The Real German War Plan 1904-14 by Terence Zuber

[Ken Wayman]

Just spent the day dipping into Terence Zuber's impressive book on German War Plans. It basically debunks the idea that the outbreak of war in August 1914 was dictated by the Schlieffen Plan, arguing that von Moltke had changed it out of all recognition as each year's deployment plan took account of French and Russian changes.

 

Has anyone else read the book? I appreciate it as it depends on original sources that had only recently been made available when the book was written in 2011.

 

What opinions and reactions has it elicited? Frankly I'm surprised it hasn't provoked a lot more reaction among historians.

 

Ken 

[bdykstra]

Historians are wary of Zuber because his arguments tend to be overstated. For instance, his book on the Ardennes in 1914 basically argues that the Germany Army had full-fledged combined arms tactics when the war started. From my experience, many historians don't really bother giving his books the time of day (my grad supervisor told me never to cite him unless it was to criticize his arguments).

 

Bodie

Edited 17 June , 2017 by bdykstra

[Ron Clifton]

On 3/12/2017 at 19:51, Ken Wayman said:

It basically debunks the idea that the outbreak of war in August 1914 was dictated by the Schlieffen Plan, arguing that von Moltke had changed it out of all recognition as each year's deployment plan took account of French and Russian changes.

That is an example of overstating the case. In all but the finer details, the Germans went to war in 1914 with the plan bequeathed to von Moltke by von Schlieffen in 1905. You only have to read the Plan itself, either in Gerhard Ritter's English translation or in the copies in CAB20 at Kew, and compare it with what actually happened.

 

Von Moltke's main change, which von Schlieffen specifically warned him against, was to weaken the right wing by moving some divisions to the left wing. Whilst this increased the chances that the Plan would fail, I do not consider that it stood much more chance of success in its original form.

 

Ron

[Hedley Malloch]

Was it not von Moltke's father who coined the phrase, 'no plan survives the first contact with the enemy'?

[Ken Wayman]

On ‎17‎/‎06‎/‎2017 at 16:11, Ron Clifton said:

That is an example of overstating the case. In all but the finer details, the Germans went to war in 1914 with the plan bequeathed to von Moltke by von Schlieffen in 1905. You only have to read the Plan itself, either in Gerhard Ritter's English translation or in the copies in CAB20 at Kew, and compare it with what actually happened.

 

Von Moltke's main change, which von Schlieffen specifically warned him against, was to weaken the right wing by moving some divisions to the left wing. Whilst this increased the chances that the Plan would fail, I do not consider that it stood much more chance of success in its original form.

 

Ron

 

Hi Ron

 

Please don't labour under the misapprehension that I am promoting Zuber's view - I had simply recently read the book and took the opportunity to use, 'A place to discuss books.' I hadn't heard of the chap previously and felt that I wanted to know more. Judging by the fact that the post was up for three months without reply I reckon few people have read much of his work. Since he cited original sources I felt it was worth mentioning the book on GWF - any historian deserves to be read, however unacceptable his views may prove. In the 1960s, 'Butcher' Haig was a popular interpretation of the C-in-C's role in the Great War - how views have changed.

While I fully accept that a complex plan such as that created by von Schlieffen was unlikely to succeed as intended, France did succumb to the German blitzkrieg planning in 1940. Such is history.

Cheers

 

Ken

On ‎17‎/‎06‎/‎2017 at 17:34, Hedley Malloch said:

Was it not von Moltke's father who coined the phrase, 'no plan survives the first contact with the enemy'?

 

And there are very few exceptions!

 

Ken

[Ken Wayman]

On ‎17‎/‎06‎/‎2017 at 08:47, bdykstra said:

Historians are wary of Zuber because his arguments tend to be overstated. For instance, his book on the Ardennes in 1914 basically argues that the Germany Army had full-fledged combined arms tactics when the war started. From my experience, many historians don't really bother giving his books the time of day (my grad supervisor told me never to cite him unless it was to criticize his arguments).

