HUNTER BUNTER

[David Filsell]

I put this review up on the British Command Style on the Western Front thread. In view of the lack of publicity for this book though it might be worth putting it here as well for the readers amongst

 

THE HUNTER HUNTED

Elaine McFarland

A Slashing Man of Action: The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston MP, £32.00, Peter Lang, paperback, 336pp, 10 ills, 4 maps, bibliog., notes and refs, index ISBN 978-3—o343-0290-6 

I have stood at the rim of Hawthorn crater and heard Lieutenant-General Air Aylmer Hunter Weston damned by others as the prototypical donkey. I have read much the same. He has become the operatic villain of British Great War Generalship, the buffoon, the military commander who, it has been claimed, when saluting the glorious dead in a trench line, actually raised his arm to a sleeping drunk. Yet although he remains the subject of anecdotal criticism from subordinates which have damned him, his long military career has never merited a biography, never been analysed in detail, despite the fact that his copious personal records, letters and analyses remain intact.

 

Elaine McFarland, Professor of History at Glasgow Caledonian University has had full access to her subject’s vast cartulary. If not a total analysis of HW the soldier, the result is valuable, her authorship crisp, authoritative and objective, which lends better understanding and greater sympathy to her toward her subject than anything on Hunter-Weston since Elizabeth Balmer’s overview of the Generals critical pre-landing expectations on the misadventure of Gallipoli.

 

A Slashing Man of Action, displays H-B’s loquaciousness, his theatricality - similar to tone and action Montgomery’s - and his increasing tendency toward what is now termed ‘micro-management’. Yet despite the much quoted comment “What do I care about casualties”, his devotion to getting the job done - and to the men he commanded, and his belief in them - is clear throughout the book. In offering what I consider a more rounded view of ‘Hunter-Bunter’ than offered hitherto, she, wisely, leaves readers to draw their own conclusions about the man in the round.

 

It is rarely even recorded that as a student at “The Shop”, and in passing Staff College H-B became an “educated soldier” - both a sound Royal Engineer and staff officer. He gained a reputation for decisive in action in both the Indian sub continent and in the Boer War. Like most senior commanders - not least Gough and Capper - he also believed in the vital importance and positive values of offensive spirit, of high morale and strived for both in all his commands. Equally it is now clear that he was he became a sound trainer of the formations he commanded and enjoyed a strong commitment to new military technology.

 

Hunter-Weston’s rapid rise from command of brigade to Corps Commander underlines the early confidence of his superiors. His performance on the Aisne was generally judged sound and competent. (Haig thought highly enough of him after the inevitable disaster of Gallipoli to plan the later discarded proposal for a British seaborne invasion of Belgium.)

 

It becomes hard to do other than accept the strictures which he faced in the disastrously misconceived Gallipoli operation – weak planning, impossible logistic support, lack of artillery and ammunition, largely inexperienced troops and poor commanders facing a competent foe defending his homeland. It remains a fact that his corps’ corps operations on the Somme were disastrous – if actually little more so than others. He was aware that he had a tough nut to crack, concerned about the strength of the defences his Corps faced, of the inadequacy of artillery support and its preparatory bombardment and the overreach of operations on July 1^st, their objective 4,000 yards from the British trenches. Faced by Haig’s inflexibility he bowed to the demands dictated to him willing himself to retain unjustifiable optimism.

 

Hunter-Weston performance on July 1^st 1916 was little better or worse than that of most Corps commanders. However, no work on him can evade discussing the reputational scar created by the early blowing of the 400,000 lb Hawthorne Mine. The author notes that her subject was refused permission blow it at 6.00 pm the previous evening as he had requested to create uncertainty about intentions amongst the Germans. Yet, while he accepted responsibility for the decision to blow the mine at 7.20 am in a letter to the Official Historian, others fled theirs. Even the official historian “... found it difficult to get to the bottom of the issue”. Equally, it should not be forgotten that in 1918, while a member of Parliament, in 1918 commanding a corps fighting a more mobile war, his performance gained little criticism.

 

Whatever his overall competence at Gallipoli and on the Somme Hunter-Weston faced particularly difficult circumstances, planning, command and operational decisions without the success for which he strived. Thus, it is not without interest to note his overall motivations and his opinions on both battles.

 

In a letter to his wife on March 23^rd 1918 he noted:

“It is a curious fatality that at Gallipoli, on the Somme and her again now, (in the Ypres sector) I have to carry out a policy with which I disagree, and as to which I have expressed myself strongly to my commanders. However as a subordinate commander is, after making my point of view quite clearly to my superior and making him see the reason s from my point of view, my duty as I say then, is to carry on to the best of my ability whatever is decided . There must be only one man to make a plan and that must be Commander-in Chief.”

 

This, if nothing else, sums up what Hunter-Weston saw as his duty as a soldier (as it does responsibilities of a solder today). If not a vindication of the man, Elaine McFarland’s biography provides a firm hand on tiller of judgement of Aylmer Hunter Weston, man, soldier and, later, the dutiful parliamentarian. This is a very greatly recommended book - even at the academic paperback price of £32.00.

