Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914

[robigunner88]

Good Afternoon GWF,

Has anyone had the chance to read this book or at least skim through it?

I read in an interview with the author, promising that it will be an "uncomfortable read" for those used to the standard accounts of the BEF in 1914.

I have already received my copy at home but will not be able to get my hands on it until March 15th, so i'm keen to read what the GWF has to say about it!

Jamie.

[charlesmessenger]

Jamie

I am currently reading it and much enjoying it. Yes, it does not pull punches, especially when it comes to the handling of the British artillery at Mons and, more especially, Le Cateau. A lot of very revealing firshand quotes help to bring it to life.

Charles M

[Steven Broomfield]

Any more detail of this book (such as who wrote it, what it costs, etc), please?

[AlanCurragh]

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Challenge-Battle-British-General-Military-ebook/dp/B00I42Q4KG/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1393417322&sr=8-1&keywords=Challenge+of+Battle

[paulgranger]

I've got it on Kindle, £5.99, or it's hardback from Amazon at £15.55, though The Book Suppository has it for £9.76 plus £2.80 postage. Written by Adrian Gilbert, of whom I know nothing, but who has produced a couple of WW2 books. I've only read the intro so far, which does suggest that there will be some contrary views about the BEF's performance

[RaySearching]

Any more detail of this book (such as who wrote it, what it costs, etc), please?

£15.55 free postage from Amazon

and a small commision for the forum

here

[phil andrade]

Would I be right if I suggested that this might be an endorsement of Zuber's book THE MONS MYTH ?

Another account that comes to mind is from Monty's memoirs : he hasn't a good word to say about the performance of the BEF at Le Cateau ( at least, in so far as he witnessed things)....a real " dog's breakfast."

£5.99 on kindle ? That's a no brainer, then. I'll buy it now and read it on the way down to the Pineapple pub this evening .

Phil (PJA)

[Steven Broomfield]

Thanks guys. Print edition ordered.

[robigunner88]

Thank you for the rapid replies.

It appears that it is going to be a good read, offering me a slightly different perspective on the BEF's performance in 1914 which I'll enjoy thinking about.

Jamie

[charlesmessenger]

Phil

Actually, the author makes plain that he is undecided whether to join the uber or the Terraine camp, at least when it comes to handling the German infantry at Mons.

Charles M

[David Ridgus]

Had this in my basket so long I'd almost forgotten when it was coming out. Thanks for the nudge and, sparing his blushes, if Charles M is enjoying it then that's a good enough endorsement for me

David

[Steven Broomfield]

Mine arrived a few days ago: I've not yet really looked closely, but it looks good.

[kenneth505]

Here is a link to an interview with Gilbert from the History Extra folks:

http://www.historyextra.com/feature/%E2%80%9Cnot-all-first-world-war-soldiers-were-heroes%E2%80%9D-says-historian

IMHO - Here's where his axe starts to grind:

"They were painful episodes, but 100 years have now passed. It’s time to move on and think about the war properly. It’s a historian’s job to find out the truth, not to please people."

With that perspective he'll be controversial. Underscores the idea that the transition from journalism to history is a slow one.

[charlesmessenger]

Ken

The book is actually pretty thoughtful and does give a convincing pcture of the BEF, warts and all. It has certainly provided me with plenty of food for thought.

Charles M

[Muerrisch]

I bought it and devoured it.

Should we be surprised to find incompetence [and incompetents!] among the able? Or cowards among the heroes?

Most organisations muddle through with the good guys more or less cancelling out the bad guys. It was ever thus. Many people are in the wrong job at the wrong time.

The biggest organisation that I ran had eleven sub-sets in eleven locations from North Yorkshire to Norfolk, with a total of 125 staff.. Of these sub-sets, four were led by excellent people, and three by inadequates. The four I left to sort out their own incompetents. The three were propped up by having enough competent staff ............... until I could wield the axe.

[squirrel]

...Should we be surprised to find incompetence [and incompetents!] among the able? Or cowards among the heroes?

Most organisations muddle through with the good guys more or less cancelling out the bad guys. It was ever thus. Many people are in the wrong job at the wrong time...

How true - many accounts of the early fighting in 1914, especially those by Junior Officers, mention being sent out out at night to attempt to find the Company, Battalion, Battery etc.

In essentially encounter battles, confusion reigns once the firing stops and attempts are then made to create some order out of the inevitable chaos.

Most can deal with this and get on with trying to make some sense it - others cannot deal with this and wait for somebody to tell them what to do.

The former are usually in the majority.

Copy of the book in question ordered.

[Steven Broomfield]

I'm reading it at the moment. It's excellent.

[David_Blanchard]

I wonder how similiar this new book on 1914 is?

1914: Fight the Good Fight: Britain, the Army and the Coming of the First World War [Kindle Edition] Allan Mallinson

Or indeed this one?

The Great Retreat of 1914: From Mons to the Marne [Kindle Edition] Spencer Jones

[mhurst]

Although several brief mentions have already been made of this book, I thought that some people might be interested in reading a slightly more detailed review.

The subtitle of Adrian Gilbert's book - "The Real Story of the British Army in 1914" - implies that it will contain revelations of the "Shock! Horror!" kind. Any reader looking to find these will be disappointed, and will instead encounter a no-nonsense account of the first few months of the war in Belgium and France from the British perspective. This period is related succinctly and clearly, and the author's style is generally very readable.

