The Somme, Defeat into Victory

[armourersergeant]

How about... Officers, slowly and inadequately at times learning a new and much vaster form of warfare than their training had ever prepared them for. Not believing at times that one of the greatest artillery bombardments of history could not reduce the enemy to nothing.

However from the comfort of our arm chairs we can see that there was much that could have been done differently, lucky are we that we have that advantage.

regards

Arm

[Tim Birch]

What other collective description would you give to a group of men who`d organized the killing and maiming of some 57,000 of the cream of British manhood in a few hours? Phil B

Do you know something which we don't? I always understood the killing and maiming of the 57,000 was actually inflicted by the German army.

[PhilB]

How about... Officers, slowly and inadequately at times learning a new and much vaster form of warfare than their training had ever prepared them for. Arm

Learning lessons presumably from Ypres, Neuve Chappelle, Festubert, Aubers Ridge, Loos and Gallipoli and still launching 100,000 men at a walk towards unsilenced machine guns. How shallow can a learning curve be? If you`re going to order that number of men over the top, surely you`ve got to make damned sure they`re not going to be slaughtered? Weren`t even junior officers warning of impending disaster? Phil B

[JPJarman]

I agree ... the learning curve was way too slow..... My earlier point was to try and inject a view that we should not judge history by modern or if you prefer contempory standards. A previous post shows what were esentially civilians in uniform learning a deadly new trade being led by a high command that was reliving the previous war which if memory serves was against the Zulu and Farmers in South Africa.

A big point that is often missed is the lack of communication with troops once the order to advance had been given.

The "idiot up a tree" had he put his reserves into the breach made by the 36th Div could well have caused confusion as no one in the fighting line would be expecting them, there is no or was no guarantee that information to the left and right of this "new" attack would get through. All problems for the command team to worry about.

As for the Political leadership, Lloyd George was not a big fan of the Field Commander, Haig, and from reading a host of books on the subject would dearly loved to have Haig replaced...... [but didn't have the political will or support to do so.... so he effectively starved Haig of troops later ... and then denigrated him after his death, the true action of a coward in my view] ...... He could have backed Haig in refusing the French request to attack in the first, place that it was clearly as unsuited as indeed Loos was deemed by the High Command the year before, but again over ridden by their political masters.

I will lay my cards on the table in this debate,I don't subscribe to the Lions Led By Donkeys thinking, I think that that is far too simplistic a view for an intelligent person to hold.

As for the walking across open ground in the face of what turned out to be withering fire........... I can only think that the order to walk was because the the amount of equipment carried would preclude any other form of ambulation and that strength was required for the final few yards prior to entering what everyone .... everyone thought would be a broken defensive position. I would be barely able to stand with so much kit let alone fight even as a young and much fitter man. Those men were trained and led in an age where one did as one was bid without question ...... they held a belief in their leaders ..... the fact that it was a disaster was down to many contributary factors not all of which were military, ie the fact that a third of the artillery ammunition was defective the guns fired the wrong kind of shells ie shrapnel instead of high explosive to cut the wire, there were too few if any graze fuses that burst on impact rather than at a set time. ..... I relish the debate however and I really do respect the views of others contrary to what the tone of my posts may suggest..

[PhilB]

I will lay my cards on the table in this debate,I don't subscribe to the Lions Led By Donkeys thinking, I think that that is far too simplistic a view for an intelligent person to hold.

I don`t suppose any of us subscribe to a literal interpretation of it. I`d need Dragon`s advice as to what it is - hyperbole, rhetoric? But it does seem to be too generous to put the 57,000 casualties down to bad luck or inevitability? Phil B

[Take on me]

I don`t suppose any of us subscribe to a literal interpretation of it. I`d need Dragon`s advice as to what it is - hyperbole, rhetoric? But it does seem to be too generous to put the 57,000 casualties down to bad luck or inevitability?

Bad luck, inevitability, inexperience, poor command decisions, the fact that these decisions were being exacerbated by a kind of tactical naivety, lack of communications and above all (in my view) massive over reliance on the artillery bombardment all played a part in my view in the targedy of July 1st 1916. Yes it certainly does seem far to generous to put it down to bad luck and inevitability. I myself think, however, that it is sometimes easy to forget how genuinly the British commanders believed in breakthrough and the power of the artillery bombardment.

I also have to say that the rigid tactics must have played a part. Although I think these have to be put down to the realities of 1914-18 era warfare in which effective communications between HQ and Tommy did not exist.

JGM

[tcm878]

Watched it and found it well directed and produced. These programmes have to appeal to the general public not just us anoraks so I suppose it will be more general than I would have liked.

Good to see the BBC producing such good quality history docudrama's, are they going to look at other battles from the great war?

