dramatic descriptions, which magnify the scale of the actual losses sustained.

The spectacle of horses being shot down is what probably accounts for this. A loss of , say, a couple of hundred troopers might be accompanied by the slaughter of several hundred horses.

I think that at Balaclava the Light Brigade lost about 250 men killed or wounded, but perhaps twice as many horses.

Maybe at Cambrai, the sight of heaps of horses going down and thrashing about really did convey the impression of a huge slaughter, especially with the riders being thrown.

Phil (PJA)