Haking: a dutiful soldier

[Chris_Baker]

Lieutenant General Sir Richard Haking is surely one the most reviled British Generals of the Great War. This stems from the fact that he presided over several of the war's most bitter actions, in which tens of thousands of British and Commonwealth soldiers were killed or wounded, with little apparent point and precious little gain. The nightmare that was the attack at Aubers on 9 May 1915; the near destruction of the 21st and 24th Divisions, rushed too late into the Battle of Loos on 25/26 September 1915; the slaughter of the Royal Sussex battalions at the Boar's Head at Richebourg on 30 June 1916; and perhaps most disastrously for Haking's reputation, the appalling show that was Fromelles on 19/20 July 1916. To make matters worse, Haking blamed his troops for these failures on several occasions. A title page in this work gives a quote from Lieutenant General Sir Richard Haking: "All I care about is doing my duty". Little wonder that he has been described by many in negative terms: he is seen as the very model of the blundering, uncaring chateau General.

Michael Senior's work is the first to examine the life and work of Haking, and draws upon a wide range of contemporary material. The research and writing is of the thoroughness and quality one would expect from an author whose PhD was a study of Haking's command, XI Corps. There appears to be relatively little evidence of Haking's childhood and youth, and the story really picks up from his entry to Sandhurst in 1880.

Much of this work examines Haking through context rather than direct evidence of the man himself. The reasons for, conduct and effect of the operations in which Haking played a significant part are examined in detail. As such we gain a good impression of what he did or did not do, but little of the soul of the man. The relatively few insights into his personality and interaction with others hint of a rather unappealing character. Haking's career hinged to some extent on patronage by Sir Douglas Haig, first as a Corps, then as Army commander, then as Commander-in-Chief. Haking was one of those "thrusting" types that Haig liked and supported: positive, offensively-minded, out to win. To some extent it was these very characteristics that caused so much trouble in the battles mentioned above, for Haking's positive outlook spilled over into over-optimism, over-stretch and a dismissive attitude to those he saw as having failed. Yet he continued to be highly regarded by the War Office and the army, and was given some "plum" appointments after the war.

Senior's summary is that revulsion of Haking has been overdone, and that credit should be given where it is due. It is a balanced and objective summary, pulling no punches when it comes to Haking's failures but also highlighting his successes. The context shows that without doubt, his influence over matters (notably as a Corps commander) was limited; he did not choose to launch the 1915-16 offensives. His Corps HQ was at times little more than a means of transmitting the wishes of GHQ and Army command down to the Divisions. On the one occasion when he did have to do something truly important he did it well and no doubt saved men's lives in doing so. This was on 9 April 1918, when his swift recognition that a German bombardment signalled an imminent attack and he ordered his reserves early into position.

This is a book well worth reading for its scholarship and insight into how the army worked. Personally while I agree with the author that things are not black and white and there are aspects of Haking's work that were positive and that should be recognised as such, the blood-soaked ground of Aubers, Fromelles and Richebourg brings me back. Had for example Plumer been at XI Corps for these actions, would they have been as ill conceived, ill planned and ill executed? Even with the benefit of Michael Senior's excellent work on Haking, I doubt it.

[archangel9]

Thanks for the review Chris. The book is on my wish list now. Does it cover his time in command of the 5th Brigade in much detail?

John

[Chris_Baker]

About one page. It moves us quite quickly on to his time with 1st Division and XI Corps.

[Leigh Mc]

Yes, thanks for the review Chris. I'll look out for this one.

[archangel9]

About one page. It moves us quite quickly on to his time with 1st Division and XI Corps.

Pity there isn't more. Thanks Chris.

John

[truthergw]

My copy is hovering in postie space and I am looking forward to reading it even more now. Thanks for the review, Chris.

[1st east yorks]

Just been looking at this book on Amazon and reading your review there,Chris.It sounds an interesting read;another for the ever expanding wish list.

Thanks for the heads up.

Anthony.

[WhiteStarLine]

Thanks for an interesting and fair review, Chris. The AWM uses ajdectives such as catastrophic, ineffective and failure when talking about Fromelles and the loss of 5,500 Australian lives in 24 hours is still remembered here for all the reasons you cite. Legendary Australian brigade commander Pompey Elliott was unashamedly in tears as he faced the small number of survivors on their return. Haking is still remembered as the architect of that attack.

[SiegeGunner]

... the loss of 5,500 Australian lives in 24 hours

Approx 5,500 is the total number of Australian casualties — killed, wounded and taken prisoner. The Australian death toll was approx 1,900.

