Cavalry on the Western Front

[squirrel]

FWIW my understanding, and I may of course be wrong, that cavalry "failings" were more to do with command and control of same rather than the cavalry units themselves.

[Steven Broomfield]

Absolutely, Mike - as alluded-to in the second set of italics in my last post: cavalry was kept under control of the Cavalry Corps, rather than under the hand of local (infantry) commanders.

Indeed, during the 100 Days the 2nd Cavalry Division was split up between various infantry formations. For example, the 4th (Queen's Own) Hussars were distributed as follows:

A Squadron, 52nd (Lowland) Division

B Squadron, 12th (Eastern) Division

C Squadron, 8th Division

All part of VIII Corps.

The regimental history reports a lot of patrolling, message-carrying, , co-operation with the Corps cyclists, etc, etc - all under direct command of the infantry divisions to which they were attached.

[MikeMeech]

Steven

Yes, the Cavalry were split up and attached to Infantry units where it was thought they would be useful and the situation was suitable for their use, the same applied to Tank Corps units in the 100 days. So two 'specialized' Corps being attached to the infantry for particular operations to aid in 'All Arms Operations' As they would also have their own air assets attached as well as the infantry and artillery air assets involved (as artillery would be involved at some level as well), it all gets quite complicated.

All sounds rather 'modern' doesn't it!

Mike

[Steven Broomfield]

Certainly does, Mike, certainly does. The "All Arms" battle in a nutshell, with command devolved to a very low level - Squadron or Company commanders making important tactical decisions on the spot. I do think that by late 1918, Haig and hos associates had, actually, got it pretty right. Shame that the 1940 generation seem to have needed to re-learn.

[Old Tom]

An interesting thread which I have only just got round to reading. May I suggest that the disussion has not given enough consideration to the practicality of the use of cavalry to exploit any breakthrough which might have occured. In this context mention has been made of the south of the Somme offensive line and the French. On the 3rd of July an officer of 18 Div carried out a reconaisance and found, in effect, open undefended country some 2 miles inside what had been German territory. It would appear that an opportunity for exploitation by cavalry was available although I seem to recall reading that 4th Army were somewhat economical with the truth in their reports so as not to appear to have failed to react. However for such an opportunity to be taken required, I would suggest, better communications than were available. If such an opportunity had been foreseen I doubt the ablity of a force of cavalry being able to cross the battlefield to get to the open country. I have no real knowledge of the difficulty in horsemen crossing several lines of trenches and a large area of shell torn ground with remains of barbed wire entanglements. As has been also mentioned the conflicting needs of artillery and cavalry to get over the same ground at about the same time would pose problems. Both could claim priority. The cavalry to be able to get through before the Germans could establish a defensive line, while the artillery would need to move up to be able to support infantry that were beyond the range of their pre-attack emplacements.

I believe at Cambrai the cavalry advance was greatly hindered by a demolished bridge. Sorry, only a very superficial knowledge of that campaign.

A year or so ago I started a thread based on a remark by an established historian speaking to a WFA meeting to the effect that as he was unaware of any plans for the logistic support of the cavalry at 3rd Ypres when it was hoped that a breakthrough would lead to capturing the channel ports. He suggested that the lack of planning meant that the intention was never considered as a realistic outcome. There was much discusion of the ability of cavalry to live off the land, but no evidence of specific plans.

Old Tom

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

While the cavalry did on the odd occasion could achive the breakthrough where the German defences were not strong but there was never little hope where the Germans were strong.

I enclose an article I wrote on such a battle in late 1918 where given the right situation the cavalry could get throw the German lines even when defended, but not very strong defences?