 

Bodie

 

Hi Bodie

 

While I accept that Zuber might not be the presently accepted viewpoint, every historian deserves the respect of being read, even if he/she is unpopular or their arguments faulty. Assumption that Zuber should only be criticised smacks a little of intolerance on the part of your supervisor. There have been many revisions, re-revisions &c of views across the board in the history of the Great War.

 

How did your higher degree go?

 

Cheers

 

Ken

[Ron Clifton]

8 minutes ago, Ken Wayman said:

Hi Ron

 

Please don't labour under the misapprehension that I am promoting Zuber's view

Don't worry, Ken - I wasn't, and hence there was no implied criticism of you in my comments. I have never read any of his works in full, so I am reluctant to criticise him, but the reaction of many who have read his works does not inspire my confidence!

 

Ron

[Terry_Reeves]

 Ken is quite right to bring the subject up. Zuber has taken a bashing which is fine,  but I have yet to see any rebuttal on this forum that produces anything that goes beyond an orthodox view.  Alternative views, however unpopular, surely must be taken into account.

 

TR

 

[Martin Feledziak]

I am currently reading "The German 66th Regiment in the First World War"

By Otto KORFES.

 

The translation is by Terence ZUBER.

 

I do not have the original Regiment history and even if I did I cant read German. ( or even afford the expected price tag )

All I can say is that I am most thankful.

 

Now we get the opportunity to read a German unit history.

 

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Martin Feledziak

[Ken Wayman]

23 hours ago, Martin Feledziak said:

I am currently reading "The German 66th Regiment in the First World War"

By Otto KORFES.

 

The translation is by Terence ZUBER.

 

I do not have the original Regiment history and even if I did I cant read German.

All I can say is that it is a great book.

 

Hi Martin

I certainly haven't come across the book you're currently reading. To be honest, the 'War Plan' book is the only Zuber work I have seen!

Cheers

Ken

[Ken Wayman]

23 hours ago, Terry_Reeves said:

 Ken is quite right to bring the subject up. Zuber has taken a bashing which is fine,  but I have yet to see any rebuttal on this forum that produces anything that goes beyond an orthodox view.  Alternative views, however unpopular, surely must be taken into account.

 

TR

 

 

Appreciate that, Terry.

 

Ken

[David Filsell]

Was not the comment about battle plans made by Clausewitz? 

[Ken Wayman]

14 hours ago, David Filsell said:

Was not the comment about battle plans made by Clausewitz? 

 

Hi David

 

I'm fairly sure that von Moltke the Elder propounded what translates as:

                 "No plan of military operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength".

Von Moltke was most definitely a disciple of the Clausewitz 'school' of military thought (as far as it existed at that time) and I am equally sure that a similar phrase (or its ramifications) is to be found in the pages of 'On War'.

 

If I'm wrong I'll happily acknowledge.

 

Cheers

 

Ken

 

[AOK4]

On 17/6/2017 at 18:34, Hedley Malloch said:

Was it not von Moltke's father who coined the phrase, 'no plan survives the first contact with the enemy'?

 

You mean Moltke senior (1800-1891)? He was the uncle of Moltke junior (1848-1916).

 

Jan

[Ken Wayman]

39 minutes ago, AOK4 said:

 

You mean Moltke senior (1800-1891)? He was the uncle of Moltke junior (1848-1916).

 

Jan

 

Hi Jan

 

I think we're talking about the same characters here. In books written originally in English, von Moltke senior and von Moltke junior are generally referred to as 'the Elder' and 'the Younger' respectively, even though they were uncle and nephew. I'm sure there are major exceptions to this, as in most aspects of history..!

 

Very best regards

 

Ken

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Ken Wayman
To insert point of elucidation.

[David Filsell]

Where's an  expert when you need one?

