The Somme, Defeat into Victory

[PhilB]

Not necessarily. I would assume that a field gun barrage would be a mixture of shrapnel and HE but mainly shrapnel. This would usefully have started in front of the German line to help sweep away any remaining wire and other obstructions. If the men had left their trenches to get up as close as possible to the wire and this type of barrage was dropped in front of them then it would clearly have an impact on their speed over the ground as they came up behind it.

If Mr Middlebrook is to be believed, "Exactly at 7.30am an uncanny silence fell over the battlefield. The British barrage suddenly ceased as it lifted from the German Front Line and gun layers adjusted their sights for the next target. By a strange coincidence, the German guns were also silent". I interpret that as there being no British shells, other than strays, after 7.30am between the jump off trenches and the German line? Phil B

[bmac]

Actually there is ............. "Tommy at Gommecourt" ............ Thomas James HigginsChurnet Valley Books ISBN 1-904546-27-7 go to WWW.leekbooks.co.uk

Which book I have but, with respect, it is not, in spite of the title, about Gommecourt. 18 pages out of 125 cover the May-July 1916 period. The rest describe Thomas James Higgins' experiences between 1914 and 1918. There are several books that contain sections on Gommecourt ('Trench Fever' by Christopher Moore, 'Over There' about the Leek RFA battery to name but two) but nothing focusing entirely on the 46th's experience at Gommecourt which is what I meant.

[bmac]

If Mr Middlebrook is to be believed, "Exactly at 7.30am an uncanny silence fell over the battlefield. The British barrage suddenly ceased as it lifted from the German Front Line and gun layers adjusted their sights for the next target. By a strange coincidence, the German guns were also silent". I interpret that as there being no British shells, other than strays, after 7.30am between the jump off trenches and the German line?

Much though I love 'The First Day on the Somme' I think that you have to accept that MM might have been using a bit of dramatic licence in some of his descriptions. As mentioned, as artillery programmes were left to Corps staff to determine, it would be impossible to state categorically that every section of the front was identical. The Official History clearly states that, opposite Montauban, a field gun barrage that 'crept' in front of the men was used. They might well have had to adjust their sites but there is nothing in this that undemines the notion that the men advanced slowly behind a creeping shrapnel barrage that started at the German wire, waited for the men to cross no man's land to get behind it and then advanced slowly across the German trenches.

And, apart from anything else, with the Hawthorn Ridge mine going up at 7.20am and the Germans thoroughly alerted (let alone the information gathered from the Moritz stations, etc.) any 'gap' between the lifting of the barrage and the retaliation of the German guns would have been all too brief. I have plenty of comments about the German artillery retaliation as being 'immediate' and, indeed, in some cases, not having stopped at all. So, whilst in some parts of the line there may have been the briefest of silences this in no way negates previous comments nor does it undermine the original thesis of P&W about the methods used by different battalions in the attack.

[PhilB]

Much though I love 'The First Day on the Somme' I think that you have to accept that MM might have been using a bit of dramatic licence in some of his descriptions.

Not beyond the bounds of possibility! I`m sure he was generalizing. Phil B

[Guest Simon Bull]

I have to preface what follows by saying that I found the programme very interesting and learned a good deal from it. The reconstructions in particular were fascinating.

However, as one who determinedly sits on the fence in the middle of the debate between the "lions led by donkeys School" and the "revisionists", I am becoming increasingly concerned by the way in which a so-called "balanced" approach is created by purely giving the views of the revisionist school. Those who support the revisionists may think this is balance but it is plainly not when it does not give both points of view, or indeed the range of views in between. It is interesting how many people have commented that this program was "balanced" when it only really attempted to put one point of view.

I also found the revisionist propaganda at the end of this particular program to be rather insulting to the intelligence. The notion, which was effectively promoted, that after the carnage on 1st July Haig and his generals sat down and it was all all right thereafter because they suddenly understood how to do fight a modern war laughable. It is, frankly, also something of an insult to the memory of the hundreds of thousands of men who died there after at Arras, Third Ypres etc..

