Douglas Haig

[phil andrade]

I have often wondered at this British thing of heaping crude obscenities on their generals as incompetents for the losses suffered in the Great War, as if it were only the British who suffered enormous losses. None of the critics seem to give any regard for the appalling casualties suffered by the Germans, French, Austrians, Russians, Italians and Ottomans during the same conflict. Chris

This is valid, and it needs to be emphasised. On the other hand, I think that we must acknowledge that there was something disproportionately shocking in the British experience of casualties in the Great War. Very close to four fifths of all British casualties on the Western Front were sustained in the period commencing July 1st 1916 to the Armistice. During that time there were episodes when British casualties were indeed extreme, even by the standards of other belligerents.

Wish to expand on this, but must take grand daughter to her swimming lesson. Back later.

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

Phil,

I think part of the problem from 1st July 1916, was the inexperience and training of the BEF at that time. The old regular units had been decimated, the British Army had expanded about fifteen fold or more with many of the new officers and NCOS being untrained for the responsibilities they had to exercise, while most of the old professionals were catapulted several ranks above their experience. Shortfalls were made up with "dugouts" well beyond their prime, and placed in positions for which they were not necessarily suited It takes time to train an army up to a professional standard. Furthermore, they were dealing with a whole new experience of war, that NONE of the warring combatants had an answer for.

Further to this, the British Army fought their greatest offensives from 1916 on, and offensive operations are very bloody affairs. Haig did not want to fight on the Somme in 1916. He was forced into it by Joffre and the British Government, so the criticism leveled regarding this battle must be spread far wider than Haig. Whenever anyone cticises Haig's performance I ask the question " Well tell me how you would have done it better?" Interestingly, every response I get is a blank look, and an inability to even articulate the issues clearly.

I don't think those people who relish military history and who have no experience of fighting, yet stand in harsh judgement of Haig, or any general, can even comprehend the difficulties involved and the absolute chaos of battle. It is not like playing a board game or a football match, although listening to some fools pronouncing judgement they seem to think a British battle must run like clockwork. One never has the full information, that irritant Clauswitz called friction inserts itself at the most inappropriate times, subordinates stuff up, and strangely the enemy does every thing he can to defeat one's efforts. Even at the level of fighting I was engaged in it was bloody difficult, and things never went to plan, despite the best efforts. The critics seem to conveniently overlook these issues.

It would be an interesting exercise if everyone on this forum who criticizes Haig, would also present their solution on how they could have fought each of his battles better than he did, and without heavy casualties. Of course we would have the advantage of hindsight and all of the information, neither of which he had. In one of the classic threads on this forum, Robert Dunlop and I examined how 3rd Ypres might have been fought better, and after much discussion we agreed that at the strategic and operational level, and it was at these levels Haig operated, there was no better approach. Once Plumer was brought in at the tactical level, his "bite and hold" tactics were remarkably successful. The fact that Flanders had an unseasonally heavy rainfall for August and October, more than twice the norm IIRC, didn't make things easy.

Enough of a rant, the Bride is callg for me to put the nose bag on.

Regards

Chris

[charlesmessenger]

Chris

What an excellent last posting. You explain the underlying problem of 1 July 1916 only too well. Likewise, your reminder that battle is a very confusing business and seldom works to plan, especially if your signal communications were as they were.

What concerns me is that in UK the Government is actively suporting just three centenary milestones - war's outbreak, 1 July 1916, and 11 November 1918. It is not difficult to guess the line that politicians will take over the Somme!

Delighted to see you back on the Forum and when will you next be in UK?

Charles M

[jhill]

I tend not to contribute to Douglas Haig threads because the points of view are so far apart that unpleasantness is always threatening.

It seems this is one of the eternally polarized topics which will never be settled. As a child I remember dinner table conversations among parents and grandparents where some of these dissenting points of view were aired with some warmth. Everyone is either "pro-Haig" or "anti-Haig" and there is no space in between.

To return to the original post, the history of books on Haig follow this pattern. They all tend to be either "pro-Haig" or "anti-Haig". When I describe a book as being "balanced" or "of sound scholarship" I usually mean that the author comes to the same conclusions as I do.

I am currently of the opinion that one must read several books of various points of view; one Haig book is never a good idea. I have not the breadth of reading as many of our members here, but I have read a certain bit from the standard list of stuff. The only two purely Haig books I have in my bookshelf nearby, are "Architect of Victory - Douglas Haig" by Walter Reid and "Haig's Command - A Reassessment" by Denis Winter. The Winter book is a well known "anti-Haig" effort. The Reid book, although claiming to be "balanced", strikes me as basically in the "pro-Haig" camp. On the whole the two make a good pair in a weird sort of way. It is easy for me to spot the weaknesses of each author's arguments, partly because I have the relief of opposite points of view.