Edited 21 June , 2017 by David Filsell

[Hedley Malloch]

According to my notes the statement was made by Helmuth von Moltke, who was the uncle of Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke, the commander of the German armies at the outbreak of the war.  The source for this is Wikipedia, so it must be true.  Unless you know different ... .

 

The statement is attributed to numerous people, including Rommel.

[David Filsell]

Looks like my bet on c o witz would have been a waste of time then!

[bdykstra]

On 6/19/2017 at 11:22, Ken Wayman said:

 

Hi Bodie

 

While I accept that Zuber might not be the presently accepted viewpoint, every historian deserves the respect of being read, even if he/she is unpopular or their arguments faulty. Assumption that Zuber should only be criticised smacks a little of intolerance on the part of your supervisor. There have been many revisions, re-revisions &c of views across the board in the history of the Great War.

 

How did your higher degree go?

 

Cheers

 

Ken

 

Agreed. I guess my main point is that all histories should be read critically and placed in their proper historiographical context. 

Bodie

[Robert Dunlop]

On 19/06/2017 at 19:29, Terry_Reeves said:

 Ken is quite right to bring the subject up. Zuber has taken a bashing which is fine,  but I have yet to see any rebuttal on this forum that produces anything that goes beyond an orthodox view.  Alternative views, however unpopular, surely must be taken into account.

Terry, I agree with your point about embracing diversity. What follows is not necessarily a rebuttal but it illustrates a recurring problem with Zuber's work. I post this not to discourage anyone from buying his books but to encourage a degree of scepticism and enquiry when reading them.

 

I conducted an analysis of Zuber's description of the Battle of Hamipré-Longlier (as one of many such detailed analyses). The account appears early on in 'The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914'. Zuber uses the account to set the tone for the rest of the book. He focuses on one of the German regiments, viz. 88th Infantry Regiment that was part of German 21st Infantry Division. It should be noted that 21st ID comprised four infantry regiments altogether. The choice of IR88 was not unreasonable as there is a very good regimental history. Zuber begins by saying that IR88 had completed its route march for the day by 11 am and was occupying quarters when the sounds of battle rang out. He goes on to describe how IR88 made contact with a French unit, the 87th Régiment d'infanterie (87RI). A firefight broke out between the two regiments, resulting in heavy French casualties and their flight from the field of battle. Zuber provides the French perspective from the written report of Corporal Albert Courouble, who survived the battle. Zuber summarises:

"The same scenario would be repeated throughout the Battle of the Frontiers. The German infantry was more mobile that the French by virtue of the simple fact that the Germans carried wire cutters and pick-axes to cut down the farmers' heavy barbed wire fences and the French didn't. The German battalion and company commanders used the terrain far better than the French. The German commanders moved by bounds, using fire and movement and the French didn't. The Germans fixed the French in front and turned the French right flank [in the case of the French 87RI in this battle], gained fire superiority, pushed the French out of their position and delivered a punishing pursuit by fire. Longlier was a scenario straight out of the German regiment tactical test. IR88 passed their test; the French 87 RI failed."

 

My first problem with the account arose when I checked the war diary for 87RI. There was no mention of the regiment being anywhere near Hamipré or Longlier. Very odd, so I double-checked in case I had misread the regimental number. No. By tracking back in the war diary, it became clear that ONE battalion of the regiment (1st Battalion, Courouble's 'wonderful battalion') was detached to Abboneau's newly formed cavalry corps that was tasked with reconnoitring the Ardennes. 

 

During the advance of Abboneau's Corps de cavalerie, 1/87RI marched on a parallel line east of the French 9th Dragoon Cavalry Brigade. The infantry formed the flank guard. Elements of the cavalry brigade made early contact with the lead units of German 21st Division. 1/87RI was tasked with occupying the town of Hamipré, anchoring the left. At the same time, the French cyclist infantry, mentioned by Zuber, were pushed forward to occupy Longlier to the NE of 1/87RI. The cyclists came under attack and were pushed back. Not realising that the German 21st Division was following so closely behind its cavalry patrols, the French 9th Cavalry Division's GOC (général de L'Espée) ordered the French infantry battalion to manoeuvre NE to bring pressure onto the force that was attacking the cyclists.

