Maxse and Montauban

[delta]

I have recently come to learn of the success of Gen Maxse's Division at Montauban; does anyone know of a good history of the man and his methods?

[Charles Fair]

Delta, you could try:

1. The biog of Maxse by Sir John Baynes "Far From a Donkey" which was published about 10 years ago.

2. The history of the 18th division.

3. There is a useful summary of why 18 and 30 Divs on the right flank of the British were successful on 1 July 1916 on pp 180-182 of "Command on the Western Front" by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson. This book has just been republished in paperback.

I am sure that Peter Simkins has also written about Maxse and 18 Div too, but cant find it.

[Robert Dunlop]

I would endorse Charles' recommendation re 'Far From a Donkey' (ISBN 1 85753 185 X).

In addition, the Battleground Europe series includes 'Montauban' by Graham Maddocks (ISBN 0 85952 579 9). This gives a nice summary on the formation and composition of the 18th Division and some details of the attack on Montauban.

The attack on Montauban included 30th Division as well. The two divisions were operating as XIIIth Corps, under the commander of Lieut-General William Congreve, VC, whose son was later killed in the battle to take Delville Wood (he was also awarded the VC). XIIIth Corps was meant to have five divisions but Rawlinson recommended that it be down-sized to two. Just before the battle, and in light of the importance of capturing Montauban and then, in subsequent days, pushing on past it, the 9th (Scottish) Division was added to XIIIth Corps OOB. It remained in reserve on 1st July, 1916. Terry Norman gives an account of this in his book 'The Hell They Called High Wood' (ISBN 0 85052 986 7).

18th Division's success must be seen in the context of XIIIth Corps as a whole, with the Corps' neighbours - the French 39th Division of Balfourier's XXth Corps on the right and 7th Division of the British XVth Corps on the left flank.

Success in a battle such as this depended on several things:

1. Surprise - the Germans knew that an attack was imminent. The prolonged preparatory bombardment was a clear indication of this, though the exact date/time was not known. I believe that the German Army Group Command for the Somme did downplay the potential threat to their left flank, despite warnings from the commander of the Montauban sector. The German defenders included 'the 12th Division, elements of the 10th Bavarian Division and some of the 28th Reserve Division'. According to the British Official History:

'The 6th Bavarian Reserve Regiment (10th Bavarian Division) held the Somme to the Montauban-Carnoy road, with the 63rd (opposite the French) and 62nd Regiments (12th Division) in support; and the 109th Reserve Regiment (28th Reserve Division) from that road to Mametz (inclusive). Attempts had been made on the night of the 30th June/1st July to relieve the 109th by the 23rd Regiment (12th Reserve Division) but, on account of heavy fire, only 1 1/2 companies had got up to the line, the others remaining at Montauban.

2. Wire cutting - this appears to have been very successful, at least on 18th Division's front.

3. Suppressing the enemy infantry and machine gun posts until the last possible minute - the artillery barrage for the morning concentrated on the front line and then lifted in stages to prearranged lines further back.

4. Getting to the enemy infantry and machine guns as fast as possible - this was achieved through destruction of the wire and through digging Russian saps. The latter were tunnels through No Man's Land that allowed the attacking soldiers to get within 20 yards of the German defenders before coming above ground. The German 62nd Regiment headquarters staff were captured through the speed of the attack.

5. Preventing the German counter-barrages - this was especially important because of the destructive power of artillery. XIIIth Corps counter-battery work was excellent. The German artillery batteries were largely neutralised and the response was minimal. This situation was greatly helped by the co-operation with the French XXth Corps, whose 240mm mortars played an important role in support of XIIIth Corps. A heavy mortar shell had penetrated into and destroyed a German artillery command post in Montauban. Another similar calibre mortar round had also penetrated one of the deep German infantry dug-outs, killing the occupants. Fraser-Tytler's book 'Field Guns in France' gives an account of the artillery support on the British right flank. He commanded a British howitzer battery.

From the British Official History:

'The artillery of both 12th and 28th Reserve Divisions suffered greatly in the preliminary bombardment, and more seriously still on the 1st July. According to one reliable history, the German batteries in the valleys north of Mametz and Montauban were destroyed with the greater part of their ammunition, and very few guns could be withdrawn to the second position. The official monograph goes into some details:

On battery of the 12th Division had lost a gun on 30th June.  Gradually, the other three were put out of action.  Another lost two guns before midday.  The other two followed in the afternoon.  In a third battery, two were lost and, in a fourth, all the howitzers became gradually unserviceable.  The greater part of the other batteries of the Group had considerable losses.  Their fighting power fell off more and more.  In the 28th Reserve Division the batteries had suffered severely in the artillery battle, and could give up little assistance.  A great number of the guns were smashed up.  Particularly the batteries in the Caterpillar Valley had lost numerous guns.  When the British attacked, there were only ten field and thirteen heavy batteries in readiness [four of these were completely unserviceable by midday], and these had numerous unserviceable guns.

The British artillery fire on the 1st July in this part of the field is described as "devastating" (verheerend).'

6. Support from the flanks - 7th division did not reach its objectives for 1st July. It did manage to capture and neutralize Mametz, which could have enfiladed 18th Division's attack otherwise. The French 39th Division was successful in achieving its objectives, in part through excellent artillery support (85 heavy batteries compared with the German's 8) and in part through the use of fire-and-move tactics developed during the fighting at Verdun. The French soldiers advanced in small groups, not long lines/waves as per the British. The influence of the French on the success of the British right flank is often overlooked.

7. Sound infantry tactics - here Maxse's influence comes to the fore. He was a great believer in training, training, training, as was Congreve. 18th Division, notably 54th Brigade, had a tougher time getting forward through troublesome MG nests but these were outflanked, partly as a result of pressure from the left flank of 30th Division in support of 18th Division.

8. Rapid consolidation - especially in light of the German propensity to immediate counter-attack. The German defenders were severely mauled on the first day (109th Reserve Regiment lost 42 officers and 2,105 other ranks. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Regiment lost 35 officers and 1,775 men) and their command & control was severely disrupted. Some counter-attacks were forthcoming. XIIIth Corps is sometimes criticised for taking the opportunity to get further forward. What it did do, in part thanks to the excellent counter-battery work, was achieve consolidation of the positions gained.

[Chris_Baker]

Those interested can read an article on the attack and capture of Montauban here

[delta]

Many thanks for the prompt replies - lots of new lines to follow. Excellent

[duckman]

XIII Corps success is relative, of course. Could they not have done much more to exploit their early morning successes?

Thoughts?

Duckman