I have my own opinions on things, but I currently try to maintain some detachment.

[Crunchy]

Winter's book would have been better if he hadn't deliberately distorted facts, made up sources that were found not to exist, distorted others, and quoted others completely out of context, leaving out the portions that did not support his completely biased view. I'd go so far as to say, Winter was dishonest in much of what he wrote. "Haig's Command" was described by Professor Jeffery Grey, who checked the sources Winter quoted, as "a manufactured fraud". The book destroyed Winter's career as a historian, and no academic historian or serious student of the war gives it any credence whatsoever. Read it by all means, but there are many, many better books on Haig.

One of the best short biographies I've read is "Haig -The Evolution of a Commander" written by Wriedt (I think that's the spelling - I am OS at the moment so can't check the bookshelf) who is an American historian with no axe to grind.

Cheers

Chris

[SiegeGunner]

"Haig -The Evolution of a Commander" written by Wriedt (I think that's the spelling - I am OS at the moment so can't check the bookshelf) who is an American historian with no axe to grind.

Andrew Wiest, Chris, who also wrote the excellent 'Passchendaele and the Royal Navy'.

[phil andrade]

"Haig's Command" was described by Professor Jeffery Grey, who checked the sources Winter quoted, as "a manufactured fraud".

Chris

Why, one wonders, did so many of us soak this kind of stuff up ? Perhaps those who endorsed it were the true "donkeys".

Phil (PJA)

[JimSmithson]

Winter is not the only source that is 'soaked up' without question. I think you were part of a discussion I had with George over the reliability of Spears as a source when he was not present. I remain sceptical of him, the more so the greater I delve into original paperwork at the NA (but not ready to take up arms against George as yet!) Even the authors of the Official Histories were individuals who will have found it very difficult to be partial when examining some of the evidence and they do pass judgement at times. It would be very time consuming and difficult to investigate what evidence was used in the creation of the OH volumes and what was may have been discarded. The process is documented but it is amongst a mountain of paper in the NA.

Jim

[Jonathan Saunders]

It would be very time consuming and difficult to investigate what evidence was used in the creation of the OH volumes and what was may have been discarded. The process is documented but it is amongst a mountain of paper in the NA.

Jim - I dont think copies are easy to come by, or cheap, but try obtaining:

Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915-1948. By Andrew Green. London: Frank Cass, 2003. ISBN 0-7146-5495-7.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[phil andrade]

listening to some fools pronouncing judgement they seem to think a British battle must run like clockwork

Chris

Since I have never served in the armed forces, let alone smelt powder, I begin to feel rather uncomfortable.....perhaps I exemplify those fools you allude to, Chris.

Monash was a proponent of the " clockwork battle " ;

In a well planned battle.....nothing happens, nothing can happen, except the regular process of the advance according to the plan arranged.

If we are to take the measure of the literature about Haig, and focus on the positive appraisals, would there be a degree of consensus that he, too, was a "formulaic" commander who aspired to the sort of battle that Monash alludes to above ?

Are there examples in the books about him that reveal that other attribute of command in high intensity warfare : the ability to fight in circumstances of chaos and disintegration, outside the remit of any plan, when things have to be carried out on impulse ?

One of the things that I admire in the record of some commanders is their admission that they had to confront and deal with situations in which they had miscalculated, or for which they had not properly countenanced. They admit to learning on the job. Grant was such a man. He admitted that it was only after the bloodbath at Shiloh that he realised what kind of war he'd have to wage.

Perhaps that book you mention, Chris, Haig - The Evolution of a Commander, by Weist , will hit the spot. Maybe the title carries the impication that I'm driving at here.

Edit : Just bought it now, one click, for my kindle ! Yipee !

Phil (PJA)

[PhilB]

Jim - I dont think copies are easy to come by, or cheap, but try obtaining:

Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915-1948. By Andrew Green. London: Frank Cass, 2003. ISBN 0-7146-5495-7.

Regards,

Jonathan S

Necessary reading for anyone who has referred to, or will refer to, the OH.

[Crunchy]

Since I have never served in the armed forces, let alone smelt powder, I begin to feel rather uncomfortable.....perhaps I exemplify those fools you allude to, Chris.

Phil (PJA)

Certainly NOT Phil. Quite the opposite. I enjoy and respect your comments. My comment alluded to those with a closed mind against Haig and his generals, and continue to hurl bile on them despite the abundant evidence now available that refutes the rubbish written by Clark, Laffin, Winter and their ilk.

With regard to Haig being able to operate in a situation of chaos, I guess one could look at his performance at First Ypres, where he seemed to me, at least, to have performed well.

Monash is regarded as a proponent of "clockwork battle", but he was also very capable in the maneuver battle, as was shown at Mont St Quentin in 1918. There he exemplified the qualities of a decisive commander in the quick attack, using speed and manoeuvre to dislodge the Germans before they could consolidate a new defensive line.

