Aeroplane klaxon?

[MikeMeech]

Hi

This is the first page of the assesment made by Aug. 1916, on the Somme fighting in July, on the results of contact patrol work.

Mike

[MikeMeech]

Hi

Here is an extract of the second page of the previous document that relates to the start of Klaxon use.

Mike

[Chris_Baker]

I have nothing to add to this thread except to say that I was once Engineering Manager for Klaxon UK. The klaxon patents and technology date from 1906-1908.

[MikeMeech]

Hi

On one of the Klaxon's other uses as an 'IFF' system, the attached is an extract from 'Orders Regarding Firing at Aircraft from the Ground at Night' (TNA. AIR1/1577/204/80/98). Revised instructions issued by GHQ on 26th July 1917.

Mike

[centurion]

From the operational plan - British assault on Broodseinde, France 4th October, 1917

"R.F.C.

Contact Patrol Aeroplanes are to be in the air from Zero till Zero plus 4 hours. They are fitted with wireless but will only use it for the purpose of reporting a Counter attack or transmitting an Infantry Signal message calling for a barrage.

They are to call for flares by firing a white light or sounding a Klaxon Horn. The leading Infantry are to light flares approximately at the following times :-

On the RED line at Zero pus 1 hour 5’.

On the BLUE line at Zero plus 3 hours 30’."

This ties in with 'British Tactical Notes' produced at the end of 1917 for the guidance of the American forces which includes

"Flares will be lit —

(i) By previous arrangement

At specified times.

At specified places.

(ii) Without previous arrangement When called for by the aeroplane by Klaxon horn. On the initiative of local commanders, who may wish

to make their position known. In this case the order should only be given when the aeroplane working with the formation is flying in their

vicinity.

Contact patrol aeroplanes have special markings, which should be known by all ranks. In addition, they carry Klaxon horns and Very lights for the purpose of making themselves known.

In addition to the Contact Patrol Aeroplanes a Counter attack machine fitted with wireless is to be up throughout the day.

In the event of a counter attack developing these machines will call on the artillery by Zone Call."

There are many definitions (all very similar) of the work of the contact patrols. This is typical

"Contact patrol work by aerop1anes was designed to keep Headquarters of formations informed as to progress of troops, to report on the enermy's positions, the advance and movement of his immediate reserves and the state of his defences, and to transmit messages from the troops engaged. They were specially marked and carried Klaxon horns and Verey lights. On their part the infantry lit flares at specified times and places in their most advanced positions, and if they carried Klaxon horns sounded them on their own initiative. Brigades and battalions indicated their position and identity to the aeroplane by ground signal sheets and stripes and sent messages by ground signal panel arranged to represent letters. Thus, in a later development, a succession of G's meant "further bombardment required," of N's "short of ammunition," of Z's "held up by wire." The aeroplanes communicated with headquarters of Corps and Divisions by dropping marked maps and written messages"

The New Zealand Division 1916 - 1919: A Popular History Based on Official Records describing the Division during the First Battle of the Somme

A Canadian pilot reported

"Attended a practice contact patrol scheme by the West Kents [Regiment]. It was quite successful. I realized the importance of turning sharply to save time, of dropping message bags up wind of the groundstrips, of accuracy in reading the T panel, of care in Morsing on klaxon [horn] to make dots distinct and dashes three times as long, of not sending the call till just before dropping the message, and of avoiding A’s [“Standby’s”] except for flares and then sending a series. Full details of information is also essential in maps and messages...."

and an AFC report

“Lt R Armstrong pilot, Lt F. Hart observer. Contact patrol, airborne 10.30 landed at 11.30. Flares called for at 10.50 am

and 11.30. Our line apparently runs [series of map references given]. Message and map dropped at 5th Australian Division,

Australian Corps and 4th Army report centre. Height 1,000 feet. Tanks and infantry moving forward without opposition.”

“Lt Foale and Lt F. Sewell. Contact patrol, take off 11 am landed at 1220. Right division sector. Flares called for at 11.30.

Line appears to run, [map references given]. Message and map dropped to 5th Australian Division, Australian Corps and

Fourth Army Report Centre. Our troops and tanks well forward. Enemy shelling at [map reference]. Also scattered shelling

all over the front. "

Incidentally I can find only one report of infantry being unwilling to use signal flares (already quoted in this thread) all others show no problems.

Towards the end of the war contact patrols also took on an offensive aspect 'strafing' and even bombing German positions holding up the advance. The technique used resembled the 'chain' approach adopted by Spanish Nationalists (in He52s) later taken up by the Luftwaffe (in Hs129 and Ju 87s) and, as it seems, with the klaxons on this must have had a psychological as well as a physical impact - one wonders if it accounts for the "trumpets of death" fitted to the German dive bombers in WW2. It would cerainly make me play dead!

