When would YOU have removed Sir John French?

[squirrel]

Take in to account the strain of the previous days, though I appreciate that his Corps had not been as heavily engaged as SD's, divergence of the two Corps, little sleep and the "bowel problem" then some irrational behaviour was not entirely unexpected particularly that apparently he was advised that a large German Force was attacking the village.

The orders given by French, who apparently had no firm idea of what was going on were not of any great assistance either.

IMHO French should have been replaced after Mons when he led the BEF straight in to the German Armies.

Edited 8 December , 2020 by squirrel

[phil andrade]

16 hours ago, Justin Moretti said:

Wasn't it Lloyd George's son?

 

 

Not unless Lloyd George knew his mother : not beyond the realms of possibility !

 

Phil

[Muerrisch]

Good one ....... I sniggered!

[Justin Moretti]

19 hours ago, squirrel said:

IMHO French should have been replaced after Mons when he led the BEF straight in to the German Armies.

Wasn't that more an issue with the way the BEF had been planned to deploy from the very first? In which case, don't we point the finger of blame squarely at Henry Wilson?

[phil andrade]

A request : I’m finding it impossible to keep up with my reading.  It’s as if I’m trying to read everything and reading nothing !

 

Too many seductive reviews, and too much downloading onto my kindle, and I’m falling asleep.  Some form of attention deficiency seems to have me in its grip.

 

My request is for a brief summary of the views of the pro French school, if there is one.  What did Churchill think of him ; and did the late Richard Holmes make a convincing case regarding his qualities ?

 

Phil

[squirrel]

Justin,

 

From my post of 25th November on this thread ..."and he was too easily bamboozled by Wilson".

As you say, French was let down by his Staff. Intelligence, such as it was, was misinterpreted or even ignored, as to the position and strength of the German forces approaching Mons and his meetings with Lanrazac of 5th Army could be a scene from a farce. Wilson was just an onlooker at these from what I have read and, as a fluent French speaker, it begs the question why he did not interpret for them. 

French does not seem to have been "the brightest button in the box" and his suggestion to Kitchener to withdraw the BEF at the end of the retreat smacks of a man who was out of his depth, out of touch with the reality of the situation and had lost the plot. At First Ypres he was not exactly "on the ball" either.

His handling of the shell shortage in 1915 was misguided to say the least and the positioning of the reserves at Loos puzzling in the extreme.

His penchant for being away from his HQ and not contactable during battles was another puzzle.

His personal dislikes of subordinates was at times irrational and badly affected his decision making.

IMHO and FWIW I think it is clear that from the outset, he was not the man for the job.   

Edited 10 December , 2020 by squirrel

[Muerrisch]

Squirrel: excellent; I ticked each point as you made it.

 

The army as a whole had not grasped the importance of the air element and scarcely grasped the importance of the machine gun and barbed wire. All these three aspects were clear to see, and not enough was learned from British manoeuvres pre-war.  Even the calculation that 80% of infantry casualties would need replacing in the first year of war was hopelessly optimistic ................. 

 

None of these errors can be blamed on politicians, they were military misjudgements. French was a party to these [or took little interest] , so went as a fish out of water into an uncharted shark infested sea.

[squirrel]

Thank you. His handling of the Curragh incident should have made those responsible for his appointment as Commander of the BEF think more than twice.

Haig and Smith Dorrien must have been spitting feathers once they were deployed and first in action.

Come to think of it, "inaction" suits French admirably, which  begs the question, why didn't he stay in the Navy? 

[phil andrade]

Sir John French, no military genius, but no fool either....

 

Richard Holmes, TOMMY, The British Soldier On The Western Front 1914-1918, page 32.

 

That leaves the door open, doesn't it, that " but no fool either " ?

 

Phil

[PhilB]

Quite complimentary compared with some contemporaries’ views of his successor though!

[Don Regiano]

2 hours ago, Fantome said:

 

King James Bible, Romans 8:31
What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us?

F.

 

Strange how opposing sides would both quote that sort of thing.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Don Regiano said:

 

Strange how opposing sides would both quote that sort of thing.

 

As worked out by J.C.Squire:

 

God heard the embattled nations sing and shout
"Gott strafe England" and "God save the King!"
God this, God that, and God the other thing –
"Good God!" said God, "I've got my work cut out!"

• On the outbreak of the First World War, from Epigrams (1916).

[Robert Dunlop]

On 10/12/2020 at 12:12, squirrel said:

...French was let down by his Staff. Intelligence, such as it was, was misinterpreted or even ignored, as to the position and strength of the German forces approaching Mons...