I think this debate about what was learned could have been presented in a much more measured way. There can be absolutely no doubt that both sides learned a good deal from the Somme. However, to say that the British learned as much as seemed to be being suggested when subsequent attacks at Arras, Third Ypres, Cambrai etc were, ultimately, unsuccessful if considered as against the scale of the loss of life therein and the total failure to achieve the ultimate objectives, was somewhat unreasonable.

I would also have more respect for the way the revisionist point of view is put (particularly as "pumped" in this programme) if revisionist did not attempt to run the argument that because we won the War we had an army which learned a lot of lessons and was necessarily the best. Anybody with a wider knowledge of the sweep of history will understand that there were numerous other factors which came into play such as, for example, the effectiveness of the naval blockade; the entry of the Americans into the War; the collapse of the German's main ally Austria Hungary the partial resurgence of the French in 1918 etc. It is very possible that we actually won this War without having the best army, or an army which had particularly well learned its lesson is, but that is never recognised by the revisionists.

Finally, the thing that really gets my goat about the way the revisionist argument is put (and I do think they have some good points but they are so keen to support Haig and his colleagues, right or wrong, that they really do go over the top) is the suggestion that the British Army was particularly quick to learn. It seems to me that there is a very good argument that the British Army did not learn properly about how to sustain attacks and pursue a new kind of warfare until after they had seen the Germans do it in early 1918. If our generals learned so quickly why did we not first launch the kind of attack which the Germans launched in early 1918?

To return to the programme, I think it is a great pity that it did not take the opportunity to be properly balanced rather than purport to be balanced by putting the revisionist point of view which is now the fashionable one. That is not to say (before obloquy descends upon my head!, that I am by any means a wholehearted supporter of the Lions led by Donkeys argument. It seems to me, as in so many polarised issues, that the truth lies somewhere between the two.

Incidentally I always thought that the label "lions led by donkeys" is something of an insult to donkeys. In my limited experience they can be rather stubborn animals but they are not lacking in intelligence!

[Guest Simon Bull]

On a different tack to my earlier posting, does anyone know how they did the reconstructions of the tanks taking part in the attacks?

Also, I have only had one brief chance to look at the programme but I thought that the tanks were lacking their external driving wheels at the back. Did others notice this or am I mistaken?

[PhilB]

Incidentally I always thought that the label "lions led by donkeys" is something of an insult to donkeys. In my limited experience they can be rather stubborn animals but they are not lacking in intelligence!

Nicely presented piece, Simon. Wish I could have put it so well! I would add a rider. The question to ask is not " Did they learn?" as only a fool would fail to learn from catastrophic losses, but "Did they learn as fast and as much as could be expected?"

Lions led by slow learners? Phil B

[bmac]

However, as one who determinedly sits on the fence in the middle of the debate between the "lions led by donkeys School" and the "revisionists", I am becoming increasingly concerned by the way in which a so-called "balanced" approach is created by purely giving the views of the revisionist school. Those who support the revisionists may think this is balance but it is plainly not when it does not give both points of view, or indeed the range of views in between. It is interesting how many people have commented that this program was "balanced" when it only really attempted to put one point of view.

I also found the revisionist propaganda at the end of this particular program to be rather insulting to the intelligence. The notion, which was effectively promoted, that after the carnage on 1st July Haig and his generals sat down and it was all all right thereafter because they suddenly understood how to do fight a modern war laughable. It is, frankly, also something of an insult to the memory of the hundreds of thousands of men who died there after at Arras, Third Ypres etc..

Simon,

I agree wholeheartedly with your comments. The revisionists seem now to have taken the 'high ground' in the debate and are quite happy to assert the correctness of their lofty position rather than feel the need to prove it.

I recently attended a WFA meeting in Kent the guest speaker being Ian Passingham (Pillars of Fire, All the Kaisers Men) who I don't think would blanch at being described as a 'revisionist'. His talk was on the German experience of the Somme. He made a variety of interesting and valid points but made it clear that he felt that:

1. The British Army and its commanders learnt a lot of important lessons during the battle;

2. The casualty 'balance sheet' was broadly neutral but the morale effect on the German Army was more severe than on the Allies; and

3. That Falkenhayn's requirement that all ground lost had to be regained whatever the cost had played into the hands of the Allies after the catastrophe of the opening day and had resulted in the loss of many of the 'best and brightest' in the German Army from which they did not recover.

