Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and th

[Crunchy]

Jonathan Boff. Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

Overshadowed in the historiography of the Great War by the vast literature on the battles of the Somme and Third Ypres, the great allied success of the Advance to Victory in 1918 has only recently received belated attention. Jonathan Boff’s Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 continues to correct this imbalance, but from a different perspective.

He delivers more than the title suggests in a meticulously researched and carefully presented study, through the relatively narrow lens of the operations conducted by Byng’s Third Army, in which he seeks to understand why the Allies won, and the Germans lost during the last “Hundred Days”. Despite the title, Boff considers both the British Third Army, and its opponents, the German Second and Seventeenth Armies, during the period August to November 1918. The result is a detailed and compelling analysis that presents some surprising conclusions, not the least of which was the failure of German command.

This is not a narrative of Third Army’s campaign, but a detailed comparative case study to address four hypotheses variously given for the German defeat: that they were overwhelmed by an Allied superiority in men and material; that German morale collapsed; superior British tactics on the battlefield triumphed; and success came from the Allied ability to maintain tempo at the operational level. In this he succeeds admirably as they apply to the narrow focus of his subject. Doing so, he sweeps away the “stab in the back theory” much touted by the German generals and their acolytes after the war, and gets down to the nuts ands bolts of why this campaign ended so conclusively in the Allies’ favour.

Following an initial chapter that outlines the campaign on the Third Army front, Boff considers each hypothesis in a thoroughly detailed manner, drawing on extensive British and German sources, accompanied by charts and tables, to make his case in each area. Thus we learn that while trained manpower was a concern for both sides, the disparity in numbers in favour of the British grew as the campaign progressed, but the material difference was not as marked as some suggest. Morale is complex issue, and Boff doesn’t fall into the trap of generalisations, reminding us of the difference between spirit and mood, and the fluctuations over time, within and between units. Thus, while morale was a factor, to suggest the German Army was a morally beaten force over-simplifies the matter. In two strong chapters Boff considers the British combined arms tactics, and the German response to them - those who tout the superiority of German tactics would do well to read Boff’s findings. As the British advanced, however, all the issues associated with culminating points were making their impact. He concludes with a comparison of British and German command performance, and the ability to maintain tempo at the operational level. Here we find a marked difference to the popular perception, rather the complexities of command in battle and the difficulties in maintaining tempo are well illustrated. While Boff highlights strengths and shortcomings in command styles, his preference to see the differences in the British approach between delegation, and control as an either/or option, a soldier would see them as complimentary and essential in the fluctuating fortunes on the battlefield.

Objective and dispassionate in his analysis, Boff arrives at balanced conclusions that reflect the complexity of modern industrial war, and this is the greatest value of his book. That the reasons for victory and defeat cannot be reduced to the simple generalisations thrown up by the arm-chair general brigade, but are the result of a highly complex range of human and material factors. It is highly recommended to those wanting a bi-partisan, mature and thorough evaluation of why the Allies won in late 1918.

[charlesmessenger]

I echo everything that Crunchy says. It is a first class analysis.

Charles M

[phil andrade]

There is a rather careful analysis of the age of the soldiers who died, using extrapolation from data ( SDGW & CWGC ?)....the result is surprising, indicating that, among the totals who died in these final battles, the proportion of very young soldiers was higher amongst the British dead than it was among the Germans'.

Phil ( PJA)

[paulgranger]

I have been looking at this as a possible buy, and I am grateful for Crunchy's excellent analyisis, which bumps it up the wish list.

[Steven Broomfield]

Just when I decide not to spend on books for at least a couple of months ... £52.70 on Amazon.

[paulgranger]

Yes, I've succumbed, and it's been ordered. I did think about the Kindle edition, but as there are a pelthora of tables and charts, which do not lend themselves to electronic bookery, I've opted for the traditional version.

[Herekawe]

I have brought the paperback edition and it was much cheaper. Very good book and a good analysis of 3rd Army activities for us Kiwis when our Division was part of the 3rd Army. Refreshing to get away from Passchendaele and the Somme. Would recommend it, the careful analysis challenges a lot of what I thought about the last 100 days.