Neil

[AndyMacdonald]

As for the Political leadership, Lloyd George was not a big fan of the Field Commander, Haig, and from reading a host of books on the subject would dearly loved to have Haig replaced...... [but didn't have the political will or support to do so.... so he effectively starved Haig of troops later ... and then denigrated him after his death, the true action of a coward in my view] ...... He could have backed Haig in refusing the French request to attack in the first, place that it was clearly as unsuited as indeed Loos was deemed by the High Command the year before, but again over ridden by their political masters.

I thought Lloyd George's distaste for Haig began after his August/September 1916 visit to France.

[bmac]

As for the walking across open ground in the face of what turned out to be withering fire...

I think Prior and Wilson have effectively demolished the myth that British soldiers stolidly walked across No Man's Land along the whole front from Montauban to Gommecourt. Quite the opposite, the tactics employed for getting the men over were many and varied. That the troops, whatever the local tactics, might have been slow moving because of the weight of equipment carried may be true but the arms sloped, evenly spaced, serried ranks portrayed by the Tyneside Irish in front of La Boisselle according to the famous photographs was not the case everywhere. Furthermore, the troops might well have been weighed down initially but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that many men jettisoned their equipment pretty early on as the basic instinct to survive cut in.

[John_Hartley]

17/Manc certainly advanced at a "slow walk". Lt Callan-McArdle of "B" Coy wrote in his diary "A Coy was in front of us advancing in sections with about 20 paces between blobs, in perfect order at a slow walk".

My grandfather, Tom Brough, was one the men of A Coy.

In spite of this slow walk, when they got to the now-captured Glatz Redoubt, the artillery hadnt finished its work on Montauban and the men had to lie down for 40 minutes before the barrage readjusted and they could actually attack the village.

John

[bmac]

Prior and Wilson's 'The Somme' page 115

"In summary, for the 80 battalions that went over the top in the first attack on 1st July, 53 crept into no man's land close to the German wire before zero and then rushed the German line, while ten others rushed the line from their own parapet. This leaves just 17 battalions, 12 of which advanced at a steady pace and five for which no evidence exists... at least some of the battalions who walked across no man's land at a steady pace did so because they were following a creeping barrage. These were some of the most successful units..."

[PhilB]

Prior and Wilson's 'The Somme' page 115

at least some of the battalions who walked across no man's land at a steady pace did so because they were following a creeping barrage. These were some of the most successful units..."

According to Middlebrook, the barrage lifted from the German Front Line at zero hour. This means there wouldn`t be a creeping barrage across nomansland?

He also says:- " The long lines rose, men looked to left and right as if to correct their dressing on a parade ground and set off after their officers at the steady, well rehearsed pace towards the enemy. There was no rushing, no shouting." As Martin presumably based this on survivors` reports, it`s difficult to see why the discrepancy with P&W. Phil B

[bmac]

Artillery plans were developed at Corps level, there was no uniformity and there significant differences. No disrespect to Martin Middlebrook, and his book was the major influence on my interest in the Somme, but his image makes a better 'story' and it fits in with people's received notions about the action. Let's face it, with the cacophony that was no man's land during the attack how anyone can say there was no shouting is beyond me. The din was so awful people had trouble hearing what the man standing next to them was trying to get across.

Why the difference? P&W presumably analysed the divisional/brigade/battalion instructions for the attack. Middlebrook talked to survivors. There is some evidence to suggest that survivors recollections are coloured by what they have been told, what they read and what they have seen subsequently. Several soldiers of the LRB at Gommecourt remember hearing whistles to signal the attack. They were not used on this occasion.

[PhilB]

But a creeping barrage across no mans land makes little sense? Phil B

[bmac]

I don't think that is what they mean. That they were following a creeping barrage does not mean that the barrage started in no man's land.

XII Corps plan (Montauban):

"The advance of the infantry will be covered by a heavy barrage... The field artillery barrage will creep back by short lifts... the lifts have been timed so as to allow the infantry plenty of time for the advance from one objective to another... the infantry will follow as close behind the barrage as safety permits."

This is, apparently, the first use of the word 'creep' in connection with a barrage.

[PhilB]

That`s how I saw it - the barrage started to creep from the German Front Line. It means that it wouldn`t have slowed down the initial advance across no mans land as suggested in the Prior & Wilson p115 quote? Phil B

[JPJarman]

That`s how I saw it - the barrage started to creep from the German Front Line. It means that it wouldn`t have slowed down the initial advance across no mans land as suggested in the Prior & Wilson p115 quote? Phil B

Whatever the case was, and I accept that I probably have not read anything like as much I should have to, to get a real appreciation of the truth. I think that the fact that wether the attacking battalions started in a trench..... from a position that they had crawled out to prior to zero hour .... wether they walked, ran or used a sophisticated fire and manouevre tactic ...... it remains the case that the artillery had not done the damage that was expected, the wire held in many places and as a consequence the German Army was able to defend it's position with tenacity.

