Which Gallipoli book?

[northstar]

Browsing in Waterstones Manchester today - couldn't decide. Any suggestions on which of the following I should go for?

Gallipoli by...

Alan Moorhead

Richard van E + SC

Peter Hart

Not sure how they compare so any comments would be appreciated.

Thanks,

Steve.

[BFBSM]

Steve,

If you have the money all three! If not:

Peter Hart's is an excellent start for an excellent overview, with content including participant views. For more participant content of greater length, Emden and Chambers. For an etremely easy read, Moorhead, which does have quite a few errors within.

Mark

[northstar]

Thanks, Mark. To be honest it's Peter Hart's I'm tempted by, but good to get your opinion. Appreciate your reply.

[Guest]

All the above are interesting and well researched, however the Official History (OH) is very hard to beat and now available free online. Interestingly few modern authors have attempted to dismantle the OH, and I think this is because the author did a remarkable job. I would strongly suggest reading it first before reading any of the modern interpretations. According to the person who has researched the OH writings in detail (Andrew Green in his PhD) the author of the OH (Aspinall-Oglander) did an exceptional job compared to other British OHs. Bean's Australian OH is very different but worthwhile too. Gallipoli was well served in the 1920s and 1930s.

For a more thought provoking view, I would suggest 'Reconsidering Gallipoli' by Jenny MacLeod. It is really only worth reading after one has read the books on your list. I found it the single volume that challenged my preconceptions the most.

The Australian authors tend to be understandably over-focused on ANZAC. The least understood parts of Gallipoli are Suvla, the Kitchener Battalions (only one of the three Divs had a history and possibly one of the most biased ever written) in particular the 13th Div's contribution sacrifice at ANZAC is a large blank spot in most modern histories. They do not have a written history and most books on Gallipoli barely give them a mention. British troops in an ANZAC formation seemed to have fallen between two stools. One might say the same about the Australian contribution at Helles.

[northstar]

Thanks Martin, interesting information and food for thought for my reading! . Really appreciate you taking the time to reply.

[northstar]

L A Carlyon?

[gilly100]

Tim Travers book should be on your list as well.

Ian

[Kitchener's Bugle]

An excellent book for the whole campaign and how it is put into perspective.

[Anneca]

Without a doubt I would recommend Stephen Chambers "Suvla - August Offensive". I have read it more than once and will do again. Another book marking the Centenary of the campaign I have tremendously enjoyed is "Gallipoli" (The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers' Words and Photographs) by Richard Van Emden and Stephen Chambers. It contains vivid personal accounts written by soldiers on both sides with amazing photographs taken by servicemen, many unpublished previously.

Anne

[MikeyH]

Ordered a copy of Peter Hart's book online a couple of days ago, look forward to reading it.

Anyone else following 'A long way to Tipperary'. which is the University of Limerick's on line account of the Great War, via the insightful and fascinating correspondence of one Irish family, the Armstrong's? Currently up to week 71 with Pat Armstrong an officer in Gallipoli. Also covers life on the home front.

Just Google it.

Recommended.

Mike.

[WilliamRev]

Gallipoli - the End of the Myth by Robin Prior is excellent, and reflects some of the latest academic thinking.

William

[clarke]

I'd have to agree with William, Gallipoli - The end of the Myth by Robin Prior. An informative and interesting read.

Clarke

[Guest]

Prior makes some very basic mistakes. Page 192 for example he has 32nd Inf Bde as a 10th (Irish) Div unit whereas in fact it was part of 11th (Northern) Div. His account of the disorganisation at the Suvla landings is overdone in my view and his criticism of the dispersal of some of the New Army formations at Helles prior to the landings at Suvla completely ignores the value of hardening the troops in Battle - something that the surviving officers were keen to stress in later correspondence with the Historical Section. He also quotes Robert Rhodes James on Gallipoli who wrote one of the poorest books on the subject. James' book was written in 1962 a few years before the war diaries were released - consequently it had very limited access to critical information. James' personal description of Suvla plain is odd to say the least: "The plain is scored with deep fissures ..... unexpected ridges". Which rather stretches the imagination. Why it was used as reference material is a mystery.

Prior also claims that Nibrunesi point was taken with ease. If one looks at the casualty toll that day the survivors might have differed in their view. The Yorkshire Regt lost 60% of its Officers and a third of its men in less than a few hours in this operation. According to Prior the objectives of the 30th and 31st Infantry Brigades (10th Irish) Div on the morning of 7th Aug were KTS ridges which is at odds with some of the facts: the 6th R Inniskilling Fus war diary clearly records orders at 07:00 on 7th Aug to attack Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hill). Ditto 5th Royal Irish Fus (both 31st Inf Bde), which they carried out. (both incidentally 31st Inf Bde). In fact all four of the 31st Inf Bde's battalions plus two battalions of the 30th Inf Bde advanced on Chocolate Hill that morning, and only the 6th and 7th Bns RMF advanced along KTS to relieve the 11th Manchesters that morning.... etc etc.