"The XXII Corps Mounted Regiment and the 2nd Battle of the Marne

By Steve Becker

On the afternoon of the 27 July 1918 Corporal Jack Taggart lead a four man mounted patrol from 1 Troop “D” Squadron XXII Corps Mounted Regiment out into the shattered debris of the Ardre River valley to locate the German front line. He followed the course of the Ardre River until encountering a force of more then 100 Germans, which forced them to retire; nonetheless Jack dismounted with a Hotchkiss gun and engaged the Germans allowing his three mates with the horses to move to cover, then returned on foot to continue the fight. Corporal Taggart and Private Vic Grist then moved to reconnaissance the German position and under heavy fire were forced to jump into the river Ardre to escape the German machine guns. Jack must have wondered at this time, up to his ears in water and mud how he came to be there in the middle of France and why he wasn’t in sunny Egypt and Palestine with the rest of the 4th Light Horse Regiment?

Near the end of June 1918 the Great German offensives had at last slowed down, however numerous German Divisions remained unemployed. Knowing this General Foch, the newly created Generalissimo of the Allied Armies in France, gathered a number of allied Divisions to form a reserve for his own offensive.

Still Foch didn’t want to wait for the next German onslaught; instead he launched a series of assaults aimed at the large bulge between Soissons and Rheims along the Marne River, which pointed like a knife point at the heart of France and at Paris.

These attacks started around the middle of July 1918 with strikes by the Tenth French Army on the western side of the salient and the Ninth French Army, including American divisions at Chateau Thierry to the south, then the Fifth French Army south west of Rheims on the 18 July 1918.

The attacks by the Fifth French Army soon bogged down and the British XXII Corps entered the battle near Marfaux on the 20 July 1918.

By the 27 July the XXII Corps had advanced along the line of the Ardre River and at last reported that German units were retiring, General Godley the commander of the XXII Corps now ordered his Cavalry to take over the advance and the XXII Corps Mounted Regiment, composed of Australian Light Horseman and New Zealand Mounted Rifleman found themselves in the front line of the Allied Armies.

The XXII Corps Mounted Regiment was a new name of an old unit, formed from the 2nd Anzac Light Horse Regiment when the II Anzac Corps was disbanded in December 1917, who along with the 1st Anzac Light Horse Regiment (13th Light Horse Regiment) of the I Anzac Corps which were used to form the Cavalry for the newly formed Australian Corps, General Birdwood the new Corps Commander didn’t need two Light Horse Regiments for his Corps and Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Godley asked that the 2nd Anzac Light Horse Regiment be retained by the II Anzac Corps when it changed its name to the XXII British Corps forcing the change of name from the 2nd Anzac Light Horse Regiment to the XXII Corps Mounted Regiment, this change from a Light Horse Regiment to a Mounted Regiment may have came about due to the commander of the XXII Corps being a New Zealand Officer. The Regiment still contained the former Regimental Head Quarters with “B” and “D” Squadrons of the old 4th Light Horse Regiment and with the attached Squadron of the New Zealand Otago Mounted Rifles. The strength of the Regiment at the start of the battle was 25 officers and 412 men.

Since the 27 March 1918, the XXII Corps was near Ypres, where in April a Composite Battalion of the Regiment was formed with the New Zealand Cyclist battalion and used to fight the Germans at Kemmel, near Ypres. When an order from General Foch sent General Godley’s Corps to be loaded on trains and moved to an area on the Somme. The XXII Corps Mounted Regiment moved on the 5 June to Blendecques and Coupelle on the 6 June, to Wavans on the 7 June, and to Bourdon on the 8 June arriving on the 9 June at Ossie (Oissy) in Picardy Somme. There the Regiment waited for over a month as the great German offensive on the Aisne died away. The XXII Corps Mounted Regiment boarded a Train on the 14 July at Pont Remy and moved to Pont Sur Seine on the 15 July, on the 16 July they were at Suzanne and finally stopping on the 17 July at Bergeres Les Vertus and moved to Ay near Epernay on the 20 July and the Bois de Talma near St Imoges on the 22 July. The XXII Corps was concentred around Revigny east of Rheims in the Forth French Armies area, with the units arriving around the 16 July 1918.

On the 18 July the Fifth French Army comprising the I French Colonial Corps, the V French Corps, the I French Cavalry Corps and the II Italian Corps carried out its part in the battle plan and attacked south west of Rheims from Ormes to Festigny, only all too soon the Italians were in trouble and the corps needed to be replaced. The only allied reserves close on hand was the XXII British Corps near Chalons and rapidly moved replacing the Italians on the night 19/20 July 1918 fitting in between the 2nd Colonial Division (I Colonial Corps) and 14th French Division (V French Corps).

