1/3 2/3 Rule

[Gareth Davies]

Did the 1/3 2/3 rule exist in 1914? If not, what were the guidelines for commanders with regard to how much of the overall amount of time available they should use for planning and how much they should give to their subordinates?

[Old Tom]

Not heard that one before. It brings to mind another 'Time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted'

Old Tom

[Gareth Davies]

Time spent in reconnaissance is indeed seldom wasted. But the time that such things as reconnaissances take need to be factored in to higher commanders' plans, hence why the 1/3 2/3 rule is so important.

[John_Hartley]

What's the 1/3, 2/3 rule, please?

[Guest]

Did the 1/3 2/3 rule exist in 1914? If not, what were the guidelines for commanders with regard to how much of the overall amount of time available they should use for planning and how much they should give to their subordinates?

No.

None in any of the relevant manuals I have seen. I don't believe it was anything that was considered in 1914. The implicit assumption was that there would always be sufficient time. I would suggest posting on a Victorian War Forum to see if it was relevant in the Boer War. even if it was, some of the Boer War lessons had been forgotten by 1914.

If the 1914 diaries are any guide, there is not a single piece of evidence to support the idea of allowing sufficient planning time one level, two levels down. Arguably one of the catastrophic failures of the 1914-15 period.

The classic example is Brig Gen Kenna VC who ordered his men to attack the enemy. When asked where they were he said he did not know but pointed in a general direction. 18% casualties ensued for zero gain. Not his fault as both levels above him equally had no idea. This happened a year after war was declared suggesting the concept of battle preparation (yes I know a modern term) was non-existent. MG

[Gareth Davies]

What's the 1/3, 2/3 rule, please?

When a higher headquarters is planning an operation, it should only take up 1/3 of the time available with its own planning and briefing. It should allocate 2/3 of the time available to the level below.

For example, Div HQ is planning an operation that is due to start in 36hrs time. It should have completed its planning and have delivered orders (at an O Gp most likely) to the Bdes. Bdes will have 24 hrs for their planning and briefing of which they should only take up 8 hrs, giving 16 hrs to the Bns. Ans will take up just 5hrs and 20 mins planning and briefing, thus leaving 10 hrs 40 mins for Coys.

[Gareth Davies]

No.

None in any of the relevant manuals I have seen. I don't believe it was anything that was considered in 1914. The implicit assumption was that there would always be sufficient time. I would suggest posting on a Victorian War Forum to see if it was relevant in the Boer War. even if it was, some of the Boer War lessons had been forgotten by 1914.

If the 1914 diaries are any guide, there is not a single piece of evidence to support the idea of allowing sufficient planning time one level, two levels down. Arguably one of the catastrophic failures of the 1914-15 period.

The classic example is Brig Gen Kenna VC who ordered his men to attack the enemy. When asked where they were he said he did not know but pointed in a general direction. 18% casualties ensued for zero gain. Not his fault as both levels above him equally had no idea. This happened a year after war was declared suggesting the concept of battle preparation (yes I know a modern term) was non-existent. MG

Thank you. Another thing to go on my very long list "must investigate further" list.

[Old Tom]

It is not surprising that the principle did not exist in WW1, although I think it might have been beginning to emerge towards the end. I have the impression that in the early stages planning at the BEF/Army level was in too great detail thus not allowing div/bde scope to apply their essentially greater knowledge of the local situation. I have thought that this because the higher formations considered they were more competent. If this is the case it would conceal the need to allow time for lower formations and hence the rule may have been a consequence. However I suspect it is much later.

Old Tom

[Gareth Davies]

I think you are right. Thank you.

[charlesmessenger]

This rule certainly did not exist per se during my soldiering days. I suspect that it is a very late 20th century innovation. I think, though, that the principle certainly formed part of World War 2 battle procedure and that at least during the Last 100 Days in 1918 something like it was being employed instinctively. It is worth looking at the preparations for 8th August 1918 (Amiens) to see it operating.

Charles M

[Ron Clifton]

I have never come across references to such a rule in my WW1 research, but I don't know if it is covered in FSR. Of course, written orders would often have followed oral briefings, and any subordinate commander worth his salt would have drafted plans for attack and defence specific to his location anyway.

You also have to bear in mind follow-up orders issued in the evening (often very late) for continuing, or breaking off, the actions of the previous day. Such orders would also have to be cascaded down the chain of command.

