The Shortest History of Germany

[mhurst]

I have just finished a fascinating book about Germany, The Shortest History of Germany by James Hawes (Old Street Publishing, 2017). It traces the history of what we now think of as Germany from pre-Roman times, and particularly of the foundation of Prussia as a State of Teutonic Knights in the 13^th century, but gets really interesting, and relevant to the First World War, in the latter part of the 19^th century, when Prussia emerges as the dominant military power in that part of Europe. A key event in this process was the handing over to Prussia of the Rhineland, including the vital Ruhr Area,. by Britain in 1815, something which the latter must have rued 100 years later.

 

What was particularly enlightening for me, who only had a sketchy view of the history of the German Empire from 1871, is how fragmented that region was, even after 1871. I had seen the emergence of the Empire as a coming together of many separate states, among which Prussia was the most powerful, into a coherent whole. Mr. Hawes has no time for this view, maintaining that the fault line in German history of the past 1000 years has always been the River Elbe, and that Bismarck had never wanted a united Germany but a Prussian Germany, ruled by aristocratic Junker families, of which he was a part, and for this to be all-powerful within Europe. Indeed, many foreign observers continued to refer to the new Empire as Prussia rather than Germany. To this end, the more liberal, and more Catholic, states to the south and west were merely the source of taxes with which to build up the Prussian army and subsidise the Junker agricultural estates.

 

Bismarck’s alliance with Austria in 1879, with hindsight the start of the road to war in 1914, is shown as a desperate attempt by the Iron Chancellor to provide a bulwark against what he saw as the major enemy – the Poles and the Russian Empire to the east. In forming that alliance, he was well aware that, in his own words, “some damn stupid thing in the Balkans” could, through this alliance, lead the German Empire, and particularly those living to the west of the Elbe, mainly Catholic and fearing France as their main enemy, into a war that they felt had nothing to do with them. Of course, history proved him right, as this is exactly what happened in 1914.

 

Kaiser Wilhelm II seemed to sum up the split personality of the new Empire. As King of Prussia he shared Bismarck’s fear of the Slavs to the east, while as German Emperor he pushed for a build-up of the navy, which was clearly aimed at Britain. Mr. Hawes claims that the popularity for this build-up demonstrates that many people in the west saw it as a chance to counter the power (and money grabbing) of the Prussian army, with its obsession with Russia as an enemy. However, it is interesting that Mr. Hawes warns against regarding the Germans in general at the time as a bellicose people, as the Prussian military commanders in the early 20^th century, bent on pursuing war according to their martial stance, were the only leaders in Europe who were uncertain whether their people in general would be supportive of war.

 

Mr. Hawes thinks that Germany should have won the First World War, as they were industrially powerful, and introduced many new technological weapons of war (with the exception of the tank). But he considers that it was Prussian strategy which lost the war. The undoing was partly down to an ill-considered unrestricted submarine warfare campaign, which brought America into the war, but also to a fixation by Ludendorff and Hindenburg, both from Posen/Poznan, one of the most Polish areas of Prussia, on continuing a punitive war with Russia after the latter had sued for a separate peace in late 1916. Instead, a Kingdom of Poland was established under a German regency, and the chance of a quick victory in the east was lost. After the October Revolution in Russia, and the clearly expressed desire of the Bolsheviks to end the war in that region, the German High Command planned to smash the Bolsheviks and restore the Romanov monarchy as Prussian clients. To this end, fifty divisions were retained beyond the Elbe, just as American troops were beginning to arrive on the Western Front. Mr. Hawes maintains that a million men were still deployed in Poland/Russia after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and so Germany was vulnerable to the allied attacks of August 1918, which heralded the final defeat of Germany. I would welcome Pals’ views on this, as I had always understood that the initially successful offensives by the Germans in the spring of 1918 were made possible by the return of divisions from the Eastern Front. Were there still even more men left behind who could have successfully resisted the subsequent allied attacks and prolonged the war even further?

 

The analysis of the split within Germany is carried through to the rise of the Nazis, as in the 1933 elections which brought Hitler to undisputed power, his main electoral base was in the heartland of East Elbia, as Mr. Hawes describes it, while his vote in the mainly Catholic south and west of Germany was considerably weaker. His determination to attack Russia, which coupled, again, with bringing America in to the war, doomed Germany to eventual defeat, is seen as emulating Ludendorff and Hindenburg’s fixation on occupying the lands to the east, although by then occupied by Poland, rather than Russia.

 

The central theme of fundamentally two Germanies continues into the post-war era. Mr. Hawes describes the ‘supposed’ (as he sees it) reunification in 1990 as undemocratic and leading to what we regard as Germany as basically resurrecting the old Prussia-Germany duality, with the former East Germany, and the current impoverished eastern Germany, playing a disproportionately significant role, harking back to the days of Bismarck. Even the present capital, Berlin, is the old Prussian one and not the natural centre of the traditional heartland of the old Germany, based on that of Roman times and the Middle Ages.