[charlesmessenger]

David

 

Thank you for that. Most helpful.

 

Charles M

[Steven Broomfield]

Agreed. Thanks.

[David Filsell]

Happy you found it helpful. Even after this book I think there is much more to be learned about HB. What really surprised me was the fact that some much of the criticism of the man is purely anecdotal - and not least created by those who bore a personal grudge against him -  a grudge deserved or otherwise.

[hazelclark]

Thanks. Since reading your review, I have actually been inspired to follow up on the story on line, and will read the book.  A lot of conflicting information.

Hazel C.

[David Filsell]

Yes plenty of 'confliction'. 

[charlie962]

There is another thread about 'no criticism allowed'. Doesn't the letter above by Hunter Bunter show the correct way that criticism should be made and treated?

 

However as a subordinate commander , after making my point of view quite clearly to my superior and making him see the reasons from my point of view,  my duty as I say then, is to carry on to the best of my ability whatever is decided .

[David Filsell]

In my opinion yes. That or resign.

[Steven Broomfield]

And, of course, were you to resign someone else less competent might get the job, so you are on the horns of the proverbial dilemma.

[The Scorer]

On ‎25‎/‎07‎/‎2016 at 18:14, charlie962 said:

There is another thread about 'no criticism allowed'. Doesn't the letter above by Hunter Bunter show the correct way that criticism should be made and treated?

 

However as a subordinate commander , after making my point of view quite clearly to my superior and making him see the reasons from my point of view,  my duty as I say then, is to carry on to the best of my ability whatever is decided .

 

16 hours ago, David Filsell said:

In my opinion yes. That or resign.

 

12 hours ago, Steven Broomfield said:

And, of course, were you to resign someone else less competent might get the job, so you are on the horns of the proverbial dilemma.

 

My thoughts exactly .... and there would also be the consideration of what would happen to you if you did resign?

 

Are there any instances of senior officers resigning rather than carry out instructions that they disagreed with - and if so, what happened to them?

[David Filsell]

One refusal I know in the second world war was Sir Alec Douglas Home's brother who, on moral grounds, refused to take a Crocodile flame thrower tank into action Normandy in WW2. There must be others in WW1 and 2. The other - not in quite the same circumstances as HB - was an author who finally refused to go back to combat because of the futility of the war (Max Plowman who wrote the splendid Subaltern on the Somme, a book well worth reading). He was court martialled, dismissed the army and was then sent conscription papers. He was still arguing against his call-up when the war ended. (He later became very involved with the Peace Pledge Union and Dick Shepard.) However, I think most who received distasteful orders probably took the HB line and complied with them - not least because they felt they had the ability to make the best of bad orders and that any newcomer would accept them anyway and not perform as well as they though they themselves could.  But its an interesting subject to pursue . 

[Herekawe]

1 hour ago, The Scorer said:

 

 

 

My thoughts exactly .... and there would also be the consideration of what would happen to you if you did resign?

 

Are there any instances of senior officers resigning rather than carry out instructions that they disagreed with - and if so, what happened to them?

Hi

 

Isn't this just arrogance in a way. If you are making an principled stand that the situation is impossible so you think you will  resign - but concurrently you self assess you are still the best man for the job,  even thought you don't know who will be appointed in your place, you judge you are the best person so you don't resign. Unless you resign how do you know what will happen next you (we) will never know.

 

Personal experience makes me wary of people who think they will resign but never actually do.

 

I would be curious about situations where people threatened to resign and the orders were rescinded or where they did resign and their replacement also refused to carry out the orders if there are any cases Pals know about.

 

I haven't got it in front of me but in Andrew MacDonalds book on the first day of the Somme I think he says that Charteris went to see HB before his attack with permission to cancel all or part of it but HB refused.

 

James

[The Scorer]

Thanks, both.

 

I don't have the answer, and have certainly never been in such an important situation myself. I have been tempted to resign from posts I've held in voluntary organisations (but mostly haven't) but these have been in a far from comparable situation, so they're not relevant in any way.

[charlie962]

and making him see the reasons from my point of view,   This bit is all important. Reading Gough's Fifth Army  Gough says several times that he doesn't think he got GHQ (Lawrence more than Haig ?) to see his point of view, particularly March 1918. But he followed orders nevertheless.

[David Filsell]

I have no idea about others who considered - or did - resign or threaten to.  I certainly don't think that HB was arrogant in this regard, nor is there any apparent evidence that he actually considered resigning at any point in his career. . He simply decided that his duty at Gallipoli and on the Somme was to "... carry on to the best of my ability whatever is decided." Adding" There must be only one man to make a plan and that must be Commander-in Chief.

 

[squirrel]

Duty to his Commission, duty to his superiors and duty to those under his command.

[David Filsell]

Absolutely and if ordered as he was at Gallipoli - regardless of losses