The Appendices to the British Official History contain a few divisional and brigade orders, often issued by telephone or telegraph and almost invariably quite short. I have a copy of a Corps order for the First Battle of the Scarpe which I transcribed, and with minimal tweaking and a still-readable font size, I managed to get it all on one pge of A4.

Operational orders for such dates as 1 July 1916, or for the use of tanks at Flers and Cambrai, are much more detailed but would certainly have been drafted and probably issued a good while in advance. It was routine procedure to describe operations in terms of "Z day" or "H hour" in the orders, the actual date and time being advised closer to the start time.

Ron

[Gareth Davies]

This rule certainly did not exist per se during my soldiering days. I suspect that it is a very late 20th century innovation. I think, though, that the principle certainly formed part of World War 2 battle procedure and that at least during the Last 100 Days in 1918 something like it was being employed instinctively. It is worth looking at the preparations for 8th August 1918 (Amiens) to see it operating.

Charles M

I think I remember it from the 1980s.

[Gareth Davies]

I have never come across references to such a rule in my WW1 research, but I don't know if it is covered in FSR. Of course, written orders would often have followed oral briefings, and any subordinate commander worth his salt would have drafted plans for attack and defence specific to his location anyway.

You also have to bear in mind follow-up orders issued in the evening (often very late) for continuing, or breaking off, the actions of the previous day. Such orders would also have to be cascaded down the chain of command.

The Appendices to the British Official History contain a few divisional and brigade orders, often issued by telephone or telegraph and almost invariably quite short. I have a copy of a Corps order for the First Battle of the Scarpe which I transcribed, and with minimal tweaking and a still-readable font size, I managed to get it all on one pge of A4.

Operational orders for such dates as 1 July 1916, or for the use of tanks at Flers and Cambrai, are much more detailed but would certainly have been drafted and probably issued a good while in advance. It was routine procedure to describe operations in terms of "Z day" or "H hour" in the orders, the actual date and time being advised closer to the start time.

Ron

Thanks Ron. I may be wrong but the options open to a lower level commander were few and far between in 1915 - mid 1918 and so Coy and Pl plans didn't require a huge amount of original thought in terms of effects and event schematics. What they required were primarily control measures.

[Gareth Davies]

A little digging brought me to this thread which doesn't answer my specific question but it does help understand Great War Battle Procedure.

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8073

[Guest]

A little digging brought me to this thread which doesn't answer my specific question but it does help understand Great War Battle Procedure.

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8073

The one detailed example I can think of was staggered evacuation of the troops at Gallipoli. The planning and execution was done in extremely fine detail. Orders were effectively issued days before, with the actual date not filled in. This allowed the troops concerned to prepare in the days ahead. There are hundreds of pages of Operation Orders, movements, coordination tables, checkpoint tables, march orders, embarkation schedules etc. It went like clockwork.

MG

[Gareth Davies]

It was used as an example of good planning when I did JDSC in the early 1990s.

[Stoppage Drill]

Perhaps the closest you will get is FSR 1909 Ch II Pt 12 (Operation Orders).

https://archive.org/stream/pt1fieldservicer00greauoft#page/26/mode/2up

[Gareth Davies]

Almost, it's in Pt 13 - Issuing of Orders on page 32. "Superior orders must be issued in sufficient time to enable subordinate commanders in turn to frame and distribute their own orders. In the case of a scattered force this may take a considerable time".

Thank you Mr Drill.

[MikeMeech]

Hi

At the RAF and Tank Corps Conference held at Advanced Tank Corps HQ on 1 September 1918, Major Leigh-Mallory commanding No. 8 squadron RAF (the Tank Support Squadron) complained that he was getting very short notice of operations that were to take place. Elles, GOC Tank Corps replied that he "suffered from the same thing". Elles had given his Brigades and Battalions instructions to give Mallory notice of every operation. However, he thought that it would be a good thing "for us to get GHQ to issue a letter to Armies asking that Corps may inform Mallory direct in the event of small operations". Indeed Mallory's phone contact number was given to them so the process of informing him was speeded up, therefore giving a bit more planning time.

We should remember that during the 100 days much of the battle was 'speeded up' and more use was made of 'verbal' rather than 'written' orders, this meant senior officers going forward to brief units to what was wanted. Full and detailed written orders can only be possible for 'set piece' battles, if the command is reacting to events or opportunities then other means had to be used.

It should also be noted that although the battle planning for Amiens on the 8 August 1918 was detailed and done in advance the pilots and observers of 8 Sqn. were not informed of the detail of the operation until the afternoon of the 7th. That was to maintain secrecy and would apply to other lower formations as well.

Mike