Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914-1918.

[Crunchy]

Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914-1918. Gary Sheffield, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2014. 249pp

 

In Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914-1918, the prolific Great War scholar Gary Sheffield delivers thirteen essays on a range of subjects broadly concerned with the topics of the main title.  Written between 1986 and 2014, all of the chapters, except one, have been published previously, with several being the fruits of presentations given at international military history conferences. Now we have them in one easily accessible volume.

 

As to be expected from such a well established and respected scholar, they are all of a high standard and offer new insights into each of the topics he considers.  Much of what he reveals is as relevant to today's armies as they were a century ago, especially those dealing with officer/soldier relationships.  Young officers would do well to read what Sheffield discerns from his research.

 

The book is presented in three parts, with two chapters in Part 1 - Context; six in Part 2 - Command; while Part 3 - Morale contains five. In Part 1 Sheffield addresses Britain and the Empire, with the first chapter considering various issues such as perceptions during the latter half of the 20th Century of the war's relevance to Britain and the Dominions, the commitment made by the Empire, and Strategy, Operations and Tactics. The second chapter discusses the contribution of the Empire in the context of coalition warfare. Part 2 looks at topics as disparate as the relationship between Haig and Rawlinson; the Australians during the Battle of Pozieres; Hubert Gough as an Army Commander; the BEF in 1917, including the effect of the learning process before and during the Battle of Arras; and finally considering the achievements of that process through the performance of British troops in 1918.

 

Part 3 considers the morale of the BEF through a couple of different lenses, commencing with an evaluation of British morale over the whole period of war, identifying the dips and causes for them at various stages of the conflict. We then delve into the subject through two studies of officer-soldier relationships; one an overview, and the other from the experience of the 22nd Royal Fusiliers (Kensingtons), which had a remarkably enlightened approach.  Next, we are offered new insights into the role and functions of the Military Police, and from their records a new perspective on the so-called rout of Fifth Army in March 1918. The impact of the war on class relationships through the eyes of one upper middle class, Eton educated officer rounds out this excellent series of articles.

 

Sheffield writes in a refreshing and unambiguous style, and one slips through each of the chapters easily.  Underpinned by sound research, he lays a few hoary myths to rest, and demonstrates the issues he considers are far more complex than the simplistic approach and inaccurate perceptions some of the more populist authors would have us believe.  For example, notwithstanding there were poor officers, overall, officer - soldier relationships in the BEF were much more homogenous and underpinned by genuine mutual respect. Similarly, although there were some low points, British morale remained relatively strong throughout the war, even during the March 1918 retreat, and attests to the strength of character and sheer staying power of the average British soldier and his officers. At the end of most chapters, and for Part 3 he offers further reading of works published after the chapters themselves were written.

 

Command and Morale is clearly in the stable of rejecting the mythology that was served up in the mid 20th Century: a perspective of the war that was based on shallow research, assumption, simplistic perceptions, ignorance, and outright lies that have be-devilled and trivialised the history of the Great War in popular culture. Instead, through sound research Sheffield, along with many others, has gone to the primary sources, and through considered analysis discerned what really occurred, good and bad. His views are balanced and convincing, and this is the strength of the book.

 

In a few instances, however, some may not agree with his views: for example, that the British Army did not have a devolved command culture before the war - Combined Training, 1905 and Field Service Regulations, 1909 clearly show the British command philosophy pre-war was the much the same as the oft-quoted German auftragstaktik. Nonetheless, these are minor quibbles and there is much here that is worth considering. In this reviewer's opinion what Sheffield presents rests on sound footings.  Not only does this book deserve to be on the shelves of those interested in understanding the BEF in its true context, officer training institutions would do well by including several of these essays in their curriculum. Highly recommended.