Mud, Blood and Poppycock

[Gunner Bailey]

Somme Day 1

Attack of 120,00 men: 19000+ killed, 40,000 wounded, 500+ prisoners of war - 50% chance of becoming a casualty

DDay DAY 1 into 2

Attack of 140,000 men, 2500 dead in total (US and British)

British total casulties (dead/wounded): 2700

I know which day one I would rather be at!

Somme in total; 146,500 British and Commonwealth dead.

Normandy: Allied Dead (US & Commonwealth, ground forces):37,000.

Tom

I think you are using dates, numbers and assosiated facts to try to prove your own point not disprove Corrigan's. You haven't convinced me.

Also the types of attack are completely different, location type completely different and planning much more thorough and scientific for D Day. The only common factor is the fate of the PBI. 1/7/16 was a naive well expected attack founded on the belief the enemy would be swept away by a prolonged bombardment. D-Day was a surprise attact with little pre bombardment and against well known strongpoints.

Gunner Bailey

[Tom A McCluskey]

Gunner,

Hallelujah! My point exactly, albeit possibly subtly put across (or maybe not so subtly ) from a page 1. Remember, it was you that brought up the Normandy point, or was it a troll? Corrigan selects narrow statistics to support his argument. And I agree, comparing WWI with WWII, to a large degree is like comparing Apples and Pears. So why does he?

Operation Goodwood, Normandy, 4000 casualties.

Arras Campaign, more than 4000 casualties per day

You could go on all day selecting statistics that support your argument, or because it is more provocative. Then give it a selective or narrow context, then things are not as bad as what people have made it out to be. It would not take the most educated mind to work out that the soldiers played more football than fighting...again you could spend a lot of time talking about a whole host of activities that soldiers spent doing instead of fighting...[paraphrasing] 'And this is why I picked the months of January to use as my trench-holding statistic'. For the more cynical mind, January was picked as it was the quietest month! Also, regardless of length of time, I can't remember any first-hand accounts about how tremendous it was being in the line anyway, nearly all said it involved back-breaking work, under the constant strain of danger. I seem to recall most accounts said it was knackering out of the line too.

In Normandy, less Divisions took part in the Fighting. The same ones were continually moved to where the fighting was: North Africa, to Italy, to Normandy. The way men were recruited was totally different too, which is why the biggest Black Watch Association is in Stoke on Trent.

Anyway

That's me finished with Corrigan's book, I think I've laboured my point long enough, and I don't think there is a point where we can meet in the middle.

Aye

Tom McC

[truthergw]

This has been a very good discussion and I have enjoyed most of it. The trouble with quoting statistics to back an argument is that they are a shorthand. To really understand what they are saying you need to know exactly how they were collected, the sources and what you did with the numbers. A book like Corrigan's is not going to give that kind of information and, to be fair, I do not think we should expect it. G.C. and his publisher had a target audience in view when writing and editing the book. It was not aimed at people with the background and in depth knowledge found on this forum. Corrigan had the courage to go against the normal butchers and bunglers theme and suggest an alternative viewpoint. If the book made the average reader question the Blackadder view then it will have performed a service, regardless of which side they eventually come down on.

[PMHart]

Hi,

Tom I suggest you buy another copy of Gordon's book as you clearly have not read it or have no functioning memory these days! I sympathise as I get 'old man' troubles as well! I'm just waiting for the waterworks to go....

You keep asking plaintive little questions that are answered in his text. Strangely one obscure Scottish territorial battalion is not a prism through which you can view the whole of the Great War. Nor can you question established official statistics based on such 'evidence'. Gordon's book points out the statistics for deaths other than by enemy action as 9% Western Front (have you forgotten influenza?) but show that Gallipoli, Italy, Egypt, North Russia, Mesopotamia, Salonika (over 55%) and East Afria were all much higher (over 70% East Africa). I presume your next question is to ask how many men were involved in these campaigns. Well it's a lot, but read Gordon's book - he'll tell you!

I think his book is excellent, laugh out loud at times, but always within the broad sweep of accepted historical accuracy and using established benchmark sources. I mentioned this latest 'controversy' on the forum to him last week and he chuckled. I suspect that every tear of rage and fury he can extract from a passing donkey is just grist to his merry mill.