He also has the 53rd and 54th Divs involved in the attacks on W Hills, Scimitar Hill and Hill 60 on 21st Aug, something they didn't do.

While the broad narrative on the 'big picture' is interesting the detail on occasion diverges from the primary source material. This is why it is worth reading the OH first, or at the very least read the OH in parallel. In order to write a detailed assessment of Gallipoli it is necessary to wade through a mass of diaries (there were over 200 major units there). I suspect many modern authors do not have the time or energy to do this. The authors of the OH of course did have the time and energy and corresponded at length with the survivors - something modern authors can't do - which is why the OH remains a key foundation stone in any attempt to re-assess the campaign. One of the challenges with Gallipoli is that the OH did such a good job*, it is difficult to find new thematics and consequently lots of material is recycled again and again. In more recent years new personal accounts have been unearthed which add considerable detail, however these require the context of the campaign for better understanding.

MG

The war diaries and CAB 45 files at TNA have dozens of letters from surviving Officers complimenting Aspinall-Oglander on writing such an accurate and honest (read critical) account. The lengthy correspondence with Staff Officers such as Coleridge and Malcolm as well as long personal narratives from a few Brigade commanders were quite key. Aspinall was of course a Staff Officer and had a ring-side seat. The only caveat is that he was forced by the British Govt to re-write his ANZAC chapters lest the Australian and NZ Govts were offended. The first draft has never come to light. MG

[David Filsell]

Martin is certainly correct about the two vols of Official History - but I still rate Morehead very highly

[WilliamRev]

In May 2015, Prof John Bourne gave a Western Front Association lecture: "Gallipoli 1915; the Faded Vision" at Wolverhampton University; he said that he thought that, on the whole, the best book so far on Gallipoli is Robin Prior's (which I mentioned above), but that he thought that the definitive history has still to be written, especially since there are a huge number of Turkish war diaries and other documents which have yet to be properly studied and assimilated into our understanding of the campaign.

William.

[Guest]

In May 2015, Prof John Bourne gave a Western Front Association lecture: "Gallipoli 1915; the Faded Vision" at Wolverhampton University; he said that he thought that, on the whole, the best book so far on Gallipoli is Robin Prior's (which I mentioned above), but that he thought that the definitive history has still to be written, especially since there are a huge number of Turkish war diaries and other documents which have yet to be properly studied and assimilated into our understanding of the campaign.

William.

Did Bourne expand on why he thought this? My views would be diametrically opposite.

Prior attempts to cover in 250 pages something that took two Official Historians ten times as many pages. I would argue that it is a physical impossibility to distill Gallipoli into a single volume and do it justice. Only Travers has attempted to do this in fewer pages. Trying to compress Gallipoli into one volume is challenging. It defeated the OH Britsih author and the OH Australian author and Peter Hart has had at least two attempts. Publishers in the modern age will limit authors in page count etc.

Suvla was arguably the most important phase given it was the last throw of the dice and included the single largest battle and the end of offensive action - Prior condenses this into just 20 pages, and as pointed out earlier is simply riddled with small errors.

Narratives ex appendices, indeces etc....page count:

Prior...............................252

Carlyon..........................661

Hart ...............................507

Steel & Hart...................422

Travers .........................229

Moorhead......................362

OH Vol I.........................365

OH Vol I.........................486

OH Vols I & II..................851

OH Aus Vol I................. 897

OH Aus Vol II................ 910

OH Aus Vols I & II........1,807

...and that is without the Turkish accounts......... MG

[northstar]

Many thanks for your replies so far with such sound & knowledgeable comments.

[hazelclark]

I started out with Hart's first book about Gallipoli, and now want to read something else. I tried to find the Aspinall O.H. online but could only come up with the Australian (Bean) History. Could someone please tell me how to access this? I do have Ian Hamilton's Diaries and the Travers' book, neither of which I have read as yet. The rest of what i have is Anzac based.

Thanks,

Hazel

[Guest]

OH Gallipoli Vol I

Maps

[MaureenE]

The FIBIS Fibiwiki page Gallipoli has links to a number of online books, including the OH mentioned above

http://wiki.fibis.org/index.php/Gallipoli.

Volume 2 of the OH is available on a restricted basis on the Hathi Trust Digital Library. I think you would need to belong to a participating University to be able to access it.

Cheers

Maureen

[hazelclark]

Thanks both of you!.

Hazel C.

[WilliamRev]

Did Bourne expand on why he thought this? My views would be diametrically opposite.

