1915 attack on the Suez Canal

[Old Cove]

Hello all, I am just returning to the Forum after a gap of several years.  Glad to see that it is still very much alive!  I am preparing a talk on the Sinai/Palestine campaign for my local U3A military history group.  My first problem is trying to find reliable information about the January-February 1915 Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal.  Different references give different figures for the size and composition of the attacking forces. Can anyone point me to the reference(s) which would currently be considered most reliable?  Also can anyone explain why the 'central' route was the one chosen for the majority of the attacking force rather than the coastal route?  Was this primarily to avoid exposure to naval gunfire or was the going firmer further inland (one of my references says that oxen were used to pull the heavy artillery and I assume that oxen would struggle over sand dunes) or was there some other reason?  Many thanks.

[michaeldr]

39 minutes ago, Old Cove said:

Can anyone point me to the reference(s) which would currently be considered most reliable?

Have a look at 'Palestine: the Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918' by Edward J. Erickson, published by Pen & Sword, 2016. ISBN 978 1 47382 737 0 
Erickson's Chapters 2 & 3 (pages 10-55 cover this offensive)

 

[michaeldr]

57 minutes ago, Old Cove said:

Different references give different figures for the size and composition of the attacking forces.

Per Erickson

Center Column - 25th Infantry Division, reinforced by 68th Infantry Regiment (from 23rd Div), 13000 men & 7500 animals + 25th Artillery Regiment + 5 bridging companies + a regiment of irregular Arab cavalry
mission: to cross the canal

Right Column – 1/80th Infantry Regiment + an artillery battery + some irregular Bedouin cavalry
mission: diversionary arrack near Al Qantara & block naval movement on the canal

Left Column – 1/69th Infantry Regiment + an artillery battery + some irregulars (Circassian/Druze/Kurdish & Bulgarian)
mission: diversionary attack at Suez, then reach Zigazig and raise rebellion

[brianmorris547]

1 hour ago, Old Cove said:

Hello all, I am just returning to the Forum after a gap of several years.  Glad to see that it is still very much alive!  I am preparing a talk on the Sinai/Palestine campaign for my local U3A military history group.  My first problem is trying to find reliable information about the January-February 1915 Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal.  Different references give different figures for the size and composition of the attacking forces. Can anyone point me to the reference(s) which would currently be considered most reliable?  Also can anyone explain why the 'central' route was the one chosen for the majority of the attacking force rather than the coastal route?  Was this primarily to avoid exposure to naval gunfire or was the going firmer further inland (one of my references says that oxen were used to pull the heavy artillery and I assume that oxen would struggle over sand dunes) or was there some other reason?  Many thanks.

The Bolton Artillery, 3 East Lancashire Brigade RFA (T), came into action on 03/02/1915 as the Turks tried to cross the Canal. The Bolton Evening News of 1915 had reports of the Action and local Casualties. I have got details of all the men named. There is not much about why the Turks attacked where they did but the reports do contain some interesting stories. 

The Gallipoli War Diaries on Ancestry have brief accounts of the Action in the War Diary of the Commander Royal Artillery 42 Div (WO 95/4313) and 1/3 East Lancashire Brigade RFA (WO 95/4314) which might help.

[kenf48]

You might be interested in the latest WFA Podcast

https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/mentioned-in-dispatches/id1205540936?i=1000671365593

Defence of the Suez Canal 1914-1915 with Dr Adam Prime

[Old Cove]

On 12/10/2024 at 14:35, michaeldr said:

Have a look at 'Palestine: the Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918' by Edward J. Erickson, published by Pen & Sword, 2016. ISBN 978 1 47382 737 0 
Erickson's Chapters 2 & 3 (pages 10-55 cover this offensive)

 

 

Edited Monday at 12:43 by Old Cove
Premature posting!

[Old Cove]

Thanks all for your replies.

 

Michael, I downloaded the ebook version of your reference - seemed like a bargain at £6.99

Brian,  I have an Ancestry account but I'm having trouble finding those diaries.  Although I have to say I often struggle searching for things on Ancestry!  Any tips to find these would be appreciated.

Ken,  I had a listen to the podcast.  Thanks for pointing me to that.

Roger

[michaeldr]

8 minutes ago, Old Cove said:

Michael, I downloaded the ebook version of your reference - seemed like a bargain at £6.99

[alantwo]

@Old Cove

Roger

You may be interested in the log book for HMS Swiftsure which can be found on Family History - Royal Navy and Naval History.Net (naval-history.net) A sample and link to their engagement on the 3rd February 1915 is  (http://oldweather.s3.amazonaws.com/ADM53-62022/ADM53-62022-168_1.jpg), but check the pages before and after.

The War Diaries for 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, 21st Kohat and 26th Jacob's Mountain Batteries at Ismalia also give accounts of their response to the attack.

Regards

Alan

 

 

Edited Monday at 19:55 by alantwo

[Old Cove]

Thanks Alan.  You don't expect to find battleships getting quite so close to a land battle!  (Swiftsure for me means the nuclear submarine class of that name which I had some involvement with as an MOD civilian.)

