The Grand Deception: Churchill and the Dardanelles

[Crunchy]

A review article of the late Tom Curran's book The Grand Deception: Churchill and the Dardanelles http://www.sydneyreviewofbooks.com/the-grand-deception/

[Guest]

Excellent Chris. thank you for that. and very interesting indeed.

Mike

[Guest]

Thanks. Very interesting. He writes extremely well. I bought the kindle version on the back of this recommendation. Thank you.

The Author/Editor of the book in question make an interesting point on the Hankey files as critical evidence but this is not new. Hankey's memoirs - based on the same files and his personal diary - had been published in 1961 under the two-volume title "The Supreme Command 1914-1918". The volumes are split into 7 parts and 83 short chapters. Part IV "The Dardanelles Committee" includes an account of his own visit to the Dardanelles during the campaign and his subsequent report. Hankey's volumes are essentially the long hand minutes from these meetings. He provides very detailed accounts of the discussions over the Dardanelles and quotes all the key participants. For anyone interested in British strategy during the war, it is essential reading.

Hankey's memoirs will not be a revelation to most military historians of this period given Supreme Command has been in print for 55 years. The quote in the review from the 'magnum opus' file was in fact in print in 1961 in his 'Supreme Command' pages 265-266....word for word;

"The meeting now seemed to be drawing to an end. The War Council had been sitting all day. The blinds had been drawn to shut out the winter evening. The air was heavy and the table presented that rather dishevelled appearance that results from a long sitting … Churchill suddenly revealed his well-kept secret of a naval attack on the Dardanelles! The idea caught on at once. The whole atmosphere changed. Fatigue was forgotten. … Churchill unfolded his plans with the skill that might be expected of him, lucidly but quietly and without exaggerated optimism".

Supreme Command is listed in the bibliography so it is slightly puzzling why this particular quote was highlighted. Also Churchill's false claim that a War Cabinet meeting took place on 5th January should be no revelation. Supreme Command recorded all the meetings and the gaps between meetings.

Edit 1. The reviewer has got it slightly wrong. The quote is from Supreme Command, not the files.

Edit 2. The reviewer writes;

Even so, Curran points out in another startling discovery that it was still Churchill who was the driving force behind the military invasion. A long-standing Dardanelles Commission finding, repeated by many historians, was that, since no War Council meetings were held between March 19 and May 14 it is not possible to ascertain the exact date following the failure of the naval attack, on which the troop landings at Gallipoli was decided. The Grand Deception tells us that finding was ‘erroneous’.

A short, informal, but legal War Council meeting attended only by Asquith, Churchill, Kitchener and Hankey did take place on 6 April, ‘to consider the questions of the military attack on the Dardanelles now being prepared in Egypt’.

My underlining. This should not be 'startling' or a 'discovery'. The quote at the end of the snippet is attributed to the Hankey papers however it also comes directly from Supreme Command page 300. Hankey described the meeting in considerable detail. The reviewer is slightly over-enthusiastic about the author's 'discoveries'. Closer examination suggest most of these have been in print for over half a century.

Edit 3. The author/editor have mistaken Vice-Admiral Carden's telegram that Churchill read out to the War Council on 5th January and was 'heard with great interest'. The author/editor claim this was Carden's cautious view of 5th January. Clearly Churchill's memory for dates was false and as pointed out the meeting happened on the 13th January - recorded in detail by Hankey. The previous day Vice-Admiral Carden had sent a second telegram dated 12th January outlining in detail a 1908 Admiralty assessment on how to force the Straits. This report was circulated by Churchill on 12th with positive reactions and was discussed on 13th at the War Council meeting on 13th recorded in detail in Supreme Command by Hankey.. This eventually formed the basis of the plan and it was this more positive telegram of 12th Jan that Churchill read out and was 'heard with great interest' not the telegram of 5th Jan quoted in the book. Both telegrams are shown in Churchill's World Crisis 1915. The only 'discovery' is that Churchill mistakenly recorded the meeting happening on the 5th rather than 13th. All other aspects in both Churchill's and Hankey's accounts concur.

