Cavalry on the Western Front

[crickhollow]

As you describe the theory it does sound a viable option, but I wonder how sustainable a cavalry force can be in these circumstances? They can carry only light weapons and limited food resources (for men and horses) and so apart from spreading mild panic for a short time they are unlikely to be able to hold or seriously disrupt any major communications facility e.g railways.

If the cavalry gets too far ahead of supporting infantry then they risk a encircling counter attack. Creating a gap between advancing cavalry and any following foot-slogging infantry could create a high risk killing ground.

I am really struggling to balance in my mind a military strategy that on the one hand developed the tank to crush barbed wire, eliminate machine-gun nests and at times allow infantry to advance with some degree of protection. In parallel with this we have a theoretical use of a cavalry force to spearhead a fast but in my view totally unrealistic attack behind enemy lines.

C.

[Steven Broomfield]

But the 1918 tank (or even the 2011 tank, for that matter) has a very limited range: it needs fuel and ammunition, lubricating, tightening of the track, and so on. The 1918 tank was very, very far from being a war-winner. It was slow, too, and unable to cross very broken-up ground, woods, rivers, wide trenches, and suchlike.

The horse was not ideal, but I suspect no weapon system is. The fact is, though, that in 1918 the horse soldier was still the only person about who could exploit a gap, spread panic in the rear areas and generally cause mayhem.

The 1918 battles contain a lot of examples of this. Even in 1916 the advance of the 7th DG and Deccan Horse at High Wood was more successful than you might think, and the actions of the cavalry on 1st december 1917 at Cambrai still stand as an epic.

Put simply, and as I said earlier, the 100 Days was the culmination of a lot of weapons systems getting it right at the same time, and the cavalry was one of thos systems.

[squirrel]

The cavalry actions during the battle of Amiens 1918 were textbook examples of how cavalry should be used - Hotchkiss and Vickers MG's and RHA batteries used to supress enemy fire from their position while 2 or more squadrons charged from different directions.

[Robert Dunlop]

I am really struggling to balance in my mind a military strategy that on the one hand developed the tank to crush barbed wire, eliminate machine-gun nests and at times allow infantry to advance with some degree of protection. In parallel with this we have a theoretical use of a cavalry force to spearhead a fast but in my view totally unrealistic attack behind enemy lines.

Yes, it will be very difficult to reconcile the concept of a fast 'attack' with the difficulties posed by barbed wire, machine gun nests, and the other trappings of position (read 'seige') warfare. The exploitation of a collapsing enemy is quite different, however. Mention has been made of the 100 days. Megiddo stands out as the example of what cavalry and mounted infantry were able to do. Megiddo was not an example of a 'fast attack'. It was an example of the pursuit of a disorganised disintegrating force. This is fundamentally different.

There were some other significant examples, particularly on the Eastern Front.

Robert

[crickhollow]

Thank you for all the comments. On reflection, maybe for the Western Front especially, one just needs to re-think how cavalry operated in the War. What do you think of this explanation: in earlier warfare cavalry attacked whilst on horseback using lance and sabre plunging into enemy positions. In WW1 mounted cavalry was the means by which an armed soldier could move rapidly to an advantageous position, dismount and then effectively operate on the ground as infantryman? The horse was simply a means of transport - faster than mechanical vehicles of the time, effective but maybe a little less efficient due to the care and husbandry of the animal.

C.

[Steven Broomfield]

As has been mentioned before, reading Kenyon's recent book "Cavalry in No Man's Land" would be a good idea - available from Amazon to own, or your library to borrow.

Also, Stephen Badsey's excellent book on Doctrine in the British Cavalry in the late 19th- and early 20th Centuries is also well worth a read. Given your obvious interest in the subject, I'd recommend reading them - you'll get a much fuller picture than from the various snippets of information posted here.

[squirrel]

I agree with mr Broomfield - these books are a superb resource for understanding the capabilites of the cavalry and also how they were used in WW1. The cavalry actions in late 1918 were by no means confined to dismounted action and swords were used effectively on a number of occasions.

