1914. Fight the Good Fight. Britain, the Army and the Coming of the Fi

[mhurst]

The full title is “Fight the Good Fight. Britain, the Army and the Coming of the First World War”, by Allan Mallinson, and the book does give an excellent account of those three topics. I read it straight after Christopher Clark’s “The Sleepwalkers”, and of course there is much overlap between the two. I have to say that the events of the last few days of July 1914 are more succinctly described here than in Professor Clark’s book, especially Britain’s entry into the war, an important aspect for British readers which I found lacking in that work.

Mr. Mallinson writes clearly and succinctly, in a style which is more easily readable than the more scholarly prose of Professor Clark, but then with a successful series of military historical novels to his name, perhaps this is to be expected. He was also a British army officer for over thirty years, with staff training, and his knowledge of military matters of the time is prodigious and authoritative. This experience makes him well qualified to pass judgements on the preparations and deliberations of the government and military hierarchy in the years leading up to the war. Most readers can begin to imagine the noise and terror of battle, even if it is only through watching modern war films, but the role of staff work in ensuring that armies are in the right place and ready for battle is not immediately apparent to the non-soldier, and Mr. Mallinson highlights the importance of this aspect of campaigning by the BEF in the summer of 1914.

He has clearly read just about everything written on this period (and most other periods, also being the author of a history of the British army) but has chosen to include the extensive notes that accompany the text (some of which are almost essays in their own right) as footnotes, with the result that sometimes the actual text on a page fills no more than half the space available. This almost forces the reader to consider the notes before moving onto the next page, after which it is sometimes difficult to regain the thread of the main text.

The author holds forthright views and opinions on the events and characters of the period concerned, which is his prerogative, and inevitably there will be some who will agree and others who will be put out by some of what he has written, much as there has been heated discussion in this forum recently over Professor Clark’s book. His strongest criticism is of the BEF commander, Sir John French, clearly believing him not up to the demands of such a post. Haig comes out not too badly, while none of the accounts of the subordinate senior staff are very flattering.

There two exceptions: one is the commander of II Corps, Smith-Dorrien, brought in at short notice to replace Grierson, and although having to suffer indifference at best, and personal hostility at worst, from French, nevertheless he managed successfully to achieve that most difficult of military operations – withdrawal in good order before a closely following superior enemy force. The other is Winston Churchill who, in 1911, at the age of only 37, predicted the course of a future continental war with uncanny accuracy, and advocated creating a strategic reserve that would assemble well behind the French line.

Mr. Mallinson is critical of other historians of the period, and is no respecter of reputations – even the revered Barbara Tuchman comes into his sights. It is clear that author does not hold the view that all the great power players must share some of the blame for not holding back from war, as I personally think is the case (although the share of some is greater than that of others, perhaps) and instead considers that Germany and Austria were the prime culprits.

Interesting though the whole book is for its account of the lead up to war and the early fighting, the most intriguing, and probably most controversial, part is the author’s ‘What if?’ scenario which has the BEF not assembling alongside the French near Maubeuge but instead concentrating further south, near Amiens (as per Churchill’s vision). Not only would there be a change in location in place, but also in time, as the scenario proposes that the BEF is only ready to engage the Germans when its full initial complement of eight infantry divisions and supporting cavalry was available, plus the first TF battalions and units of the Indian Corps, in all totalling some 300,00 men – a formidable force, indeed. Joffre’s push towards the Marne would still take place, without the BEF in the centre, and the pursuit of the Germans would still end on the Aisne, but in this case the BEF would be champing at the bit to attack from the west, causing a German swing clockwise to face this new threat. Coupled with an advance by the Belgian army from Antwerp, there would be a very real possibility of the Germans suing for an armistice in the west, and the possible mind-boggling different course of European history to which this could have led.

The reason that the BEF did not assemble near Amiens, as suggested in this scenario, has its roots, the author posits, in the failure of political direction on the part of the British government as to the role the BEF would play in a future continental war with Germany. Lacking any direction to investigate alternatives, the preparations for war were effectively left in the hands of Wilson and Foch, so that when the July crisis ended in war, the British government found that it had only one alternative – to assemble on the left of the French near Maubeuge, as planned; Britain’s own version of ‘war by timetable’ ensured that there could be no other outcome.

Mr. Mallinson suggests that the title of his book comes from what the soldiers of the BEF thought they were doing – fighting “the good fight” (the quote comes from the Book of Timothy) – reinforced by Sir John French’s confirmation that their “cause is just”. Personally, I don’t think that this meant as much to the Old Contemptibles as it did to the later New Armies or to soldiers in other, future wars. These were old sweats, most of them, tough professional soldiers, either regulars or reservists, and they just got on with their job, regardless of any personal views of the rights or wrongs of the war, which I doubt many of them even thought about.

