High Officer Casualties

[Steve Bramley]

In 'The first day of the Somme' by Middlebrook i remember reading that British officers were easy targets due to them having 'thin knees' meaning the wearing of jodpeurs making them conspicuous.

What other things would make a British officer stand out to the opposition?

Were the French and Germans as equally easy targets?

When did the British learn by their mistakes and did they then dress as O.R's and carry a Rifle?

Did the Aussies and Canadians have the same problems?

I could go on...

Just strikes me as wasting a valuable asset on a needless scale.

Can anyone shed some light?

[Tim Birch]

Other identifying marks of officers making them obvious targets included wearing a Sam Brown, carrying a sword, carrying a relvolver, blowing a whistle, encouraging the troops forward with arm movements etc.

I think the lesson was learnt fairly early on during the Somme battles.

Later officers did dress in the same clothing as ORs and had not too obvious badges of rank, they also took to carrying a rifle rather than a revolver or sword.

Tim

[Steve Bramley]

Thanks Tim,

I just can't understand why it took so long for them to realise. It must have been almost suicide in an attack. Perhaps army tradition was something to do with it. I can understand New Army and Territorials trying to emulate the Regulars, but why would the regulars persist.

Sorry but i think i've asked this question in the wrong section!

Steve.

[Clive Maier]

On the first day of the Somme, about 75 percent of the officers became casualties. The figure for ORs was about 50 percent, so there was some advantage in looking like an OR but not all that much.

According to Middlebrook, the final British tally for 1st July 1916 was:

Dead: Officers – 993, ORs – 18,247

All casualties: Officers – 2,438, ORs – 55,032

The conduct of the first day of the Somme was such that officers and men alike might as well have had targets pinned to them. In fact, many of the men did in the form of shiny tin triangles on their backs. This was ostensibly to help observers. I suspect it was to help them keep their faces towards withering fire.

[Muerrisch]

There are some big assumptions here, and I wonder if Pals are being brainwashed by stereotypes. One assumption is that an officer, once identified, can be selectively hit by a frightened enemy at combat ranges. This really implies aimed rifle fire only. As the shell was easily the biggest killer, a substantial percentage of officer casualties are placed outside this debate, unless sniping by 5.9 is included.

Part of the comparatively high officer death toll will have been due to the leadership role ...... necessarily, leaders were more vulnerable because they did overt things like standing up, leading from the front, not retreating etc. They were not the best target, they were the only target on occasion.

The Germans used far fewer commissioned officers in the front line and one imagines that their WO and SNCO class had the highest death rates.

And did ANY officers wave swords in 1916?

[Steve Bramley]

One assumption is that an officer, once identified, can be selectively hit by a frightened enemy at combat ranges. This really implies aimed rifle fire only.

I am researching the 1/5th Lincolns attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt in 1915 at the moment. almost 95% of the Lincolns' officers were casualties that day as were the officers of the other attacking Battalions of the 46th Division. Although some officers were indeed killed on the parapet most were killed in no mans land by a well placed and determined machine gun crew, could they have been targeted?

Some gains were made on this day but were unable to be consolidated mainly due to the lack of leadership. I have read similar accounts from other battles. I agree with the leadership role argument but it would be interesting to know whether consealing identity would have made any difference whatsoever and did it in later battles, if so, any examples?

Perhaps swords were not waved in 1916, but footballs were kicked, walking sticks carried and even an umbella if memory serves me right!

Thanks for the replies,

Steve.

[The_Historian]

Hi,

If any of you get the chance, buy a book called "Bloody Red Tabs"-forget the authors name.

This lists the 78 British Generals killed by direct enemy fire in WW1. Apparently, so many of them were visiting front-line trenches and being killed that an official order was issued banning the practise. Needless to say, it got ignored and generals continued to be killed on all fronts right up to the Armistice.

The funny thing is, most of the casualties were in the mid war years, when popular myth would have you believe they were skulking in chateaux 25 miles behind the front.

