Alderson & "Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Can. Div at War 1914-

[Jonathan Saunders]

Does anyone have any views on this book in relation to General Alderson?

I have been looking into General Alderson who commanded the Canadian Corps in 1915/1916, on and off, for a while now. In his pre-WW1 service I find an innovative, capable officer able to make sudden and sound, command decisions and highly respected by all ranks. His WW1 reputation appears to be blighted by his relationships with Sam Hughes and his son, Brigadier General Garnet Hughes, and Brigadier General R.E.W. Turner, all of whom seem to conspire against Alderson and are ultimately successful in having him removed from his command. Alderson was certainly the victim of political machinations by the afore-mentioned and Haig had no qualm in sacrificing him for what I expect he viewed as the greater good, but what I am trying to find out is to what extent Alderson's removal was valid at an operational/command level.

The price of the above book makes it a small investment and I’d be grateful for any views on its merits (or alternative suggestions) before I go ahead and buy.

Thanks and regards,

Jonathan S

[Moonraker]

I skimmed it several years ago in connection with my own research into the First Contingent on Salisbury Plain and was impressed. It inclines towards the academic and is very readable.

Moonraker

[adk46canada]

I did a PhD thesis on Richard Turner and found I believe sufficient evidence to indicate that Alderson was a poor choice to command the Canadians in battle. He provided strong leadership in preparing the 1st Canadian Division for its initial battle but his conduct of Second Ypres, like that of both Turner and Currie, was flawed. The orders issued by the 1st Canadian Division indicate a commander with a poor understanding of what was happening at the front, the capabilities of his forces and what the Germans could achieve, as attested by the complaints by subordinate formations, both British and Canadian about the unrealistic timing for movement and attacks. Edmonds, the British Official Historian, believed Alderson had lost control of the battle and was out of touch.

Alderson performed so poorly at Festubert that Haig was scathing in his diary about Alderson, his staff, and Canadian commanders. He was unable to deal with Sam Hughes, the unstable Minister of Militia, something Alderson's replacement Julian Byng was far more effective at. Certainly, interviews conducted by Arthur Currie's first biographer do not paint a picture of Alderson as being a particularly well-respected combat leader by his Canadian subordinates. At least one battalion commander claimed that both Turner and Currie went to Alderson to complain about how the division was being commanded in the aftermath of Festubert.

Hughes was a challenge and Alderson's attempts to block Hughes' sometimes malign influence were a major factor in his unseating. Alderson did not have Byng's political savvy and character to successfully command a national contingent with two different masters - GHQ for operational matters and the Canadians for administrative issues. Alderson at times tried to play the political game but was operating at a disadvantage when dealing with an experienced politician like Hughes. One example was Alderson's attempt to go around the Canadian government to complain to the Canadian Governor-General about the Ross Rifle through a back channel. Alderson's motive in trying to get the unsatisfactory Ross Rifle replaced was appropriate but his means were not. Another example of his sometimes underhanded actions was an negative report of Richard Turner that he wrote when Turner was being considered for command of the Canadian 2nd Division. Alderson did not show the report to Turner as was required by regulations, probably because he did not want to deal with the political fallout.

To my mind the best evidence for Haig's assessment of Alderson's capability was when Alderson was sacked, Haig demanded the Canadians find a place for Alderson commensurate with his rank. Given the rapid expansion of the British Army and the shortage of qualified officers for senior positions, the fact Haig was unwilling to give Alderson a command in France suggests that Haig had a low opinion of Alderson. After briefly serving as an Inspector-General for Canadian forces in England, Alderson transferred back to the British service and served as an Inspector-General.

As to the book, it is well-researched and argued. The author overturns some of the commonly held views about the 1st Division and the battle with a well-reasoned and supported argument .

Thank-you

Bill

[Jonathan Saunders]

Gentlemen,

Many thanks for your replies and endorsements for the book, which appears to be a fairly robust examination, which is exactly what I am after.

