Cavalry on the Western Front

[Robert Dunlop]

Bob, when did this incident occur during the war?

I recall now that we have had this discussion before. I will look out the thread.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It is clear that at a high level of command in the British Army there were varying levels of commitment to the use of cavalry (e.g. between Haig and Rawlinson).

It is important to be clear about what this means. Haig was the C-in-C, who had direct responsibility for GHQ assets. This included the cavalry. Rawlinson was the GOC Fourth Army. He had no authority to plan for the use of cavalry unless this authority was delegated to him. This is not an issue of commitment. It reflects the different focus and responsibilities of different levels of command.

There is no doubt that views varied on a number of issues. Cavalry were not alone in this. Witness the wide variety of bombardment schemes that were used on July 1st 1916. A purpose of scenario planning was to ensure that commanders who weren't familiar with or responsible for a particular arm would consider its use.

Bear in mind that Rawlinson had behaved badly, as a commander, during and after the Battle of Neuve Chapelle.

I will deal with each of Kenyon's comments, which I am familiar with, in turn. Suffice to say that the interpretations expressed are widely repeated in the literature, as I noted in the beginning.

Robert

[crickhollow]

Whatever the personal views expressed on the Forum I do sense that there are many different views on the role and effectiveness of cavalry on the Western Front.

I have yet to finish reading Kenyon's paper but it seems that not all are in agreement with some of his observations, so I would be interested in your brief comments on his conclusions.

As GOC Rawlinson may have had a limited role in developing C-inC Haig's strategy, but clearly he could influence the implementation, as per Kenyon's comments:

Indeed on 13 September Rawlinson went even further to restrict the freedom of movement of the cavalry. His ‘Instruction on the event of a general advance’172

reiterated the necessity of avoiding clogging the rear areas and masking the guns with advancing cavalry. It insisted not only that the cavalry should wait until the infantry

were established on the ‘Red Line’ final objectives, but also that they should wait until the artillery had been leap-frogged forward into supporting positions behind the new

infantry line. Only after that were the rôles reversed and the infantry tasked to support the further advance of the cavalry “… the rapidity of whose advance at this period of the

battle is all important.”

It is hard to see how any rapidity of advance would be achieved by forces queuing up behind the advancing artillery. Indeed it is hard to read in

Rawlinson’s orders for the cavalry any sense that he saw them as anything other than a bulky inconvenience and even a liability, his tone is clear in the last paragraph of the'Instructions':

The Cavalry Corps must ensure that the forward areas now in our hands are not blocked with cavalry prematurely… The cavalry advance must be continuous,

but it must also be very methodical, any attempt to push too much cavalry through at one time will only lead to confusion and consequent delay

Good intelligence and communications are a vital part of military operations. Thus the rôle of the cavalry as reconnaissance troops was a vital one and should not be underestimated. It is not the same, however, as the use of mounted soldiers in the actual assault on those enemy positions or in the exploitation of any success.

(Ackowledgement and thanks to Kenyon for my use of his material).

C.

[Robert Dunlop]

Kenyon's paper offers some interesting observations...

Haig seems throughout to have been wedded to the concept of a breakthrough and cavalry exploitation. He was constantly anticipating a decisive collapse of the German defences. This was a keynote of his attitude throughout the remainder of the war, despite the fact that even up to November 1918 arguably it never took place.

The key word in this paragraph is 'wedded'. This, coupled with the tone of the last sentence, implies that Haig was obsessed with the idea. You can read about the planning process for the Somme here. It is a long thread but contains a lot of original source material. Far from being 'wedded' to the idea, it is apparent that Haig paid little attention to the issue of cavalry until further along in the process.

To understand the concept of being 'wedded' to breakthrough, IMHO, you need to understand how Nivelle planned and attempted to execute his offensive in 1917. Then compare Nivelle with Haig. This has been done elsewhere in the Forum. I recommend starting with this post here.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Haig’s vision was spelled out in a G.H.Q. memorandum of 19 August, calling for plans of attack to be prepared by Fourth and Reserve Armies: “with the object of securing the enemy’s last line of prepared defences between Morval and Le Sars, with a view to opening the way for the cavalry.”