Despite the observations above, I suspect there is deep value in the book is pulling together a variety of sources to tell the story. Hankey's accounts did the same and it will be interesting to see exactly what new ground is being broken in this book. Regardless, it is nice to see that this aspect of the Dardanelles is being aired again. [Edited]

Hankey pulled no punches in 'Supreme Command'. The primary material in CAB might be more openly critical than the book, however the example above demonstrates some of the quoted the evidence is in fact nothing new. When his memoirs were published the primary war diary and cabinet papers had not been released to the public. John F Naylor also wrote a detailed biography of Hankey "A Man and an Institution: Sir Maurice Hankey The Cabinet Secretariat and the Custody of Cabinet Secrecy" in 2009 and Roskill's "Hankey: A Man of Secrets" Vol I was written in 1971. Both use his papers as primary source material.

Hankey had a ring-side seat at all the critical Government meetings and War Cabinet meetings during the war. It is a fascinating read and I am sure would be of interest to anyone who has read the book under review. MG

Hankey's papers and correspondence are spread across a number of institutions, primarily the Churchill Archives Centre Cambridge and the National Archives UK. Some useful links:

https://history.blog.gov.uk/2012/05/01/maurice-hankey-architect-of-modern-government/

http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/813

http://spartacus-educational.com/FWWhankey.htm

https://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0014%2FHNKY

Edited.

[Resurgam13]

As the author of a book covering similar ground to Curran’s, I take exception both to the claims made for his work and to the treatment of my own.

I do not see that Curran has broken any new ground, as a quick reading of the footnotes will indicate. As he, himself, notes in Chapter 7, many of the participants published Cabinet documents wholesale, and most of the material has been widely available since the 1960s.

Curran (or his Editor) makes great play of the discovery of a crucial factor underpinning “The Great Deception”, which turns out to be the fictitious War Council meeting of 5 January 1915.

Curran does acknowledge Lynn Curtright (“Muddle, Indecision and Setback”) for first mentioning this fact, which is limited to one sentence in her 1986 monograph. Buried in a footnote, Curran then adds that I make “a passing reference to this phantom War Council meeting” in my own 1997 work “Straits : British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign” and leaves it at that.

My “passing reference” runs to a number of pages and was, I believe, the first account placing this in context. Indeed, it is in the matter of context that Curran appears to me to be deficient, as he all but ignores the Balkan element, which is crucial in considering the “Drift to the Dardanelles”.

As we cover more-or-less the same ground in reasonable detail, though coming to slightly different conclusions, I might have expected my book to be discussed in Curran’s final chapter, “Literary influences: the ‘Battle of the Books’ ”, a survey of Dardanelles’ literature from 1923 to the present, but it is curiously absent throughout, rating only two mentions in footnotes.

The chapter on Fisher’s Resignation seems an afterthought and the final impression is of someone who had already made his mind up about Churchill.

[Guest]

Curran (or his Editor) makes great play of the discovery of a crucial factor underpinning “The Great Deception”, which turns out to be the fictitious War Council meeting of 5 January 1915.

Curran does acknowledge Lynn Curtright (“Muddle, Indecision and Setback”) for first mentioning this fact, which is limited to one sentence in her 1986 monograph. Buried in a footnote, Curran then adds that I make “a passing reference to this phantom War Council meeting” in my own 1997 work “Straits : British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign” and leaves it at that.

My “passing reference” runs to a number of pages and was, I believe, the first account placing this in context. Indeed, it is in the matter of context that Curran appears to me to be deficient, as he all but ignores the Balkan element, which is crucial in considering the “Drift to the Dardanelles”.

The reviewer describes it thus: "In a masterstroke of forensic research Curran reveals that this 5 January War Council meeting ‘is pure fabrication’; it did not take place."

Is simply the case that Churchill made a mistake on the dates? 5th for 13th?. His description of the meetings and what was discussed is largely supported by Hankey's account i.e Churchill presents the Naval option based on Carden's telegram and the 1908 plan. Curran/The Editor seem to imply the confusion over dates 'pure fabrication' and a deliberate attempt to deceive. To what end? I cant see what advantage Churchill gains by claiming the meeting happened a week earlier. It seems a simple error of dates and nothing more; a trivial matter that had no implications for the blame game for the Dardanelles. The World Crisis 1915 goes to great lengths to show the telegrams in question and gives them verbatim in the text.