I asked whether he felt that, given Falkenhayn's foolish tactics, the British Army might have been better employed using Rawlinson's original plan of a narrower, shallower attack designed to 'bite and hold' areas of local tactical importance which could be effectively defended by the massed British artillery. With the Germans feeling obliged to re-take these positions (or withdraw to alternative positions having lost the initiative on the Somme) they would then waste themselves on heavily defended positions where the Allies would have the advantage of both position and firepower. The alternative to Rawlinson's plan being, of course, Haig's more expansive and ambitious breakthrough plan which became the basis of the 1st July attack.

Somewhat to my surprise Mr Passingham agreed that Rawlinson's plan would have probably achieved the better results both in achieving the initial objectives and in the principle purpose of a battle of attrition (to which concept Haig came to rather late in the day), i.e. killing more of the enemy relative to your own losses. Mr Passingham, however, adhered to the 'learning curve/lessons learned' theory, pointing out that, if one excludes the 1st July casualties, the German Army must have lost more men during the battle than the Allies (this presumes, of course, that once accepts the casualty figures put forward by, amongst others, the Official History).

The follow-up question that I did not ask was, if the lessons had been learned, where, in particular, was the evidence of their application at 3rd Ypres (amongst other battles)? The concept, planning and conduct of this battle does seem to me to be the one that the revisionists, and more particularly, the supporters of Haig as the long-sighted, visionary General, have the most urgent need to explain to us sceptics. Where precisely is the evidence of the strategic and large scale tactical lessons learnt on the Somme being applied in the mud of Flanders? I must admit that the answer escapes me.

I don't think it is adequate to point to the successes of the 100 days in 1918 as evidence of lessons being learned and applied by the C-in-C as there is so much else that can be pointed to with which to help explain the collapse of German morale in the late summer and autumn of 1918: US involvement, the collapse of their allies, the blockade and the domestic food and fuel crisis, political instability in Germany, the huge losses of the Kaiserschlact, the clear evidence that they faced a foe vastly better equipped to fight a prolonged industrial war.

Personally, I do not doubt that several Army, Corps, Divisional and artillery commanders learnt valuable lessons: Plumer at Messines being a good example, the Canadians at Vimy, etc., but Haig set the strategic tone, employed the generals (ditching Plumer after Messines and replacing him with the 'thruster' Gough for 3rd Ypres), set the overall objectives and determined the places of attack. If lessons were learnt on the Somme then surely there should have been some evidence that Haig, in particular, had learnt them and then applied them in 1917. As yet, I have I can see little evidence to this effect.

[FAAAEd]

2. The casualty 'balance sheet' was broadly neutral but the morale effect on the German Army was more severe than on the Allies;

I too watched the programme under discussion and whilst finding it in general satisfactory did feel that its scope was limited. Let us hope that the BBC have plans for follow ups, now that both football WC and tennis are about to drop off the listings, to provide a broader and more detailed exposition on the Somme Campaign of 1916.

Television programmes by nature though, aiming at a broad audience, will always be lacking to those with specialist knowledge. For my part I frequently have to consciously avoid grinding my teeth when watching offerings from the Discovery or History Channels on naval and aviation topics, from their being littered with oversimplifications or factual innacuracies.

Your quote from revisionist perspective repeated above is, surely, wide of the mark. In this BBC programme, IIRC, it was stated that the British and French suffered a 5/3 ratio of casualties compared to the Germans. Of these the British would have sustained the lion's share a point with which anybody who has read much about the battles for the Bazentin Ridge, and in particular High Wood (with its controversial treatment of Barter), would agree.

bmac, you clearly have an excellent grasp of the details and issues of the complexties of this campaign (as one would expect from the author of such a gem as 'Pro Patria Mori') and of its place in the broader context of the fighting on the Western Front throughout the war. I am in total agreement, for what that is worth, with you on all the valid points that you have made in this thread.

