To Win a War

[Old Tom]

I have just read the Cassel and Co Military Paperback 2008 edition of this 1978 book. I have failed to find a review of it although there are many references to it. It deserves being brought again to the notice of members. It covers the events of 1918 in some 250 pages, including notes at the end of each chapter; positioning which I find better than a huge list at the end. It does not deal in any detail with the many operations in that period but, to my mind, provides an excellent over view of the German offensive and the operations of the 100 days. In particular the political military interface is explained clearly. I found the treatment of the influence of President Wilson and General Pershing fascinating. I have formed the impression that they were 'Prima Donnas' of the first rank. It would be interesting to know of others views on the allies negotiations of how to bring the war to a close. John Terraine, of course, rated FM Haig highly (and why not) and includes a quote from one of his letters - I paraphrase - it is a mistake to impose humiliating terms on Germany as it will merely cause troubles in the future.

Old Tom

[hazelclark]

Hi Tom,

My impressions were very similar to yours. Some of the British would have settled, i think for less harsh conditions, possibly with the future in mind, but the French, who really had been our traditional enemies wanted their pound of flesh. Nevertheless, the prevailing sentiment was for "unconditional" surrender, although had it been left to the to the British, things might have been very different.

Have not yet read anything about Pershing or Wilson to indicate they had any redeeming features. From all that I have seen, Wilson did not agree to do much other than political meddling, until it looked as though we were going to lose the war. Some of the things that Pershing did, seem to me unconscionable. e.g. Attempting to remove his men on the eve of battle, which would have happened had Haig not intervened. I think that some of them were removed.

I know that Terraine has received some bad press for being "pro Haig" but quite honestly, I find his books very rational.

Hazel

[phil andrade]

Firing from the hip, here, so to speak....

Haig went on record and stated - when he assumed high command at the end of 1915 - that the loss of one tenth of Britain's manhood would be a price worth paying for the defeat of German militarism.

His reckoning proved chillingly prescient : the generation of British military manpower was literally decimated.

Bearing this in mind, I find Haig's preaching of moderation rather hard to understand....one might have thought that he would press home the most relentless onslaught, giving Germany no chance to regroup and come forward again a generation later. German militarism was not defeated ; the Germans were allowed to believe that their soldiers remained unvanquished. So the price was paid. And the end was not attained.

Forgive my simplistic view.

I have gained the impression that Pershing was keen to press on and enter Germany, and worried that unless this was done, the Germans would live to fight another day. Might it be that Haig was uncomfortable with prolonging a war which would necessarily entail a growing US preponderance, at the expense of the British Empire ?

I have read the book we're discussing. I rate it quite highly. There is another Terraine book which is, in my opinion, the best of all his writing on the Great War, but hasn't been widely acknowledged : IMPACTS OF WAR, 1914 & 1918. I'm not even sure that I've got the title correct, but it's brilliant, in my view.

Phil (PJA)

[hazelclark]

Hindsight is always 20/20. My own opinion is that having imposed the conditions of the Armistice, whether right or wrong, they should have been enforced, or at least possibly eased in a formal manner. The way in which they were violated seemed like the thin edge of a wedge that got pushed further and further. I think that Haig was probably correct in suggesting the measures were too harsh. It would have been much better for all concerned, including Germany, had the terms been more realistic and enforceable. The monetary conditions alone, notwithstanding the huge cost of the war to Europe alone, were almost impossible if Germany, like the rest of Europe, was to recover.

Hazel

[WilliamRev]

I find myself reading and re-reading Terraine's books: they are staggering good, and I remember hearing that the late Richard Holmes had a huge admiration for Terraine's writing and sheer breadth of knowledge. To Win a War is simply wonderful in the way that it unites the politics and the conflict in the final year of the war and gives a clear understanding of how the armistice agreement proved so unsatisfactory. I feel that Terraine really gets to the heart of the relationship between Haig and Lloyd George in this book (and also in his books "The Western Front" and "Douglas Haig - the Educated Soldier", both of which I highly recommend),

As Phil says, Terraine's "Impacts of War" is an excellent book - in it he refines the arguments of his previous books and (among many other fascinating points) shows afresh how Lloyd-George deliberately excluded Haig and his colleagues from various essential committees (such as the Cabinet Committee on Manpower which essentially determined that the army should be very low in the list of who had priority over the allocation of manpower), and constantly sought to undermine Haig. Even after the war Lloyd-George in his memoirs was ever "one of the most skilled assassins of other men's reputations" - Terraine hits the nail on the head once more.

I am about to start reading his book on Mons, after which I think I will have read just everything he wrote on WW1, and I will have to start reading them all again....

William

[phil andrade]

There was also, of course, the Bolshevik menace, and a very real fear that anything that diminished Germany would render Central Europe- and, by extension - the World at large, more vulnerable to the onslaught of Communism.

I feel uncomfortable trying to cast judgement on the wisdom or folly of the people charged with making peace. How could we begin to imagine the difficulties they faced ?