[michaeldr]

I am grateful to Alan for the reminder of the RN's part in this action. 
The attached article is taken from The Naval Review 1915, Vol.III. 
[This was downloaded from the website of TNR in June 2007, when it was freely available to all-comers]
I hope that like the Erickson book it too will prove useful here

.....................................................................................................

Taken from The Naval Review, 1915 – Vol. III
(downloaded June 2007)

THE SUEZ CANAL. 
NAVAL CO-OPERATION WITH THE MILITARY AGAINST AN INVADING ARMY. 
by C.W. Swithinbank 

The work carried out by the Navy comes under five headings:- 
(1) Supporting the troops by gunfire from ships at various strategic points.
(2) Establishing examination services at Port Said and Suez. 
(3) Patrolling the canal between military posts with armed tugs. 
(4) Rigging and working searchlights at various points. 
(5) Reconnaissance of the coasts of the Sinai Peninsula and Asia Minor with seaplanes. (The inland reconnaissances were carried out by the military aeroplanes.) 
… … … … … …

(1) This necessitated special arrangements for indirect fire, firstly because in many places the banks were too high for the gunlayers to see over, and secondly because the "point of aim" would probably be impossible to define in the desert. As a rule also mirage is less troublesome aloft.
 

In one ship a director sight was fitted by the ship's staff in each control top. This sight was provided with a highpower telescope, and a bearing pointer working on a large arc painted on the deck. The elevation and bearing thus found were passed to the guns, which were fired by gongs from the top as the director sight "rolled on." It may be interesting to note that when the ship was "gared up," the roll was quite appreciable, being seldom less than ten minutes. 

In another ship spirit levels were fitted to the sights at the guns. The range was put on the sights and the gunlayer then elevated his gun to bring the bubble central. 

For places where the banks were too high for the shell from the heavy guns to clear, light Q.F. guns and Maxims were mounted in the tops. 

Shrapnel shell was obtained for all guns and was specially suitable for dealing with troops, who were necessarily in the open owing to the nature of the country. 

Ships provided sandbag protection for the bridges and round the light Q.F. guns. The latter also had steel bullet-proof shields. 

(2)Lieutenants R.N.R. were detailed for this work, and their experience was found very valuable for the examination of ships' papers. A sloop or light cruiser was anchored outside the entrance to take the place of the examination battery. When possible, torpedo boats were used to ascertain the names of approaching steamers and to report them by searchlight to the examination ship. Suspected steamers were escorted into harbour by a torpedo boat, and when it was considered possible that the ship intended to attempt to block the canal, an armed guard was put on board for the passage. Later on when the enemy approached, sandbag protection for the bridge and wheel was rigged in all ships entering the canal. 

A special service of tugs and a torpedo boat was instituted at Port Said to deal with sailing craft.

(3) A number of tugs were obtained from the various shipping firms at Port Said and armed. In every case the deck required strengthening to carry the gun. A steel shelter was erected round the wheel to give protection from rifle fire, and where necessary this protection was provided for boilers and engines. The armament generally consisted of one 12-pdr. 8-cwt. or 3-pdr. and one maxim. It was not expected that these vessels would be able to fire over the banks, but they had the power to enfilade any trenches on the canal bank.

(4) Three canal hoppers were taken up and stationed respectively at Kantara, Ismaillia Ferry and El Kubri. A high wooden platform was constructed to carry the searchlight. Each hopper acted as parent ship for the armed tugs detailed for its section. The hoppers were armed with maxims and carried a crew of canal employees in addition to gun and searchlight crews.

(5) An interned German ship from Alexandria was used as a seaplane carrier for the Northern Coast. A Marine guard and a steam cutter for recovering seaplanes were provided.

Arrangements had to be made for hoisting in seaplanes. A second ship was afterwards taken up and also proved satisfactory, except that she had to be fitted with longer derricks, Both might be described as large well-found tramps. 

Light cruisers carried the seaplanes for the Southern Coast and for Asia Minor. 

THE TURKISH ATTACK ON THE CANAL, 
JANUARY 25TH - FEBRUARY 3RD, 1915. 

On January 25th news was received that the enemy was approaching, and on the 26th the ships took up their stations at various points in the canal. The writer's ship was stationed about two miles north of Kantara, and as the ship moved down, an artillery duel was in progress between the Indian Mountain Battery and the enemy's field artillery.
 
On 27th large bodies of the enemy's cavalry, camelry and infantry could be seen on a ridge 13,000 yards away, and the ship opened deliberate fire until they dispersed. Owing to the mirage, the men and horses stood out very clearly against the skyline, and an accurate range of an individual man was taken at 13,000 yards with a 9-ft. rangefinder. 

For the next few days nothing of importance occurred. Every morning our troops advanced about four miles to a ridge and retired at sunset. Every night the enemy advanced to our outpost line and retired before sunrise. On these occasions there were several small engagements. 