There are few surprises in the descriptions of the pre-war army, designed for frontier conflicts and chastened by its experience on the South African veld. The nature of the leadership qualities expected of the officers is well described: the 'Stand and Fight' mentality of the Waterloo era, with its emphasis on personal bravery as an example to the ORs, and leading to horrendous officer casualties as a consequence.The shortcomings of such an army in a modern conflict were quickly apparent, with the lack of co-ordination between artillery and infantry, at which the Germans were far more adept, being the leading cause of the lack of progress.

One of the chapters on Le Cateau is, tellingly, subtitled 'The Defeat', which description counteracts the views of many historians, and my own amateur view, that this was a successful rearguard in the face of overwhelming superior forces. That mistakes were made, particularly in the siting of guns in near-suicidal positions, and the falling back of battalions in complete disarray, was perhaps inevitable as the army faced up to the realities of modern warfare. (Incidentally, the author names the units involved, which tactfully remained anonymous in John Lucy's "There's a Devil in the Drum", and explains that such incidents were omitted from the official and regimental histories of the battle, for obvious reasons).

Mr. Gilbert describes the pressures under which officers of all ranks were placed, and how some coped better than others. The very young Bernard Montgomery was wounded honourably and made it back to the British lines, while others, such as Lieutenant Colonels Mainwaring and Elkington were cashiered, while yet others, such as the 4th Division's senior staff officer (and future author of the Official History), Colonel Edmunds, near to collapse, were assigned less stressful duties. Several brigade and even divisional commanders had to be relieved of their posts, while yet more were killed in action, bravely leading their men.

There were more 'unfortunate' incidents of battalions leaving their trenches instead of standing firm, both on the Aisne and at Ypres, and both French and Smith-Dorrien had serious concerns about their men's fighting resolve. One such battalion, the West Yorkshires, is shown in a very bad light, whereas in previous accounts I had read that although they had suffered serious casualties, their fighting honour wasn't in doubt.

Many commanders come in for much criticism. Some, such as French's overall unsuitability for a command of this nature, have been voiced many times before, and few would disagree. However, Smith Dorrien is also criticised for not extending his command over the battlefield. In the days before radio communication, this would have involved riding over what would generally have been dangerous ground, something I would have thought a corps commander should be least expected to do. Other brigade commanders are criticized for their lack of flexibility, but few envisaged the terrible nature of modern warfare, and every man had to adapt as best he could. As described above, many were not up to the task and were removed.

Mr. Gilbert's conclusion is that overall the BEF fought well, and in some cases displayed the dogged determination and grit which has come to characterise all of the Old Contemptibles. One battalion in particular, the 'little-known' (except in Lancashire, of course) Loyal North Lancashires displayed, in the author's view, outstanding resolve and were typical of the best of the regular army, which he asserts, like many other authors, died by the end of 1914. The truth is a bit different: nearly 40% of the pre-war regulars didn't arrive back in the UK from their colonial postings until after the end of First Ypres, and took part in much of the fighting in 1915. However, sadly it is fair to say that the old BEF was "gone past recall" in the words of the Official History, by December 1914.

That the way they faced up to the terrible maelstrom of modern warfare wasn't quite as some writers would have us believe – they were human, not supermen, after all – doesn't detract in any way from the fact that they were remarkable soldiers, and men, and deserve to be remembered and honoured as such.

[Black Maria]

The 1st Loyal North Lancs ( mentioned in the above post) were fortunate to have their first few months of the war documented in two excellent memoirs, one by an officer

and the other by a 'other rank' , namely Hyndson's 'From Mons to the First Battle of Ypres' and Bolwell's 'With a Reservist in France' . They are of extra interest to me

as my Grandfather was an 'Old Contemptible' in their ranks.

[paulgranger]

Hyndson's memoir was Kindle deal at 77p earlier this week, haven't checked today.

[David Ridgus]

Hyndson's memoir was Kindle deal at 77p earlier this week, haven't checked today.

Still there Paul

[Jack Sheldon]

Melvin

We have been round the buoy a number of times on Le Cateau. In producing the Battleground Europe guide Le Cateau with Nigel Cave I did a careful analysis of which German formations actually fought that day, because there is no value in simply totting up the whole of Kluck's First Army and comparing it with the reinforced British II Corps. On the day the corps was not outnumbered and it was forced back off the field as soon as the attackers manoeuvred to make the right of the British line untenable. That II Corps was never again pressed as hard has as much or more to do with German failings as British skill.

If you would like to read the German perspective, click on the link.

Jack

Le Cateau GE perspective.docx

[kenneth505]

Great post Melvin, thanks.

[mhurst]

On the day the corps was not outnumbered and it was forced back off the field as soon as the attackers manoeuvred to make the right of the British line untenable. That II Corps was never again pressed as hard has as much or more to do with German failings as British skill.

Jack,

I stand corrected regarding the ‘overwhelming odds’ faced by the BEF at Le Cateau. I have read your excellent book, co-authored with Nigel Cave, but while in it you opine that the Germans missed an opportunity, I didn’t get from it the impression that the BEF was not in fact outnumbered. Would you go so far as Adrian Gilbert, then, in describing the battle as a ‘defeat’?

By the way, who drew the illustrations in your book – they really are very good, especially the one on p. 97, which is clearly based on a famous photo.

Melvin