I think we have to remember that from 1915, the armies were forced to make what we soldiers call deliberate attacks, which gives the impression of Haig being formalistic. In fact the generals had no other option.

Regards

Chris

[SiegeGunner]

Perhaps that book you mention, Chris, Haig - The Evolution of a Commander, by Weist , will hit the spot. Maybe the title carries the implication that I'm driving at here.

I corresponded with Andy Wiest about his earlier book, 'Passchendaele and the Royal Navy', and revived the correspondence when 'Haig — the Evolution of a Commander' was published. From memory, he told me that it was aimed primarily at a North American audience and was intended to 'work' on two levels — as a stand-alone mini-biography for those not inclined or required to study the subject further, and as an introduction/preparation for further and wider reading by students of history, both academic and 'hobby' — hence the copious Notes and Bibliographic Notes referencing larger and more detailed works on Haig.

[JimSmithson]

Jim - I dont think copies are easy to come by, or cheap, but try obtaining:

Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915-1948. By Andrew Green. London: Frank Cass, 2003. ISBN 0-7146-5495-7.

Regards,

Jonathan S

I have the book Jonathon and it is well sourced; however, I am suspicious of the use of some of the sources and the omitting of others. I know of one example which either Green overlooked in his working through the correspondence in Cab 103 or chose not to use. In 1917 volume 1 there is reference to the infamous meeting on February 29th with all the shenanigans involved. In it the Official History writes that there was a disagreement between Haig and Nivelle over Vimy ridge, having previously referred to a letter from General de Vallieres criticising Haig's plan. That letter does not criticise that the attack on Vimy is taking place but the limited goals it has when a breakthrough to the Douai Plain is sought. The minutes of the meeting on the 29th refer to a previous operation that Nivelle felt Haig used too many reserves on one flank, Haig countering that later action showed he was correct. There is correspondence in CAB 103 outlining this mistake - which has perpetuated a myth to this day about Nivelle not wanting Vimy taken. This was ignored and the original material was used.

This is not a criticism of Green. I am working on a relatively microscopic element of the whole war and thus I am bound to go deeper. I am merely pointing out that the OH must be used with caution, even though, like Green, I agree that on the whole Edmonds attempted to keep as much of a balance as possible. He has; however, many examples of where Edmonds lays some criticism at Haig's feet as examples of his even-handedness, but not those where some critical analysis is due but not awarded.

Jim

[spof]

I'm indebted to Chris Baker for highlighting this several years ago but CAB 45 at Kew contains the letters written to Edmonds and Falls when they were compiling the original OH. They are not well indexed as many of the correspondants were involved in more than one battle so how to organise all that in a logical order is a feat in itself.

Not the easiest set of records to go through as they are also all hand written but very interesting too.

Glen

[Jonathan Saunders]

I am merely pointing out that the OH must be used with caution, even though, like Green, I agree that on the whole Edmonds attempted to keep as much of a balance as possible. He has; however, many examples of where Edmonds lays some criticism at Haig's feet as examples of his even-handedness, but not those where some critical analysis is due but not awarded.

I could not agree more Jim. Across the volumes the OH also had potential contribution from thousands of participants (was it 800 for opening of Somme alone?), some with more influence than others and wanting to put themselves or their Corps, Division, Battalion etc in the best possible light, possibly urging old comrades to do the same. Others purposely mislead. Its been 3 or 4 years since I read Green but it provides a very useful insight into the problems Edmonds et al faced.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[phil andrade]

All those people that Haig met and conversed with - soldiers and statesmen, politicians and businessmen, of different nationalties - surely, they must have left their impressions on record. Haig certainly makes some interesting comments about them. What did they say about him ?

Jan Smuts....what did he have to say ?

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=176650564867&set=a.145886079867.110025.145818974867&type=3&theater

[Chris_Baker]

My faith in the Official History was somewhat shaken when I researched in depth for my book on the Battle of the Lys. I went through every item in CAB45 that covers this period. Most of the correspondence dates to the 1930's and many of the men writing to Edmonds began by saying "of course it was a long time ago and I am doing this from memory". What shook me was how many of the memories they provided were taken, often verbatim, into the final version of the OH. I've never trusted regimental histories and now I don't trust the OH either! Even the war diaries from this most confused and broken of battles are sometimes of little value, with units always blaming the ones on their flanks for breaking first. "Believe half of what you see, son, and none of what you hear" is not a bad motto for researching the Great War, it seems to me.

[phil andrade]

https://www.facebook...&type=3

That's lovely : a great soldier and a greater gentleman.

Thank you, George.

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

Delighted to see you back on the Forum and when will you next be in UK?

Charles M

Many thanks for your kind words Charles. I have emailed you re our next trip to the UK.

Best Wishes

Chris