The Murdoch Program BBC2!

[Gardenerbill]

There was a very interesting program about Keith Murdoch (Rupert's father) and his famous Gallipoli letter last night on BBC2. I know a little about the Gallipoli campaign, so I wondered what the regular Gallipoli posters made of it?

[Steven Broomfield]

Recorded said programme last night but not watched it yet.

[Mark Hone]

If you ever see the old Aussie TV mini-series 'Anzacs', which mixes real and fictional characters, Keith Murdoch features rather prominently.

[Guest]

I watched it.I thought it was excellent and watched it again. Very balanced and the original motive force of Ashmead-Bartlett was not glossed over. It could have benefitted from fewer banjos and folk tunes and more talking heads in the shape of the historians who have researched this episode. Some of their contributions were cut down to one-liners. I thought Max Hasting was a good choice as one of the talking heads - as a journalist-turned-historian who has seen a few wars and reported on them, he spelled out the journalists' definition of truth.

A well crafted drama-documentary. MG

[Moonraker]

Interesting balance of opinions, though I would welcome further views on how much Murdoch embellished the facts.

Interesting too that the BBC screened it, not Sky!

Moonraker

[PhilB]

Was that actually Ian Hamilton live talking?

[Gareth Davies]

Yes.

[Moonraker]

Wikipedia tells us that at the age of eighty-one,Hamilton was filmed as part of a war documentary film called Forgotten Men. I assume that Gareth's clip is from that.

Moonraker

[bruce]

Ayesha and I have just watched this, and enjoyed it.

The was a fair balance of talking heads, and the views reinforced our thoughts of Ferlinghetti to Gallipoli.

For those who regularly criticise leadership in the Great War, I would love to hear how things should have been done differently.

One of th implied criticisms in the programme is the landing by rowing boat. Since the only previous occasion when an amphibious landing was attempted went tolerably well, albeit the good people of Clacton were less likely to fire at troops than the Turks, how else could we have landed the troops?

It was also nice to see that there was mention of the French.

At the Cenotaph yesterday, we had National anthems of GB, Australia, New Zealand and Turkey......but no French anthem.

Bruce

[Kitchener's Bugle]

I loath Rupert Murdoch but brought myself to watch it...................I enjoyed it and learned quite a bit from it.

Bruce, an interesting comment was made when it was stated that the landings were planned in 33 days whilst D-Day took 2 years!. I know the circumstances where different of course but another point was made in that no Army had ever been landed on a beach in a large force against a well set defence of machine guns.

Another point well made was that at Suvla the objectives where not well communicated. For Some units the bay landing was in chaos, having been made in pitch darkness which resulted in great confusion with units becoming mixed and officers unable to locate their position or their objectives. Remember 20,000 British began landing at Suvla, they were opposed by only 1,500 Ottoman soldiers - good odds you would have thought.

[Guest]

Another point well made was that at Suvla the objectives where not well communicated. For Some units the bay landing was in chaos, having been made in pitch darkness which resulted in great confusion with units becoming mixed and officers unable to locate their position or their objectives. Remember 20,000 British began landing at Suvla, they were opposed by only 1,500 Ottoman soldiers - good odds you would have thought.

I think the problems were not related to the communication of objectives. The diaries of the 10th (Irish) Div and 11th (Northern) Div indicate the Operation Orders for Suvla are quite clear about objectives for the first day. The problem at Suvla was one of leadership and its inability to react to changing circumstances.

The New Army spearheaded the assault and the leadership of was simply not up to the task. The old adage that no plan survives the first shot rang very true on 7th Aug 1914. Enthusiasm among the rank and file and some determined leadership at battalion level could not offset the paralysis at Brigade, Divisional and Corps level. Leaders with initiative and drive - such as that displayed by the CO of the 11th Manchesters (11th Div) in the initial 24 hours - made determined progress across some brutal terrain (KTS ridge in this instance), followed by equally determined efforts by units of the 10th (Irish) Div. Poor maps were not the issue, as the terrain of Suvla and the KTS and Kavak Tepe-Tekke Tepe ridges are quite obviously vital ground. Unless those features were secured the position of the troops in the Suvla basin would become untenable. This was recognised at the time. Most competent military commanders would immediately understand the importance of securing the high ground to protect the bridgehead. It is not difficult terrain to read. The problem at Suvla was on the 8th when initial efforts were becoming exhausted, leadership at Brigade and Div level lost focus and lost all momentum. 34th Inf Bde commander (Sitwell) had lost his nerves after a shell exploded close to him. In the words of one eyewitness he had 'gone ga-ga' had a nerous breakdown prior to the war and there was speculation he had not recovered. Another Brigadier (Haggard, 32nd Inf Bde) was wounded early on, The 11th Div commander Hammersley was unfit in poor health with diarrhoea. He was relieved in all senses of the word on 23rd. He was only outdone by Mahon (Comd 10th (Irish) Div) who resigned in a fit of rage on 15th Aug when de Lisle was promoted over his head. Criminally irresponsible.