Aye Aye,

Pete

PS He tells me he can only shoot straight these days after imbibing strong drink!

[General Melchett]

Corrigan selects narrow statistics to support his argument. And I agree, comparing WWI with WWII, to a large degree is like comparing Apples and Pears. So why does he?

I think, if I may, what he is trying to suggest is what I stated earlier up the thread. Infantry pretty much ALWAYS pay a heavy price and the casualty RATES in WW2 were not necessarily too different to those of WW1. I pretty certain part of his analysis concluded they were heavier in WW1 but if proportionatly compared to WW2 I think many people would be surprised. It certainly got me questioning what I thought I knew.

As he and others have said no one called Montgomery, Ike and other commanders in WW2 butchers. The US casualties in the pacific war were pretty horrenous, but it still seems fashionable in the UK to condem commanders from WW1 as butchers bunglers et all. A point neatly encapsulated by the bungling asre Melchett (my forum moniker) in Blackadder

As someone else said statistcs can mislead and often a further analysis of their collection and underlying trends might need to be undertaken. Lets be honest the casualty figures for WW1 / 2 would probably require several volumes if they are to be analysed and properly compared, then you would have to factor in changes in weaponry, the fact that the fightly was far less static in it's nature etc etc, so like you suggest direct comparison seems somewhat pointless.

However I'm still reminded of the village of Starcross a small sleepy Devon vilage.

I'd aslo like to think that as a published author Corrigan would have researched his figures and released them relatively free of spin!!

[Tom A McCluskey]

Pete,

I smell a troll

Aye AYe AYE

Tom McC

[bmac]

I will admit up front to not having read MB&P nor do I plan to in the next 48 hours. In the meantime, can someone explain the point GC is trying to make about the non-battle casualties? Does he, for example, give similar figures for WW2? Does he, for example, make allowances for the different nature of war on the static fronts of WW1 in which many British troops were involved where living in insanitary conditions surrounded by the dead of previous battles provided a perfect breeding ground for illness. Or is he trying to suggest that someone taken from their civilian life either as a volunteer or conscript who then dies from an illness they probably would not have caught at home should not be regarded as a 'proper' war casualty?

I do believe that GC suggests that 'whole swathes' of the UK were mainly unaffected by the casualties of WW1 but I'm not sure he names such a 'swathe'. Can someone?

[bmac]

As he and ... snip ...moniker) in Blackadder

Re: Normandy and the Somme I think there is a clear answer. The result of 11 weeks fighting in Normandy was the destruction of the German 7th Army at Falaise (and elsewhere) and the swift liberation of France. The results of the 20 weeks of the Somme were c. 250,000 British and Empire casualties and an advance of a few miles on a narrow front involving the complete destruction of the land taken. I think it reasonable for people, especially the ordinary member of the public, to judge such things on a profit and loss basis.

Normandy might have been done better but was a clear success. The Somme might have been done better (biting my tongue there) but we are STILL arguing about its impact on the outcome of the war 91 years later.

[General Melchett]

Meltchett,

I do a... snip ... particular month.

Aye

Tom McC

Tom It would be interetsing to look at your figures, will send you a PM

[General Melchett]

I think it ... snip ... and loss basis.

Is that what the book is about though, trying to debunk some of the popular perceptions?

I will admit ...snip ... Can someone?

I think really you would have to read the chapter entitled "The lost generation" in his book. It's difficult to put the entire chapter into juts a few words.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Melchett,

Are you sure you want to be associated with a passing 'fool' like me

Aye

Tom McC

[PMHart]

Hi,

To pick up BMAC's points.

Gordon was merely making the point that 'Not all deaths were caused by enemy action' as I suspect most of us hadn't realised how high the casualties were from accidents and disease were. His point about the distribution of casualties is that the 'pals' recruitment meant that casualties were disproportionate in certain areas, employments or social groups when those battalions went over the top. He then makes an 'on the other hand' to refer to the handful of 'thankful villages' who suffered no deaths.

Nothing too controversial there I'm afraid.

Hey up,

Pete

[bmac]

Is that what the book is about though, trying to debunk some of the popular perceptions?

My point is that I would argue that the 'public perception' here of the relative 'profit and loss' on the two campaigns is absolutely correct, i.e. Normandy a worthwhile if costly sacrifice, the Somme an excessively prolonged waste of men. I cannot see how 'debunking' myths with rubbish stats helps the public understand these wars in any way.