You might see where " I'm coming from " though....a man reconciled to the massacre of the best part of one million men from the British Isles as a price worth paying for the defeat of German militarism seems very far sighted when he assesses the momentousness of the cause ; he seems rather myopic when he countenances the prospect of humiliating the foe that had brought such misery on the world.

I can't make up my mind about that man. Just as well, I suppose....

Phil (PJA)

[WilliamRev]

In which case, Phil, I would not only recommend Terrain's book on Haig (which I do - he skates over superfluous biographical stuff, and gets to the heart of Sir Douglas as a soldier and the way in which, tasked with winning the war, he went about it in an all-out manner, but then advised a sympathetic treatment of the defeated foe) - but also Brian Bond and Nigel Cave's "Haig A Re-appraisal 80 years on" which contains essays which take Terraine's championing of Haig as a starting point, and develop arguments both for and against him. Another excellent book.

William

[Old Tom]

Phill,

When Haig assumed the appointment of Cin C BEF he had been a Corps and Army commander for a period in which the BEF had, to state the obvious, retreated from Mons, taken part in the Marne, defended Ypres and had launched offensives. At that stage , with his cavalry/optimistic temprament, he may have considered that victory at a high cost was acceptable. In November 1918 he had experienced the Somme and 3rd Ypres and was well aware that manpower was limited and might well have considered that further large losses while achieving unconditional surrender were not worth it. It the event his change of mind proved to be justified.

Also, with regard to Pershing, the book makes it clear that the US Army, although up to infantry strength, relied on mainly French artillery and British horses. Its logistics were not working well. An early thrust into Germany was, perhaps, wishful thinking.

Old Tom

[phil andrade]

But the point is Haig's prediction did prove correct. It's not as if the cost that his fighting incurred transcended anything he had imagined, inducing a change of heart. What he predicted was what he got.

Perhaps it was actually slightly worse than decimation, but he was more or less right.....he had attained the battlefield victory at the price he reckoned with, and then - to put it crudely - dropped the baton, rather than pass it on to the Americans and let the team cross that line.

Was Pershing keen to press on and finish the job ?

I know that I'm being very sweeping here, and would not wish to enter the lists as a denigrator of DH.

Phil (PJA)

[Old Tom]

Phil,

You comment on Haig and Pershing. As far as Haig is concerned I will let the matter rest. As far as Pershing is concerned I believe Terraine's view was that the US army, alone, was not in November 1918 capable of 'crossing the line' which I assume means pushing the German army to a surrender in the field. I think Pershing wanted the allies to 'cross the line' with the US forces playing a major part.

I think one should bear in mind that the US Army was growing, in numbers, at a very high rate. But, in terms of effectiveness was at an early stage. I recall reading that US divisions were about twice the size of European divisions largely because they had too few generals. Pershing had sufficient infantrymen to allow him to form an Army but lacked qualified formation HQ staff and support arms and services. At least that is what Terraine was saying.

Old Tom

[David Ridgus]

There was also, of course, the Bolshevik menace, and a very real fear that anything that diminished Germany would render Central Europe- and, by extension - the World at large, more vulnerable to the onslaught of Communism.

I feel uncomfortable trying to cast judgement on the wisdom or folly of the people charged with making peace. How could we begin to imagine the difficulties they faced ?

Phil (PJA)

Phil

Share your discomfort in the company of Margaret MacMillan. Her book "Peacemakers" is terrific. A hugely entertaining read about the extraordinary cast of characters who assembled in Paris in1919, as well as a minute dissection of their solutions to the problems they faced.

David

[phil andrade]

Yes, that book made its impact on me, too, David....especially as it's written by DLG's great grand daughter !

Phil ( PJA )

[Marilyne]

I see this is an old thread, but having just finished Terraine's magnificent book, I thought I'd give my thoughts on it. 

As already said somewhere else, I bought this book (2008 Cassell edition) in Ypres one day and had completely forgotten I had it until I started looking for something else and that one fell out of the mess that is my - FAR TOO SMALL - book case. I'd been looking for books on the last 100 days and voilà... there was the first one. 

Mostly everything has been said on it, but I particularly like Terraine's way of making it all sound so logic and simple. as an introduction to 2018 operations, a complete overview without going too much into details, it's a great book. What is also very good about Terraine's approach, in my point of view, is that he does not take sides on who did well and who did not. and of course his take on the political implications (both during the battle as during the deliberations for the armistice later on) are spot on. 

Last but not least, I think that Terraine is the first author I encounter (I maybe have much to learn still) that clearly sais that the Americans were absolutely not ready for this and blundered from one battle into the other... that they even managed to achieve something sounds like a miracle... 

what I'm missing is of course a bit more on the northern part, the collaboration with the Belgian army, but... there is only so much one can put in a book. 

Thank you, Mr Terraine, for another great read! 

 

Marilyne