[Robert Dunlop]

Badsey's book gives a very detailed description of the debate about cavalry versus mounted infantry. There was a very clear difference. For a less rigorous discussion of the issue, I would recommend this thread here. At least it is free . The key point is not to assume that shock action using sabre or lance was the only role of the cavalry. As you will read in the recommended thread, the use of dismounted action was drilled into all British and European cavalry before the war.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

What do you think of this explanation: in earlier warfare cavalry attacked whilst on horseback using lance and sabre plunging into enemy positions.

This concept is a partial explanation of what cavalry did before WW1. The notion of 'plunging into enemy positions' is not really correct, if by that you mean that cavalry charged fixed defensive positions. If you meant that pre-WW1 cavalry used the charge then that was true, sometimes. But cavalry had many more roles than the charge. One of the most important, and most pertinent to this thread, was the pursuit of a beaten enemy. Reconnaissance was also extrememly important. A third distinct role was the deep raid. There were even some examples of this in WW1 on the Western Front, with von Kluck nearly being captured by a French cavalry raid.

Robert

[crickhollow]

Good points. Reconnaissance and quick deep raids would take advantage of the mobility offered by cavalry. I am less convinced about pursuit of a beaten enemy across a devastated WW1 battlefield - a relatively small mounted force would be rather exposed to counter-attack?

I started this thread trying to understand Haig's vision of a cavalry force. This is often characterised as potentially exploiting the (mythical) 'breakthrough'. In mid-to-late stages of WW1 I think this was an unrealistic objective.

C.

[truthergw]

Good points. Reconnaissance and quick deep raids would take advantage of the mobility offered by cavalry. I am less convinced about pursuit of a beaten enemy across a devastated WW1 battlefield - a relatively small mounted force would be rather exposed to counter-attack?

I started this thread trying to understand Haig's vision of a cavalry force. This is often characterised as potentially exploiting the (mythical) 'breakthrough'. In mid-to-late stages of WW1 I think this was an unrealistic objective.

C.

I suspect that the root of your problem is a too narrow reading base. Perhaps if you were to spread your net more widely and consider concentrating on material written fairly recently, you would revise your interpretation. Please remember that Haig's ideas on tactics evolved throughout the war, as did every other commander's. As to pursuit. More than one commentator remarked on the Allies' good fortune that the Germand did not have a cavalry arm at the Kaiserschlacht. It was felt that this might well have turned a precipitous retreat into a rout.

[Ron Clifton]

(1) ... a relatively small mounted force would be rather exposed to counter-attack?

(2) ... potentially exploiting the (mythical) 'breakthrough'. In mid-to-late stages of WW1 I think this was an unrealistic objective.

As to the first point, counter-attack from where? Cavalry pursuit was usually undertaken against an enemy force which had lost the ability to mount an organised defence. And don't forget that the cavalry would not be advancing unsupported - any areas where the enemy was likely to co-ordinate forces to mount a counter-attack would also, in all probability, be subject to interdiction fire from the cavalry's own artillery - and not just the 13-pounders, but other field and heavy artillery as well.

On the second point, and with the benefit of post-1918 hindsight, and as regards the Western Front, I think you are largely right. But the use of the tank (designed to accompany infantry and moving at their speed) was in too early a stage of development, even by 1918, to mount effective pursuits on a large scale, so the cavalry was the only weapon available to exploit a breakthrough if it did occur.

Ron

[crickhollow]

Yes, I think I should read more about effective cavalry strategies that were pursued on the Western Front - I prefer to read about fact rather than theory. Suggestions?

The history of warfare is full of accounts of advancing forces chasing an assumed defeated enemy, only to find that they become isolated and vulnerable.

It is with that consideration in mind that I am cautious about a fast-moving cavalry attacks rather than a staged infantry advance. If the purpose is not to take advantage of the speed of a mounted force then why bother?

C.

[crickhollow]

OK, as recommended by you more knowledgeable members I need to do some background reading so I have now downloaded David Kenyon's PhD thesis: 'British Cavalry on the Western Front 1916-1918' from http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do. (thanks to Gavin Robinson in the Aug/Sep 2010 WFA threads on British cavalry).