I presume this quote has been supplied as an example of Haig being obsessed with the breakthrough. In the context of scenario planning, this simply means that the planning needed to take into account the possibility of the German forces withdrawing from the last line. Haig did not specify when this should happen. The plans from Fourth and Reserve Armies included different lines of objectives to secure the first of Haig's 'object'. As it happens, the continued infantry attacks did open up the way for the cavalry. In an unprecedented move, the Germans created and then withdrew to the Hindenburg Line. British (and French) cavalry played an important role as advance guards. It was known, however, that the Germans had not been routed. The cavalry operated in a more circumspect way. Thus Haig's 'vision' came to pass in the aftermath of the Battle of the Somme (although the 'scenario' of a withdrawal caught the Entente by surprise because it was out of sequence with the battle).

FWIIW, I don't read 'with a view to opening the way for the cavalry' as meaning 'take every step to ensure this happens, irrespective of the consequences'. This is not how the Fourth and Reserve Armies actually planned the attacks (as pointed out above), which is the clearest indication of what was meant and how this phrase was interpreted. '...with a view...' is the key to understanding the meaning. If you approach this subject with the express intention of 'proving' a pre-determined view of Haig then it is easy, IMHO, to misinterpret such comments.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

As the battle progressed on 15 September [1916] Archibald Home, newly appointed as Kavanagh’s Chief-of-Staff was less optimistic “It would appear that if the cavalry does not get a chance this time it will be the end of them" and did not want to upset other arms. "The Corps Commander wishes Divisions to be very careful as regards questions of traffic and water. They must remember that they are only guests in the different Corps areas, and a great deal of tact is required to avoid friction".

The appearance of words like ‘guests’ and ‘tact’ are curious in the context of a military operational order. The Cavalry Corps thus began the September battles on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand they had been given the opportunity finally to participate in the battle in strength and potentially show their true fighting value, but on the other they were not to be permitted even to advance until Rawlinson’s infantry and artillery battle had been fought and won. Indeed their mere appearance in the rear areas prior to the appointed moment would be seriously frowned upon by Fourth Army. It is difficult to see how any meaningful exploitation of successes by infantry could be obtained under these circumstances.

There are two aspects to the first paragraph. Home was reflecting on the recent past history of the Cavalry Corps. In late 1915, the decision had been taken to convert the cavalry to dismounted units, similar to what the French and Germans had done with some (but not all) of their cavalry units. This process turned the Cavalry Corps into the equivalent of an infantry division, reflecting the differences in numbers of men between infantry and cavalry units with the same designation. Naturally the cavalry commanders were pleased that their role had been re-established. There was significant concern that things might revert back again.

The issue of behaving like 'guests' is an interesting one. There is a direct reference to avoiding friction, refering to 'friction' with non-cavalry units. It must be recalled that this was the first time that massed cavalry formations had lined up behind their BEF infantry and artillery counterparts in a major offensive. There was much to learn about how cavalry and non-cavalry units should best work together in these circumstances. This issue remained under scrutiny, as the cavalry sought to optimise the best way to get forward if the opportunity arose. It led to the use of dedicated teams to build cavalry tracks across the battlefield, for example. These lessons were applied and adjusted as the war progressed, leading ultimately to the successes enjoyed during the Battle of Amiens and Megiddo.