The XXII Corps near Pourcy, used as a centre line the river Ardre valley with the 62nd Division on the right bank alone the Bois de Reims and the 51st Highland Division on the left bank of the river valley with the Bois de Courton Ridge. Heavy fighting continued for a week as the British fought there way up the valley along both ridges against the strong German defences of the 123rd German Division with its 178th, 351st Infantry and 106th Reserve Infantry Regiments and the newly arrived 240th German Division.

Marfax had fallen on the 23 July in an attack by the New Zealand Cyclist Battalion supported by the 2/4 Hampshire Battalion losing two officers and 19 men killed and three officers and 70 men wounded. While Chaumuzy fell on the 26 July.

On the morning of the 27 July the assaults continued lead by the 51st Highland Division with the 62nd Division in reserve, the advance began at different times due to the terrain with the left flank 153rd Brigade at 6.10 am then the 187th Brigade (62nd Division) in the centre at 6.56 am and the 152nd Brigade on the right flank at 7.30 am.

The creeping barrage moved at 100 metres each eight minutes with three 20 minutes stops. French Light Renault tanks of a Tank Battalion, used in the earlier attacks, were left behind as they were unable to move due the sodden ground from the torrential rains and limited fuel supply.

The first objective was taken by the 51st Division 8.45 am and the second objective at 10 am, along the whole line only one prisoner was taken and it became apparent to the Corps Commander that the Germans were in retreat.

General Godley during the change over of divisions ordered a new advance to begin at 1 pm and the Corps Cavalry moved forward to Nanteuil where Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Hindhaugh received his orders from General Braithwaite, commander of the 62nd Division to “push forward rapidly and seize the line Bligny to Montagne de Bligny, and as soon as this line was in there possession, the (62nd) division would move up to relieve them”.

Lieutenant Colonel Hindhaugh was given command of a Composite force comprising the XXII Corps Mounted Regiment, the New Zealand Cyclist Battalion and the French Tank Battalion, and moved to Marfaux to set up his Head Quarters while command of the Mounted Regiment reverted to Major Roy McLeish.

Both Major Thomas Williams “B” Squadron and Captain Bertram Burnie “D” Squadron (less two Troops retained as Head Quarters protection), moved from Nanteuil at 2.45 pm while the Otago Squadron under Major Gordon Mitchell remained in reserve, Major McLeish moved his “RHQ” to north east of Chaumuzy.

“B” Squadron covered the Left front of the 185th Brigade as it advanced from Chaumuzy while “D” Squadron covered the Right front of the 186th Brigade near the Bois de Rouvroy during the advance to Bligny and Montagne de Bligny they pushed throw the infantry who’s patrols followed on behind the cavalry screen.

At the start Light Horse patrols of four men sections were dispatched to uncover German strong points and establish the German line of resistance. These would then be cleared by the light horse patrols or could be reinforced with a larger light horse force or posted and left for the Infantry to destroy.

No sooner then patrols from Lieutenant Claude Apps 1 Troop “D” Squadron left the British front line, when heavy machine gun fire was directed onto them from their right near the Bois des Dix Hommes, Bois de Hyermont and from a number of posts along the German front line, this slowed the advance as the light horse patrols manoeuvred around them or destroyed them.

One Patrol under Corporal Jack Taggart ran into a German force of 100 men on the northern side of the Ardre River and after engaging them discovered there strength and location then returned with the details to Lieutenant Apps.

Corporal Walter Scott was at work against another position when he was wounded while the Squadron Commander, Captain Burnie and Squadron Sergeant Major, Harry Ayres brought out the Hotchkiss machine gun sections to engage the enemy posts forcing the Germans to retire.

A patrol with Private William Bell avoided the German defences and entered the town of Bligny and found the Germans in some strength, then returned with the intelligence.