[WhiteStarLine]

Thanks Mick, I did mean casualties, not lives. A full article, quoting Brigadier-General Elliott's words of tactical abortion may be read at http://www.awm.gov.au/wartime/36/article.asp. Pompey Elliott's suicide in 1931 is partially ascribed to Fromelles by the author of this article.

[PMHart]

Thanks for an interesting and fair review, Chris. The AWM uses ajdectives such as catastrophic, ineffective and failure when talking about Fromelles and the loss of 5,500 Australian lives in 24 hours is still remembered here for all the reasons you cite. Legendary Australian brigade commander Pompey Elliott was unashamedly in tears as he faced the small number of survivors on their return. Haking is still remembered as the architect of that attack.

Phew! Looks like we cruel heartless British got away scot-free again as there were obviously no British casualties at all at Fromelles in this purely Australian sacrifice for 'the greater good'. The more I hear about the Australian Battle of Fromelles the more I realise that it is a human tragedy without parallel in the Great War and it certainly utterly dwarfs minor skirmishes in the same locality such as the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge and Festubert in 1915!

Pete

[truthergw]

Phew! Looks like we cruel heartless British got away scot-free again as there were obviously no British casualties at all at Fromelles in this purely Australian sacrifice for 'the greater good'. The more I hear about the Australian Battle of Fromelles the more I realise that it is a human tragedy without parallel in the Great War and it certainly utterly dwarfs minor skirmishes in the same locality such as the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge and Festubert in 1915!

Pete

Now Pete, don't be naughty. The realisation that the Great War, previously assumed to have been fought in Gallipoli, spilled over into Europe is to be encouraged. Eventually, skirmishes involving French, Canadian, Americans et al. might be acknowledged as having had a part to play in the victory.

[David Filsell]

Chris,

Just started reading this for a Stand To! review - couldn't agree with your analysis more from what I have read so far. I fear you leave me very little to add, damnit!

regards

David

[mtaylor]

Really enjoyed reading this book which oozes scholarship at its best. Does anyone know how to contact the author? Or does he follow the GWF?

[Robert Dunlop]

This is a book well worth reading for its scholarship and insight into how the army worked. Personally while I agree with the author that things are not black and white and there are aspects of Haking's work that were positive and that should be recognised as such, the blood-soaked ground of Aubers, Fromelles and Richebourg brings me back. Had for example Plumer been at XI Corps for these actions, would they have been as ill conceived, ill planned and ill executed? Even with the benefit of Michael Senior's excellent work on Haking, I doubt it.

I agree about the scholarship. This, coupled with the author's writing style, makes the book easy to read as well as very informative. Senior quotes extensively from primary sources, particularly GHQ, army and corps level orders and other associated documents (such as the records of meetings between commanders). As Chris points out, this information allows the reader to gain insights into how various levels of command operated in the war. This information needs to be heavily caveated, however. Senior himself notes that the study of Haking is just that. On the one hand, Senior is rightly cautious about extending insights gained from such a study more widely across the British army. On the other hand, he does make several general conclusions (pardon the pun) that should be treated with caution.

Haking had a particular command style. Senior brings this out very well. It is not surprising that Haking never rose higher in the command structure, bearing in mind that he did serve as acting commander of First Army for a short period but the War Office did not ratify Haig's recommendation for Haking to retain this role. I think it is equally significant that Haking's Corps never served in an active part of the Western front, apart from the defensive operations in response to Operation Georgette and the very late phase of the last 100 days. Some of Senior's comments about corps-style command must be taken in this context IMHO. I have studied corps-level war diaries across several corps and in relation to numerous battles. While it is true that orders down the chain mirrored what came from further up the chain, other corps commanders were more likely to influence army and GHQ levels of command than Haking illustrates. In many battles, this meant that what came down the chain had already been influenced by what higher level commanders had already received by way of feedback, analysis, etc from subordinates. Haking does not come across in this way. This adds further insight into his character and how he behaved as a 'dutiful soldier'. It means, however, that Senior's analysis must be regarded in this context.

On the issue of Aubers, Fromelles and Richebourg, I don't have a particular opinion FWIIW. It was very interesting that Senior contrasted Fromelles with an equivalent size operation mounted by Haking's Corps in 1918, following the Spring offensives. The comparison is excellent and well worth reading. On whether Plumer would have handled Fromelles better, there is a fascinating quote in relation to Plumer and Haking. When Haking was planning an operation, he sought support from Plumer whose Army was operating on Haking's left flank. With all the demands at that time, Plumer had to turn down requests for extra artillery support. Plumer's reply noted that Haking would have enough to mount the operation successfully when Haking, quite rightly, felt this wasn't the case.