My apologies for not responding earlier but I had intended to respond to a couple of Bill’s comments regarding the criticism of Alderson’s Staff at Festubert – my understanding is Alderson’s Staff were mainly compromise appointments, many of whom Alderson himself did not think ready for the responsibilities they were given. Turner is another that Alderson did not rate highly and I believe Turner's sometimes erroneous reports hampered Alderson’s performance at Second Ypres. I did read through the OH that evening regarding the Canadian Division at Second Ypres and the impression I was left with was one in which utter confusion existed but where Alderson was trying to support and positively respond to Turner’s reports back to HQ. In the end Alderson did not think Turner up to Divisional command - a battle Alderson lost although Turner's own sacking within a year of receiving his Division would suggest Alderson was right. Rather than just throw comments out I did intend to respond more comprehensively but I am afraid work commitments don't currently give me the time but an interest in Alderson means I do want to look at the Canadians more closely whilst they were under his command.

Once again many thanks for your endorsement of Shoestring Soldiers - added to the list.

Kind regards,

Jonathan S

[adk46canada]

Jonathan,

I have to disagree with several of your statements, based on my research and analysis. I started the Turner project in substantial agreement with the standard narrative about Turner but the evidence I saw indicated that, while Turner was not an outstanding commander, he was far better than is usually portrayed. Much of how Turner is described in the standard Canadian works is erroneous, exaggerated or at least debatable. For instance, his selection to command is usually ascribed to his being closely affiliated with party in power. In fact, he was aligned with the Liberal party and not the Conservatives. His selection to command in 1914 was as a result of a solid pre-war career in the militia, including command of a cavalry brigade, as well as outstanding service in the Boer War where he won the VC and DSO. It would take far too long to explain all of it, but I will touch on a couple of issues you raised.

At Second Ypres, on several occasions reports from Turner's headquarters were erroneous but it is difficult to see how they substantially affected Alderson's conduct of the battle. In all the Canadian engagements I have studied in detail the recurring fact was initial reports were almost always inaccurate either exaggerating success or minimizing failure. Experienced officers learned to treat initial reports with care recognizing that it took time for an accurate picture to emerge. Alderson faced a challenging situation of having to manage at one point 33 battalions and his headquarters was so far behind the lines and subject to constant communications breakdowns, so some of his being out of touch is understandable.

Alderson's commanders were Canadian but his senior general staff officers were for the most part British Regular Army officers (GSO I and GSO II were British) so any failings in staff work were more the fault of British officers overwhelmed by the situation. (The Canadian officers on the staff were not political appointees but in many cases trained staff officers.) For instance, the 13th Brigade ordered to make an attack complained that attack times stipulated by Alderson and his staff were seriously flawed, as it was impossible to reach the start line on time. Another example is the attack of the 10th Brigade on 25 April that was to consist of 15 battalions but only 5 reached the start line because of the poor planning by Alderson's staff.

Turner was not sacked as suggested. Alderson wanted to have him removed after St Eloi, but Haig refused. Subsequently, Turner led the 2nd Division to the most significant Canadian victory at the Somme at Courcelette, so it is difficult to see Turner's transfer to England as being sacked. The position was first offered to Currie who rejected it as he thought it was a political manouver. Turner was persuaded by the political authorities that it was his duty to accept the position. The issue being the Canadian Corps was hampered by the abysmal state of the Canadian training and administration organization in England. The government decided that a front-experienced senior officer was needed to reform the organization and Turner was selected after Currie turned down the offer.

Thanks

Bill

[Jonathan Saunders]

Bill - many thanks for your further comments, especially those relating to Turner, which I do take on board.

Kind regards,

Jonathan S

[nigelcave]

I always thought that Turner could not be sacked - Haig wanted to but it was not felt practicable; I think (all going on memory) was Haig's opinion to do with the rather indifferent performance (easy to sit in a chair and write that!) at St Eloi? If anyone had to go, it had to be Alderson. Added to which there was the Sam Hughes thundercloud over everything. As regards him, is there something reasonably modern on dear old Sam?

[Jonathan Saunders]

Nigel - in my opinion there were certainly political machinations at play regarding both Alderson's demise and Turner's ascendancy. What I would be interested to read are whether you have any robust views on Alderson's operational command. Was he another Victorian soldier entrenched in his views and unable to adapt to trench warfare or was he actually better than that?

Regards,

Jonathan S

[nigelcave]

Will get back to you - up to my eyeballs in reviewing papers for deadlines at the moment.