Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical

[Steven Broomfield]

George, from memory, the Ambala Brigade at this stage comprised the 8th Hussars (I think - British), and the two Indian regiments, 9th Hodson's Horse and 18th KGO Lancers. I know that both Indian regiments were involved in a counter attack on Gauche Wood (in conjunction with 2nd Grenadier Guards and tanks).

Fortunately, I have both Indian regiments' histories at home (keep quiet: Mrs B doesn't know about the 18th Lancers one), so I'll have a look when I can, probably this evening.

[MikeMeech]

Dear All

Please find attached a list of Cavalry units and their Ground Signals. This first post is of the Indian Cavalry on the Western Front in late 1917 (it was with the 35 Sqn. AIR 1 document. Others may know the exact date of the unit composition.

Mike

[MikeMeech]

Dear All

For the sake of completeness here is the rest of the previous document.

Mike

[MikeMeech]

Dear All

The Middle East also had Report Centre Signals and Call Signs for Cavalry Units. The attached is from AIR 1/2053/204/391/5, 'Instructions Regarding Co-operation of Cavalry with Aeroplane Contact Patrols'. I believe this is from 1918 (anyone who thinks different please tell me as there was no date on the document as it was in a file from 'No. 3 School of Aeronautics RAF' and presumably kept for 'example').

Mike

[MikeMeech]

Dear All

Sorry to hog the post, but please find attached the signals carried and used by the Cavalry on the Western front. This example dates from Nov. 1917 but remained basically the same through much of the war, appearing quite often in the AIR 1 files.

Mike

[George Armstrong Custer]

No apology needed, Mike - as Robert has already said, this is fantastic material. This raw data gives us some of the nuts and bolts which held together the efforts to maximise all-arms co-operation between one of the oldest branches of the service and the newest.

George

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks very much. I have read about this type of cooperation, most recently in 'Fire in the Sky'. Great to see the details.

Robert

[salesie]

Here's a paper that some of you may be interested in reading: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA471594 (it's a .pdf file and sometimes takes time to load)

It's entitled, ANGELS OF ARMAGEDDON: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO, and, amongst other things, details the interaction and close co-operation between cavalry and the RAF. And the author concludes (in summary) that:

"The strategic success of the Royal Air Force in wrestling air superiority from the Germans was the key that allowed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) to prepare and conduct its campaign against the central powers across the plains surrounding Megiddo. It provided the EEF intelligence of enemy positions, freedom to maneuver forces undetected, and the depth to attack and rout the retreating Turkish forces to the point of annihilation. The evolution of local air superiority in Palestine, properly coordinated with the ground offensive, was the deciding factor for victory in that theater."

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, it is an interesting paper but must be taken with a grain, or more, of salt. There is no doubt that the air force played a very important role in Palestine. It was not, however, 'the key' as the author suggests. There were major campaigns that were executed with near complete tactical surprise, despite not having complete air superiority. Cambrai was one example. Operation Michael was an example of a different sort, in which (like the prelude to Megiddo) the defenders were very uncertain about where the attack would be launched. The Germans achieved this without complete air superiority.

The EEF received 'some' intelligence about German positions from aerial reconnaissance. Radio intercepts, prisoner interrogations, and spy networks were also extremely important.

Deception played a crucial part in winning surprise and local tactical superiority at the Schwerpunkt of the battle.

The air force was able to operate in depth but so was the cavalry, who participated in the capture of at least 8,000 prisoners. The aerial attack on elements of the Ottoman Seventh Army caused few casualties but did take out a number of guns and transport. The Seventh Army was severely disrupted but was not 'wiped out'. In November 1918, it still comprised III and XV Corps, along with 2 of the divisions (1st and 11th) that had been present in September 1917.