[Take on me]

The follow-up question that I did not ask was, if the lessons had been learned, where, in particular, was the evidence of their application at 3rd Ypres (amongst other battles)?

I don't think it is adequate to point to the successes of the 100 days in 1918 as evidence of lessons being learned and applied by the C-in-C as there is so much else that can be pointed to with which to help explain the collapse of German morale in the late summer and autumn of 1918: US involvement, the collapse of their allies, the blockade and the domestic food and fuel crisis, political instability in Germany, the huge losses of the Kaiserschlact, the clear evidence that they faced a foe vastly better equipped to fight a prolonged industrial war.

I think that tactical aspects such as artillery preperation and infantry tactics together with an increase in the number of infantry machine guns points to at least some lessons being learned. At Arras and Third Ypres the BEF showed itself to be capable of large set piece battles such as the storming of Vimy Ridge, the first day of Third Ypres and Plumers attacks on Polygon Wood and the Menin Road. The problem for the British was that the Germans were also learning and were able to enhance their defensive measures.

Even despite this the British were able to do a lot of damage to the Germans in September and October 1917 before rain, mud, resistence and poor preperation stopped the British some German commanders were recomending a retreat from the Belgium coast. This would indicate that at least a few things had changed since the dark days of the Somme. Yet the British were not quite able to turn a break into German lines into a breakthrough and follow up attacks remained costly.

I think that in 1918 Haig had learned from his mistakes. He insisted that the advance of British forces continued incessantly and was instrumental in planning a number of operations, although his role had diminished by this stage. I agree that there are a lot of reasons for German collapse in 1918, and it was certainly not beacause of the efforts of the British Army alone, but the effectiveness of the British and (frequently neglected) French armies should not be dismissed. They had learned from several years of war and defeated the German Army on a number of occassions during the final period of 1918. These hammer blow offensives convinced the German High Command, through operations such as the breaking of the Hindenburg Line, that, together with the collapse of their allies, their strategic position was as untenable as their defeat was inevitable. It was only after these defeats that the German state began to collapse under political revolution because they realised this.

JGM

[Andrew Upton]

On a different tack to my earlier posting, does anyone know how they did the reconstructions of the tanks taking part in the attacks?

Also, I have only had one brief chance to look at the programme but I thought that the tanks were lacking their external driving wheels at the back. Did others notice this or am I mistaken?

The tank used for the filming was built for/featured in the opening sequence of the film "The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen", and is based on a Centurion Working Chassis, engine, etc, with the shape of the WW1 tank built up around it, and the tracks run around the outside, which is in fact currently for sale at £25,000. It was very impressive on site seeing it trundle across the nearby fields until it reached the trenches, and also rather dangerous (i.e. we were warned to keep our distance when it was moving as if one of the tracks "slipped" it could essentially spin through 90 degrees pretty much instantly, which was combined with the almost zero-visibility of the driver, who had to be given directions via a walky-talky most of the time! ).

As I understand it, many tank crews very quickly realised that the external driving wheels were of little, if any benefit, to steering, and many were lost or ditched by the crews at the first opportunity, much like the anti-grenade nets on the roof (one of which was recreated for the filming) - the tank purist probably had more to criticize in the two large doors on the sides, required for some of the filming of "The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen", but usually cunningly filmed by the BBC so as not to be too obvious...

[Take on me]

Personally speaking I was rather impressed by the tanks and thought them (or it) one of the redeeming features of the documentary. Just imagine seeing one of those things trundling across No Mans Land at you!

JGM

[Guest Simon Bull]

The tank used for the filming was built for/featured in the opening sequence of the film "The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen", and is based on a Centurion Working Chassis, engine, etc, with the shape of the WW1 tank built up around it, and the tracks run around the outside, which is in fact currently for sale at £25,000. It was very impressive on site seeing it trundle across the nearby fields until it reached the trenches, and also rather dangerous (i.e. we were warned to keep our distance when it was moving as if one of the tracks "slipped" it could essentially spin through 90 degrees pretty much instantly, which was combined with the almost zero-visibility of the driver, who had to be given directions via a walky-talky most of the time! ).