[MikeMeech]

Hi All

At the risk of getting away from the Klaxon. The question of the use of ground flares appears quite often in primary documents in the AIR 1 files, this includes complaints that they were not lit. This was not just down to a reluctance to light them it could be the troops had run out of them or they were too damp to light. However, there was a great concern about the smoke they gave off even by those that used them properly. (Proper training in their use for the Officers and men was it appears the major factor in flares, and other equipment, being used or not). In the 'Great Contact Patrol Survey' of late 1917 instigated by GHQ, which many Divisions contributed to, the 'Analysis of Reports on Signals to Contact Patrol Aeroplanes' states that: "29 reports definitely favour flares and 7 are definitely against them. 8 reports are in favour of flares used in conjunction with some other device such as Watson Fans."

So a larger number were in favour of flares, however, this did not preclude the statement that: "A large proportion complain of the smoke given off by the flare and advocate a smokeless flare." It was the smoke that the infantry felt gave away their location to the enemy, and which is why on occasions they did not light them.

In the analysis a RFC report probably hit the nail on the head over this, it states: "One report from an R.F.C. source, points out that flares are nearly always successfully used when our attack is successful, but when the attack is not successful or only partially so, very few flares are lighted."

The colour of flares was also an issue 'white' or 'red' appear to have been best, but not in all lighting conditions, and 'red' was also used by the Germans so could cause confusion at times.

The whole survey (and it covered much more than I have mentioned) is very interesting and shows the strengths and weaknesses of this method of finding out information as many units held quite opposite opinions on equipment and methods so giving GHQ a minor headache, but more trials and tests were carried out after this and various equipments, ideas and methods were tried out to the end of the war, as had been the case before the survey.

Mike

[centurion]

Hi All

At the risk of getting away from the Klaxon. The question of the use of ground flares appears quite often in primary documents in the AIR 1 files, this includes complaints that they were not lit. This was not just down to a reluctance to light them it could be the troops had run out of them or they were too damp to light. However, there was a great concern about the smoke they gave off even by those that used them properly. (Proper training in their use for the Officers and men was it appears the major factor in flares, and other equipment, being used or not).

This does seem to have been taken into account somewhat.

"Contact-patrols during an infantry attack upon the enemy, keeping in touch with the infantry advance and notifying distant

command-posts of the positions reached. A contact-patrol machine could fly over the attacking troops and sound a series of "A's "(in Morse

code) on a Klaxon horn. The arranged response of the infantry was to light flares in trenches or shell-holes (so as to hide the signals

from the enemy) ; or to show bright tin-discs or white cloths. Another ground-signal was the laying of rifles, muzzles outward, on the

parados (opposite side from the parapet) of a captured trench." History of the AFC

[MikeMeech]

Hi Centurion

Yes, the instructions were to light them in the bottom of trenches and shell holes and also for soldiers not to get between them and the view of the CP observer. All the regulations on this matter came from the Appendix 'B' of SS.135 which laid down the procedures and was ammended to the end of the war. All pre-battle instructions are based on these laid down prcedures, although it did not preclude trying new ideas. But still there were instances (and I do not think in the majority of cases) of troops not lighting the flares because of their perception that it may give away their location to the enemy mainly due to the smoke they gave off. Although in most cases it probably did not reveal their location, however, the matter does keep cropping up in the contemporary paperwork and had to be dealt with. It could be dealt with by the proper training of troops so they knew the importance of the marking of their location. This was done through lectures and exercises, again this comes through in many of the contemporary documents which are contained in large AIR 1 files at the TNA.

I did mention about the 'rifles' being used as a marker previously. Now in the 3 Sqn AFC War Diary (AWM 4-8-6-17 Part 2 Page 68) it mentions a test carried out on 9.5.18. it states:

"Special test carried out over trenches in H.18a 7 b. Observer called for flares at 3.30p, m/c then at 1500'. Infantry put out rifles in groups of three at 10 yds interval. The rifles were easily seen from this height though whether butts pointing towards enemy or not could not be recognised."

However, in a report dated 19.8.18 from 3 Sqn AFC to OC 15th Wing, RAF (AWM 4-8-6-20 Part 1 Page 26-35) it states:

"A further point seems to have been established in connection with the experiments recently tried with rifles laid in groups along the parapet of a trench. Though these were visible on trenches in the back areas even from heights up to 1500 feet, no single instance is recorded of the contact Observer seeing them during this battle nor in the previous battles of MORLANCOURT & HAMEL. Tin discs however proved to be visible."

Throughout the contemporary CP documents there is the the statement and belief that "Battle is the only true test" of these equipments and procedures.