Prior attempts to cover in 250 pages something that took two Official Historians ten times as many pages. I would argue that it is a physical impossibility to distill Gallipoli into a single volume and do it justice. Only Travers has attempted to do this in fewer pages. Trying to compress Gallipoli into one volume is challenging. It defeated the OH Britsih author and the OH Australian author and Peter Hart has had at least two attempts. Publishers in the modern age will limit authors in page count etc.

Suvla was arguably the most important phase given it was the last throw of the dice and included the single largest battle and the end of offensive action - Prior condenses this into just 20 pages, and as pointed out earlier is simply riddled with small errors.

I have no doubt that Martin is completely right in pointing out the minor errors of detail in Prior's "Gallipoli the end of the myth". But Prior is not particularly concerned with a detailed description of the campaign, which has been done with varying degrees of success by others - rather he examines why it was that the campaign came about; in particular how Churchill's plans for naval actions in the west were thwarted by the navy, so as a back-up plan he proposed bombardment of the forts in the Dardanelles, and how this plan gained a momentum of its own as it turned into an invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula. He doesn't load all of the blame on Churchill, but Churchill, Kitchener, Lloyd-George and (especially) Asquith were all in the mix, and the role played by Fisher was bizarre.

As always with the First World War, things are more complex and nuanced than some people would like them, but Prior concludes that the Gallipoli campaign was not "a good plan that was spoiled by poor generalship and inadequate resources". Rather, it was a poorly-planned enterprise that had almost no chance of success from the start, despite the great bravery of the Allied troops, and even if it had been successful, then it wouldn't have shortened the war by a single day.

William

[aussiesoldier]

G'day,

Researching my college's Anzac Day speech I had occasion to read two books that attempted to describe the Turkish point of view, both interesting reads.

Defending Gallipoli. The Turkish Story, Harvey Broadbent, Melbourne University Press, 2015. He had unrivalled access to Turkish archives and is highly complimentary of Turkish efforts to stand their ground despite being vastly outnumbered.

Gallipoli. The Turkish Story, Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Basarm, and Hatice Hurmuz Basarm, Allen & Unwin, 2003.

To read from the Turkish point of view of their preparations and responses to the various invasions gives new insights into the reasons behind the various failures.

Hope this helps.

George

[michaeldr]

even if it had been successful, then it wouldn't have shortened the war by a single day.

Ludendorff appears to disagree – see his “My War Memories” pages 174/5

“If the enemy fleets, by occupying the Straits, had commanded the Black Sea, Russia could have been supplied with war materials of which she stood in such need. The fighting in the East would then have assumed a much more serious character. The Entente would have had access to the rich corn supplies of South Russia and Rumania and would have persuaded this kingdom to to yield to its wishes even sooner than she actually did. Russia's communications with the outside world for the transport of war materials were, at that time, via the Trans-Siberian railway, along the Murman coast, to which the railway from Petrograd was still under construction, and far from completion, and, in summer, by the White Sea. The traffic through Finland with Sweden was important, but the latter would not permit the transport of war material. Sweden interpreted the duties of a neutral State correctly. These details clearly show the importance of the Straits, and therefore of Turkey, for the Eastern Front, and our whole military position.”

[my emphasis]

The Russian front and the numbers of Central Powers forces which it held down, can be seen for what they were worth, when one looks at what happened in March 1918, as those same Central Powers forces were now freed to go to face the French and the British empire in the west.

[Guest]

As always with the First World War, things are more complex and nuanced than some people would like them, but Prior concludes that the Gallipoli campaign was not "a good plan that was spoiled by poor generalship and inadequate resources". Rather, it was a poorly-planned enterprise that had almost no chance of success from the start, despite the great bravery of the Allied troops, and even if it had been successful, then it wouldn't have shortened the war by a single day.

William

Nothing in the summary of Prior's thoughts is new. It is not cutting edge and the ideas of 'poor generalship and inadequate resources' have been flogged to death since Nevinsons's dreadful history. This is simply recycling what has been understood and accepted for at least 70 years, and enshrined in the OH. Similarly the ideas it was poorly plannedand had no chance of success is nothing new. I'm struggling to find anything in Prior's book that is ground-breaking.

Speculation on what should have/could have/would have happened doesn't really add much. It implies that there is some magic formula that pre-determines the outcome. A game of chess or a hand of cards is what mathematicians call a deterministic system; one that has exact possible outcomes that can be calculated. These are rare. In the real world and in war we have what mathematicians call non-deterministic systems; the outcomes are not limited and can not be calculated. The idea that anyone can argue the war would have been shortened (or lengthened) by the non-deterministic outcome of the Gallipoli campaign is purely speculation and nothing more. It is meaningless. I am pretty sure Prior didn't claim this but if he did he simply doesn't understand some very basic concepts and confuse speculation with facts. They are very different things that carry very different weight in any debate. MG