Cavalry on the Western Front

[crickhollow]

As a relative newcomer to GWF I feel somewhat wary raising a topic that I feel must already have been discussed exhaustively (if so, I cannot find the thread- apologies).

My query concerns British cavalry regiments on the Western Front. I believe that in the very early stages of WW1, mounted cavalry played an effective role (Mons, First Ypres). Thereafter, apart from one or two isolated and ineffective engagements (e.g. High Wood) cavalryman more usually fought dismounted alongside infantry regiments.

Haig is said to have placed great faith in the use of cavalry in any potential breakthrough. My concern is that the resources used by the cavalry regiments to look after horses and the strategic dead-end this force represented were a net drain on the British Army. It would have been more effective to have more fully embraced at an earlier stage the new technologies of tanks and the aeroplane.

Did the British Army cling on to cavalry for too long? When did the French and Germans disband their cavalry forces?

I would be interested to read some views on this.

Christopher.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Some of these themes were looked at here: Cavalry Studies

George

[MikeMeech]

Christopher

I don't want to repeat much arguement on this subject that is found else where but just mention a few of my own thoughts.

First I think we should all remember when discussing WW1 or anything in history is that WE KNOW the outcome and those involved who lived through it, of all ranks and nationalities, did not at the time. I think that with that knowledge we could all have done things much better than those involved (and even prevented the war), but without that knowledge we would probably had made similar 'mistakes' .

We should also remember that cavalry was the only fully mobile arm during the Great War and was to the end, despite the difficulties of using it in the operational enviroment. Also cavalry was still being used on the Eastern Front in the Second World War despite it being in the 'tank age'.

It is doubtful that tanks or aeroplanes could have been introduced much earlier due to design, development and production problems (some argue that tanks were used too early and the operational deployment should have waited until they were available in greater numbers). In Britain's case there were enough problems training and equipping a mass army which didn't exist pre-war, let alone equipping it with tanks and aeroplanes 'earlier', especially when they either did not exist pre-war (tanks) or were only being produced by a small construction industry (aeroplanes). Cavalry of course were not using the same 'industries' therefore in production terms you would not be replacing or transferring capacity from one military device to another.

Cavalry did not increase on the same scale as the British Army's size, that was mainly Infantry, Artillery and logistics, although the RFC did increase greatly during the war in comparison with 1914.

It was still believed during 1914-18 that the cavalry would be needed in any 'breakout' through the German lines after the artillery and infantry (with tank support after 1916) 'brokethrough' . Of course much of the war this did not happen but it was planned for during major offensives and it is here we see developments of 'new technology' being added to the 'old'.

In the National Archives there are various documents that relate to air support for cavalry, even pre-Somme, although during the Somme we start to get 'named' RFC squadrons who were to support the cavalry. In September 1916 the squadron involved with this task was No. 18 Squadron equipped with FE.2b aeroplanes (hence its winged horse squadron badge on its Chinooks today). This squadron had moved on in early 1917 and therefore the surprise withdrawal by the Germans to the Hiddenburg Line meant that it was 9 and 15 Sqns equipped with BE.2e's that supported the cavalry as they moved foreward to the new enemy line.

During the planned offensives of 1917 it was 35 Sqn (FK.8), (winged horses head badge post war) that was now the cavalry support squadron. It should be mentioned that all these support squadrons had a ground element that would go forward with the cavalry, including a RFC officer and signallers with each cavalry division and also, at least in 35 Sqns case, a Fitter and Rigger who would ride forward with the Cavalry Division they were to support (The forerunners of the Aircraft Servicing Commandoes of WW2). There would also be a GS Wagon (horsedrawn) with each division that carried fuel, oil and some spares for the aeroplanes with a reserve of 8 wagons with Cavalry Corps HQ.

In 1918 during the '100 days' the support squadron was No.6, which was fully motorised, during the 8-13 August 1918 period they undertook 87 Contact patrols, 3 Counter Attack Patrols and 15 Artillery Patrols, altogether 290 flying hours supporting the cavalry. In many ways thae cavalry was 'old fashioned' to our eyes but had certainly been modernized with the air support as had the Infantry and Artillery arms. Like the cavalry the Tank Corps was also 'modernized', in 1918, by having dedicated air support, in this case by 8 Sqn (FK.8) and later 73 Sqn (Camel) was added to aid the the former in their anti-tank gun suppression task, which became very important towards the end of the war.