Mike

[centurion]

Mike - I've seen references to the reluctance to light flares being related to instructions to light flares at predetermined times (so that when not lit the contact patrols had to fly very low to ID uniforms) but that with the introduction of the Klaxon cooperation improved as they were willing to light them when they knew one of their own aircraft was in the vicinity. This may have been helped by the contact patrols' capability to provide direct assistance

" A contact patrol of No.9 squadron observed 50 British infantrymen pinned down by a German machine-gun nest, and used their guns so effectively that the nest was

removed." J Halyburton Smith

[centurion]

It would seem that the Germans did use Klaxons to signal to artillery - AA Artillery though

"Just as our leading bus arrived within range and began to spit bullets through the propeller, a signal rocket streaked from the first Boche biplane, and the trio dived almost vertically, honking the while on Klaxon horns. We were then at about 6000 feet We were expecting to see the Huns flatten out, when — ''Wouff! wouffi wouffi wouffl wouffr said Archie. The German birds were not hawks at all; they were merely tame decoys used to entice us to a prearranged spot, at a height well favoured by A.-A. gunners." Cavalry of the clouds

[MikeMeech]

Hi Centurion

Yes CP a/c would do ground attack and call in artillery fire when needed. The Counter-Attack Patrol grew out of the CP role and became a role for a separate a/c as the war progressed, but there are still examples of attacks against enemy troops especially where they see immediate risk to troops on the ground. The Tank support squadron still done both as did the Cavalry support squadrons.

The Klaxon was introduced in July 1916 but some problems of one sort or another are evident from the documents on the subject through 1917 and 1918. The Klaxon was not of course used in isolation, first along with a Very Light and by the end of the war with a special air bursting smoke bomb when available. There were various ideas of other methods along the way. most 'problems' brought up were down mainly to individual unit opinions and /or 'bad' experiences.

For example:

[MikeMeech]

The Germans did not use Klaxon for their Contact Patrols, according to the documents that are available. Some of their official documents were captured and translated and published as SS.563 and SS.619 plus other smaller documents.

Klaxons were used for other puposes, eg. Gas warning in trenches and on airfields for 'alerts' and cannot be ruled out of use for other puposes by the Germans as the British, as mentioned earlier, had used it for alerting AA defences at night that they were 'Friendly'.

Example from SS.563

[centurion]

Hi Centurion

Yes CP a/c would do ground attack and call in artillery fire when needed. The Counter-Attack Patrol grew out of the CP role and became a role for a separate a/c as the war progressed, but there are still examples of attacks against enemy troops especially where they see immediate risk to troops on the ground. The Tank support squadron still done both as did the Cavalry support squadrons.

All the material I've seen on Counter Attack aircraft suggest that they were always separate from contact patrol and did not grow out of it. Their role was to have a wireless and give warning of a German Counter attack and call down a zone barrage. They were not to indulge in ground attack as this could blind them to seeing a counter attack developing

"In addition to the Contact Patrol Aeroplanes a Counter attack machine fitted with wireless is to be up throughout the day.

In the event of a counter attack developing these machines will call on the artillery by Zone Call."

[MikeMeech]

Hi Centurion

Again I am concious of getting away from the Klaxon, however, I must say if you have seen material stating that contact patrols and the counter attack patrol were always separate then that material is not based on the contemporary, then classified, documents that are available to go through in the AIR 1 files of TNA. From these a process of the evolving nature of the contact patrol is clearly laid out over the time period 1915-1918. A sample of this is as follows;

AIR1/2251/209/54/13 'Communication between Infantry and Royal Flying Corps' dated 15.6.16. This has the 'Provisional Instructions regarding Liaison between Infantry and Aircraft' attached (the use of liaison in the title indicates some French influence, as I have mentioned earlier). This includes, in Section 3, the statement that during the attack the 'Tactical reconnaissance (CP a/c)' would report on:

(i) Vicissitudes of the attack and positions reached.

(ii) Movement of the reserves and impending counter-attacks.

So both the location of own troops and any German counter-attacks.

AIR1/122/50/40/122 'Provisional Instructions for Contact Patrol Work by Aeroplanes' of December 1916. Here the object of the CP is laid down as:

(a) To keep headquarters of formations informed as to the progress of their troops during an attack.

( To report on the positions of the enemy opposing the advance, the movements of his immediate reserves and the state of his defences.

© To transmit messages from the troops engaged to the H.Q. of their formation.

So again covering both the CP and Counter-Attack patrol tasks.

It is obvious from the documents that there were some problems with this joint activity and various alternatives were tried out in battle in 1917 as AIR1/918/204/5/879 'Extracts from R.F.C. Reports on Second Army Offensive.' On page 4 of this document it states:

(d) The special contact patrol machine for the purpose of reporting hostile movement and giving early warning of counter-attacks were found very useful. These machines were up continuously on the day of the attack from 0+1 and on the succeeding days as the occasion demanded.

So the 'Special Contact Machine' was what would be later called the 'Counter-Attack Patrol Machine'.

By the issue of SS. 135 Appendix "B" dated April 1918 the rolls are separate but contained in the same document. Contact Patrols from page 3-6 and the Counter-Attack Patrol on page 7.

The progress of this eventual separation of the two roles is clear from the contemporary source evidence written by the people at the time for internal military consumption, the documents generally are marked 'Secret'. I have been researching the subject of the Contact Patrol some time now, the evolution of which I find quite interesting. I still have some gaps in the information as some things appear to missing from the files (probably to be found in other files), but I can state quite clearly from the evidence in the files the Contact patrol and Counter-Attack Patrol relationship is quite clear.

I would be interested in the material you mentioned and is it primary source as it runs counter to the official documentation on the development of these roles?

Mike