Kenyon has taken this issue a step further in the second paragraph. In doing so, however, he has betrayed a lack of understanding about what Haig was meaning. This reinforces the danger of starting out with pre-determined views. Kenyon's misinterpretation is betrayed when he writes that '[the cavalry] were not to be permitted even to advance until Rawlinson’s infantry and artillery battle had been fought and won.' I don't understand (and nor would Haig I suspect) how the cavalry could advance otherwise. We know, with hindsight, that the infantry and artillery battle took some while to fight and 'win'. By 'win', I am referring to the German withdrawal from the last line of defence in 1917. The time taken reflected the fact that the German forces continued to defend their positions with vigour. This scenario was planned for, with the different objective lines and the importance of keeping interference from cavalry formations to a minimum. The cavalry were there, however, for a different scenario. One in which the German forces collapsed and suddenly started retreating. When seen in this light, a different picture emerges. It is not a picture of a demon-inspired C-in-C, creating the horns of a dilemma (pardon the mixed metaphor).

Irrespective of whether the Germans collapsed or not, the BEF was going to continue to engage the German army for as long as possible. This process was not maintained with a view to releasing the cavalry. There were a completely different set of drivers for this process. As a consequence of such a process, however, there remained the possibility of a German withdrawal. Haig sought to have his Army commanders prepared for this eventuality. It is interesting to note that the French, on the other hand, got caught out by their success on the first day of the Somme campaign. They too had planned to use cavalry for exploitation but the assumption had been that the cavalry would not be required for some while. The sudden collapse of German resistance south of the Somme took the higher command by surprise. Their cavalry were still being brought together and were not ready to exploit the opportunity. This issue has been covered elsewhere in the Forum. I will dig out the reference.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It is interesting to note that the French, on the other hand, got caught out by their success on the first day of the Somme campaign. They too had planned to use cavalry for exploitation but the assumption had been that the cavalry would not be required for some while. The sudden collapse of German resistance south of the Somme took the higher command by surprise. Their cavalry were still being brought together and were not ready to exploit the opportunity. This issue has been covered elsewhere in the Forum. I will dig out the reference.

Check out this post here and the one that follows it.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

So, at least at the end of 1916 at an operational level (Western Front) it seems that the role of the cavalry was still unclear. Haig had his vision on the use of cavalry some of his commanders had their doubts.

With respect, the role of the cavalry was very clear. Even at the end of 1916, the British (and French) cavalry knew exactly how they would exploit a collapse. Even commanders like Rawlinson knew how this process worked in general. I suspect what you are referring to (correct me if I am wrong) is that it was unclear if the cavalry would get an opportunity to fulfill their clear role. If it had been left up to Rawlinson then the cavalry would not have featured in the planning at all, at any stage of the campaign.

It is important to recall, however, that Rawlinson's handling of Neuve Chapelle saw an important opportunity lost. Leaving aside the issue of whether the cavalry could have played a role in exploitation, as was planned for Neuve Chapelle, British battalion commanders had recognised the opportunity to push on in the first wave of the attack. Haig had emphasized that this might happen and had explicitly requested Rawlinson to plan accordingly. This included encouraging this divisional commanders to assume the same, which didn't happen. To cut a long story short, Rawlinson could not be trusted.

Rawlinson was an advocate for 'bite and hold' operations. Even he recognised, however, that 'bite and hold' could not win the war. And he did not consider how the Germans would evolve their tactical responses to 'bite and hold' to negate Rawlinson's concept of how it would work. Furthermore, Haig did not deny the process of 'bite and hold', as evidenced by his acceptance of the staged objectives (short of a breakthrough) in all of the major offensives on the Somme. Rawlinson was not the commander who could make, or could best consider, decisions about exploitation. While his opinions should be respected, the fact that he would not have included the cavalry in planning does not mean that the role of cavalry was unclear. Even with Haig's urging to plan for the use of cavalry, the potential for this option to not come to fruition was always inherent in the planning process.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

As GOC Rawlinson may have had a limited role in developing C-inC Haig's strategy, but clearly he could influence the implementation...