This point needs some amplification. Both sides struggled to understand the actions and intent of the enemy. Intelligence information was incomplete and, at times, conflicting. Observations from aerial reconnaissance were not definitive. This was just as true for the German and French as it was for the BEF. Cloud, timings of flights, adverse weather conditions, enemy counter-measures, and covered terrain (eg in Ardennes region) confounded attempts to gather complete and accurate information. Findings had to be corroborated with information flowing from cavalry and other ground-based reconnaissance, as well as civilian feedback, newspaper reports, and intercepted enemy messages for example. Intelligence reports were never a true, complete, and accurate view of the other side. The information was always open to interpretation. 

No matter what has been written about misinterpretation of the Macdonogh's reports and other intelligence information, it is very clear from the GHQ Operation Orders and from the way the BEF deployed before the Battle of Mons that major contact with significant German forces was considered highly likely. For example, the main body of cavalry was ordered to halt behind the Condé Canal, begin preparing defensive positions and then transition to the BEF left flank as II Corps came into line. The BEF was not pushing forwards blindly and inexorably in the two days before the Battle of Mons. 

 

Having translated the German official history of the Battle of Mons, the German perspective is almost identical to the BEF situation. General von Kluck and his Chief of Staff made similar 'mistakes' that, in retrospect, compromised the ability of First Army to defeat/destroy the BEF. In other words, the perceived problems with General French and his command of the BEF in the earliest months were not unique to him. It would be difficult to consider him for removal at that time, IMHO.

 

Robert

[squirrel]

All your points taken, the fog of war, patchy intelligence poorly assessed or disregarded. But he didn't get a grip of the situation. My summation was based on not only the move up to Mons and contact with the enemy, but his record post Boer War and the spat and lingering antagonism toward Smith Dorrien, his handling of the Curragh incident, along with the other examples I cited, made him in IMHO, unfit for the command of the BEF in the first place.

This, taken with Mons, should have rung alarm bells with the War Office. Post Mons his behaviour was not always that of a rational man.

So, again IMHO, he should not have been given the command in the first place and should have been relieved from his position, post Mons or at the end of the retreat at the latest. 

[Muerrisch]

In the immediate aftermath of Mons his command was divided, potentially fatally so.

 

It was his responsibility to keep his command in hand. Of his subordinates, one took a successful almighty risk, and one panicked, whilst GHQ and French fannied around like wet fish.

 

He should not have been chosen [that is, if choice was exercised].

[Justin Moretti]

19 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

Of his subordinates, one took a successful almighty risk

 

And he seems to have resented that subordinate for it from that moment until the day he finally found an excuse to be done with him. Le Cateau was probably the most spectacular "stand" the British Army made once it had been levered out of its original positions at Mons and started the withdrawal; and it might have galled French to realize that Smith-Dorrien, whom he hated already, was going to be the one remembered by history for pulling it off on his own initiative and authority.

[Robert Dunlop]

It was the responsibility of the respective unit commanders to ensure that their commands were secured, not the C-in-C. GHQ should not have been worrying about the details of the two corps. If the either of the two Corps commanders felt that flank security of his corps was utterly dependent on the other corps then the Corps commander had to do something about it. Arrangements were made to secure II Corps' left flank at Le Cateau through cross-Army cooperation, with General Sordet's Cavalry Corps making its way behind II Corps to the left flank. This sort of arrangement did require GHQ assistance to set in motion. The responsibility for flank protection flowed down the command chain to division - brigade - battalion levels. There was a problem on the right flank of II Corps at Le Cateau early that morning. The retirement of units from the crucial high ground and from Le Cateau itself was not clearly understood by II Corps HQ but the next flank units in line picked up the responsibility, albeit in less than adequate positions. 

 

These issues cannot be laid at the feet of Field Marshal French IMHO.

 

Robert 

[Muerrisch]

3 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

It was the responsibility of the respective unit commanders to ensure that their commands were secured, not the C-in-C. GHQ should not have been worrying about the details of the two corps.

 

Robert 

 

I find that extraordinary. I think we have different views on French's job description. 

[PhilB]

I too find that odd, Robert. As the buck stopped at French’s desk, the details (at least the broader ones) of his Corps’ doings was surely pertinent to him?

[Derek Black]

22 hours ago, Justin Moretti said:

 

And he seems to have resented that subordinate for it from that moment until the day he finally found an excuse to be done with him. Le Cateau was probably the most spectacular "stand" the British Army made once it had been levered out of its original positions at Mons and started the withdrawal; and it might have galled French to realize that Smith-Dorrien, whom he hated already, was going to be the one remembered by history for pulling it off on his own initiative and authority.