Stand by!

[truthergw]

Yes, I think I should read more about effective cavalry strategies that were pursued on the Western Front - I prefer to read about fact rather than theory. Suggestions?

The history of warfare is full of accounts of advancing forces chasing an assumed defeated enemy, only to find that they become isolated and vulnerable.

It is with that consideration in mind that I am cautious about a fast-moving cavalry attacks rather than a staged infantry advance. If the purpose is not to take advantage of the speed of a mounted force then why bother?

C.

Facts are meaningless without interpretation, i.e. theory. A search for cavalry in the review section will turn up many books for you to choose from.

[crickhollow]

Facts are meaningless without interpretation - self evident I think, however to re-phrase that old cliché: truth theory is the first casualty of war

[Robert Dunlop]

This is often characterised as potentially exploiting the (mythical) 'breakthrough'. In mid-to-late stages of WW1 I think this was an unrealistic objective.

Then why did it work in Brusilov's offensive (1916) and Megiddo (1918)? In Palestine, the encircling movement (which was brought about by a breakthrough) caused the near destruction of an entire army.

Do the successes mean that every use of cavalry was guaranteed to work? No. Haig knew that and scenario planning meant that if the German forces did not collapse then other options were in place. There were ways to tell the difference between a disorganised retreat versus a planned withdrawal. Numerous instances exist where commanders could tell the difference. Even so, cavalry were trained not to go racing ahead in an uncontrolled and unsupported way. I mentioned before that the process of pursuit was conducted in a systematic way. This was to prevent the possibility of a 'counter-attack' taking the force unawares. In a disorganised retreat, as mentioned above, the risk of a coordinated counter-attack was almost negligible. Rear guard actions were possible but, as Amiens showed, the cavalry were able to cope.

The issue was not that a breakout was unrealistic. You can only say this with hindsight. If Allenby had assumed this before Megiddo then the cavalry and light horse would not have been ready to exploit the rupture of the Ottoman lines. The issue was how to ensure that the cavalry could do their job if required and alternatives were in place if not.

Robert

[crickhollow]

Thank you, interesting examples of cavalry action but my query was focused on the Western Front. I need to complete reading Kenyon's analysis on the use cavalry, but so far I remain puzzled as to how and why the British Army command during most if not all of WW1, continued to place such faith in the 'cost-effectiveness' (for want of a better analysis) of a mounted force (emphasis on the Western Front). I suspect that this loyalty to cavalry is inconsistent with a necessary focus on developing new methods of coordinated infantry attack using the products of industrial technology such as tanks, aeroplanes and new weapons. A mounted unit can by definition only be lightly armed so risky to operate independently. If it has to operate with infantry forces then I am not sure what a horse contributes to the action.

I don't think these criticisms are made with hindsight as I am sure there were many far-sighted strategists working within Haig's command.

C.

[David_Underdown]

What do you mean by "lightly-armed"? British cavalry carried exactly the same rifle as the infantry, and I believe that the number of integral Hotchkiss guns was proportionally higher in a cavalry regiment than the number of Lewis guns in an infantry battalion. Pre-war at least, rifle shooting scores were actually generally higher in the cavalry too.

Some writers have made a comparison between the (potential) deployment of cavalry in WWI and airborne forces in WWII

[Robert Dunlop]

I don't think these criticisms are made with hindsight...

I respectfully disagree. You can only argue that major cavalry operations, along the scale of Megiddo, were impossible on the Western Front because you know how the war played out. The British High Command placed no more faith in cavalry than it did in any other arm of the services. Hence scenario planning. Cavalry had specific roles, just like every other major discipline. You will have to provide proof that the attitude to cavalry was 'inconsistent with a necessary focus on developing new methods of coordinated infantry attack using the products of industrial technology such as tanks, aeroplanes and new weapons.' As Kenyon and Badsley point out, and as David just mentioned with respect to the use of automatic weapons, cavalry underwent change. The 'new methods of coordinated infantry attack' included a different style of cavalry involvement, with smaller cavalry units providing closer support and reconnaissance/scouting roles during major offensives, for example. This is in addition to the role of independent cavalry actions, such as occurred with effect in the Battle of Amiens. I have read numerous British GHQ and Army level reports, planning meetings, after-action reviews, etc and these have left me with the clear impression that cavalry were treated no differently from the other arms. All were subjected to scrutiny, analysis, improvement, and ongoing review.