[Resurgam13]

Apologies for the length of this reply, from Chapter 23 of "Straits":

. . . Fisher, though, would not be diverted. Replying to Churchill the same day (4 January) he agreed that Borkum offered great possibilities, but it was purely a military question whether the island could be held;[1] on the other hand, the ‘Naval advantages of the possession of Constantinople and the getting of wheat[2] from the Black Sea are so overwhelming that I consider Colonel Hankey’s plan for Turkish operations vital and imperative and very pressing.’[3] Then, at one minute to four on the afternoon of Tuesday 5 January, came the ‘bombshell’ when Carden’s reply was received in the Admiralty:

With reference to your telegram of 3rd instant, I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships.[4]

Carden would later admit: ‘I did not mean distinctly that they could be forced. I had it in my mind that it was impossible to form a real opinion on the subject until one had destroyed the outer forts at the entrance, and was able to get inside and actually find out the extent of the gun defences of the mine field and the extent of the movable armament on both sides of the Straits.’[5] Churchill would subsequently declare that this answer to his inquiry was ‘remarkable’. Indeed, the relevant chapter in The World Crisis is heavily slanted and no more so than in the episode of Carden’s telegram and the prevailing opinion within the Admiralty. Attempting to lay the groundwork for his defence, Churchill maintained that Carden’s reply was immediately shown to the War Council ‘that afternoon…[and] was heard with extreme interest.’ Then, returning to the Admiralty, Churchill had a conversation with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson (acting in an advisory capacity) who reviewed the idea of extended operations favourably and who had also written a memorandum that day which, however, Churchill was unable to read until ‘some days later’.[6]

The truth was somewhat different: Churchill’s later account was incorrect as the War Council did not meet until Thursday, 7 January, two days after the receipt of Carden’s reply. Furthermore, there is no indication that Churchill divulged the contents of Carden’s reply at that meeting, nor on the following day.[7] Indeed, it was not until the meeting of 13 January that Churchill referred to an interchange of telegrams between the Admiralty and Carden, the gist of which was that, while the forts could not be rushed, they might be demolished one by one.[8] This error in relation to the alleged meeting of the War Council on the 5th which, if it had been true, would have meant of course that he had not had sufficient time to peruse Admiral Jackson’s far more cautious written appraisal, was conveniently made by Churchill in The World Crisis and has been perpetuated in subsequent accounts,[9] including the official biography:

…All future plans [Martin Gilbert has written] depended upon the view of the Admiral on the spot. When Carden’s reply arrived early on the afternoon of January 5 it surprised everyone at the Admiralty…The War Council met later that afternoon…Kitchener pressed his colleagues for action at the Dardanelles. Churchill was able to give some support to Kitchener’s appeal by reading out to the War Council the telegram which he had received from Carden an hour before…[10]

Carden’s telegram did not arrive ‘early on the afternoon’ of the 5th but at one minute to four. There was no Cabinet or War Council that day.[11] Asquith, in fact, spent part of the late afternoon on a ‘solitary drive’ after which he called in at the Athenaeum, where he wrote a ‘little note’ to Venetia Stanley, before then going on to dine at the Admiralty where Churchill was still pressing for the Northern option.[12] The reason why Churchill was so keen to disguise the timing will become apparent when Admiral Jackson’s memorandum is considered. Following the discussion in the Admiralty that evening, Asquith declared that the alternative objectives now numbered four: ‘(1) Schleswig (Winston) (2) Salonika or Dalmatia (Ll. George…) (3) Gallipoli & Constantinople (Kitchener) (4) Smyrna & Ephesus (F.E. [smith] & others — I rather like this)’.[13]