[PMHart]

Hi,

The point about the Somme was that the British and French were fighting the majesty of the German Army in all its undimmed glory. It was a hell of a fight and at the end of it the German Army was seriouly damaged but still more than capable of fighting on. But at some point you have to defeat the main enemy's main army in the field.

In the Second World War the German main army was in the east and had already lost to the Soviets by 1944. Normandy was a sideshow if you like. The main battle had already been fought. Yet even so the fighting in Normany was murderous in the extreme: fighting the German Army is always a painful business. I have interviewed many Normandy veterans and their stories are similar in general tone to 1914-1918 interviews. The divisions used time and time again by Montgomery were utterly diestroyed - the 50th Division for one had to be broken up.

Pete

[General Melchett]

I cannot see how 'debunking' myths with rubbish stats helps the public understand these wars in any way.

Fair enough!

[bmac]

Gordon was ... snip ... suffered no deaths.

Anyone who had an interest in pre-WW1 military history would have expected the wastage from illness to be at least as high as the numbers given, e.g. American Civil War where the ratio of death by sickness versus action was 2:1

The Union Army losses estimates:

Battle deaths: 110,070

Disease, etc.: 250,152

Total 360,222

The Confederate estimated losses:

Battle deaths: 94,000

Disease, etc.: 164,000

Total 258,000

And so a 'swathe' comes a handful of 'thankful villages'. I assume a 'handful' because after conscription and the demise of the 'pals' principle in 1916, pretty much immediately after the 1st July, the British had their most expensive 28 months of the war bar July 1916.

B*gger, I suppose if I am going to carry on with this I will have to get the book from the library.

[bmac]

Hi,

The point about the Somme ... snip ...broken up.

Pete

Once again, there are plenty of eminent historians who still argue the toss about the outcome of the Somme. But, with respect, not my point. How can you blame the public for seeing Normandy as a worthwhile and effective sacrifice and the Somme as, well, neither of those things given their immediate relative outcomes, especially when these historians themselves seem not to be able to agree?

Who the British were fighting in Normandy is irrelevant, IMHO, we are talking about the relative casualty figures and why the some are regarded as 'acceptable' and others are not. Again I do not really see the point GC is trying to make. Sure, British troops were involved in ferocious and costly fighting in both wars but more men were lost in a shorter period of time and in historically unprecedented numbers in a war which for 90% of its conduct in the main theatre (for the British) seemed not to get anywhere. Those are the elements that formed public opinion and I cannot see how you 'debunk' them with spurious comparisons.

I would be more interested in a comparison of the relative 'battlefields', the 'industrialisation' of the battlefield compared to pre-WW1 and the changes that took place that made the type of war expected by the French and British in 1939 so outmoded, etc., etc. Is this in the book?

[Tom A McCluskey]

Ref my post 52 - Erratum Goodwood was 5500, Epsom was 4000.

Just a general point, albeit the British battles in Normandy were considered costly, I still don't think they were of the same casualty rates (per troops engaged) as British offensives in 1916 and early 1917. The battles were large to the British, and occurred over large areas, but as different tactics are used (dispersing the combat units wider, mobile defence, etc.) the concentration of death in one area is lessened. The Normandy battles were mainly mobile, and tank/infantry battles - in ideal ambush country. When I say mobile, there still is an pointless attritional element to Goodwood that occurred until a few realities come home: British tanks could not take a hit, and a 6-pounder was not much use against German heavy tanks. I also think (from memory, such as my distant memory of MBP - yes it was a long time ago when I read it), that the highest percentage of casualties of units at the front line, in hedgerows of Normandy, were the tank units, especially during operations such as Goodwood. Concerning the tanks, and apologies for going over to a flank, but I believe it is the air-to-ground attack that had the major battle-winning influence, and in doing so prevented more of our tanks and infantry from being ground up by the Germans.

Aye

Tom McC

[Gunner Bailey]

Pete,

I smell a troll

Aye AYe AYE

Tom McC

Tom

You have not convinced me or others and the use of playground talk has only made me regard you less seriously! Does the forum need that? No.