Mean while on “B” Squadron’s front the Germans were found north of the Nardi Farm and in the Bois de Eclisse by patrols of Lieutenant George Gordon’s 2 Troop, who went out after the enemy defences to scout and secure useful positions until the Infantry patrols came up. As one of these enemy positions were found the Hotchkiss machine gun sections, under men like Private Hugh Newth, were dispatched and after an engagement that wounded all his crew Newth captured the German position allowing the infantry patrols to advance.

When another patrol ran into the German defences, Private Frank Elliott was sent to see where the enemy machine gun positions were sited, when completed Elliott returned with the vial information allowing the position to be taken.

During this time, the French had not come up on the British left flank and a patrol under Corporal Christopher Christofferson was sent to establish the left flank and find the French, this he succeeded in doing allowing the British 153rd Brigade (51st Division) to come up and who cleared the woods of the Bois de Eclisse and by the end of the day gaining touch with the 14th French Division.

In the late afternoon most of the German covering positions had been destroyed or they had retired to their main defence line based around Bligny and the Montagne de Bligny, this now allowed a number of deep Light Horse patrols in force to move towards our objectives.

The first, 2 Troop under Lieutenant Joseph Nott “D” Squadron, moved forward with his Troop to Bligny through the Bois de Rouvroy, where they found the Germans strongly entrenched and the Troop were forced to retire. 1 Troop under Lieutenant Apps moved out to support Lieutenant Nott along the river Ardre only to be held up by strong German defences and Sergeant Bill Smith’s 4 Troop “B” Squadron came to his support.

Lieutenant Arthur Lord’s 3 Troop “B” Squadron was sent to find a crossing place of the Ardre River to enable the cavalry to move from the south side of the river to the north along the Bligny to Montagne de Bligny line.

Sergeant James Stevenson’s 1 Troop “B” Sqn was ordered to secure the left flank of the Corps on the Montagne de Bligny. There he gained a lose hold on the hill under very heavy German pressure which force him to retire to a less exposed position, there the Troop held on until the Infantry came up during the night.

Lieutenant Gordon’s 2 Troop “B” Squadron advanced to support Sergeant Stevenson and captured a German 77mm gun, only the Germans attacked in force and Gordon could make little progress against a stiffening resistance.

Some time around 8 pm the Otago Squadron was called forward to support the light horse between Bligny and Montagne de Bligny. They reached the line around 9 pm only to be held up by German fire, a force of two officers and 50 men dismounted and moved to capture Bligny only they couldn’t gain touch with the units on their flanks and took there place between the town of Bligny and the Montagne de Bligny to hold back the German counter attacks. During the struggle Trooper’s Angus MacGibbon, Bill Hornell and Dave Williamson were active in the fighting while Sergeant John Weaver brought up food and ammunition keeping the squadron in the fight, while Farrier Sergeant Bill Hutchings was killed.

At 7.40 pm the 185th and 186th Brigades advanced to support the Cavalry only to find the Light Horse and Mounted Rifles were short of their objectives by roughly 500 meters and the town of Bligny and the Montagne de Bligny were still in enemy hands. The infantry were to complete the relief of the cavalry by midnight only this was not completed till about 2.14 am when the 2/4th Hampshire Battalion came up delayed due to the rain and darkness. The Hampshire Battalion along with the 1/5th Devonshire Battalion was fresh from Palestine having recently joined the 62nd Division before this battle.

The German defenders during that afternoon were the rear guards of the 240th German Division, who fought a delaying action as they retied onto their main defensive line round Bligny and the Montagne de Bligny. The 240th Division (a third Class (low quality) formation, had arrived from the Argonne front on the 20 July, where it was resting following the fighting around Bethune in April, and where the Division suffered heavy casualties. Elements of the 469th, 470th and 471st Infantry Regiments were manning positions in front Bligny and the Montagne de Bligny during the week and reported Light Horse patrols during the evening and night of the 27 July.

On the morning of the 28 July the advance began at 4 am covered again by the XXII Corps Mounted Regiment. Rain had fallen all night as the 186th Brigade steeped off only to be again struck by fire from the Bois des Dix Hommes on the right. This slowed movement on that front until the French 77th Division came up on that flank and cleared the wood.