Churchill testified to the Dardanelles Commission that, in addition to sending the initial telegram to Carden on Sunday 3rd, he also ‘put the same question verbally to Sir H Jackson’ who, while deprecating an attempt to rush the Straits ‘spoke of the considerable effects of the brief bombardment of 3 November, and the possibilities of a gradual step-by-step reduction of the fortresses.’ The C.O.S., Vice-Admiral Oliver, purportedly shared ‘much the same view’.[14] After giving this oral opinion, Jackson went away to compose his memorandum, which was ready by 5 January. The result – his Note on forcing the Passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus by the Allied Fleets in order to destroy the Turko-German Squadron and threaten Constantinople without Military Co-operation[15] – painted a far more pessimistic picture than the one he had previously given in conversation with Churchill. Examining both a scheme for rushing the passage and one for a methodical bombardment, Jackson found some degree of fault with both: the latter would

entail the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition and wear of heavy guns, and also some losses, but it would enable the attacking squadron to replenish before making the passage and to start fair from the ‘Narrows’ and expend much less ammunition during the last rush, and then be in a better position to engage the enemy naval forces. It may reasonably be expected their forces would endeavour to meet our squadron as it emerged from the Straits into the Sea of Marmora, before we had time to reform in that sea and recover from the effects of the fire of the batteries. To arrive off Constantinople with depleted magazines and ships almost out of action from gun fire, and with shore batteries still intact both in front and rear, would be a fatal error, and tend to annul the effect of the appearance of the squadron as soon as its real state was known...

As bad as this sounds, it was, according to Jackson, at least more promising than a rush. Before attempting a rushing operation it would be ‘most desirable that the guns mounted in the defences at the entrance be entirely demolished’ which would necessitate a much more determined attack than the November bombardment, including the landing of demolition parties to destroy the outer guns. During this phase of the operation some losses would have to be expected. With the outer forts silenced, armoured ships could then enter the Straits ‘subject only to fire from Field Artillery, and damage from mines and torpedo attack’! Mine sweeping would be hazardous and should be conducted on a foggy night only after all the outer guns had been ‘permanently silenced’ while, overall, ‘the attack should be as much of a surprise as possible’. This rushing approach would result, Jackson calculated, in the complete elimination through battle damage of an entire battle squadron of eight ships; therefore, the attempt could only be made by two battle squadrons so that, once the first was eliminated, the second might get through ‘with much less damage’. Behind this, there would then have to be two cruiser squadrons. Even if a proportion of these ships managed to survive the passage and proceeded to Constantinople, Jackson was forced to concede that, while the capture of the city would be worth ‘a considerable loss’, a bombardment by itself ‘would not greatly affect the distant military operations; and even if it surrendered, it could not be occupied and held without troops…’[16]

When queried about this memorandum at the hearings of the Dardanelles Commission Churchill stuck rigidly to his story: it had not come before him, he maintained, till ‘some days afterwards. I remember thinking, well that is less favourable than the impression I had from the conversation [on the 3rd].’[17] It almost beggars belief that Churchill waited some days before reading Jackson’s document; that aside, his insistence that he did not see it immediately was crucial to his attempt to excuse his subsequent actions. At a quarter to two on the afternoon of Wednesday, 6 January – that is, the day after Jackson had completed his less than sanguine memorandum but, supposedly, before the First Lord had seen it – Churchill signalled Carden: ‘Your view is agreed with by high authorities here. Please telegraph in detail what you would think could be done by extended operations, what force would be needed and how you consider it should be used.’[18] Churchill’s ‘high authorities’ consisted of no other than Jackson and Oliver, the former of whom now clearly recognized the difficulty of the operation. Fisher himself, who denied seeing Churchill’s telegram, maintained that ‘I should have objected to that, and asked him [Churchill] to word it in some other way. Naturally Carden would think I was in it, would he not?’[19] Although the sending of this telegram by Churchill would appear to undermine the contention that he was not seriously interested in the Dardanelles operation, yet at the War Council on the following day Churchill steadfastly pressed for the northern option.[20]

To explain this, it would be necessary to assume that, by the 6th, Churchill’s opinion of the merit of the Dardanelles operation was more or less identical to that expressed in a contemporary Admiralty minute: the value would be ‘almost exclusively limited to the moral effect produced by the operations, since the material results would be small and of a very temporary nature in the absence of larger land forces to confirm the success, and at present no troops are available for the enterprise.’[21] Then, perhaps surprised by Carden’s cautiously optimistic reply, he continued to promote planning for the Dardanelles scheme while pressing for immediate operations in other areas; and, having finally put the Dardanelles plans in motion, Churchill himself was swept along by the momentum he had inadvertently generated. It is important to remember that Churchill’s position, despite Asquith’s support, was by no means secure. The Navy’s record under his leadership since the start of the war had not been particularly edifying. Minor triumphs, such as the Battle of Heligoland Bight, had been more than offset by the escape of Goeben and Breslau, the loss of Audacious, the sinking of Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue in a single morning, the disaster at Coronel, and the bombardment of Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool. The one undoubted victory — at the Falkland Islands — was due to Fisher. Then, on New Year’s Day, 1915, the pre-dreadnought Formidable, was torpedoed and sunk in the English Channel.