On February 2nd at about 10 p.m. heavy rifle fire was heard and seen at our outpost line. The ship assisted with searchlights on pre-arranged bearings. The firing continued intermittently all night and the enemy did not retire as usual. Just before daylight the ship was informed by telephone that our troops would advance in four minutes time. As the dawn broke, we saw our troops come out of their outpost trenches and the enemy retire. The ship opened fire with light Q.F. shrapnel at about 3,000 yards, and when the range increased with heavy lyddite. The latter particularly had considerable effect.  At the same time the Territorial Field Artillery and the Indian Mountain Battery engaged the retreating enemy on the south-east and east respectively. 

Meanwhile at Ballah, just south of Kantara, a sloop was in action with a concealed field battery. She was hit three times but received no damage. 

At the same time the enemy attacked Ismaillia Ferry.  A French ship was stationed in Lake Timsah in a specially dredged billet east of the channel.  A large scale squared map was supplied by the military and she did some very good indirect shooting. She came under heavy fire herself from the same gun that damaged the Hardinge, and was straddled but not hit. She succeeded in silencing this gun. 

Another French ship was stationed at Serapeum. She caught several large bodies of the enemy in close order and did some good shooting. The French prefer their high explosive mélinite to shrapnel, but they are supplied with both. 

The actual attempt to cross the canal was made between Tussum and Serapeum. At both of these places the military had posts established on the eastern bank. The pontoons were brought down to the water's edge and several were actually launched, but the majority were riddled with bullets from our trenches on the western bank. 

The crossing having failed, the enemy entrenched themselves at various places on the eastern bank. An armed launch enfiladed one of these trenches with shrapnel at about 800 yards. A large number of Turks were killed in this trench and the remainder surrendered to our troops. 

A torpedo boat was sent to destroy any remaining pontoons. This she did by gunfire when they could be got at, but in some cases it was necessary to land and blow them up and this was carried out under fire. 

The ordinary traffic was kept going as far as possible during these operations, but night traffic was only permitted between Kantara and Port Said. This latter section was well protected by the inundation, which was obtained by cutting the bank of the Salt Works Canal near Port Said. The complete stoppage lasted about 24 hours and there were then 29 ships in the Bitter Lakes waiting, so it can well be realised what would have happened if the canal had been blocked even for a week. 

--- --- --- --- ---

 

Edited 12 hours ago by michaeldr

[alf mcm]

On 12/10/2024 at 15:23, brianmorris547 said:

The Bolton Artillery, 3 East Lancashire Brigade RFA (T), came into action on 03/02/1915 as the Turks tried to cross the Canal. The Bolton Evening News of 1915 had reports of the Action and local Casualties. I have got details of all the men named. There is not much about why the Turks attacked where they did but the reports do contain some interesting stories. 

The Gallipoli War Diaries on Ancestry have brief accounts of the Action in the War Diary of the Commander Royal Artillery 42 Div (WO 95/4313) and 1/3 East Lancashire Brigade RFA (WO 95/4314) which might help.

Roger,

   To find a war diary on Ancestry, go to the card catalogue and select 'Gallipoli War Diaries'. At the search screen enter the last part of the National Archives reference. So, for WO95/4314 for 1/3 East Lancashire Brigade only enter 4314 by itself. A date can be selected or perhaps just a month.

4314 - UK, World War I War Diaries (Gallipoli and Dardanelles), 1914-1916 - Ancestry.com

Regards,

Alf McM

[Old Cove]

Success! Thanks Alf.

[Old Cove]

2 hours ago, michaeldr said:

The elevation and bearing thus found were passed to the guns, which were fired by gongs from the top as the director sight "rolled on." It may be interesting to note that when the ship was "gared up," the roll was quite appreciable, being seldom less than ten minutes. 

It's a bit off topic, but does anyone know what this means?  I believe 'gared up' means moored up to bollards but I don't understand the references to roll and rolled on.  Is it minutes of time or bearing? A 10 minute period roll in the conventional sense seems a long time!

[brianmorris547]

2 hours ago, alf mcm said:

Roger,

   To find a war diary on Ancestry, go to the card catalogue and select 'Gallipoli War Diaries'. At the search screen enter the last part of the National Archives reference. So, for WO95/4314 for 1/3 East Lancashire Brigade only enter 4314 by itself. A date can be selected or perhaps just a month.

4314 - UK, World War I War Diaries (Gallipoli and Dardanelles), 1914-1916 - Ancestry.com

Regards,

Alf McM

Thanks Alf

Brian

[michaeldr]

This will link you the Naval OH's relevant map https://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-RN2-118.JPG  and the text can be seen here https://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-RN2a.htm#VII 

Regarding “roll” my best guess (and alas, guess is all it is) is that in the confined space of the canal, then the recoil from the ship's gun would roll the ship's hull out of its 90° upright stance in the water, and thus set up a wave which would return very quickly from the canal's bank(s). As the ship continued to roll there would be a consequent variation in the gun's elevation which would then have to be taken into account on each subsequent round fired. 
The guns were fired by gongs from the top as the director sight "rolled on" – i.e. the decision at which point during the roll the gun was to be fired was communicated by the gong
The example of the other ship which is given, suggest that they used a spirit level to assist in determining the precise point during the ship's roll when she was level and the gun could be fired.

Caveat – this is a guess and subject to correction be anyone who really knows about ships' gunnery under these unusual circumstances (the confined waters of a canal)