 

The book is liberally illustrated with maps, which are very informative but, unfortunately they are often too small to study easily without a magnifying glass – the book would be better suited to a larger format, but that would only have increased its price. Also, the book is sprinkled with textbook-style diagrams which, although informative, can lead to an impression of ‘dumbing down’ the book for readers, which is most definitely not the case for this most thought-provoking and erudite of books. I can thoroughly recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn about the ancient, but in particular the relatively recent, history of Germany. Mr. Hawes concludes by saying that Germany “should be treated, and it should act, as what it was always meant to be: a mighty land at the very heart of the West”, and after reading his book, it is difficult to disagree with him.

[Eastindia]

Ivo Dawnay gave good review in the June Oldie. The cheapest place I found to buy it, once postage was included, as at Wordery.com

[josquin]

With respect to your question asking whether a million German soldiers remained deployed in the East until the war's end,

Hawes's statement is correct.  It is speculation to claim that a redeployment of these troops could have resulted in a

German victory, but by July 1918 the Germans had lost the numerical superiority they enjoyed at the beginning of the

Spring Offensives on the Western Front--by that time there were 207 German divisions and 203 Allied.  Both sides had

sustained roughly equal losses, but the Allies could readily replace their losses and the Germans could not.  The German

High Command declared that 200,000 men per month were necessary to restore their Spring Offensive losses, but only

300,000 men were available from the next annual group of 18-year old conscripts.  Since the Germans had serious problems

with supply and munitions shortages, logistics, transport, ,and  adequate foodstuffs, it is a legitimate question how an

additional million soldiers could have been maintained, transported, and provisioned over a time frame of many months.

A useful supplement to Hawes's book is Holger Herwig's "The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918,"

(2014, A & C Black).  Joe Robinson's excellent book, reviewed on The Forum, clarifies how the segregation and regional

identities of the various German states impacted the organization, operations and command of the German Army

as well as the regional rather than national character of the post-1871 nation that Hawes addresses (Frank Buchholz,

Janet Robinson & Joe Robinson, "The Great War Dawning: Germany and Its Army at the Start of World War I," 2013,

Verlag Militaria).

Regards,

Josquin

Edited 27 November , 2017 by josquin

[mhurst]

Very interesting insight into the possibilities open to the Germans in mid-1918, and reassuring to learn that James Hawes was right about the men retained on the Eastern Front. The book mentioned sounds promising, but at £141, even used, on Amazon, it's way beyond my pocket. Thanks for the reference, anyway.

Melvin

[trajan]

How do you get £141? $11.80 here - https://www.amazon.com/Shortest-History-Germany-James-Hawes-ebook/dp/B06XY6P5N2

[RaySearching]

46 minutes ago, mhurst said:

but at £141, even used, on Amazon,

???

 

 £12.38 or under    Here

 

Ray

 

Edit Trajan types faster than me

Edited 28 November , 2017 by RaySearching

[josquin]

Trajan and Ray,

Melvin was referring to the more costly book by Buchholz, Robinson & Robinson, "The Great War Dawning,"

that I had mentioned in my post. 

Josquin

[The Prussian]

Hello!

The brilliant book by Buchholz and Robinson/Robinson costs 60€:

https://www.militaria.at/Book.aspx?book=2277660&Language=de

It will be available in Kassel too:

http://www.waffenboersen.com/locations/view/kassel-herbst

Edited 29 November , 2017 by The Prussian

[joerookery]

http://www.militaria.at/Book.aspx?book=2277660&Language=en

 

Thank you for the kind words. Yes the book is  pricey. the Austrian publisher did a really masterful job in producing the work – lots of color pictures and I do mean lots. It is such a handsome product that it works well as a Christmas gift. However we get no royalties and I do acknowledge that it is quite pricey.   We are about to turn a manuscript into an American publisher – McFarland – but everything is black and white. Real pity about the maps but color would drive the cost up astronomically.  We do not set the price points the publisher does.

[The Prussian]

Hello Joe!

I don´t think the book is pricey. 60€ is an ok price for it. Look what other military books cost. The horror is the shipping price! I think it´s more than 40 bucks to the US!

[joerookery]

The publisher actually has a link to where the book will be mailed within the United States had much reduced postal rates. Part of the problem however, is that the book is 4 ½ pounds. I don't know what that equates to in British measurements but this is one heavy book. You can use it as a doorstop or as a weapon to hurl at your opponents!

 

https://www.militaria.at/Default.aspx