Infantry Platoon Structure

[PhilB]

Lt T Floyd (2/5 LF, From Messines to 3rd Ypres) describes his platoon at Ypres as consisting of a sergeant, a corporal, a Bombing Section of 8 men, 13 Riflemen, 11 Rifle Grenade men and 2 Lewis Gun sections of 7 men each. 48 men in total. This seems to have a been a normal, non-specialized platoon but I am surprised by the variety of infantry trades it contains. Was this a typical platoon make up of the time or did COs have the freedom to compose their platoons as they thought best so that some battalions might be quite different?

[regimentalrogue]

An officer of The Royal Canadian Regiment describes something similar as "the new platoon formation" in use for the assault on Vimy Ridge.

An RCR Officer's Diary 1914-1918

APRIL 1917

This was the first occasion on which the new platoon formation was used. It had been found that the platoon must be a self-contained unit with each branch of the infantry represented, This was deemed essential for trench to trench attack. The platoon was divided into four sections and a platoon headquarters, a bombing section, Lewis Gun section, rifle and bayonet section and a rifle grenade section. In this manner practically any situation could be handled effectively on the spot and the success at Vimy certainly justified this contention.

This system originated from the French and was adopted by all.

[centurion]

By early 1918 all men were trained in bombing and other grenade related matters so all sections other than Lewis gun ones became the same so that they could adapt more flexibly to whatever tactical situation arose

[Ian Riley]

The pamphlet SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action (France: General Staff, February 1917) laid down the platoon structure which would have a sections of bombers. rifle grenadiers, riflemen and a Lewis Gun section (with one Lewis Gun). I think that this was taken into general use around 1 April 1917 although there is certainly evidence that units had been experimenting with it previously and the Canadians appear to have formally moved over to something similar in the New Year of 1917. This could be varied for specific (and clear) tactical purposes but essentially the platoon commander was to command a platoon both in training and on operations that was made up in this way and that maintained, as far as possible, continuity of personnel (ie Rifleman Jones was not shuffled randomly from one platoon to another in his company)

It was precisely this mix within the platoon that was required in order to give the platoon commander (the highest level of command across which control could be exercised on the battlefield by voice, whistle and hand signal) the flexibility to deal with obstacles as they were encountered. The decision to deploy individual Lewis Guns at platoon level rather than retain all four at company level (originally favoured by Haig) was made personally by Haig in February 1917 following a demonstration of the proposed platoon organisation organized under the direction of Brigadier-General Arthur Solly Flood. SS 143 would then have been finalised and was with infantry battalions within weeks. It was also accompanied (indeed pre-empted) by The Organization of an Infantry Battalion and the Normal Formation for the Attack (France: General Staff, April 1917). Note: Organization of an Infantry Battalion previously issued as O.B. 1919 of 7 February 1917 and Normal Formation for the Attack previously issued as SS 144 (O.B./1914/T) dated February 1917 but the pamphlet generally in the hands of the platoon commander would have been SS 143.

The new system 'sort-of'' originated with the French although the Lewis Gun appears to have been a much more suitable weapon to provide covering and neutralising fire than the French Chauchat. The new organization also came to the BEF with a first class user manual, SS 143, and increased training opportunities for officers and NCOs at divisional schools (through late 1915 until mid 1917) and increasingly at corps and Army schools to learn their responsibilities as leaders and to aquire their tactical and instructional skills in command.,

What is interesting in Floyd's description is his reference to two Lewis Gun teams per platoon. In general, this did not become a feature until later in 1918 when either increased production or increased availability as a result of the merging of some battalions and the reduction of infantry battalions to three per brigade rather than four (or perhaps for both reasons) allowed for experimentation with two LGs per platoon. It may be that the 2/5th Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers had a specific plan in mind for Floyd's platoon in the Battle of Pilckem Ridge that required this variant which should imply that some rifle platoon was without a Lewis Gun. The 55th (West Lancashire) Division would probably have rehearsed throughout the summer using their intended ORBAT for the opening of the Passchendaele campaign.

Floyd was serving under Lieutenant-Colonel Best-Dunkley (awarded a posthumous VC for his conduct in the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, the opening of the Passchendaele campaign). Floyd was not, if I recall, at Messines (and neither was his battalion) and joined the battalion later in any case. For a junior officer he has a hugely good opininion of himself! As there is no copy of the battalion war diary at Bury and I have not yet got the original from the NA, I have not yet been able to cross-reference his book (originally published as At Ypres with Best-Dunkley) against the record except as it ties in with the 164 Infantry Brigade Diary

Ian

[Black]

An interesting thread here about the evolution of the infantry platoon stucture as the war progressed.

