Military Adaptation in War

[truthergw]

I mentioned acquiring this book in the Classic Threads, what are you reading thread.

Military Adaptation in War: with fear of change. Author,Williamson Murray. Cambridge Uni. Press.2011.

The title caught my eye in an online flyer. When I saw that there was a chapter , " Complex Adaptation; The Western Front: 1914 – 1918", I prised open the wallet. I was keen to see a bang up to date appraisal of an aspect of the Great War which most of us are interested in. I had slight misgivings at the fact that the author is an American professor with strong ties to their defence institutions but told myself I should welcome diversity of opinion and not close my mind to new insight.

This is an academic work, fully annotated and copious footnotes. All quotes referenced, etc. This allows the reader to notice the strange choice of references. Two or three books are the main source, although a couple of handfuls get a mention. The mother lode as far as Dr Murray is concerned is to be found in Travers and Prior and Wilson. Big chunks of their books are rechauffeed. Most of us will have already read the books in question. The Killing Ground, by the former and Command and Control and Passchendaele by the latter. Our valued forumite, Jack Sheldon, gets a mention as do many others but footnotes apart, the text relies heavily on the aforementioned works.

In a footnote, Dr Murray states, " For a favourable view of Haig, that is directly contrary to this author's". This then refers thereader to John Terraine . That about sums up the chapter. We read that Haig totally ignored or was ignorant of tactics.That view is repeated more than once. We also find that Haig was poor strategically and at operations level. There is little to explain advance and final victory but the author seems to think that it should be ascribed to Rawlinson's influence. The reduction in German activity at Verdun was due to Russian success on the Eastern front. The first day of the Somme figures strongly throughout the chapter. Haig of course is saddled with total responsibility for the disaster.

A very disappointing book. The chapter on the Great War is firmly fixed in the 1970s as far as military analysis is concerned. Thirty years of scholarship, the opening of the archives in Eastern Europe have all gone for naught. The book is not confined to the Great War but unless the analysis in the other chapters is an order of magnitude better than the one dealing with ' our war', I could not, in all honesty, recommend it.

Edited to put back the spacing that cut and paste mangled.

[geraint]

Thanks for that summary Tom. What does 'Adaptation' refer to or mean in the title and chapter heading?

[truthergw]

Thanks for that summary Tom. What does 'Adaptation' refer to or mean in the title and chapter heading?

That raises a question, Geraint. The blurb distinguishes between adaptation and innovation. The author has another book dealing with that. As far as I can see he is referring to our familiar learning curve.The change in doctrine, tactics and strategy in response to the changing conditions on the battlefield. He sees a difference between that and introducing new weapons which he files under innovation. I am not so sure that the two can be clearly distinguished. I would have thought that the Germans had to adapt to tanks appearing and we in turn had to adapt to accomodate them successfully in the field. I think he sees tanks and AP rounds as innovation and defence in depth as adaptation. I say defence in depth was a reaction to new artillery. I did not read all of the book, just the introduction and the chapter dealing with the Great War. I decided therefore to restrict my criticism to matters well known to most of us on the forum. As you will have gathered, I am not over impressed by the theme of the book as far as I had read it. To be brutally frank, I think his approach to the Great War material that is now available was verging on the shoddy. He read a couple of books, took their theme as his and then cherry picked the evidence to support that position. I am not sure what his primary field is, apart from being defence related but I think he would have done well to have avoided 1914-1918.

[geraint]

Thanks for that Tom. Its a very interesting concept - and a shame, (from your critique), that it hasn't worked. The subject matter certainly has a depth of context to be a very worthwhile study. Like yourself, I'm an avid reader and one gets a surfeit of memoires and respuns and one appreciates a more academic outlook.

[truthergw]

I am in awe of the scientific and mathematical works that pour out of the USA . Absolutely first class and seemingly never ending. It is all the more disappointing to find areas where they are lacking. It is common for American authors to display a lack of political acuity when dealing with European politics in all their aspects. They are somehow naive. They miss the nuances. As in this case, they seem predisposed to come across an author or a point of view and adopt it completely. A modern author, writing in 2010 that Haig was ignorant of tactics, operations and strategy would, in Britain, be greeted with incredulity. To find a reputable publisher like Cambridge accepting this book was, in itself, a disappointment. One wonders who read it for them. Perhaps the advisor to NAM who assured the public that Haig was known as ' butcher'. It may not be insignificant that Murray recommends the Haig biography by Harris. The strong point of that work was the author's penchant for telling the reader what Haig had been thinking at given times.

[Charles Fair]

I am not sure what his primary field is, apart from being defence related but I think he would have done well to have avoided 1914-1918.

I think its more strategy and military/defence institutions and how they work (or not). I don't think tactics and weapons systems is his main area of focus from what I have seen. Not someone who would have been digging through WO95 to look at say artillery/infantry co-operation for example.