The threat of British (and French) cavalry continued to play on the minds of the German command, especially during the last 100 days. Quotes have been recorded on this Forum but I will have to look out where.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

You will have to provide proof that the attitude to cavalry was 'inconsistent with a necessary focus on developing new methods of coordinated infantry attack using the products of industrial technology such as tanks, aeroplanes and new weapons.'

Here is some proof to the contrary. It comes from Powell's book 'Plumer: The Soldiers General' (p. 185):

"Previously, on 20 May [1917], Haig had drawn up some notes for the guidance of Second Army in the coming battle [of Messines in 1917]. They were extremely detailed. After a number of paragraphs of a general nature, Haig posed a large variety of questions to Plumer's corps commanders, examples of which were:

Have you got the enemy's batteries accurately located?

Are changes of position occurring, and, if so, in what manner? For example, is the enemy occupying alternative positions near vacated ones; is he re-occupying his old ones after a certain lapse of time, or do you see a general tendency to move his batteries back?

Have you discovered any new positions in course of construction, and are they being camoflagued as they are being made...?

Have your Intelligence and Artillery Reconnaisance Officers detailed information as to where he is placing his machine guns, etc?

How do you propose forming up the troops for the attack...?

Have you a detailed plan for stopping the bridges over the River Lys or Canal d'Ypres, as the case may be...?

Are your infantry trained to deal with low-flying hostile aeroplanes by Lewis Gun and rifle fire?

Are you satisfied with the Inter-Corps and Inter-Division barrages; are all co-ordinated and that, as far as possible, they meet with the views of Divisional Commanders?

Have you arranged your barrage in depth from the moment of the assault onwards?

What is your plan for destroying the wire?

Have you considered the number of guns that it will be necessary for you to allocate to counter-battery at zero?

The specific questions that followed for each of Plumer's corps were even more detailed: a minute cross-examination on how they were to capture specific objectives such as Messines and Wytschaete; how the river Douve and the Steenbeek were to be crossed; were the various counter-battery groups adequate and their positioning satisfactory?

And so on for pages. For three full days, between 22 and 24 May, Haig visited the headquarters of the corps and divisions planning for Messines, working his way through the list and checking the plans of the various generals."

This does not fit with an obsession over cavalry, especially to the exclusion of everything else. Quite the contrary IMHO.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The threat of British (and French) cavalry continued to play on the minds of the German command, especially during the last 100 days. Quotes have been recorded on this Forum but I will have to look out where.

There is one example posted here.

Robert

[bob lembke]

Just noted this thread, and I hope that you gentlemen, clearly interested in cavalry, might be able to decypher a puzzle for me.

About 2000 I found my father's and grand-father's letters from the front, and decided to start a serious study of WW I. (First step; teach myself to read German, and the old hand-writing systems.) But before I did anything, I decided to write down the family oral history of the war, in the form of the stories that my father had told me, before my memory was colored by both reading the letters, and also any other reading I might undertake. I wrote down 40 pages, single-spaced, of my father's recollections, mostly told to me, I think, in the period 1950 to 1955. Unlike the usual stereotype, my father loved the war, and enjoyed telling me about it, often over and over, probably why I seemed to remember many stories so very well.)