The matter of Lewis guns and their allocation prompts me to mention the recently-published "Fighting Nineteenth" which covers the history of the 19th Battalion, AIF in the context of its parent formations, the 5th Brigade and the 2nd Division. In Chapter 12 (around page 326) is mentioned the story of the 5th Brigade commander (aka "Bob the B*****d" Smith) who asked his four battalion commanders in a Confidential memo to report exactly how many Lewis guns they really had in each unit. There are sufficient hints in the unit and brigade war diaries that Lewis guns guns and magazines salvaged from the battlefield were not being taken to the Divisional Salvage Dump as per divisional orders - shock, horror - but being re-distributed among the rifle platoons so that there may have been two or more per section. This appears to have occurred from late 1917 onwards, supplemented by extra training when in rear areas to ensure that every man in the platoon knew how to operate that weapon and could take over if the No1 on the gun was hit.

Smith's memo shows that he was tacitly aware that these extra weapons were being used in his units, but in an understrength AIF facing a shortage of reinforcements, this gave him extra fire-power in his key fighting sub-units, the rifle companies and platoons. His units could go into the line under-manned, but up-gunned. Smith's brigade was probably not the only one making use of salvaged materiel to increase tactical advantage. This was occurring even before the change from four-battalion brigades to three-battalion brigades which was effected in late October 1918.

All of this goes to show that while there are always Official Orders, Instructions and Establishments, there will also always be someone out there in the field trying new methods, whether with official sanction or not.

I would be keen to see other examples of these types of evolution of infantry (or other) skills put up on this thread.

Regards,

Black

[Mark Hone]

Slight tangent. Thomas Hope Floyd was an old boy of Bury Grammar School (where I teach) and Manchester Grammar School. As pointed out above, the book's original title was 'At Ypres With Best-Dunkley', Bertram Best-Dunkley being the fire-eating CO of 2/5th LF who won a potshumous VC for his actions on 31st July 1917 and is buried at Mendinghem. The publishers of the recent paperback reprint obviously decided a catchier title was needed but it is a misnomer as the book has absolutely nothing to do with the Battle of Messines, as Ian Riley mentions. It must be one of the best and most detailed accounts written by a junior officer of the build-up to a major battle. Floyd's comments on the unpopularity of Best-Dunkley amongst the other officers are particularly amusing. His description of the attack on 31st July itself gives a very interesting picture of the 'empty battlefield' phenomenon. Floyd missed what was probably 55th Division's finest hour, the defence of Givenchy in April 1918 as he was recuperating from his wounds but he did write an unpublished follow-up to 'At Ypres...' about the last few weeks of the war when he eventually became part of a flying column commanded by Brigadier-General Stockwell, Frank Richards' infamous 'Buffalo Bill'. Interestingly Floyd seems to have had a lot of time for Stockwell but not Jeudwine the long-time CO of 55th Division, whom he accuses of pushing for an entirely unnecessary battle on the eve of the Armistice. Floyd in later life was a prolific letter-writer (and eccentric) and left his voluminous papers, including the original manuscripts of his books, to the Lancashire Records Office in Preston. Articles written by him also appear in the LF's 'Gallipoli Gazette'. One thing Jeudwine did do was require extensive 'after-action' reports from Junior Officers and NCOs and these can be compared with Floyd's later written account to give a very full picture of 55th Division's attack on 31st July. I have already used these as the basis for a battlefield walk and hope to do a more extensive one in the future.

[PhilB]

I wasn`t going to mention the very negative comments on Best-Dunkley! I was surprised to find how young he was but not, on reflection, surprised that such a young Lt Col was not a popularist.

One tends to think of a platoon going over the top in extended lines but how did a platoon composed as Floyd`s was go over? Which section/s would lead?

[Steven Broomfield]

Smith's memo shows that he was tacitly aware that these extra weapons were being used in his units, but in an understrength AIF facing a shortage of reinforcements, this gave him extra fire-power in his key fighting sub-units, the rifle companies and platoons. His units could go into the line under-manned, but up-gunned.