Apart from Rogge's regimental history of the German IR88, there is an account left by Feldwebel C as well. He noted that, far from the regiment's march being over for the day:

 

"About 1 p.m. a patrol coming from Longlier notified us that we could advance without danger since that locality was not occupied by the enemy. After having some soup, prepared by the field kitchens, we resumed our march. All of a sudden, on our right, we heard an unwanted noise, altogether new to us. We knew right away what it was : a shell [While the lead German infantry regiment had been enjoying lunch, général de L'Espée had moved his artillery batteries onto the high ground overlooking the valley.] Several dropped quite close to us. Major Schmidt immediately gave the following order: 
'The 5th, 6th and 7th Companies will advance in skirmish line, taking shelter behind the hill which lies before them. The 8th Company will stay behind in reserve.' 
All the officers, sword in hand, marched in front of their men, as in a review. 
The French and Belgians [sic. - only the French were involved] aimed very well and, sad to say, were aided by our own 27th Artillery who fired at us. After being reinforced by the 87th Infantry, Colonel Puder ordered the attack."

There are several important things to note from this account, which was published shortly after the war. The German infantry regiment was unprepared, with no knowledge that the French were so close and were manoeuvring to engage them. When ordered forward, the advance began like a review. Shell fire was unknown to the men prior to coming under fire from the French cavalry batteries. There was a blue-on-blue incident involving the German artillery. Finally, and this is most important, IR88 was reinforced by IR87 in the attack. What is not clear from this is that the 21st Division's other brigade, comprising two Hessian regiments, was advancing on IR88's left flank, i.e. directly towards the hapless French infantry battalion.

1/87RI ended up being assaulted by no less than EIGHT German battalions, plus machine gun companies. Zuber quotes Courouble description of his capture: "The battle began at 1330. By 1500 it was over." Courouble's involvement in the battle was indeed over by, presumably, 1500 hours but that is not the same as saying that the French battalion's resistance was over. As Zuber goes on to note: "Corporal Muthig of 8/88 reported that his company conducted fire and movement for three hours…" Despite being heavily outnumbered, the French battalion put up a fierce resistance. The German 21st Division was completely held up and made no further advance that day. 

 

1/87RI was not completely overrun, despite the loss of its commander and three of the company commanders. Approximately a company of men made it back but they and their colleagues had brought precious time for the French 9th Cavalry Division to withdraw in the face of the German 21st Infantry Division and its fellow division advancing to the south.

 

If Zuber's account is taken at face value then it appears as if a German infantry regiment defeated a French infantry regiment in short order. The truth, however, was very different. Far from being textbook 'tactical test', the French infantry BATTALION put up significant resistance against more than one German infantry regiment. The Germans made a number of tactical errors, starting with the cavalry recon elements being far too close to the infantry advance guard. As a result, the Germans were taken by surprise. They reacted slowly and took several hours to overcome the defence of the French infantry battalion, which was heavily outnumbered. The French battalion was not surrounded. Although only about 25% of its number got away, the stubborn defence enabled the French cavalry to withdrawn from the advancing infantry corps.

 

In response to this analysis, Zuber countered with the comment that: "I[sic.]/ 87 RI accomplished nothing, and would have been combat-ineffective for months, if not forever." I will leave readers of this post to judge the accomplishments or otherwise of 1/87 RI but 87 RI war diary notes that the 1st Battalion was still attached to the cavalry on 26th August. The battalion was then re-united with the regiment on 1st September. At no point was the battalion disbanded and reformed. There was more than a cadre of men left. Approximately 2/5 of the original battalion were present when it returned to the regiment. The battalion resumed active operations with the regiment on 1st September. 87 RI then received 800 reinforcements on 7th September, most of whom were assigned to the 1st Battalion as you would expect. 1/87 was fully functional again by mid-September 1914, when there is the first note in the diary of 1/87 being assigned a specific mission.