At 4 am Lieutenant Nott’s Troop had moved forward past Bligny with patrols to Ausilly where they found the village strongly held. The Otago Squadron had replaced “B” Squadron during the night and patrols of New Zealanders went out past the Montagne de Bligny to discover the extent of the German defences at Sarcy, while another patrol was sent to the village of Chambrecy. One patrol with Signaller Peter Weaver went on a reconnaissance of the village of Bligny when they came under heavy fire during which one of the men was wounded. The village was found to be strongly held by the Germans and Signaller Weaver despite being himself wounded recovered his mate and brought him back to our lines, he was later awarded a DCM.

Bligny was entered during the day by the 2/4th Duke of Wellington’s and 2/4th Hampshire Battalion (186th Brigade) but not captured and fighting went on there all day and was not completed till 4 pm in the afternoon.

Mean while the 185th Brigade moved between Bligny and Montagne with the 1/5th Devon Battalion on the right and the 8th West Yorkshire’s on the left with the 2/5th West Yorkshires in support and captured part of the Montagne de Bligny slopes by 7 am capturing 69 prisoners and nine machine guns, but failed to drive the Germans completely from the hill.

Around 8.25 am the 51st Highland Division with the 153rd Brigade on the left and 152nd Brigade on the right took up the advance during which the 6th Black Watch took Chambrecy. The 7th Gordon’s joined the 8th West Yorks on Montagne de Bligny that night allowing the 14th French Division to move up and take over Chambrecy. The 154th Brigade 51st Division replaced the 152nd and 153rd Brigades later that night. The 1/4th Gordon’s relieving the 7th Gordon’s by 3 am on Montagne.

Small numbers of Light Horse and Mounted Rifle patrols continued to be sent during the day, only not on the same scale as the day before, and all patrols were withdrawn around 4 pm. German resistance was growing as they fought to allow there formations to retire from other areas of the salient. The Germans had decided to retire from the salient on the night of the 26/27 July and the first stage started at 11 am with a limited withdrawal. The withdrawals would be by stages and would take place over a week. Still German doctrine allowed continued counter attacks to slow the enemy forces so they couldn’t exploit the withdrawal.

On the 29 July fighting continued on the Montagne de Bligny by “D” Company 2/5th West Yorks 185th Brigade who attacked at 7.45 pm to clear the remainder of the feature. The hill was taken by two platoons from “D” Company while the two other platoons disappeared when they lost there way in the darkness and where captured, the company lost one officer and six other ranks killed and a further 20 men were gassed, one officer and 45 men were missing believed prisoners. Other Brigades restricted their actions to consolidating their gains due to the poor weather and fatigue.

On the morning of the 30 July elements of newly arrived German 50th Division, a first class (high quality) Division, which replaced the 240th Division during the night, counter attacked at the Bois les Houleux against the 186th Brigade, and made some ground in a gap between the 62nd Division and 77th French Division until driven back in the late afternoon. The 62nd Division and most of the British XXII Corps was relieved by both the 14th and 77th French Division’s during the night 30/31 July leaving only the 154th Brigade 51st Division in the line.

On the 31 July elements of German 50th Division again counter attacked at 8.00 am at Montagne de Bligny held by the 154th Brigade (51st Division) only to be again driven off.

The 154th Brigade with the remainder of the 51st Division left the front later that day with the French now taking over all positions, as the XXII Corps moved for a rest and renew its strength for future operations. The Regiment with the Otago Squadron arrived at St Imoges at 6 pm 31 July to rest and while there Trooper Lewis Grant was gassed near the Bois de Talma.

The British Divisions reported the following casualties when in action between the 20 to the 31 July 1918;

51st Div – 115 officers and 2950 other ranks

62nd Div- 118 officers and 3865 other ranks

The Germans lost 21 officers and 1148 men as prisoners with 135 machine guns and two guns captured. These men were found to be from seven different divisions used in the fighting."

Cheers

S.B