So it should be stated that the cavalry still had a place on the battlefied as no real replacement had been found for the arm, tanks were not that technically capable yet and had their own vulnerabilities, it had difficulties in operating but its operating methods had been modernized with its dedicated air support in an attempt to improve its capalities on the 'modern' battlefield.

I hope this is of some use to you.

Mike

[pioneecorps]

Hi Christopher

The poor old Cavalry horse, did not stand a chance against modern day weapons, barb wire, and the Caltrop:

[truthergw]

Hi Christopher

The poor old Cavalry horse, did not stand a chance against modern day weapons, barb wire, and the Caltrop:

Nor, in theory, did infantry. Yet men and cavalry attacked and defended, and won in the end. Some of the real successes of the cavalry's war came right at the end during the 100 days.

[pioneecorps]

Nor, in theory, did infantry. Yet men and cavalry attacked and defended, and won in the end. Some of the real successes of the cavalry's war came right at the end during the 100 days.

Hi,I agree with you, infantry and cavalry were up against the same weapons, altough they did have the same weapons themselves, to fight back, unlike the horse. Gerwyn

[scottmarchand]

Pioneercorps: Caltrops have been around documented in use as far back as the 4th century B.C., and probably much earlier - certainly not a modern invention in the context of your statement.

[Steven Broomfield]

I hate to be picky (well, actually I quite enjoy it), but could we say Barbed wire rather than use the Americanism, barb wire, please?

And the cavalry horse proved itself immensely adaptable; as Tom says, some of the most notabe successes came in the 100 Days. For example, on the 8th August, the 5th Dragoon Guards (1st Cavalry brigade, 1st Cavalry Division) captured 20 0fficers, 740 men, 50 horses, 5 transport waggons, some railway rolling stock and a number of artillery pieces, for the loss of 1 officer and 7 men killed, 1 officer and 53 men wounded, and the loss of 122 horses. Remember also that cavalry captures of prisoners tend to be under-reported as the prisoners were frequently passed on to infantry as the cavalry couldn't spare men to accompany them to the rear.

[squirrel]

I would suggest reading "Horsemen in No Man's Land" British cavalry & trench warfare 1914-1918 by David Kenyon.

This is taken from the concluding chapter:

"They were present in the BEF in such small numbers that they could only play a small part in comparison to their colleagues in other arms, and as the war developed in 1917 and 1918 to allow greater potential for the cavalry to contribute,their numbers in proportion to the size of the BEF as a whole dwindled almost into insignificance. The question of whether "more cavalry, better lead" would have been helpful on the Western Front is ultimately like many counterfactual arguments, somewhat sterile, but it is reasonable to argue that the cavalry units that were present, when offered the chance to get in to battle, acquitted themselves well and proved that at brigade and regimental level the cavalry was an effective fighting arm."

And, their more succesful engagements were in the main carried out in accordance with the pre war training manuals and we know who did a great deal of the work in compiling these.

[truthergw]

Hi,I agree with you, infantry and cavalry were up against the same weapons, altough they did have the same weapons themselves, to fight back, unlike the horse. Gerwyn

The horses carried men armed with rifles and machine guns and were supported by other horses pulling field guns.

[pioneecorps]

Pioneercorps: Caltrops have been around documented in use as far back as the 4th century B.C., and probably much earlier - certainly not a modern invention in the context of your statement.

Hi ScottM

Thank you for pointing this out, I was not making a statement, saying, they had not been used in previous wars/conflicts, the post I thought, related to WW1, which they were used in.

British soldiers (see image) gather and inspect sharpened metal devices designed to delay and discourage cavalry pursuit left behind by the Germans in their retreat to the Hindenburg Line.

It would be great to see some early photos of them.

Gerwyn

[Tim P]

I think the cavalry were instrumental in breaking the stalemate. Or at least monopolising on the breaks.

Fortunately for the horses Ww1 was a swansong for them though.

its very easy to see all mounted troops as cavalry which of course was far from the case

[Ron Clifton]

Hello all

Perhaps we should remind ourselves that, once the front had become extended from Switzerland to the Channel, the war on the Western Front had the nature of a vast siege, with modernised versions of techniques mediaeval engineers would have used (mining, trying to force a breach), and cavalry never had a significant role in sieges.