As I understand it, many tank crews very quickly realised that the external driving wheels were of little, if any benefit, to steering, and many were lost or ditched by the crews at the first opportunity, much like the anti-grenade nets on the roof (one of which was recreated for the filming) - the tank purist probably had more to criticize in the two large doors on the sides, required for some of the filming of "The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen", but usually cunningly filmed by the BBC so as not to be too obvious...

Thanks Andrew. Very interesting. Gives one some idea how dangerous the real things must have been to their own side!

I appreciate that the wheels were quickly dispensed with, but I would have thought that they would have still been in use at this stage.

[delta]

Certainly C15 was still fitted with her steering wheels on 25th Sep

http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/Europeweb/...cts-Europe8.htm

[Andrew Upton]

Thanks Andrew. Very interesting. Gives one some idea how dangerous the real things must have been to their own side!

I appreciate that the wheels were quickly dispensed with, but I would have thought that they would have still been in use at this stage.

Certainly C15 was still fitted with her steering wheels on 25th Sep

http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/Europeweb/...cts-Europe8.htm

I suspect time, cost and technical complexity all played their part in the wheels not being recreated for the filming - as it was, the BBC prop makers on site only just got the anti-grenade fitting done in time for the day scheduled for filming with the tank, and that was to all intents and purposes a very "simple" thing to replicate! I was told that the cost of painting the tank with correct September 1916 markings would have cost £3000 alone ( ), and so when it arrived on site various people had fun "dirtying" it to make it look better - cue the day of filming, where it rained heavily and washed most of it off again...

Far easier to say the steering wheels were just lost in a shell-hole or destroyed by shell-fire before the cameras started filming...

[delta]

Far easier to say the steering wheels was just lost in a shell-hole or destroyed by shell-fire before the cameras started filming... Andrew

Given the number of tanks in September 1916 which did lose their steering wheels as a result of shell fire (including Creme de Menthe - twice?), you have a good point

Stephen

PS - I'm not nit-picking; the programme taught me a lot - please don't take my comments amiss

[Guest Simon Bull]

Far easier to say the steering wheels was just lost in a shell-hole or destroyed by shell-fire before the cameras started filming... Andrew

Given the number of tanks in September 1916 which did lose their steering wheels as a result of shell fire (including Creme de Menthe - twice?), you have a good point

Stephen

PS - I'm not nit-picking; the programme taught me a lot - please don't take my comments amiss

I agree entirely - also did not want to be seen as nitpicking.

[Andrew Upton]

Far easier to say the steering wheels was just lost in a shell-hole or destroyed by shell-fire before the cameras started filming... Andrew

Given the number of tanks in September 1916 which did lose their steering wheels as a result of shell fire (including Creme de Menthe - twice?), you have a good point

Stephen

PS - I'm not nit-picking; the programme taught me a lot - please don't take my comments amiss

I agree entirely - also did not want to be seen as nitpicking.

It's not a problem! Half the point of using "specialist extras" such as myself was the nitpicking factor - trying to get things as accurate as possible within the confines of time, cost and practicality - my only major gripe with the programme was the one MG08 whose ammunition belt never moved, despite the fact it was meant to be firing (all done with CGI afterwards).

I did have a moment that made me smile at the time - I arrived on site the day before filming was due to begin, and had an explore of the recreated trenches. Two BBC prop techies had just inserted a beautifully made replica of a German steel "sniper" plate into a trench wall, and were admiring their work. I went up to them and said "You do know it's in backwards, dont you?". The techies said it was deliberately done, and I left - but later they came up to me, po-faced, and admitted they had now turned it to face the right way...

[AndyMacdonald]

FYI. Peter Jackson of Lord of the Rings Fame has built an exact replica of a MK1 tank as used on 15.9.16 and it resides in NZ. WHo know what he'll be using that for down the line.

Andy M

[delta]

I would not want to be near it when it revs up - the exhaust noise must be awful