General Sir Ian Hamilton

[trooper]

I have lately been reading a number of accounts of the British landing at Suvla Bay and was wondering who the Pals thought should be held responsible for the failure to exploit a potential campaign winning opportunity. From what I read it would appear that Hamilton must take most of the blame if only for his failure to remove incompetent commanders sooner.

What do you think?

Trooper

[Guest Pete Wood]

Ho ho, this will be fun. Okay, I'll accept that Hamilton must shoulder the blame, as he was in charge - and weak.

But Stopford should never have been allowed so much reign, or put on the train to Marseilles. I sincerely believe he was the WORST General in WW1. Anyone disagree...?

[mmbennett]

I believe this was mentioned on a "Line of Fire" episode on THC, that Hamilton was (at that time) the best man for the job at Gallipoli, and was actually a free-thinking intellectual open to new ideas and challenges. Gallipoli proved to high an obstacle for him in the end, but to heap the blame entirely upon him is unjustified, in my personal view.

Regards,

Matt

[paul guthrie]

Worse than Hunter-Weston? Then he's really in the big leagues!

[Guest Pete Wood]

Matt, I said he must SHOULDER the blame; the person in charge is ultimately responsible.

But I would be the first to agree that had he had more decisive commanders, things may not have turned out so bad.

Notice I am not saying the British (Paddy you KNOW what I mean) WOULD have won if Hamilton had done things differently, but....

Yes, he listened to different views. But, he was complacent and, IMO, vague.

Should he have waited so long for Stopford and others to push on? Should he have been nearer Suvla at the initial landings? Was he unlucky that his communications were cut, or should he have made a plan B?

Who do YOU think should share the blame...?

[MartinWills]

Now this is an interesting debate.

Firstly the question posed refers solely to the Suvla Landings, so I think we should disregard other aspects of the campaign (especially the charge at the Nek) remembering that poor performance might be distributed otherwise outside of Suvla.

I have no doubt that the need to find commanders resulted in some scraping of the barrel amongst the hierachy and I am sure time will further identify unsatisfactory commanders/officers at Suvla. For the time being, though, much of the blame must surely be shared between Stopford and Hamilton. Stopford's background fighting natives and policing the empire most certainly did not equip him for commanding what we must recognise as a "state of the art amphibious landing". None the less his dogged insistence on waiting for good artillery support, which might be regarded as a Western Front tactic and the decision to dig in and establish the landing positions clearly ensured that the British were not able to take the initiative. Coupled with this he also ensured that the co-ordinated action at the north end of the Anzac sector was able to achieve little and was quicly to yield what ground had been gained.

In parallel Hamilton surely cannot have failed to have serious concerns about Stopford's ability. None the less he chose not to be there to be able to intervene to ensure the best was made of the opportunities. Not only that, he also chose to be confined at the critical moments to a naval vessel that was not even in steam and thus ensured he could not even make it to Suvla to intervene if he wanted to do so.

The war cabinet also have to answer for pursuing a campaign without being prepared to resource it to appropriate levels, Kitchener amongst them bearing the standard of the "westerners".

Fundamentally it was Stopford on the spot who could have done the right thing (which may not have been any more successful) but the blame also lies with others for putting him there, limiting resources and not exercising adequate command over him. All three of these points could and should have been addressed even without the benefit of hindsight. None of them would have specifically guaranteed success.

Martin

[paul guthrie]

I think it somewhat germane ot point out that research in Turkish archives enabled Tim Travers to prove as stated in his Gallipoli 1915, terrific book, British units- can't remember which away from books - were not within a very short time from there first in race to occupy Lala Baba but nearly a day.

This may make Stepford's performance better or worse, I can't decide. But, both were terrible!

[Guest Pete Wood]

Nicely written, Martin.

But Stopford's insistence on howitzers was heavily influenced, I believe, by his 2i/c Brigadier General Hamilton Reed VC - a war hero, and who had come from the trenches in France. Stopford was the puppet and Reed pulled the strings.

Had Stopford been on the Western Front, on active service, instead of being dug out of semi-retirement (wasn't he governer of the Tower of London?), perhaps he would have had the confidence to stick with Hamilton's plan which relied, mainly, on surprise.

If only Kitchener had agreed to release Byng or Rawlinson....

[armourersergeant]

If only Kitchener had agreed to release Byng or Rawlinson....

Then perhaps one of these two would now have the reputation of a Hunter-Weston. Can you imagine what history would think of Rawlinson if he had commanded badly at Gallipoli and then went onto the Somme. Perhaps he would never have got to the Somme, now theres an interesting thought. What would hsve happened there.

I know little of the Gallipoli battles etc in any depth so am not qual;ified to say but the general interpritation i get is that who ever had been in charge would have found it difficult to manage.

Arm.

[trooper]

If my reading of Hamiliton's Gallipoli Diaries is correct then one of the reasons he could not get either Byng or Rawlinson, even if they were available, was they were both junior to Mahon who commanded the 10th Division and Stopford was one of the few "active" generals senior to him, thus limiting Kitchener's choice of Corps commander.

Would thinks have been any different if Hamilton had been willing to accept Mahon as commander of IX Corps after all he was a Lieut General with at least as much experience as Stopford and did as well as could be expected with the resources available to him as British commander in Salonika?

Does anyone know why Hamilton refused to take Mahon as Corps commander and took Stopford instead?

Trooper

[michaeldr]

Does anyone know why Hamilton refused to take Mahon as Corps commander and took Stopford instead?

Trooper

Trooper,

Kitchener refused to release to Hamilton any officer then serving on the WF

instead he put up three names including Mahon

according to John Lee's biography of Hamilton, 'A Soldier's Life' IH replied

"I will give Mahon every support and encouragement but remembering his condition when he disappointed you by returning to the Sudan when you offered him a Cavalry Brigade in South Africa, I fear he may not long stand the strain of this class of warfare."

Kitchener would not ignore the precedence of the Army list [and Ewart was too 'stout of girth'] so Stopford got the job

Regarding RT's last comment:

The corollary to this pre Suvla wrangle is also worth noting [again from John Lee]

"When Hamilton cabled on 14th Aug that Stopford and his divisional generals were not fit for further offensive action, Kitchener sent an immediate and astounding reply asking if Hamilton had generals on hand to replace Stopford, Mahon, and Hammersley. 'This is a young man's war, and we must have commanding officers that will take full advantage of opportunities which occur but seldom.... Any generals I have available I will send you.' This is precisely the warning which that Hamilton had given Kitchener in such good time before the operation had begun. Now Kitchener was asking Sir John French to supply a corps commander and two divisional commanders from France - the very men that Hamilton had asked for by name and been refused."

Regards

Michael D.R.