I am prepared to concede the stupidity of reinforcing failure rather than success but I wonder just what was going through the senior commanders minds what did they base their decision making on. What I am not prepared to believe is that any Army Commander would wantonly waste his most precious asset, men.

Whilst I cannot recall the detail of the Officer's names more than one was replaced for injudicous use of his assets ........ probably too late but dismissed nevertheless.

John

[bmac]

That`s how I saw it - the barrage started to creep from the German Front Line. It means that it wouldn`t have slowed down the initial advance across no mans land as suggested in the Prior & Wilson p115 quote?

Not necessarily. I would assume that a field gun barrage would be a mixture of shrapnel and HE but mainly shrapnel. This would usefully have started in front of the German line to help sweep away any remaining wire and other obstructions. If the men had left their trenches to get up as close as possible to the wire and this type of barrage was dropped in front of them then it would clearly have an impact on their speed over the ground as they came up behind it. The instruction to the artillery was for a deliberate creep forward which would have meant that the infantry's progress would also have been deliberate once they had started forward from their initial position some way across No Man's Land.

[bmac]

Whilst I cannot recall the detail of the Officer's names more than one was replaced for injudicous use of his assets ........ probably too late but dismissed nevertheless.

As far as I am aware only one general lost his job as a result of 1st July, Montagu Stuart-Wortley, GOC 46th Division which, ironically, had the lowest casualties of any division that attacked at 7.30am. His sacking probably had little to do with his performance and more to do with the fact he had p*ssed off Haig in October 1915 though.

[JPJarman]

As far as I am aware only one general lost his job as a result of 1st July, Montagu Stuart-Wortley, GOC 46th Division which, ironically, had the lowest casualties of any division that attacked at 7.30am. His sacking probably had little to do with his performance and more to do with the fact he had p*ssed off Haig in October 1915 though.

I always feel slightly sorry for him as his failure was mainly due to the wire still being in place at Gommecourt as opposed to any lack of fervour on the part of his men, if memory serves he refused to send any more men into what was obviously a failure after the second or third wave and thus probably saved lives.

I am sure some one will have the full story on this ........ any takers?

John

[bmac]

They inherited a trench system in a dreadful state, liable to flooding and, in places, with sections of trench filled in with barbed wire because the previous division was so thinly stretched they couldn't man the whole line.

They were given less than two months to improve this, dig a forward trench and some Russian saps without any additional labour. The forward trench flooded immediately in the heavy rains in the last week of June.

The staff planning was poor and the waves following on the leading ones went up the flooded trenches, already filled with men and casualties, instead of going over ground on trench bridges as with the 56th Division. By the time they reached the front lines the attack was all but over.

The smoke screen was thin and drifted parallel to the lines rather than across the German lines meaning the attacking waves were gradually exposed to severe flanking MG fire.

Unknown French wire left over from 1915 was encountered in the long grass slowing down the attack and the German wire, especially on the right, was inadequately cut.

The Germans laid down a severe barrage on the British lines and in No Man's Land with much of it coming from Adinfer Wood which was outside the area of responsibility of the VII Corps heavy artillery.

Attempts to reorganise the attack foundered on:

1. a lack of proper smoke screen;

2. failure to co-ordinate the artillery; and

3. the inability of officers to persuade men rigidly trained for a specific function to adapt to a new role. The 46th had suffered very badly at Hohenzollern in 1915 and then again at Souchez in the early spring of 1916 and had a lot of very inexperienced men and officers.

Several new attacks were scheduled and then cancelled for a variety of reasons. In one case a group of men did leave the trenches thinking the attack was going in and almost all were cut down within a few yards.

Believing some Sherwood Foresters were holed up in the German lines one the extreme left various plans were made to reach them. Eventually a Lincs battalion went over at midnight and found the wire uncut and the trenches full of Germans. They lost significantly in the withdrawal.

Having said all that Gommecourt was a diversion and. as far as the overall plan was concerned, it made no real difference whether it succeeded or failed. M-S-W was sacked by Snow (GOC VII Corps):

1. in a pre-emptive strike to cover Snow's failings; and

2. as a result of a grudge held by Haig against M-S-W since the time of the Hohenzollern redoubt attack 13th October 1915.

Anyway, to date that is my reading of the situation.

[JPJarman]

Thank you Bill

[Steven Broomfield]

Thank you Bill

There's a book recently published about the attack at Gommecourt. If you click on the link on Bill's website, you might get a clue

[bmac]

But not about the 46th Div... yet

[JPJarman]

Actually there is ............. "Tommy at Gommecourt" ............ Thomas James HigginsChurnet Valley Books ISBN 1-904546-27-7 go to WWW.leekbooks.co.uk

It is a very personal history but well worth reading nevertheless.

John