Churchill desperately needed a victory, somewhere, to cement his position; for the same reason, he could not afford to alienate Fisher. In a letter to Sir John French on 5 January (which he decided not to send) Churchill outlined the competing schemes:

…Discussion here has turned rather to looking for other theatres of war: for the employment of the new armies. Some point to Emden & Wilhelmshaven & the direct invasion of Germany there, others to Schleswig Holstein with the consequent opening of the Baltic & the exposure of the Baltic shore to Russian oversea attack. Competing schemes turn to the capture of Constantinople & an advance via Belgrade from Constantinople & Salonika; or to an invasion of Austria from the Adriatic shore. There is a general feeling that a condition of stalemate has been reached in France and Flanders — certainly in Flanders: & that we ought not to play the German game by incurring very heavy losses in driving them (if we can) from one entrenched position to another. Nothing is decided: but this view is very strongly held. The war council is to meet on Thursday. Before anything is settled I shall press that you should come over to some later meeting. Of course if there were good prospects of a fruitful offensive in Flanders or on the French front, that would hold the field. But I fear that the losses would not be repaid by gains, except perhaps along the coast; & that is not the job it was…[22]

Could it be that here, in this unsent letter, are the first signs of Churchill’s change of heart? That, at this time, while he continued to investigate the northern options most of which, it now appeared, would involve heavy casualties, he was first attracted by the siren call of what he assumed would be a relatively bloodless victory at the Dardanelles? Carden’s telegram, according to Churchill, ‘offered a prospect of influencing the Eastern situation in a decisive manner without opening a new military commitment on a large scale...’[23]

Then, on the morning of Thursday 7 January, as Churchill wrestled with the various options, a message was received in the Admiralty from Paris. This message has gone largely, if not wholly, unnoticed in the accounts of this momentous week and, but for the coincidence of timing, perhaps deservedly so; however, in what could only be termed a meaningful coincidence,[24] on the very morning of the first War Council convened to discuss the strategic alternatives, Churchill was now privy to the following information:

from French Naval Attaché to Marine, Paris, forwarded to Admiralty…An intercepted telegram from Constantinople states that Goeben has been in collision with 2 Russian mines close to the Bosphorus and sustained serious damage. The time required for repairs is estimated at 2½ months.[25]

The information was correct.[26] Goeben, the bane of Churchill’s war-time tenure at the Admiralty, and the putative defender of Constantinople, was now a sitting target. The first stipulation of Jackson’s memorandum had been that the allied squadron must arrive off Constantinople ‘in sufficient force to engage the enemy squadron’; if, however, the enemy pushed forward with the intention of engaging the allies as they emerged from the Straits into the Sea of Marmora, the chances were that the allied fleet would arrive off Constantinople ‘with depleted magazines and ships almost out of action from gun fire.’ Now, instead, a priceless window of opportunity presented itself: without Goeben the Turkish fleet was reduced to a motley collection of elderly battleships of variable quality, and a number of cruisers all of which (with the exception of Breslau) had had their frailties exposed by the torpedoing of Messudieh. Any attempt to force the Dardanelles from early January to late March could be commenced safe in the knowledge that Goeben could not interfere.[27]

The War Council which convened in the Cabinet Room at noon on Thursday 7 January commenced with a discussion on ‘The Defence of London Against Airships’ before moving on to consider ‘The General Policy of the War’ which, despite the grand sub-heading in the minutes, involved little more than a rejection of French’s plan for an operation against Zeebrugge. Support for this scheme was forthcoming only from Churchill, which was hardly surprising as he was the co-author of the plan and was in constant private communication with French.[28] Discussion then moved on to consideration of the Borkum operation which would be difficult, Churchill admitted, but not insuperably so; in any case ‘A large amount of detailed work would be required before the plans were ready.’ In Fisher’s opinion this would take two or three months. The operation was approved in principle, subject to a feasibility study.[29]