Absolutely categorically Rawlinson had to influence the implementation, with respect to Fourth Army over whom he had responsibility. It was totally appropriate, IMHO, that Rawlinson should do so. He exercised this role in cooperation with his corps and division commanders. Rawlinson's implementation reflected their concerns and issues, as was dictated by the BEF process for planning an attack. Haig knew this. He was completely aware of the process and the detailed plans for implementation. Unlike Nivelle, Haig did not override Rawlinson in these aspects of the implementation. Haig ensured, however, that the possibility of cavalry was still factored in.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It is hard to see how any rapidity of advance would be achieved by forces queuing up behind the advancing artillery. Indeed it is hard to read in Rawlinson’s orders for the cavalry any sense that he saw them as anything other than a bulky inconvenience and even a liability, his tone is clear in the last paragraph of the 'Instructions':

The Cavalry Corps must ensure that the forward areas now in our hands are not blocked with cavalry prematurely… The cavalry advance must be continuous, but it must also be very methodical, any attempt to push too much cavalry through at one time will only lead to confusion and consequent delay.

Good intelligence and communications are a vital part of military operations. Thus the rôle of the cavalry as reconnaissance troops was a vital one and should not be underestimated. It is not the same, however, as the use of mounted soldiers in the actual assault on those enemy positions or in the exploitation of any success.

Alternatively, one can read Rawlinson's instructions as a very sensible description of the key issues. He was drawing attention, quite rightly, to lessons that had to be learned from the first major attempt to involve large formations of cavalry. Kenyon is correct in his comment about rapidity of advance behind a queue of artillery. This was a key tactical problem that the British (and French) worked hard at solving. If Kenyon is stating that a rapid advance was never possible then I respectfully submit that he is incorrect. Amiens and Megiddo proved otherwise.

There is a more important issue at stake. These issues reflect a series of tactical problems, ie how to enable large formations of cavalry to exploit the sudden collapse of an enemy force on a large scale. The tactical problems should be kept separate from the strategic/operational use of cavalry. Haig's emphasis on scenario planning ultimately saw the British army evolve the tactical approaches to improving the role of cavalry as reconnaissance troops, when a break-in was not complete such as occurred during the Battle of Pilckem Ridge on July 31st 1917, and to enabling the cavalry to engage in pursuit operations, as occurred in the Battle of Amiens. It was Rawlinson who commanded the British and Dominion forces in the Battle of Amiens. His approach to the planning of the cavalry component was quite different from what has been described for the final phase of operations on the Somme. This is a clear example of how scenario planning leads to organisational learning.

Did the cavalry exploits during Amiens win the war? No, though they certainly contributed to German uncertainty over how the BEF would attack in the future (as per von der Marwitz's note to his troops). But Amiens is clearly related to the Somme through Rawlinson and Haig. The battle showed what was possible on the Western Front. The cavalry contribution was not trivial, though it was not on the scale of Megiddo. Unfortunately, many writers cannot make the link between the Somme and the likes of Amiens.

Robert

[crickhollow]

Thank you Robert, for some excellent arguments and explanation of the role of British cavalry on the Western Front. You obviously have a deep knowledge of this subject.

I initiated this thread because I wanted to better understand the thinking (and to some extent the cultural background) behind the continued support for cavalry in what rapidly developed into a war of almost static armoured attrition on the Western Front. As the war progressed, it seemed that a mounted force was a solution looking for a problem (if you see what I mean). Given all the issues of equipping and looking after horses in the war zone (simply shipping over feed was a huge logistical undertaking) , cavalry must have appeared at many levels in the Army to be an anachronism.

There was no intended direct criticism of Haig (I am really not qualified to do so). Like many who have limited knowledge of the conduct of WW1 I started out as an uninformed critic, but after further study I think I now have a better understanding of his key strengths and what he achieved. However, his continued support for the role of cavalry is something that I wanted to question. I started by feeling somewhat sceptical about this support. I now understand more clearly why he (and his planners) might have had their views on the usefulness of cavalry, but to be honest I still have reservations about whether this was a good use of a fairly costly resource. Did the (somewhat limited) cavalry success justify the effort involved? I will read further on the subject (with an open mind!).