I was quite dubious about the process, as it relied on my father's memory over a span of about 35 years, additionally relying on my memory over a time span of 45 or more years, and finally on whether or not my father was telling me the truth (as he remembered it) in the first place; he occasionally enjoyed a good hoax, one of which he maintained for over 40 years. Although I had a fair general knowledge of military matters, I did not have a lot of specific information on the German Army of WW I, and some of it sounded a bit fanciful. However, after 11 years of serious study, probably averaging 4-5 hours a day, reading in (I just counted) 11 languages (only five to a significant degree; 98% of my reading for the last year has been in French, German, and Flemish), and checking my father's stories against many sources (other family letters and stories, military documents he accumulated, and hundreds of official histories, documents, memoires, etc. that I have collected and read), almost all of the stories that could be corroborated have checked out (certainly certain stories of a more personal nature cannot be corroborated or disproved), and the two or three that still seem questionable may likely be more a fault of my memory, rather than my father's memory, or his veracity.

All of this is a long way to set the stage for my question of many years, if any of you cavalry enthusiasts are still with me. My father said that he was in the vicinity of the last big cavalry charge of the Great War. (Clearly he really meant on the Western Front, not the whole war, he never got to the East, although he did serve at Gallipoli.) He said that the Germans had forewarning, or at least strong suspicions, of an impending British cavalry charge, across a wheat field. The Germans strongly-staked piano wire in the field (he was a Pionier, and possibly might have served in the wiring detail), and brought up machine gun formations, and sure enough a force of British cavalry roughly of the strength of half a division (a brigade?) charged, and as they encountered the wire, and many horses tripped and fell, the MGs opened up, and the attack was halted in its tracks, with considerable losses.

Does this alleged encounter trigger any recollection of a British cavalry engagement?

Although my grand-father gravitated to the heavy artillery, and my father to the Pioniere, my family's traditional service was in 3. (1. brandenburgisches) Ulan=Regiment "Zar Alexandar II von Russland", which generations of ancestors served in.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Bob, when did this incident occur during the war? It doesn't ring any bells with me. Cavalry charges were not pre-planned by the British in this way. Later in the war, almost all such incidents would have occurred during the exploitation phase of a break-in, when things were chaotic. I don't know of any charge involving such large numbers at the same time.

Robert

[crickhollow]

I think this exchange of views has given me a better understanding of the complicated and changing role of cavalry on the Western Front. Thank you all.

It is clear that at a high level of command in the British Army there were varying levels of commitment to the use of cavalry (e.g. between Haig and Rawlinson).

Kenyon's paper offers some interesting observations especially during the Fleurs-Curcellette and Morval actions in August/September 1916 which highlights some of the concerns:

For those of you still following this thread below are some extracts that makes for interesting reading:

Haig seems throughout to have been wedded to the concept of a breakthrough and cavalry exploitation. He was constantly anticipating a decisive collapse of the German defences. This was a keynote of his attitude throughout the remainder of the war, despite the fact that even up to November 1918 arguably it never took place.

Haig’s vision was spelled out in a G.H.Q. memorandum of 19 August, calling for plans of attack to be prepared by Fourth and Reserve Armies: “with the object of securing the enemy’s last line of prepared defences between Morval and Le Sars, with a view to opening the way for the cavalry.”

As the battle progressed on 15 September Archibald Home, newly appointed as Kavanagh’s Chief-of-Staff was less optimistic “It would appear that if the cavalry does not get a chance this time it will be the end of them" and didi not want to upset other arms. "The Corps Commander wishes Divisions to be very careful as regards questions of traffic and water. They must remember that they are only guests in the different Corps areas, and a great deal of tact is required to avoid friction".

The appearance of words like ‘guests’ and ‘tact’ are curious in the context of a military operational order. The Cavalry Corps thus began the September battles on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand they had been given the opportunity finally to participate in the battle in strength and potentially show their true fighting value, but on the other they were not to be permitted even to advance until Rawlinson’s infantry and artillery battle had been fought and won. Indeed their mere appearance in the rear areas prior to the appointed moment would be seriously frowned upon by Fourth Army. It is difficult to see how any meaningful exploitation of successes by infantry could be obtained under these circumstances.

So, at least at the end of 1916 at an operational level (Western Front) it seems that the role of the cavalry was still unclear. Haig had his vision on the use of cavalry some of his commanders had their doubts.

All interesting stuff... maybe time to call a halt, unless any of you have some further comments you would like to make? I will be reading more on this subject.

Rgds

C.