Black

There is a photo of an Australian platoon about to go into action at (I think) Mont St Quentin: there are about 10 men in the platoon but they have, IIRC, four Lewis Guns.

[squirrel]

SS143 gives differing formations depending on what was being advanced toward. However, ususally Section Scouts in front as a skirmishing line followed by Sections in single file; Lewis Gun Section and Platoon Commander in the centre.

[connaughtranger]

Some notes for Platoon Commanders prepared by G. O. C. 170th Bde dated July 2nd 1917

[connaughtranger]

"To be read in conjuction with SS 143 & 40/WO/3995

[PhilB]

Having gone over the top, would the platoon commander then be immediately free to use any of his sections as perceived opportunities arose or not? Would the company commander still be considered as in overall control or would control have devolved down to the platoon commanders in view of the communication difficulties? And where would the Coy Commander be?

[squirrel]

Platoon Commander had control of his platoon is my understanding - Coy Commander would oversee from Coy HQ in the rear of the deployed platoons and issue any orders accordingly.

[Ian Riley]

The Company Commander is unlikely to be able to exert much immediate influence on the deployment of the leading platoons beyond committing his reserve platoons or perhaps calling for artillery support probably rather tediously by runner. EDIT or later calling on a friendly tank.

By 1917, platoons going forward over any distance would be likely to start in 'worms (file of sections). EDIT as mentioned by Squirrel. They would shake out into line only later and would try to move forward using fire and manouevre of sections within the platoon.

Somewhere I have a postcard illustrating this in a rather stylized way; I will hunt

Ian

Edited 1 November , 2011 by Ian Riley

[Ian Riley]

Slight tangent. Thomas Hope Floyd was an old boy of Bury Grammar School (where I teach) and Manchester Grammar School. As pointed out above, the book's original title was 'At Ypres With Best-Dunkley', Bertram Best-Dunkley being the fire-eating CO of 2/5th LF who won a potshumous VC for his actions on 31st July 1917 and is buried at Mendinghem. The publishers of the recent paperback reprint obviously decided a catchier title was needed but it is a misnomer as the book has absolutely nothing to do with the Battle of Messines, as Ian Riley mentions. It must be one of the best and most detailed accounts written by a junior officer of the build-up to a major battle. Floyd's comments on the unpopularity of Best-Dunkley amongst the other officers are particularly amusing. His description of the attack on 31st July itself gives a very interesting picture of the 'empty battlefield' phenomenon. Floyd missed what was probably 55th Division's finest hour, the defence of Givenchy in April 1918 as he was recuperating from his wounds but he did write an unpublished follow-up to 'At Ypres...' about the last few weeks of the war when he eventually became part of a flying column commanded by Brigadier-General Stockwell, Frank Richards' infamous 'Buffalo Bill'. Interestingly Floyd seems to have had a lot of time for Stockwell but not Jeudwine the long-time CO of 55th Division, whom he accuses of pushing for an entirely unnecessary battle on the eve of the Armistice. Floyd in later life was a prolific letter-writer (and eccentric) and left his voluminous papers, including the original manuscripts of his books, to the Lancashire Records Office in Preston. Articles written by him also appear in the LF's 'Gallipoli Gazette'. One thing Jeudwine did do was require extensive 'after-action' reports from Junior Officers and NCOs and these can be compared with Floyd's later written account to give a very full picture of 55th Division's attack on 31st July. I have already used these as the basis for a battlefield walk and hope to do a more extensive one in the future.

Again at a tangent (although this raises the question of the accuracy of the text), I am slightly suspicious of Floyd's evidence as my recollection is that (by his own account) he always seems to land 'buttered side up' in any situation. I was amused by his comment that even Best-Dunkley referred to him as 'the General' (if memory serves me right - I have not read it for two years but I now have a first edition waiting to be read) and am slightly cautious about drawing lessons from the book in my analysis of the training of the 55th Division. I get the impression that Floyd always casts himself in a rather good light although I suppose that should not affect his more subjective recollections. I do agree that his account of the 'empty battlefield' resonates strongly with other accounts. Floyd did miss quite a lot of the preparation for Pilckem Ridge which took place over the late spring and early summer.

