"The Great War Generals"

[hazelclark]

Have just finished reading this book and would recommend it to anyone who is relatively new to the Great War who may have read some histories and wants to know a bit more about the Entente generals on the Western Front. There has been a huge amount of criticism about the British generals and Haig in particular, and this book, although not attempting to whitewash anyone, gives a fairly rational account of the reasons behind their decisions in some of the more important battles. I came away with a better understanding of some the decisions made and the reasons for the negativity and outright hate inspired by some of the generals. In the case of Haig, it seems he just didn't know when to stop sometimes. Neillands also puts the contributions of the other allied armies and their officers in perspective. The assessment is to my mind, reasonably objective, and his conclusions concur with that of Daniel Dancocks whose book "Legacy of Valour", The Canadians at Passchendaele, I had just read prior to this one. (Dancock's book is worth reading also)

It is astounding when one stops to consider the political machinations involved in every aspect of the war and the more one reads the more one starts to think that people like Lloyd Georgeshould be the ones called the "butchers". The book is very readable and the maps are not bad.

[kenneth505]

the more one starts to think that people like Lloyd George should be the ones called the "butchers".

I'd love to hear more of why you're coming to this opinion.

[Lachlan]

I also tend to believe that Lloyd George has something to answer for. In my view, he pushed Haig into adopting the charismatic Nivelle's "war-winning" plans for Spring 1917, which saw the British and Dominion troops go it alone after the French charged to disaster and mutinied, the whole event sputtering to an inconclusive halt in May 1917 with higher casualties per day than at The Somme or Passchendaele. LG supported Haig's plans for the Ypres Salient for the summer/autumn of 1917, then the Cambrai attacks in November. Then he bottled out due to the losses (which made him look bad) and held reinforcement troops in Britain, causing severe strain on the Western Front when the Germans launched their Kaisershlacht offensives in March 1918 onward. It seems he wanted to replace Haig, but couldn't, because he was still the best man for the job. No doubt LG revelled in reflected glory after he "generously" released trooops for the front in June/July 1918 (after the crisis was past) and Haig masterminded the Amiens offensive of August.

Winston Churchill had Gallipoli, another example of political interference. He also had the Greek fiasco in WW2.

In the 19th Century, Pres Lincoln pushed "Little Mac" (Gen JB McLellan) to fight Lee at Antietam in September 1862, America's bloodiest day.

Politicians have their job to do, military commanders their job to do, they must cooperate but when one dominates or crosses over to the other's field of expertise, stand by for disaster.

In my opinion.

[hazelclark]

Hi Ken!

I am not very widely read in terms of war histories. However, the more I read, the more I realise the level of incompetent political interference the military brass had to put up with and the level of disinterest at other times depending on political expediency. A great example of the latter, is the management of 3rd Ypres when the politicians, and Lloyd George in particular,had it in their power to shut the whole thing down when it became obvious that the conditions on the ground were atrocious and miniscule gains had the potential for huge casualties. At that point they were just not interested. At other times they refused to allow Haig the reserves he actually needed to keep the line intact in view of his being obliged to take over more and more of the French Line. This put huge pressure on the exhausted troops. Lloyd George also treated Haig apallingly by his underhanded back stabbng, to cause him embarrassment. He did not have the courage to get rid of Haig but nevertheless did his best to undermine his authority and credibility. Haig was far from being perfect and at times seemed to have had recourse to the "ostrich principle" because I cannot figure out any other excuses for his decisions in the Fall of 1917. He also was not the greatest judge of character and therefore made many errors in judgement. He listened to people like Gough but not his own divisional commanders. BUT, he does not deserve ALL the blame. ( Prior and Wilson make a pretty good assessment of both characters in "Passchendaele - The Untold Story")

Anyway, it is my opinion that Lloyd George has a lot more to answer for than is seen at first glance. Interestingly enough, I discussed this not too long ago with my Mother who was born at the end of the war and she said that my Grandfather (who lost his arm at 3rd Ypres after lying wounded for two days in no man's land) hated Lloyd George but thought that Haig was okay. He always blamed the politicians and some of the field officers for the huge casualties.

It is hard for us in 2012 to get our heads round the fact that large numbers of casualties, which I suppose, meant attrition on both sides were quite acceptable in the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Sorry, didn't mean to write a book! It is late- excuse any spelling errors!!!

Hazel C

.quote name='Ken Santa Fe' timestamp='1327453871' post='1700390']

I'd love to hear more of why you're coming to this opinion.

I agree with most of what you say!

Hazel C.

I also tend to believe that Lloyd George has something to answer for. In my view, he pushed Haig into adopting the charismatic Nivelle's "war-winning" plans for Spring 1917, which saw the British and Dominion troops go it alone after the French charged to disaster and mutinied, the whole event sputtering to an inconclusive halt in May 1917 with higher casualties per day than at The Somme or Passchendaele. LG supported Haig's plans for the Ypres Salient for the summer/autumn of 1917, then the Cambrai attacks in November. Then he bottled out due to the losses (which made him look bad) and held reinforcement troops in Britain, causing severe strain on the Western Front when the Germans launched their Kaisershlacht offensives in March 1918 onward. It seems he wanted to replace Haig, but couldn't, because he was still the best man for the job. No doubt LG revelled in reflected glory after he "generously" released trooops for the front in June/July 1918 (after the crisis was past) and Haig masterminded the Amiens offensive of August.

Winston Churchill had Gallipoli, another example of political interference. He also had the Greek fiasco in WW2.

In the 19th Century, Pres Lincoln pushed "Little Mac" (Gen JB McLellan) to fight Lee at Antietam in September 1862, America's bloodiest day.

Politicians have their job to do, military commanders their job to do, they must cooperate but when one dominates or crosses over to the other's field of expertise, stand by for disaster.

In my opinion.

[John_Hartley]

I "liberated" this book from the shelves of a cottage we stayed in during the summer. I left three crime novels by way of exchange and, in truth, I think the cottage may have got the better of the deal. I found the book a bit of a slog to read but, then, books about strategy are not usually my thing. It is farily revealing about the machinations that went on at very senior level but some of the points are laboured - yes, I got it first time that Lloyd George was a duplicitous sh!t.

Worth a read if you come across it in the charity shop - which is where my copy will soon find itself.

[hazelclark]

Nearly four years on I would concur. Have read a bit since then, but would stick with my original thought that the book is not a bad read for a newcomer.

Hazel C.

[David Filsell]

Liberated? If you don't want send the book back to owner.