The attack at Wadi el Far'a represented an important turning point in the perception of aerial power, just as Cambrai did for tanks. Both of these events have come to be embued with more significance than is warranted. You, of all people, should have guessed that already . Best to steer clear of tactical issues

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, it is an interesting paper but must be taken with a grain, or more, of salt. There is no doubt that the air force played a very important role in Palestine. It was not, however, 'the key' as the author suggests. There were major campaigns that were executed with near complete tactical surprise, despite not having complete air superiority. Cambrai was one example. Operation Michael was an example of a different sort, in which (like the prelude to Megiddo) the defenders were very uncertain about where the attack would be launched. The Germans achieved this without complete air superiority.

The EEF received 'some' intelligence about German positions from aerial reconnaissance. Radio intercepts, prisoner interrogations, and spy networks were also extremely important.

Deception played a crucial part in winning surprise and local tactical superiority at the Schwerpunkt of the battle.

The air force was able to operate in depth but so was the cavalry, who participated in the capture of at least 8,000 prisoners. The aerial attack on elements of the Ottoman Seventh Army caused few casualties but did take out a number of guns and transport. The Seventh Army was severely disrupted but was not 'wiped out'. In November 1918, it still comprised III and XV Corps, along with 2 of the divisions (1st and 11th) that had been present in September 1917.

The attack at Wadi el Far'a represented an important turning point in the perception of aerial power, just as Cambrai did for tanks. Both of these events have come to be embued with more significance than is warranted. You, of all people, should have guessed that already . Best to steer clear of tactical issues

Robert

I agree with the the pinch of salt bit, Robert - I was just testing the speed of the jerk from your knee.

Seriously, I only posted the paper because there is some interesting stuff about air-ground co-operation in it (which was in concert with the way the thread was heading). Perhaps T.E.Lawrence nicely summed up the RAF's attack on the 7th, "The RAF lost 4 killed. The Turks lost a Corps."

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

The red wine hasn't kicked in yet. Try again in a couple of hours

Robert

PS: your 'seriously' comment is right on the mark.

[Latze]

For what it's worth:

I found "Cavalry Combat" (no author given, published 1937 by the United States Cavalry Association) to be the best overview text on this matter. It contains numerous examples of mounted troops action from all major combatants and in all roles ranging from security and recon to breakthrough. Maybe a bit optimistic regarding the use of the horse in the upcoming decade but very useful nonetheless.

regards

Matt

[Steven Broomfield]

Returning to George's question about the Ambala Brigade at Cambrai, as I suspected both Hodson's Horse history and that of the 19th KGO Lancers have quite a bit about the action at Gauche Wood (note that the latter book is the history of the combined regiment, post-1922. The constituent regiment concerned was the 18th KGO Lancers. The other constituent, the 19th Lancers (Fane's Horse) was present, but with the Sialkot Brigade in the 4th Cavalry Division).

I am a bit pressed for time this evening, and will be out tomorrow so I'm afraid I won't have a chnace to write it up until Friday evening, but having had a quick read I would say both regiments thought the action quite a success, with relatively low losses. I'll also look up the other relevant regimental histories I have (plus that of the Central India Horse, which is in the post ) and get onto it.

I'll also check SDGW to see what that gives for the 8th Hussars. My suspicion is that the German source quoted by george is displaying a bit of hyperbole (one might say "bombast"). I would also question his allegations about the morale of the Indian prisoners: the cavalry were very sound, having suffered far fewer casualties than the infantry, and had also spent a lot of time in training - they were good. I also suspect the comments about the British leaving the Indians to do the dirty work were either made up by the Hun, or made up for the Hun. Given that both regiments had followed the 8th Hussars, it is unlikely they didn't know the British regiment was there. Addisitionally, Strathcona's (Canadian Cavalry brigade - part of the 5th Cavalry Division) was in the area and the men of Hodson's and the 18th had been mixed-up with men of Strathcona's. Finally, the assault on Gauche Wood was carried out in conjunction with the 2nd Grenadier Guards, and you don't get much more British than that!

Incidentally, following this action, a very cordial relationship existed between the 18th lancers and the 2nd Grenadiers, with an exchange of silver for the Officers' Mess for both regiments, and cordial greetings on regimental days.