Regards,

Gordon

[David Seymour]

A helpful addition to the discussion from General Jack:

From GENERAL JACK’S DIARY 1914-1918 – The Trench Diary of Brigadier-General J. L. Jack, D.S.O., edited and introduced by John Terraine, London, 1964.

1917: JULY 20TH

“Although incurring their displeasure thereby, I have ordered all company officers to wear tunics – with small rank badges – issued to the men, men’s trousers and equipment, the subalterns to carry rifle instead of revolver. The junior leaders run sufficient danger from their positions in action without adding to it through the presence of trappings which the German marksmen can distinguish.”

Regards,

David

[duckman]

I think langleybaston1418 comes closest. It is not that officers were especially targetted by "sniping with a 5.9" ( ) but they were expected to put themselves in harms way.

It is usual for a plan of attack to breakdown as soon as the whistles blow and the footballs are kicked over the parapet, and at that point an officer (up to battalion or even brigade level) has to lead/direct his men to respond to the developing situation. And the only way to do that is stand up and be seen - by eveyone. That makes them no more vulnerable to a direct hit from a howitzer shell but random machinegun fire, shrapnel etc become far more hazardous.

It was also very much the expectation that junior officers would lead. Disproportionately they would be cut down in the first wave, leaving the rest to flounder without direction. Repeatedly through the war we see objectives taken (or nearly so) only for the attack to be finally repulsed because the counterattacks would fall on leaderless men, who would defend their position but without co-ordination and support could not hold out. Witness the unexploited successes of 1 July 1916, as well as those areas where footholds were gained, but eventually driven back.

In the German army, similar leadership roles fell to senior NCOs who also suffered a disproportionately high casualty rate. Empire troops also tended to expect more leadership from their NCO's that those of the British Army, and although I don't have figures to hand, I would expect they would show a similarly high casualty rate.

Finally, officers would be specifically targetted in trench raids, either to decapitate the local leadership or to capture the most valuable intelligence sources.

It all adds up.

[Andrew P]

The same occurred in WW2.

Fighting against the Japanese in New Guinea many Australian officers wore the same clothes as the men as previously many of the officers were getting picked off by snipers.

[Guest paddy]

Empire troops also tended to expect more leadership from their NCO's that those of the British Army,

G'day Duckman.

Substitute "from the whole" for "those of the".

That's your fault, AL Pal.

ooRoo

[Guest Hussar]

It was also very much the expectation that junior officers would lead. Disproportionately they would be cut down in the first wave, leaving the rest to flounder without direction. Repeatedly through the war we see objectives taken (or nearly so) only for the attack to be finally repulsed because the counterattacks would fall on leaderless men, who would defend their position but without co-ordination and support could not hold out. Witness the unexploited successes of 1 July 1916, as well as those areas where footholds were gained, but eventually driven back.

Duckman,

I feel you do a great disservice to the majority of the junior/senior N.C.O's.

The assumption that a fresh, young Subaltern would be more tactically aware than an experienced Sergeant ( or other), particularly under combat conditions, doesn't make sense.

On the Somme, the positions taken were held, mostly under the direction of these same N.C.O's, untill no longer tenable or a withdrawal was ordered from the rear.

The lack of support being due to the inability of reserves to get across No Man's Land or the decisions of Officers not to risk it.

The notable successes were not exploited because Rawlinson refused permission for the Reserves to be brought up or for Gough's Cavalry, whose only actual purpose was exploitation, to be sent forward.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Just following on from Hussar's last point I remember seeing a film clip where the subaltern blew his whistle and then stood and watched all his ORs go over the top before doing so himself, thus ensuring their were no slackers. Of course this could have been a staged managed film clip or can anyone else comment on officers performing this role?

[Guest paddy]

And did ANY officers wave swords in 1916?

Will a walking stick in 1917 do.

Dr John Laffin, p100 of the cost of victory