Capt Coleridge's (Gen Staff Officer 3) report of the 8th when he walked the whole perimeter of the Suvla basin unmolested and observed the inertia, was very telling. 'Golden opportunities are being thrown away'. He was quite clear in conveying the objectives. The leaders on the ground were simply not up to the task. There is extensive correspondence between staff officers present on that day and Aspinall-Oglander (author of the OH and also present) discussing these aspects when the OH was written. The OH does not pull its punches on this phase. There are other eyewitness accounts from people such as Rettie (RA) who vents his anger and frustration over the paralysis in correspondence to the OH author. The Gallipoli diaries and CAB 45 are packed with post-war correspondence that show widespread realisation of what needed to be done by people who were there on the ground but not senior enough to grip the situation. On the 8th, Hill 10, Chocolate Hill/Green Hill, and Scimitar Hill were occupied (all objectives of 11th Div Op Order) and patrols stood on the top of Tekke Tepe ridge unmolested. Had these positions been exploited and consolidated by troops loitering less than a mile away, things might have been slightly different. The best part of an Army Corps (20 battalions) was on the ground less than a few miles distant. In less than 2 weeks 98% of the battalion Officers and two thirds of the ORs at battalion level would have become casualties trying to re-secure the objectives that they had simply neglected to consolidate on the 8th. By the 9th the Turks had occupied the heights as well as Scimitar Hill ans Ismail Oglu tepe (W Hills) and stopped the advance along the KTS ridge. The rest is history. MG

Col Malcolm (GSO 1 11th Div) is worth reading in detail. He wrote a 10,000 word assessment of Suvla which Coleridge (SO 3 at the time) annotated and added remarks*. It formed part of the 11th Div war diaries in the old days when you could download a whole divisions worth for £3.50. I have transcribed this document and done some detailed cross referencing with other correspondents with the OH historian. Malcom and Coleridge concurred on almost every aspect and much of the content formed the foundations for large parts of the OH.

* "Unfortunately the local commanders were not equal to the emergency".

MG

[Steven Broomfield]

I have the same view of Mr Murdoch as Mr Bugle, but I have just watched the programme, and thought it jolly good.

And, in re Sir Ian Hamilton, is there a nicer badge than the officers' badge of the Gordon Highlanders?

[Gareth Davies]

I have the same view of Mr Murdoch as Mr Bugle, but I have just watched the programme, and thought it jolly good.

And, in re Sir Ian Hamilton, is there a nicer badge than the officers' badge of the Gordon Highlanders?

Queen's Own Highlanders?

[David Filsell]

It's rarely mentioned but the much criticised 'Hunter-Bunter' wrote a pre landing report opposing the Gallipoli operation.

[Steven Broomfield]

Queen's Own Highlanders?

Bit fussy - in three parts it looks like too much has been slapped in.

[Guest]

It's rarely mentioned but the much criticised 'Hunter-Bunter' wrote a pre landing report opposing the Gallipoli operation.

Any Idea where this report is hidden? I would be interested in reading it. There are some interesting views in the OH correspondence on the viability of the landings - most after the fact. One thing that has always troubled me is that very few regulars with experience of the APril landings participated and many mistakes were repeated.. ...MG

[Robertwolves]

Watched programme thought it was very good and balanced. Used a wide cross section of respected commentators. An interesting topic to consider is do we in the England under estimate the impact the Australian and Canadian armies had during the great war. For example Australian and Canadian forces were the attack troops on 8th August 1918 the 'back day of the Germany Army'.