As I said, I will try and get on to this on Friday or over the weekend. Both Hodson's and the 18th lancers claim (with, I suspect, some justification) that the brigade saved the day.

Watch this space.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Thanks for looking at those sources, Steve. When you get a moment to post them I look forward to reading the picture they paint of the action which Koch describes in the IR 418 regimental history. What you say in outline is very supportive of the correctives to Koch's account which Jack gives. The British OH lists the 5th Cavalry Division as sustaining 9 officers and 45 ORs killed between 20 November and 8 December 1917, with 0 officers and 76 ORs missing. The same source lists 26 officers and 255 ORs as wounded for the same period. Total casualties of 35 officers and 376 ORs for the whole Division for the nineteen days, then. It would be interesting to know if any of your histories give the % of these totals which were inflicted upon the Ambala Brigade on 30 November.

George

[Steven Broomfield]

Coming back to george's question on the Ambala Cavalry Brigade on 30th November, the histories of both 9th Hodson's Horse and the 18th KGO Lancers cover it.

The 18th first. On the 30th, the regiment (with the rest of the Brigade) were preparing for winter warfare; parties had been told off to visit the Line, where they were expecting another winter of dismounted service. Around 9.00 a.m., a subaltern announced that the heavy fire they could hear from the Cambrai area presaged a move: "We're off" Luc

...In half an hour the regiment was on the march, each squadron in turn cheerfully shouting its own war cry, towards the cross-raods a thousand yards east of Estrees, where the brigade was to concentrate

The regiment then, having concentrated by 11.00 a.m., trotted the ten miles to a valley just west of the St Emilie sugar factory, arriving about midday. Orders were received at 1.15:

...were for the 8th Hussars to move west to Epehy on Vaucelette Farm, about a mile and a half north of eiziere, and drive back in a northerly or north-easterly direction any enemy encountered. The 9th Hodson's Horse, 14th MG Squadron and the 18th Lancers were to follow in support in the order named.

From there the ground was open, with good going; movement was in line of troop columns with irregular intervals and distances to minimize the effects of shell fire and to make ranging difficult.

From the head of the regiment the 8th Hussars could be seen galloping over the crest between Vaucellette farm and revelon, the 9th Hodson's Horse following in support.

From this point, the 18th Lancers acted on foot, the horses being left near Revelon Farm. Sadly, from this point their story really is not relevant to this thread, although the history comments:

Just before moving off it was reported that Hodson's Horse had suffered casualties, amongst them being captain Frazer and Jack Atkinson, a famous polo player. The 8th Hussars, too, had lost an officer killed. This comment should be born in mind later when casualty figures for those regiments are discussed. For the 18th, they seem to have lost no-one on the 30th, and suffered one British officer (the CO) and 6 Indian other ranks killed, with three British and one Indian officer and 28 other ranks wounded - this in an attack on Gauche Wood followed by a day and night under shell fire.

Hodson's Horse next: Their history follows that of the 18th Lancers up to arrival at the spot near Epehy. At this point, the GOC of the division (MacAndrew) gave orders for the brigade to push on to Gauche Wood and get in touch with the Guards on their left; 8th Hussars leading. This regiment duly moved off, but at Chapel Crossing on the railway line were checked by wire on the old British second line, then by fire from Villers-Guislain, and suffered a good many casualties

Apparently, further progress was impossible, but one squadron had made a sunken road 400 yards west of gauche Wood, so Hodson's were ordered to go up on the Hussars' left and get into touch with the Guards. Hodson's trotted forward as far as revlon, where it stopped to make sure of the direction. Then C and D Squadrons advanced rapidly, the other two, and HQ reamining for a few minutes more at Revelon.

The ground was criss-crossed with trenches and wire, and C found a gap in the wire where it crossed the road running north east to Gouzeaucourt. From here it was a straight gallop of just over a mile of open country to join the Hussars in the sunken road. Some german infantry were coming out of gauche Wood towards the sunken road, but on seeing the cavalry, turned back. C Squadron's advance was so rapid that enemy fire couldn't be brought to bear.