 

III Bataillon's commander, Oberleutnant Böhm, left this account in the IR88 regimental history:

 

"We were under heavy enemy fire though. The company didn't have any cover and its losses were increasing. I spotted that the railway line also ran through cuttings as well as on an embankment. These must provide excellent cover. We had to get forward quickly!

 

I gave the order to move forward. The company bounded forward by platoons and sections. The process was repeated over and over, in between the bursts of enemy fire. The distance came down. Still 400 meters from the railway line. Then 200 meters away. And suddenly we were there, just at the point where the railway ran through a cutting. The first dead Frenchmen were around about. We were in a defilade position, hidden from the enemy and from our own troops. My men started to pick up French kepis. One took a French bugle. The situation could have become uncomfortable if the French, who were only a few meters above us, had pushed forward. They would have been able to shoot down on us from above.

 

The company rushed up the edge of the depression and we then found ourselves in the midst of the French position. Very few Frenchmen were left, maybe 10 or 20, in the railway cutting at this point. They stood up, raised their hands and ran towards us. We could see that our regiment was still in a firefight off to our right but, in several places, some sections were also getting up and bounding forwards."

 

It struck me when I first translated this section of IR 88's history (which Zuber did not include in his book) how III Battalion was 'under heavy enemy fire' and 'its losses were increasing'. Böhm was so worried about this that he ordered the battalion to move forward across essentially open ground. Normally such a move would only have been attempted if there was fire superiority, which III/IR 88 clearly did not have. Nevertheless, it was possible for smaller units to bound forward 'in between the bursts of enemy fire'. By the time III/IR 88 reached the French position, however, there were few French infantry left alive – this without III/IR 88 being able to lay down devastating fire.

 

I finally managed to track down the regimental history for IR80 Füsilier, which lay to the south and left of Böhm's left flank battalion, IR88. The Füsilier Regiment was advancing towards Hamipré, which if you recall from earlier in this post had been occupied by French 1/87 RI before it moved NE:

 

"As soon as I Battalion [IR80] debouched from the forest 2 km east of Neufchâteau, it came straight into combat. III Battalion had been deployed on I Battalion's left flank by then and carried on towards Hamipré. The battalion commander, Major Waitz, rode ahead right up to Hamipré, to discover personally the enemy's flank – bullets whistled around him. The companies followed and from Hamipré they were soon able to take the enemy in the flank. From the road the men could see the long line of red trousers lying in a railway cutting. There was no hesitation. The companies shook out to the right from the column of sections and destroyed the enemy very quickly by enfilade fire at close range. Individual ‘red trousers' tried to run back but they were all felled after a few steps."

 

It is now clear that IR80 was responsible for the 'success' of IR88, having outflanked the French infantry to the south and taken the elements of the French battalion facing east in enfilade.

 

In summary, Zuber quoted selectively from IR88 and did not take the effort to read the other regimental histories. The latter can be excused as there is only so much time to spend when writing about a much larger action. It is incumbent on an historian, however, to alert the reader to any such deficiencies and to avoid sweeping claims based on limited data. A more circumspect approach is more appropriate IMHO. My biggest concern is that some information in the IR88 history, which Zuber did read, was left out. The information contradicted or called into question Zuber's claims. He either missed this information or, more worryingly, deliberately left it out.

 

This is not an isolated example.

 

Robert

[lostinspace]

"Terry, I agree with your point about embracing diversity. What follows is not necessarily a rebuttal but it illustrates a recurring problem with Zuber's work. I post this not to discourage anyone from buying his books but to encourage a degree of scepticism and enquiry when reading them."

Robert,

 

Nice to hear from one of the original "voices of reason" back on the forum! Excellent analysis, as usual.
 