Regards

Christopher

[Steven Broomfield]

Given the amount of work cavalry did - as cavalry, as dismounted infantry, as pioneers and so on - I would really dispute that they were a wasted resource. As Robert has also pointed out, they were part of planning for contingency.

Imagine your home insurance. For years nothing goes wrong, so you think you could do without. A week later, your house burns down. Compare, then, March 1918. The cavalry have been dismounted and disbanded; the Germans break through. Your mobile reserve has gone. You'd look pretty silly. Compare to the Germans at the same time: their cavalry had gone, and they break through - no cavalry to exploit.

The role of cavalry was not, largely, the stirrup-to-stirrup charge (that went out with Lady Butler); exploitation, recconaissance, harrying a retreating enemy, chasing a broken enemy and all those other roles discussed.

Personally, I'd say three divisions (at maximum, five) of superbly-trained, adaptable and professional soldiers in an army numbered in millions was probably a pretty small insurance policy.

[Robert Dunlop]

Christopher, it is great that you have raised these questions. It is a while since the issues were discussed at any length. For one thing, this thread has served to collate several other threads and posts together.

Steven has mentioned the issue of insurance policy. As to the 'cost' of that policy, it is worth looking at Corrigan's book 'Mud, blood and poppycock'. He analysed the requirements for supporting the cavalry, especially in terms of feed, etc, and then compared this with the rest of the British Army. As Steven alluded to, the impact of the cavalry on the overall consumption of resources was tiny. IMHO, the role of the cavalry in March 1918 alone was enough to justify what was needed for their upkeep in the whole war. It boils down to what you might regard as costly . You are fully entitled to your own views on that score. Thank you for at least taking the time to consider another perspective on the issue of the strategic and operational thinking behind the British cavalry.

Robert

[truthergw]

Not quite on topic but I hope an allowable supplementary issue. Anyone hoping to understand the Western front and the role that the cavalry played there, must read Kenyon's book. It is however, not without flaws and to recognise and discount these flaws requires knowledge gained from other fields in the study of the Great War. This thread has illustrated the danger inherent in reading a book and accepting its thesis without question. War is a complex affair and to understand even a small part of it requires wide reading.

[Steven Broomfield]

Another side issue which has been touched on is the space occupied by cavalry waiting for the breakthrough.

An interesting sidelight is given in the history of the 11th Hussars in the preparation for 8th August 1918. I'll dig it out over the weekend and post some of it. It is apparent from there that the arrangements for assembling cavalry had, like all other tings, improved in leaps and bounds by that stage of the war.

[crickhollow]

Corrigan's book 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock'.

I pulled out my copy of the above (one of the many books I always plan to read - you know how it is!) and glanced at the various entries that discuss the use of cavalry especially Ch.5 'Government-Sponsored Polo Clubs'.

He does make some interesting observations, the one that amused me was his quote of the time that '...you could smell a French cavalry regiment a mile off..' due to poor care of their horses.

Corrigan points out that (partly as a result of the Boer War) the British developed a fairly modern approach to the use of cavalry such as a screening, reconnaissance, patrolling, escort duty and message-carrying. The British cavalry unlike the French were now more willing to dismount and fight as infantry. Their expected use in a breakthrough never really materialised ( they were not given their unique opportunity at Cambrai Dec 1917) and it seems this lack of strategic focus was accepted within cavalry force, which affected their 'cavalry spirit' to the extent that many officers transferred to other units.

Nevertheless planning for the 'breakthrough that never came' still seemed to occupy the minds of high command. Sorry to go back over topics that we have already covered, but I still feel that it would have been more effective to have contained the role of cavalry to those activities where it was truly effective in the emerging Western Front battle areas i.e. not in the expectation of exploiting a breakthrough. There may be a degree of hindsight here (with a degree of critical judgement) but I am also trying to understand the thinking of a military who by now understood the real nature of trench warfare.