An excellent book and highly recommended.

Robert

[Old Tom]

I have just finished this excellent book and have been interested to read the views in this thread. I would like to add a couple of comments on minor aspects of the book which caught my attention. First, the authors treatment of the British acceptance and application of the offensive spirit, and second his treatment of the Portugese Corps. The latter has not received much attention. In my reading only Chris'es fairly recent book has much to say on the topic. General Hakings appreciation of their likely performance and his arrangements to contain their anticipated collapse were surely to the General's great credit.

Old Tom

[Chris_Baker]

I agree with that, Old Tom. One of the great what ifs - had Haking come back from Italy a touch earlier and been able to relieve the 2nd Portuguese Division before 9 April 1918, what difference would it have made to "Georgette" and indeed the course of subsequent fighting?

[Steven Broomfield]

Out of interest, I (and many others I suspect) received an e-mail from Naval & Military Press yesterday - this title is on sale at £4.99 (+P&P) at present. I have ordered a copy.

[Steven Broomfield]

And I am now half-way through. I can agree with pretty well all of the reviews posted: it's an excellent, well-researched and well-written (and very readable) book. Having just reached the end of the chapter on Fromelles I do have a more forgiving view of Haking, though as Mr Baker says, the author doesn't entirely rescue the subject's reputation. The detail of the operational decisions made before the action is intriguing, and one does wonder if Monro should perhaps take a little more responsibility than he usually receives.

 

At the price I paid it whole-heartedly recommended. In fact it's worth twice the price!

[paulgranger]

I read this in conjunction with ' The Battle of Fromelles' by Roger Lee, which is a good, dispassionate, account of the action in both planning and execution. As with Michael Senior's book, it provides a different picture of Haking. Lee has also written 'British Battle Planning in 1916' with Fromelles as a case study, but that's a bit pricey, and I've not read it 

[Petroc]

Hi all,

 

recently read this book and found it to be well-researched, well-written and very informative (I might also recommend the author's earlier book 'No Finer Courage'). I think that Chris' earlier comment regarding the lack of truly personal insights about Haking's character, thoughts and opinions are explained by the author when he refers to the fact that there is very little (discovered) surviving information in terms of the General's letters, diaries, etc (another, more senior, General springs to mind here....isn't this the case with Horne too?).

 

To my mind, the real strength of this book lies in the fact that it begins to highlight a rather neglected aspect of the histiography of the conflict, namely the somewhat awkward position of senior Corps staff in the BEF hierarchy...Corps was an undoubtedly integral part of the military establishment, but seems to have endured a rather strange limbo-like existence, often unable to dictate firm strategy for its fluctuating component divisions and brigades whilst at the same time being subjected to firm dictates from Army and GHQ command level   

[Steven Broomfield]

Hear, hear. I agree wholeheartedly: it is a very good and (dare I say) important work.

[Petroc]

On 9/3/2016 at 20:19, Steven Broomfield said:

Hear, hear. I agree wholeheartedly: it is a very good and (dare I say) important work.

Perhaps more is needed on Corps and Brigade-level studies, Steven?

[David Filsell]

In view of the above, as an interesting overview of command and control from Corps down to platoon and the way in which top down instructions were variously interpreted, misdirected  and fell in battle it's well worth taking a look at 'Attack on the Somme, Ist Anzac Corps and the Battle of Pozzieres a Ridge' ( Helion, Wolverhampton Military a guides No 19 ).

The author, Meleah Hampton, has undertaken a forensic examination of the many surviving papers  in the Australian War Memorial on the battles. It's a fascinating work based on research which I suspect could not be possible from the heavily weeded papers in the National Archive , right  down to muddy notes sent back from officers in at the front of assaults  whilst the fighting was going on. 

I think  it is a work that will not be well recieved by those in Oz who take the traditional 'incompetent British up market ********' view of the battle. It also highlights how events and individuals can influence victory or defeat regardless of comman incompetence (Gough comes out it very badly as do most other senior commanders). It's a book which really set me thinking.

[Steven Broomfield]

2 hours ago, Petroc said:

Perhaps more is needed on Corps and Brigade-level studies, Steven?

Yes indeed.