This book will not satisfy every reader – far from it – but it should still be a must-read for anyone interested in the fascinating opening stages of the war.

Edited 9 May , 2014 by SPOF
Corrected book (and post) title.

[lostinspace]

Melvin,

I haven't read Mallinson's book yet but I am in process of reading "Challenge of Battle, The Real Story of the British Army in 1914" by Adrian Gilbert. From your comments, both books seem to challenge Edmonds' contention that the British army sent out to do battle in August was the "best trained, best organised, and the best equipped British Army that ever went forth to war.", or am I putting words in your mouth?
What seems odd is introducing the 'what if?' scenario, because Mallinson is basically saying that the British presence from Mons up to the Aisne was useless; that Joffre would have been able to build up the Sixth Army and launch the Marne offensive without the B.E.F. involved at all. It seems to me that no matter where the B.E.F. concentrated they would have been sucked into the battle as the German Second Army crashed through the French on the Sambre, besides, the 7th Division wouldn't have been available until October and 8th Division until December! I think the whole idea is pretty far fetched (but that probably won't prevent me from buying the book).

Dave

[mhurst]

Thanks, Dave. Yes, Allan Mallinson is critical of Edmonds’s contention about the BEF, but seems most scathing about the politicians’ lack of any idea of what to do with the BEF on the outbreak of war. At the crucial War Council meeting the day after war was declared, French and Churchill pushed for alternatives to concentrating near Maubeuge, one option being to reinforce the Belgians through Antwerp, acting independently of the French instead of supporting their left flank. In the end, though, there wasn’t enough of a consensus to challenge Wilson’s carefully laid plans, and the BEF marched to its destiny at Mons.

I agree that the ‘What If’ scenario is far-fetched, but perhaps only a little so. At that War Cabinet meeting, Haig had advocated delaying the movement of the BEF to France until all the forces from overseas had been assembled – not before October at the earliest. If that had been the case then the French would have had to face the German First and Second Armies alone, but although in reality the BEF gave the Germans pause for thought in following too closely, they did not seriously hinder their advance. It was the over-ambitious nature of the Schlieffen plan which was their undoing – the German infantry simply couldn’t keep up. The French, once they had deployed their Sixth Army, would probably still have checked the Germans on the Marne – the lack of a BEF in the centre wouldn’t have hampered them. As soon as the BEF was ready to cross the Channel, the ensuing scenario proposed by Mallinson may not have been so improbable after all.

I have also started reading Adrian Gilbert’s book, which promises to be very interesting. However, add “Fight the Good Fight” to your list – you will not regret it.

[squirrel]

Reading "Germany's Western Front 1914 vol 1" it mentions the pre war view of Von Moltke that the British might well land and concentrate at Antwerp.

[lostinspace]

Wasn't the R.N. opposed to such a plan? If I remember correctly they couldn't guarantee the safety of transports sailing up the Scheldt Estuary (plus Henry Wilson would have had to have been locked up in a closet somewhere!). I agree that the Schlieffen-Moltke plan probably didn't have much chance of working, but that is only apparent in hindsight. After the enormous French losses during the frontier battles Joffre was having great difficulty in finding the troops to stop the German advance even with the help of the B.E.F. I know it's becoming the revisionist view that Liege, Antwerp, Mons, Le Cateau and Guise were merely bumps in the road for the German steamroller but, in one way or another, all of these battles changed the course of the offensive, giving Joffre the time to work his "miracle".In my opinion there never was the slightest chance that the B.E.F. could have been held out of action until October (or later) given the military and political circumstances.

Dave

p.s. How is your book coming along?

[mhurst]

".In my opinion there never was the slightest chance that the B.E.F. could have been held out of action until October (or later) given the military and political circumstances."

Dave

p.s. How is your book coming along?

You're probably right, but the temptation to pose 'What if?' questions will never diminish, I'm sure.

Final maunuscript with publishers - due date end of April, all being well. Thanks for asking.

Melvin

[lostinspace]

That's great, best of luck!

Dave

[mhurst]

It is the obligation of any reviewer at least to get right the name of the book under scrutiny. In this I have failed miserably. Of course, the full title of the book is "1914. Fight the Good Fight. Britain, the Army and the Coming of the First World War." My apologies to Allan Mallinson (at least I got his name right), and to anyone who read my post.

Melvin

[mhurst]

That's great, best of luck!

Dave

Dave,

Just to let you know that the publication date for my novel is now 30th May. It will be under the Austin Macauley imprint, and I'll post publication details in the Classified section when I have them.

Melvin

[lostinspace]

Thanks Melvin, any chance of your book being distributed 'across the pond'?

Dave

[mhurst]

Thanks Melvin, any chance of your book being distributed 'across the pond'?

Dave

I'm not sure that publication will extend internationally, but I'm sure that we can 'make a plan', as they say in certain parts of the world, if you want a copy.

Melvin