I must say I have found this exchange extremely useful and interesting so many thanks to you Robert, Steven,Tom and others for your patience and contributions. I wish all threads had such helpful contributors,

Regards

Christopher

[Robert Dunlop]

Corrigan points out that (partly as a result of the Boer War) the British developed a fairly modern approach to the use of cavalry such as a screening, reconnaissance, patrolling, escort duty and message-carrying. The British cavalry unlike the French were now more willing to dismount and fight as infantry.

Corrigan is incorrect in his comparison of the British and French cavalry. The latter were taught to fight dismounted, as were their German and Belgian colleagues. I will dig out the reference to this. The screening, reconnaissance, patrolling, escort duty and message-carrying roles were also ubiquitous across the different nations as well.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The information about French cavalry training in dismounted action is here.

Robert

...I am also trying to understand the thinking of a military who by now understood the real nature of trench warfare.

Christopher, what do you think they understood about the real nature of trench warfare?

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

As I quite frequently keep my promises, here are some extracts from Lumley's History of the 11th Hussars, relating to the assembly on the night of 7th/8th August, 1918.

The whole Cavalry Corps was to assemble in the triangle of roads which lay just south east of Longeau, on the south-east side of Amiens... the whole three cavalry divisons had to pass through Amiens. The good march discipline of the cavalry allowed this concentration to be carried out without a hitch ... the men rode in sections with their horses nose to croup

To deaden noise, sand had been laid on the roadways through Amiens, and the regiment was in place, under cover in a small wood, by 3.15, having left the assembly position a few miles west of Amiens at 11 p.m.

Interestingly, when the attack began the regiment was 4 miles behind the front line, but:

The failure of Cambrai was not going to be repeated. Instead of waiting for orders from behind for the cavalry to advance, the leading cavalry were to move from point to point according to a time-table, and were to take the first opportunity of passing through the infantry.

In order to facilitate the move forward, 100 men of 1st Cavalry Brigade had gone forward on the night of the 7th (on bicycles) to prepare a cavalry track, and immediately the attack started, the track was pushed through the front line to get the cavalry across the trench lines (such as they were).

I'll leave it there - the 11th were, to their disappointment, left pretty much nehind by the work of the other two regiments in the brigade (the Bays and the 5th DG), but I think this gives a small flavour of the staff work and preparation which went into this day's work.

[crickhollow]

Christopher, what do you think they understood about the real nature of trench warfare?

Robert,

Thank you for the link to previous discussions on cavalry. Very educational.

As for answering my semi-rhetorical question: help! Trying to find an answer is, I suspect, why so many of us are interested in WW1 history.

Obviously there must have been many differing and conflicting views at all levels of Allied command, some merely expressed verbally or just repressed, but some documented I suspect in various records. I happen to have a personal view that once trench warfare was imposed on the battlefields, that the potential use of cavalry to exploit a breakthrough (Western Front) was never realistic option. It is not just that a cavalry force is inadequate for this presumed task but that the very concept of a 'breakthrough' was flawed. I know this will be considered as merely hindsight but it seems to me that as the war progressed the Allied forces did realise at senior levels that the only way to win the war was to crush the Germans by force of arms across a broad front. Despite the theory and some unlikely expected outcomes of 'breakthrough' cavalry tactics , this was really a distraction from where the real focus needed to be.

How's that as a provocative comment?!

[MikeMeech]

All

It is interesting that we still treat the different arms of service separately when discussing their operations in the Great War. At the time of course they would not have been especially in 1918 when 'all arms co-operation' was the order of the day, and that started very early on. Infantry did not do their attacks (or defence) without artillery, to aid that aircraft were used to spot for the guns and also keep the location of both friendly and enemy forces known. Tanks were introduced to aid the infantry but they also needed the infantry near by as well as they could not operate effectively without troops near by. Also aeroplanes were needed to suppress anti-tank guns untill the tanks and infantry over-ran them. All were part of the military 'tool-box' as were the cavalry. The cavalry corps were a small organization in the army but could perform useful roles when conditions were suitable. In the 100 days conditions for cavalry use did come about and they did operate 'successfully' on occasions, not having them may have reduced the British army's effectiveness in certain situations. The cavalry were not operating in isolation but as part of a battle plan and with the support of other arms, as with the use of air support, their organic artillery and machine-guns as well as the following infantry. It has to be said that the National Archives is full of documents relating to various 'arms' and their co-operation with other arms, especially S.S. docs and their predecessors. Much of this has been mentioned in other posts.