Dave

Edited 21 July , 2017 by lostinspace

[Terry_Reeves]

Robert

 

Thanks for your post, it is nice to see you here again.    I am not suggesting that everything Zuber says is right by any means, but what concerns me is that there is a tendency to simply to criticise any alternative simply because it is Zuber, as in this case, or in other cases  just accepting that a British view based on solely British records is the gospel truth.  My signature  reflects my views in a broad sense but it is the last bit I suspect we really never get to, we just look to our reasoning.

 

I enjoyed your analysis, many thanks.

 

TR

 

 

Edited 21 July , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[nigelcave]

32 minutes ago, Terry_Reeves said:

Robert

 

Thanks for your post, it is nice to see you here again.    I am not suggesting that everything Zuber says is right by any means, but what concerns me is that there is a tendency to simply to criticise any alternative simply because it is Zuber, as in this case, or in other cases for that matter, just accepting that a British view based on solely British records is the gospel truth.  My signature  reflects my views in a broad sense.

 

I enjoyed your analysis, many thanks.

 

TR

 

 

 

That's fine and in general I would agree. The point to take is to consider alternative viewpoints as seen from different historiographies. However .... I do not think, for example,  that too many people take Dr (?) Moser's views terribly serious as gospel on either who won the Great War and Verdun ... but it does drive you into finding chapter and verse of unqualified accepted fact (e.g. like the date of a battle). In the case of Colonel Zuber the problems are (a) the use of endless abbreviations/acronyms which makes reading his work difficult; and (b) the tendency to depend on a set of resources that tend to be themselves selective. That, of course, can be said about many of the earlier histories of the war, often dependent on very limited sources. However, in 2017, it should not be excused quite so simply.

 

For myself, and I have bought all his books, I find them effectively unreadable because of all the abbreviations.  

 

 

 

[Terry_Reeves]

Thanks Nigel.  I agree about different historiographic viewpoints. My point is,  that in the general case,  commentators on this forum simply judge Zuber simply through their own national  records. What Zuber produces is an alternative view that can be compared against other research. I am not suggesting that he is right, just that he produces a different point of view, rightly or wrongly. 

 

Without an alternative we have no comparison, which surely means we are left with  no balance. Rousseau below refers.

 

TR

Edited 21 July , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[Robert Dunlop]

12 hours ago, Terry_Reeves said:

Robert

 

Thanks for your post, it is nice to see you here again.    I am not suggesting that everything Zuber says is right by any means, but what concerns me is that there is a tendency to simply to criticise any alternative simply because it is Zuber, as in this case, or in other cases  just accepting that a British view based on solely British records is the gospel truth.  My signature  reflects my views in a broad sense but it is the last bit I suspect we really never get to, we just look to our reasoning.

 

I enjoyed your analysis, many thanks.

Thank you, Terry - on all counts.

 

And thank you all for the welcome back.

 

I understand your concern, Terry, which came through in your earlier post as well. At one level, there can be a general concern about some writers. Where this becomes important, I think, is the situation when someone asks a general question about what to read on the war or a battle or whatever. This is not an uncommon occurrence on the Forum for example. In such cases, I would not recommend such writers. Taking the case in point, I would have no hesitation in recommending Jack Sheldon's books for example but would not recommend Zuber. If someone asks about Zuber's books in particular then I try to point out the limitations in order that the person can make a more informed choice.

 

As problematic as writers like Zuber and Moser can be, I welcome their contributions - even if I have don't have the highest respect (for what that is worth). Very often, great good has been forthcoming as result. Witness the impact that earlier historians had on the efforts and outputs of John Terraine for example. Or the wonderful 'Handbook of Imperial Germany' written by Janet and Joe Robinson, written in part to provide a more 'balanced' view of pre-war German military preparations compared with Zuber's view.

 

Robert

Edited 22 July , 2017 by Robert Dunlop