Cavalry could be used, and in Egypt under Allenby was used, to great effect in places where the terrain and the nature of operations permitted it. There were four British (and Dominion) mounted divisions in Egypt in 1918 but only three on the Western Front.

In answer to one of Christopher's original questions, yes, the Germans began to dismount their cavalry by 1916 if not 1915, and reduced their eleven peacetime divisions to three by 1918. I believe that the French did something similar with their ten but I cannot quote a definite source. The British achieved a similar result, in part by not expanding the mounted arm as fast as the rest, and in part by dismounting yeomanry regiments (and in 1917 turning a lot of them into infantry). Yeomanry regiments at home were all (I think) converted to cyclists, thus making them mobile infantry.

Even in 1918 on the Western Front limited but effective use could still be made of cavalry. I was once told by a well-known military historian that they coped with barbed wire by teaching some of the horses to jump fence-posts (the horses could not see the actual wire) and getting the rest of the troop to ride in single file behind these trained horses. I don't know how effective this actually was, but if you could get cavalry over the wire in this way you could wreak havoc on men in the enemy trenches, especially with a lance.

Ron

[crickhollow]

Thank you all for some interesting observations.

Whatever the merits and undoubted competence of the cavalry forces, my feeling is that this resource represented a strategic dead-end at an early stage of what became the Western Front. As has been pointed out, Haig's background led him to believe that a potential 'break-through' exploited by a cavalry force could be a turning point in the war. How realistic was this idea? In practical terms what could such a move really achieve? Was this a distraction?

I don't think hindsight is a factor here - it must have been clear to many military planners by say 1915, that it was only developments in weapon technology and in coordinated attacks that would bring about a winning outcome, not cavalry.

As late as 1917 mass production of the tank was obstructed by the War Office - by this time development of effective tank technology was not a real issue, so it could be argued that this weapon could have been introduced earlier in greater numbers.

The Germans were finally pushed back across the border as a result of sheer weight of armoured force across a broad front. A cavalry 'break-through' on the Western Front was never going to achieve any worthwhile gain.

I wonder if the Germans were faster to develop more appropriate fighting techniques on the Western Front (specialised storm troops, flexible defences etc.) once they abandoned the use of cavalry Uhlan regiments? (I believe cavalry was used more effectively on the Eastern Front).

C.

[truthergw]

Hi ScottM

Thank you for pointing this out, I was not making a statement, saying, they had not been used in previous wars/conflicts, the post I thought, related to WW1, which they were used in.

British soldiers (see image) gather and inspect sharpened metal devices designed to delay and discourage cavalry pursuit left behind by the Germans in their retreat to the Hindenburg Line.

It would be great to see some early photos of them.

Gerwyn

Not aimed at cavalry I suspect but rather at the everyday horsedrawn supply.

[squirrel]

Not aimed at cavalry I suspect but rather at the everyday horsedrawn supply.

Wouldn't have done an infantryman's feet any good either.

[Steven Broomfield]

The Germans were finally pushed back across the border as a result of sheer weight of armoured force across a broad front. A cavalry 'break-through' on the Western Front was never going to achieve any worthwhile gain.

I wonder if the Germans were faster to develop more appropriate fighting techniques on the Western Front (specialised storm troops, flexible defences etc.) once they abandoned the use of cavalry Uhlan regiments? (I believe cavalry was used more effectively on the Eastern Front).

C.

To point 1, no. They were pushed back due a multitude of factors, effective use of armour being one, but artillery, air, machine guns, cavalry and that definitive article - the infantryman.

One of the reasons they abandoned cavalry was less to do with doctrine and more to do with supply: the blockade created a situation where feeding the men was difficult; feeding the horses a luxury. Had the Germans had use of a few cavalry divisions in March 1918 I suspect the outcome might have been nearer-run than it in fact was.

And, no, a mass breakthrough by cavalry was a dream, but the work done by cavalry is not to be under-estimated. As Squirrel mentioned, Kenyon's book is a well-worth read. Your local library will have it, or you can get if for about fifteen quid from Amazon (and support the Forum), so I'd recommend it.

[Robert Dunlop]

Whatever the merits and undoubted competence of the cavalry forces, my feeling is that this resource represented a strategic dead-end at an early stage of what became the Western Front. As has been pointed out, Haig's background led him to believe that a potential 'break-through' exploited by a cavalry force could be a turning point in the war. How realistic was this idea? In practical terms what could such a move really achieve? Was this a distraction?