While cavalry was a small part of the army it had its uses on a number of occasions and it would probably have been a 'Dereliction of Duty' on the part of the commander's not to have this 'tool' in the 'tool-box', especially as the resources it took up were relatively marginal compared with the resources available. There was as yet no real replacement for its capabilities. I expect if the cavalry did not exist during the '100 days' we would now be talking about the 'stupid' generals who got rid of the cavalry when it was 'obvious' that this arm would have been needed at that stage of the war. After all something similar has been said about the German lack of cavalry in their 1918 Spring Offensive!? But that is the joy of looking back at events rather than making decisions on them at the time. There is another question of course similar to the cavalry; 'Were the High Seas Fleet and the Grand Fleet a waste of resources?' after all they did spend most of their time at their bases and only came out fighting for a limited period during the war, rather like the 'cavalry'. However, there would have been consequences not having the fleets as there would have been, much more limited, consequences of not having cavalry!

regards all

mike

[Robert Dunlop]

...it seems to me that as the war progressed the Allied forces did realise at senior levels that the only way to win the war was to crush the Germans by force of arms across a broad front. Despite the theory and some unlikely expected outcomes of 'breakthrough' cavalry tactics , this was really a distraction from where the real focus needed to be.

How's that as a provocative comment?!

Christopher, more a restatement of what is widely written in the literature, so not provocative . Most senior commanders on all sides knew that if a decision could not be forced in the earliest weeks then it would come down to an attritional war. The American Civil War served as the model for this. Even the Franco-Prussian War served as a warning to the German high command.

The American Civil War also illustrated how cavalry could become more useful as time went on. Although most attention has focused on the likes of JEB Stuart and Nathan Bedford Forrest, it was Generals Sheridan and James Wilson that provided the examples akin to Megiddo. The large cavalry formations began to exert a major effect once the Confederate forces had been worn below a certain threshold.

Hindsight is the only reason you can hold the view that cavalry would never have been effective if the Germans had collapsed on the Western Front.

Robert

[crickhollow]

Hindsight is the only reason you can hold the view that cavalry would never have been effective if the Germans had collapsed on the Western Front.

Robert

I don't want to prolong this interesting discussion simply by restating views that better-informed contributors have already dismissed, but so far as I understand matters, it was the infantry who would create an opportunity for the cavalry to then 'exploit a breakthrough'. How was this planned to work at say, the Battle of Cambrai Nov-Dec 1917? Here the infantry and tanks made worthwhile gains but then the effort petered out. Even if the cavalry had made it through the lines to 'exploit a breakthrough', how would this have worked out? What were the planned objectives and what resources made available to achieve the aims? How would success be measured? Was a limit put on the extent of this action? What assumptions made? What would prompt a retreat from this breakthrough? A cavalry breakthrough could only be consolidated by supporting infantry forces. If this was not planned for or available, then no matter what a cavalry breakthrough is an unrealistic option even judged by the military thinking of the day.

Unless these issues are better understood then I don't think 'hindsight criticism' is totally valid..

C.

[PMHart]

...no matter what a cavalry breakthrough is an unrealistic option even judged by the military thinking of the day.

C.

Well there we go - an interesting thread comprehensively debated with some great contributions by Robert and Mike! I think that surely we can now all move on after Christopher has so boldly restated his original unmodified contention that cavalry is useless! Surely he is entitled to his own opinions and we can give him a couple of years to complete his reading before we trouble him further?

Pete

[David_Underdown]

For Cambrai (and the chances missed by the cavalry), see Bryn Hammond's Cambrai 1917: The myth of the first great tank battle