Maybe French had by then had discovered it had been a smaller force of Germans that had mauled II Corps. Also that they had only managed to continue the retreat due to a mistaken belief by the Germans they had defeated the entire BEF, and had given their victorious soldiers a day of rest instead pursuing the battered remnants.

 

see these god threads for more on Le Cateau

https://www.greatwarforum.org/topic/211353-le-cateau-1914-triumph-or-disaster/

https://www.greatwarforum.org/topic/249893-analysing-the-battle-of-le-cateau/

 

 

Edited 20 December , 2020 by Derek Black

[Robert Dunlop]

15 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

 

I find that extraordinary. I think we have different views on French's job description. 

The General Staff branch of BEF GHQ was responsible directly for operational oversight of I and II Corps in August 1914. Specifically GSO 1 (Operations), Deputy Chief of Staff, and Chief of Staff, who was the immediate subordinate of the C-in-C. There were formal communications, such as the Operation Orders, that were issued in the name of Field-Marshal Sir John French, G.C.B., Etc. He bore ultimate responsibility for the content but the details were formulated by GSO 1 and his team typically. There were numerous informal conversations between the Corps commanders and GHQ. The separation of the I and II Corps around Mormal Forest was the specific focus of my previous post. Sir Douglas Haig, GOC I Corps (which was affected directly by Mormal Forest in its line of retreat), was 'communicated with' before the relevant Operation Order was issued. GHQ then specified the march routes to be followed, enabling II Corps to have full use of the main road and associated road network to the west of Mormal Forest. The decision to separate the two corps was based on the lack of roads through the forest and the major problems of manoeuvring the corps together on one or other side in the face of the German advance. Operation Order No. 8, issued on 25th August 1914, included the following instruction: "The I. Corps will start [its retreat along the specified routes] at 5.30 A.M. and march to the area of Le Busigny, and connect with the II. Corps at La Sablière." The details of the march routes and the expected point of reconnection would not have been worked out by Sir John French. I don't know (because I have not checked) if and how Sir John was involved in the high-level risk assessment around the decision to separate the two corps. Given that his role involved high level meetings with key stakeholders outside the BEF, such as General Lanrezac (GOC French Fifth Army), then it is quite possible that Sir John would not have been present for such discussions. GHQ would still have been able, indeed would have been expected to, review the risks, discuss with the key commander/s affected, and then issue the relevant orders, ratifying them subsequently with the C-in-C.

 

Robert 

[Robert Dunlop]

On 18/12/2020 at 21:54, squirrel said:

... his record post Boer War and the spat and lingering antagonism toward Smith Dorrien, his handling of the Curragh incident, along with the other examples I cited, made him in IMHO, unfit for the command of the BEF in the first place.

'Spats' were not unique to Sir John French pre-war. There were factions, arguments, etc, etc, across the board from what I have read (though not studied in great detail). But there is a more important issue to consider in this context. It is difficult to predict how a commander will operate in the white-heat of war. Pre-war behaviours were not definitive indicators. Sir John French had held a significant command post, though not C-in-C, during the Boer War. It might be argued that a combative style would help in times of war but not necessarily in peace time. Be that as it may, Sir John French had something of a track record by which a decision to appoint him C-in-C could be made. 

 

Robert

[David Filsell]

Just a small point - but who after Mons an Ypres would you consider could, would or should have replaced him?

Regards 

David

[Muerrisch]

1 hour ago, David Filsell said:

Just a small point - but who after Mons an Ypres would you consider could, would or should have replaced him?

Regards 

David

You left out Le Cateau and the Retreat towards Paris. In any case, I would have preferred S-D; he was a much more modern general than Haig in many ways and had proved himself as a fighting soldier over a long period. He was well liked by junior officers, had a proper regard for musketry, a proper scepticism of cavalry, and had pushed for modern machine-guns. Opinion is divided about the wisdom of Le Cateau, but it worked, and II Corps lived to fight again.

As it happened, Haig did a job, but he lacked charisma and replaced dash with dour doggedness.

Edited 24 December , 2020 by Muerrisch

[phil andrade]

17 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

You left out Le Cateau and the Retreat towards Paris. In any case, I would have preferred S-D; he was a much more modern general than Haig in many ways and had proved himself as a fighting soldier over a long period. He was well liked by junior officers, had a proper regard for musketry, a proper scepticism of cavalry, and had pushed for modern machine-guns. Opinion is divided about the wisdom of Le Cateau, but it worked, and II Corps lived to fight again.

As it happened, Haig did a job, but he lacked charisma and replaced dash with dour doggedness.

 

Any British officer who managed to escape from Isandlwhana must have had a good deal of dash.

 

Phil