Several questions have been posed in this paragraph. I will address a few of them. The issue of 'break-through' has been misunderstood and misrepresented. Various writers latched onto the idea, twisting it to represent Haig being out of touch about modern warfare, meddling with other commanders who had better ideas (eg Rawlinson and 'bite and hold'), and generally being obsessed with the concept. The corollary is that Haig's 'obsession' led to unnecessary casualties. The issue has been discussed several times before on this Forum. I will dig out some of the references. Basically, however, Haig was ensuring that his commanders planned for the possible collapse of German resistance. The modern concept is known as scenario planning, where multiple possible futures are held to be equally probable. Planning then proceeds in such a way that the scenarios are catered for and the warning signs for one or other scenario are looked for. The signs of a particular scenario evolving would trigger appropriate pre-planned additional actions being taken. Thus, on July 1st 1916 the BEF had plans in place for complete failure, partial success (ie capturing and consolidating the German front line), and complete collapse of the German forces. The latter was possible, given Intelligence reports of the losses at Verdun, the relative lack of German reinforcements opposite the Somme sector, and the movements of German units to the Eastern Front. The 'break-through' scenario was not based on Haig's 'background' but on the best estimates of possible outcomes made at the time and in light of updates in Intel.

The major benefit of scenario planning is that of organisational learning. It is an approach that ensures more effective communication, wider consideration of issues, and reduces the likelihood of high command getting stuck in a rut.

Robert

[crickhollow]

....The issue of 'break-through' has been misunderstood and misrepresented.....

Robert

Thanks, accept the point regards 'scenario planning'. Don't want to repeat on topics covered exhaustively elsewhere (are you there George Custer?!) but briefly, what was Haig's 'breakthrough' strategy? What unique and cost-effective contribution could cavalry make in these circumstances?

C.

[pioneecorps]

Not aimed at cavalry I suspect but rather at the everyday horsedrawn supply.

Hi, I have to point out, in the caption, it mentions " Cavalry pursuit" not horse drawn supply. Gerwyn

[pioneecorps]

The horses carried men armed with rifles and machine guns and were supported by other horses pulling field guns.

Hi. Are you saying, because the horses carried the men, who used the rifles, or pulled the field guns, for the men to fire, that killed or maimed.

Horses, mules, dogs, and pigeons, were all vital to our our war effort, but, I can't remember ever reading of them firing at the enemy . Gerwyn

[Steven Broomfield]

Hi. Are you saying, because the horses carried the men, who used the rifles, or pulled the field guns, for the men to fire, that killed or maimed.

Horses, mules, dogs, and pigeons, were all vital to our our war effort, Gerwyn

Yes, of course they were. There was no other practical way of moving artillery, munitions, etc, in quantity until the internal combustion engine reached maturity. Even in WW2 the German Army was usinh huge quantities of horse-drawn transport.

[truthergw]

Hi. Are you saying, because the horses carried the men, who used the rifles, or pulled the field guns, for the men to fire, that killed or maimed.

Horses, mules, dogs, and pigeons, were all vital to our our war effort, but, I can't remember ever reading of them firing at the enemy . Gerwyn

Feel free to interpret my posts in any way you choose.

[George Armstrong Custer]

are you there George Custer?!

Leave me out of this, chum - having looked at you and pioneercorps posts I fully intend leaving the pair of you to it!

George

[Robert Dunlop]

... briefly, what was Haig's 'breakthrough' strategy? What unique and cost-effective contribution could cavalry make in these circumstances?

The strategy was to have a mobile force of cavalry available to pursue German forces if they suddenly collapsed and started withdrawing across a wide front. The operational aim was to gain control over key lines of communication as quickly as possible, rather than pursue German forces just because they were retreating. Disrupting lines of communication would force the retreat to become more widespread because German units trying to stabilise the flanks would be threatened.

As discussed elsewhere on this Forum, there were several tactical aspects that were implicit in this strategy. Cavalry knew how to conduct such a pursuit, based on the use of officer patrols, advanced guards, etc. The cavalry logistics systems were geared to sustaining an advance/pursuit. Independent command, in pursuit of deep operational objectives, was a characteristic of the cavalry.

Robert