[Guest]

I think they could have substituted the rambling musical interludes with more content and commentary from the academics. Jenny MacLeod's writings on Gallipoli are incisive*, yet her role in the programme was reduced to a few one-liners reading headlines from old newspapers. A missed opportunity. Some of the AUtralian academics had some very interesting perspectives which drew in the Australian political dimension which I would have loved to have learned more about. Also, the contrast in approaches between Bean and Murdoch might have been worth exploring too. Both contributors to the ANZAC legend but with quite different methodologies. I had no idea Murdoch supported the idea of Australian conscription or was so tight with the Australian premier or indeed had brothers serving in the AIF.

I thought the dramatisation was quite powerful and very well done. I was left with a much more sympathetic view of Murdoch and his motives. It left me wanting to read more on him. I also began to understand the political motives behind the ANZAC legend as a way of changing (should that read levelling?) the relationship between Australia and Britain. The pen is mightier than the sword. All most fascinating. MG

* her book Reconsidering Gallipoli has a chapter on the journalists response and covers Murdoch in some detail.

[Tom Wales]

Aren't you being a little harsh about the background music - two mentions already? Did it really replace other content?

[Norrette]

He was only outdone by Mahon (Comd 10th (Irish) Div) who resigned in a fit of rage on 15th Aug when de Lisle was promoted over his head. Criminally irresponsible.

I'd love to know what went on, on the 15th. My great grandfather's record shows that on that day he was reprimanded for refusing to obey an order from an officer and for insolence to an officer. He was in the 10th Divisional pioneers and fell the following day.

[Guest]

Aren't you being a little harsh about the background music - two mentions already? Did it really replace other content?

No.

Yes.

I am only trying to think of ways they could have expanded the content of the many academics interviewed. Give me professors of military history over droning folk- musicians any day. If the prog was limited in time, what could be sacrificed? I find the folk-music rather annoying at any time, and especially when spliced into military history; inaccurate in its narrative*.The minstrels' droning seems the obvious cut to make way for more content from people who know what they are talking about. A personal choice. MG

* tin hats at Gallipoli apparently.

[Kitchener's Bugle]

Thanks Martin for your comments and observations..........appreciated.

This I previously read on the Dublin Fusiliers site......it mentions them ariving in theatre without any maps....hence my previous comment about commuications/objectives. I know that in general the maps that where available where sourced prior to the war and obsolete.

http://www.dublin-fusiliers.com/battaliions/7-batt/compaigns/suvla-bay.html

The article is quire informative.

Regards

KB.

[bigbill]

Apparently, Murdoch spent only five days at Gallipoli, and gathered all his information and impressions in that short space of time. He must have been buzzing about like a demented bee.

[Guest]

Thanks Martin for your comments and observations..........appreciated.

This I previously read on the Dublin Fusiliers site......it mentions them ariving in theatre without any maps....hence my previous comment about commuications/objectives. I know that in general the maps that where available where sourced prior to the war and obsolete.

http://www.dublin-fusiliers.com/battaliions/7-batt/compaigns/suvla-bay.html

The article is quire informative.

Regards

KB.

Understanding Suvla is quite important as its failure sealed Hamilton's fate. I would argue it was lost on 8th-9th August, some six weeks before Murdoch's letter. By the time Murdoch's letter was written, offensive action had all but ceased and the supply of fresh manpower and materiel stopped. His letter was dated 23rd Sep and the last (and costliest) offensive was 21st Aug 1915. Had the British secured the heights at Suvla on 8th Aug - something I think the British had the resources to do - I wonder if Murdoch's letter would have had the same impact. Murdoch's letter was written in the aftermath of acknowledged failure.This aspect was touched on by one of the Australian academics.

Murdoch's dual objectives appear to have been to apportion blame while absolving the Australians. His negative comments on British red-tabs are particularly interesting.

One might consider that Murdoch's letter simply reflected some reasons behind a failure that was already understood and acknowledged - but not openly discussed - and Hamilton's dismissal was already an inevitability. The timing of Murdoch's letter might not have been a factor in Hamilton's dismissal, which is one of the central themes of the film.

MG

Edited.

[Guest]

Ashmead Bartlett's letter here