Gunner Bailey

[Tom A McCluskey]

Gunner,

Cheer up. My response was to the educated, but patronising none-the-less, comment made by Peter Hart. Some may have taken considerable umbridge. I haven't. Nor at any point have I delivered a personal attack on anyone on this thread. Many positive comments have been made about Mr Corrigan's book, others have a different opinion, I am one of the others and that is the counter-balance.

Aye

Tom McC

[Gunner Bailey]

Tom

I'm always happy!

GB

[bmac]

The comparison in the book is as follows:

Page 298 Table 12

The Somme 1.7.16-18.11.16 - 20.5 weeks - 53 British Divs engaged - 95,000 dead - 89 Dead per Division

Normandy 6.6.44 - 25.8.44 - 11.5 weeks - 19 British Divs engaged - 22,000 dead - 100 Dead Per Division.

I know we have rehearsed the argument about comparing 'apples and pears' with GC's Normandy/Somme casualty comparison but these numbers have nagged at me over the weekend. Apart from anything else I wondered why they were so low.

From what I can see, GC has arrived at these numbers by the simple arithmetic of taking the number of weeks in the campaign, multiplying that by the number of Divisions which were involved at any point in the campaign and then dividing this number into the total casualties.

So, Somme campaign equals: 20.5 x 53 = 1086.5 then 95,000 / 1086.5 = 87.4 (not 89). This result is then declared as the average number of fatal casualties per division per week. Using this wonderful piece of arithmetic GC then apparently goes on to 'prove' that the Divisions in Normandy suffered heavier casualties than their equivalents at the Somme. At least I assume that is what he is trying to prove.

This, of course, would be fine if (and only if) all of the 53 or 19 Divisions were actively involved over the entire period of the campaign. The problem is that this is clearly not the case. If one does not take into account whether or not these Divisions were actively engaged and, if so, for how long, then the results are complete gibberish.

Now, I am no mathematician (as my O-Level grade will prove!) and I am not pretending that my numbers are any more scientific than GC's and I have no equivalent information about Normandy but I have just done a little test. Using Chris McCarthy's 'Day by Day Account' of the Somme I have produced a spreadsheet for July showing which Divisions were engaged and on what days (at some point I will do the other months). According to the table, 31 Divisions were engaged for one day or more during July 1916. Of the 13 engaged on 1st July 5 did not fight again that month (or again in some cases). The 23rd, 30th and 19th were in action for the largest number of days and, in total, there were 136 Division 'days' of action, i.e. 19.4 'Division' weeks.

As I don't have the time to enter the information for the rest of the campaign I will have to resort to some crude arithmetic. If one assumes that 19.4 'Division' weeks is a rough monthly average then over the campaign (approx. 4.5 months) this translates into about 87.4 'Division' weeks for the whole campaign. Divide 87.4 'Division' weeks into 95,000 fatal casualties and one gets an average number of fatal casualties per Division actively involved of 1,090 per week. Even if one makes an allowance for the distorting effect of 1st July by taking 19,000 off the total number of casualties (but also deducting two 'Division' weeks for those Divisions involved) this results in a average number of fatal casualties per Division actively involved of 890 per week from 2nd July to 19th November.

Clearly, the number of weekly fatal casualties per Division actively involved in Normandy will also shoot up if one bases the numbers only on those Divisions active. I have no data for this and I will be quite prepared to accept that the numbers might still be greater than those on the Somme (indeed, I believe they will) but would like to see some data based on sounder principles.

I am sure someone will now come along and point out the error of my mathematical ways but this is the best a grade 6, Maths O-Level student can manage!

[Gunner Bailey]

Bill

Noble effort! Without any of us having direct access to Corrigan's source documents I think it's very difficult to refute his statement and respond in detail, either to the accuracy of his maths or his thinking. I think Corrigan is right to challenge the 'standard' Blackadder and 'Donkey and Butcher's' views. To some he may not be convincing but to the majority I think he makes a good case, articulates it well, and presumably his publishers would have checked through much of what he states before publishing it.

Gunner Bailey

[SiegeGunner]

... presumably his publishers would have checked through much of what he states before publishing it.

I doubt if that is the case. Perhaps one of our author pals could comment.

[bmac]

presumably his publishers would have checked through much of what he states before publishing it.

I doubt whether the publishers would second guess someone like GC and only an editor who too was an expert on WW1 might be in a position to comment. Not many of them around I would guess.