It would not surprise me in the slightest if he had had a personal collision with Jeudwine, a GOC who was in the habit of visiting front line trenches alone and unannounced at any time of day or night to discover, typically, "gas sentry reading the Daily Mail" * (I would not have liked to be the company commander responsible). Jeudwine was reputed to have little time for officers who tried to bluff their way out of the searching light of his criticisms ("Woe betide them" was the comment of the Liverpool Scottish historian) and, although it is only (rather less than) surmise, I can imagine Floyd trying to be too clever by half in an encounter with his Divisional Commander. Stockwell did not always agree with Jeudwine's policies and interpretations of tactical situatiions (of which there is evidence in the Jeudwine papers)

Ian

* I mention the Daily Mail from memory; it might just have been 'a newspaper'. Still, the steam was still visibly rising from the pages of Jeudwine's notebook at this point.

Edited 1 November , 2011 by Ian Riley

[Guest]

Forum member Ian Jones posted these useful pamphlets.

Instructions for the training of platoons Feb 17

Platoon training 1918

Mike

[Ian Riley]

Mike,

Thanks for these links to the two versions of SS 143 (I think that the earlier one is avalable as a reprint somewhere)

Unfortunately, the back cover is not scanned with the printer's colophon but I think that the later (blue cover) version was prepared in November 1918 and did not actualy appear until early 1919 - I am being too idle to go in the loft and get my copy (if I could find it). To my mind it bears the imprint of Lt Gen Sir Ivor Maxse, the man who (in his own opinion at least) revolutionised BEF tactics and who had been appointed Inspector-General of Training in mid-summer 1918 after a somewhat difficult time as GOC XVIII Corps in the German Spring offensives. My feeling is that the credit belongs in the main elsewhere, not least with Solly Flood in drawing together many ideas from many sources in 1917 and whose department produced the first highly user-friendly version of SS 143 written in informal and relatively unstilted language that would resonate with a newly-commissioned young officer from a rather wider background than his 1914/1915 counterpart. That is not to say that Ivor Maxse did not make a major contribution to infantry training; he did. Issues such as these have been outlined in a Birmingham University MA dissertation of Alastair Geddes and for 1918 developments, in a similar dissertaion by David Molineux

The 1918 version does show tactical progress that must have been developing throughout 1918 and taking in the lessons of Third Ypres and Cambrai and one can recognise threads that were still present in the Infantry Platoon in Battle (1960), the platoon commander's bible through to almost the 1980s. It seems much more formally written that the earlier version and probably went through several editorial stages, being put out for commentary, as was described by Lt Col Cuthbert Headlam in his letters recently published by the Army Records Society concerning the revision (earlier in 1918) of SS 135 (the divisional version of SS 143)

The diagram of an advancing platoon in the 1918 version is worth looking at for the section 'worms' rather than the extended lines

Ian

[Black]

Hello all,

A number of responses in the thread above have referred to an attack formation as a "worm" - or files by sections.

I believe this was more widely known as "Artillery formation" and was adopted from the French by the UK and its Dominion forces later in the war. It allowed for better command and control of sections during the approach to an objective. if an obstacle of any kind was hit, then the section could spread out and deal with it.

Regards,

Black

[squirrel]

Artillery formation was practiced before the war. John Lucy in his book "There's a Devil in The Drum" describes watching his brother's platoon advancing under artillery fire on the Aisne in 1914 and deploying in to Artillery Formation. It is also described, admiringly, by Walter Bloem in his book "The Advance from Mons" at the professionalism the BEF soldiers adopting Artllery Formation under fire like a drill.

Essentially, IIRC it was deploying by half sections in to a diamond like formation with each man between 5 and 10 yards apart.

SS143 gives Artillery Formation with the sections in diamond formation of double files or worms with the two Section Scouts leading each file. The Platoon Commander and Lewis Gun section in the rear or on the open flank with each section up to 20 yards apart so the front and depth of the Platoon would be 100 to 120 yards or so.

[billyv]

A fascinating thread.There is obviously much to learn about World War 1 infantry units. I am fairly well read on infantry tactics but not from the Great War.Perhaps because of the fixed defenses of deep trenches

I have not read enough of the evolution of infantry tactics in British and Commonwealth units.

Recommendations for further reading would be appreciated. Patrolling ( scouting and trench raids ) seems to me to have demanded an enormous effort in training and original thought.

[billyv]

In my own book stacks I find a good discussion in John English's 1981 A Perspective of Infantry. I look forward to reading some unit histories .