Lloyd George tried, unsuccessfully, to broaden the debate to encompass the strategic options outlined in his own memorandum but his turn would come the following day when he pushed for an attack on Austria — only to be then met with fierce criticism. Kitchener in particular quashed the idea by reading French’s letter on the futility of subsidiary operations.[30] Any attempt to assist Serbia in her struggle against Austria while, in French’s opinion, ‘the least objectionable of any possible proposal’, depended entirely on a friendly Greece and strictly neutral Bulgaria; however if Italy deviated from neutrality the whole force would be threatened. Kitchener had done his homework well — the War Office had prepared a preliminary examination of the southern options from which Kitchener declared:

The Dardanelles appeared to be the most suitable objective, as an attack here could be made in co-operation with the Fleet. If successful, it would re-establish communication with Russia; settle the Near Eastern question; draw in Greece and, perhaps, Bulgaria and Roumania; and release wheat and shipping now locked up in the Black Sea.

Hankey himself (not unexpectedly, but somewhat unconstitutionally) joined in to point out the benefits accruing from the operation, while Kitchener added that ‘150,000 men would be sufficient for the capture of the Dardanelles, but he reserved his final opinion until a closer study had been made.’ Lloyd George, piqued that his grand strategic plan had been rejected, ‘expressed surprise at the lowness of the figure.’ Kitchener then went on to advocate a subsidiary attack on Alexandretta to strike at Turkish communications: this ‘minor but useful operation’ would require 30,000 to 50,000 men.[31]

Churchill’s reaction to all of this is of interest for, while agreeing fully that the Dardanelles and Alexandretta operations should be studied, he continued to press strongly for action in Northern Europe, particularly if Holland could be induced to enter the war. The advantages flowing from this action, he asserted, ‘would far outweigh those of the Mediterranean’. Churchill also raised once more the question of possible operations against Zeebrugge, advocating this time that they should take the form of a naval attack to try to reduce the menace from German submarines operating from that port. However, although the conclusion reached was that the Admiralty should proceed if the operation could be accomplished ‘without excessive risk’, Fisher went on the record as saying that the results would not justify the danger involved.[32] . . .

[1] It was just as well that no one asked for Richmond’s opinion: the acerbic Assistant Director of Operations recorded in his diary: ‘It is quite mad. The reasons for capturing [borkum] are NIL, the possibilities about the same. I have never read such an idiotic, amateur piece of work as this outline in my life. Ironically enough it falls to me to prepare the plans for this stupendous folly. Yet Sea Lords like Wilson (for he is in effect a Sea Lord) enter no protest. It remains with the army, who I hope will refuse to throw away 12000 troops in this manner for the self-glorification of an ignorant & impulsive man.’

[2] Hankey, it would be fair to say, had a fixation about the economic potential of naval warfare. Fisher’s reference to wheat makes it clear he was being tutored by Hankey.

[3] Fisher to Churchill, 4 January 1915, WSC Comp. vol. III, pt. i, pp. 371-2.

[4] Carden to Churchill, no. 10, 5 January 1915, PRO Adm 137/96.

[5] Proceedings of the Dardanelles Commission, qu. 2332, PRO Cab 19/33.

[6] Churchill, The World Crisis, p. 325.

[7] Churchill later asserted that, at the War Council at which he read out Carden’s telegram, ‘the question of an attack on Turkey and a diversion in the Near East was one of the principal subjects discussed.’ [World Crisis, p. 325] No such discussion took place at the War Council on 7 January; however, the following day, there was talk of a diversionary attack. Nevertheless, the minutes show no indication of Churchill mentioning Carden’s telegram. On the contrary, after Lloyd George had put forward his “Southern Austria” scheme and Kitchener had pronounced upon the Dardanelles and Alexandretta, Churchill (according to Hankey) ‘fully agreed in the proposal to study the suggested operations in the Mediterranean. He urged, however, that we should not lose sight of the possibility of action in Northern Europe.’ Churchill had ample opportunity, following Kitchener’s lead, of divulging Carden’s reply; instead, he kept his secret. Minutes of the War Council, 8 January 1915, PRO Cab 42/1/12 [my emphasis].