However, D met a very different reception, and the leading troop was almost blown to pieces as it left the narrow opening of the defile in which the regiment had been sheltering ..

... but the remainder of the squadron never wavered nor did they change their pace. Advancing with the utmost steadiness through the gap, the troops spread out in diamond formation forty yards apart, and breaking into a gallop crossed the intervening open graound under heavy shell and machine-gun fire and joined the leading squadron in the hollow road

A and B Squadrons now arrived, having also galloped the intervening ground. They suffered few casualties, although the officer commanding B Squadron (Major F St J Atkinson DSO) was mortally wounded at the head of his men. The horses were led back to Revelon farm, then on to Heudecourt. From this point, Hodson's also fought on foot.

In the action Hodson's suffered the loss of two officers (the other being Major Fraser DSO) and 8 Indian other ranks killed, with two British and Three Indian officers and 43 other ranks wounded (two later died) and one missing. It is noted;

Of these losses, twenty five killed and wounded were in D Sqaudron, and almost all of these were hit in the few minutes occupied in passing through the gap in the wire near Revelon

Of the 8th Hussars, all I can say is that a look at SDGW indicates one officer (another Major, so presumably a squadron commander) and 8 other ranks killed between 30th November and 5th December.

I will finish with a quote from the history of another Indian regiment involved, but slightly further south, at Limerick Post. The Central India Horse, referring to the charge of the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse):

Moreover, such a fire greeted their appearance in the open that a halt was out of the question; and so, at a good fifteen miles an hour this gallant regiment swept down the valley under a storm of bullets from rifles and machine guns which, properly aimed, should have emptied half the saddles. In point of fact, there were very few casualties. A mile and a half from the crucifix a trench, known as Kildare Trench, full of Germans, seemed to bar the way; but so great is the moral effect of galloping horsemen that the enemy did not wait for them, and the horsemen galloped into the trench, occupied it and held it against heavy odds all day (In the action, Gardner's lost 2 British officers (including the CO), one Indian officer and 6 o.r. killed, 2, 1 and 50 wounded, and 0, 1 and 47 missing.)

I'm not sure what, if anything, this proves, but for me it shows that in 1917 the cavalry still had a role. They were the only mobile reserve available to plug the gap when the Germans broke through, and it was their speed of action, gallantry and swiftness which put men in place and rifles in the Line.

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, the latter action illustrates a further point. It has already been noted that the cavalry were well trained in musketry. The point was made that, despite the high levels of training, cavalry were less effective than their infantry counterparts because of the smaller numbers. The smaller size of cavalry formations (cavalry regiments became the equivalent of infantry companies when the cavalry were briefly transformed into dismounted infantry units in late 1915), coupled with the use of horseholders, meant fewer rifles in the line (if you considered a cavalry squadron to be an infantry company). Many contemporary writers noted that this disparity was compensated for by the mobility of the cavalry. Thus a smaller number of rifles could have a disproportionate effect if they arrived suddenly and unexpectedly. This effect was recognised as temporary, and needed augmenting while the enemy was off-balance.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It should also be noted that, whatever we might think about cavalry from our perspectives, the cavalry were still feared on the Western Front. Here is an extract from the German Second Army order of 25th August, 1918. It was issued soon after the Battle of Amiens:

"It passes all comprehension that inconceivable rumours have been spread about behind the front during the last few days by people who have lost their nerve. People with anxious temperaments see everywhere squadrons of tanks, masses of cavalry, and dense lines of infantry. It is in fact high time that our old battle-tried soldiers spoke seriously to these cowards and weaklings, and told them of the deeds that are achieved in the front line." (General von der Marwitz).

Cavalry are listed alongside tanks and infantry. All three caused a high level of anxiety, sufficiently widespread to require the Commander of the Second Army to issue this statement.

A numerically small force could exert more than the weight of its musketry fire.

Robert

[phil andrade]

The BEF would have come unstuck "big time" in the Flanders battles of October 1914 had it not been for the superb performance of its cavalry. Am I right ?

Phil (PJA)