[8] Minutes of the War Council, 13 January 1915, PRO Cab 42/1/16.

[9] For example, James, Gallipoli, p. 28; Steel and Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli, p. 10; Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, p. 43. Hickey, Gallipoli, p. 43 confuses the War Council meeting of the 8th with that of the 13th.

[10] Gilbert, Winston S Churchill, vol. III, p. 237.

[11] Hankey conceded that the Grand Duke’s appeal was, ‘one might think, of sufficient importance to require a special meeting of the War Council.’ But it was the old bugbear — the weekend — as the appeal had arrived on a Saturday when ‘the War Council could only have been collected at short notice with some difficulty.’ Hankey, The Supreme Command, vol. I, p. 253.

[12] Asquith to Stanley, 5 January 1915, Asquith Letters, no. 248, pp. 360-1.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Dardanelles Commission, Statement by Churchill, PRO Cab 19/28.

[15] A copy of the memorandum can be found in PRO Adm 137/96.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Proceedings of the Dardanelles Commission, qu. 1131, PRO Cab 19/33.

[18] Churchill to Carden, no. 4, 6 January 1914, PRO Adm 137/96.

[19] Proceedings of the Dardanelles Commission, qu. 3120, PRO Cab 19/33.

[20] Minutes of the War Council, 7 January 1915, PRO Cab 42/1/11.

[21] Considerations affecting the passage of the Dardanelles, unsigned Admiralty minute, PRO Adm 137/96.

[22] Churchill to French, 5 January 1915, WSC Comp. vol. III, pt. i, p. 379. This letter might have remained unsent as Churchill was probably only too well aware what French’s reaction would be to such unpalatable advice.

[23] Churchill, The World Crisis, p. 325 [my emphasis].

[24] See “Synchronicity: an Acausal Connecting Principle” in, Carl Jung, Selected Writings, (London, 1983), pp. 339-41.

[25] Marine, Paris to Admiralty, 7 January 1915, PRO Adm 137/96. Goeben’s battle damage from her encounter with the Black Sea fleet had been repaired by early December and she was pressed into service later that month to help escort troop transports to Trebizond in support of the Turkish offensive. Returning from this duty Goeben ran over a Russian minefield on 26 December; two mines exploded under the ship causing considerable damage and extensive flooding. Repairs this time would be lengthy and it was not until 3 April 1915 that the battle cruiser was again seaworthy. Nekrasov, North of Gallipoli, pp. 36-7.

[26] Report of Admiral von Usedom, January 1915, PRO Cab 45/215. It was thought that the mines Goeben encountered were not set deliberately by the Russians, but had broken loose; nevertheless von Usedom admitted the evident superiority of Russian mines which had ‘compelled us to greatly extend the zone within which a channel had to be cleared.’

[27] This applied also to Russian Black Sea operations. Despite having a ‘comparatively small naval force’ Nicolson informed Hardinge on 3 February that ‘as the Goeben is evidently seriously ill [Russia] has pretty well command of the Black Sea.’ Nicolson to Hardinge, 3 February 1915, Nicolson mss., PRO FO 800/377.

[28] Hankey, The Supreme Command, vol. I, p. 260.

[29] Minutes of the War Council, 7 January 1915, PRO Cab 42/1/11.

[30] Already quoted in part, see above.

[31] It will be remembered that, on 2 January, Kitchener had asserted that ‘Alexandretta has already been tried and would have no great effect a second time.’

[32] Minutes of the War Council, 8 January 1915, PRO Cab 42/1/12.

[Guest]

Thank you. Most interesting.

Does it extend to comment on Carden's telegram of 12th outlining the 1908 plans?

MG

[Resurgam13]

Carden's plan is mentioned in the following chapter (the entire text is freely available online).

[Guest]

Carden's plan is mentioned in the following chapter (the entire text is freely available online).

Many thanks.

That is my weekend's reading sorted out. If anyone needs the link it is here click

[Guest]

Also some interesting documents available free at the National Archives, if you can read read the writing? Click

Mike