German Assault Troops of the First World War

[Robert Dunlop]

Subtitled: 'Stosstrupptaktik: The First Stormtroopers' (ISBN 978 86227 362 7). I picked up a copy of this recently published book. As the title suggests, it focuses on the development of the German infantry assault tactics. The author has concentrated on correcting certain myths about stormtroopers, such as infiltration tactics were the invention of von Hutier; the tactics were first used in the Spring of 1918; and the tactics were uniformly successful, with lower casualty rates, in 1918. Most of these 'myths' have been successfully debunked by other authors in the past, most notably Bruce Gudmundsson. Stephen Bull has added some new information drawn from German sources. He has also drawn on the work of Martin Samuels in illustrating how Stosstrupptaktiken were forged as much in the defensive (for the Germans) battles of 1915 through 1917 as in offensive battles and raids. There are descriptions of the evolution of infantry tactics in general, with an emphasis on the rapid cross-fertilization between enemy forces, the development of grenades, flammenwerfer and gas warfare, machine gun tactics, and close-quarters combat, including combat against tanks. The casualties inflicted on stormtroop units is analysed. There are hints about the lack of widespread uptake of Stosstrupptaktiken in non-specialist units. Unfortunately, this book does not address the serious problems confronting stormtroops when they tried to attack heavily- and well-defended enemy positions, eg in Operation Friedensturm, compared with the defenses on parts of British Fifth Army's front on March 21, 1918.

The book was an easy read. For someone who is new to the concept of German stormtroops, it is not as detailed as Bruce Gudmundsson's or Martin Samuels' books (though it is not short on detail). It reads more like a supplement, and as such focuses more on assault tactics in general, with a few pieces of additional material about stormtroopers not covered in most other books. While there is some attention to assault tactics in defensive battles, other books provide more detail on this aspect. Personally, the book does not address what I regard as some of the major deficiencies in our understanding of specialist stormtroops (as per my comment on Operation Friedensturm above for example). For anyone with a detailed knowledge of stormtroops, I find it hard to recommend this book, though I would not reject it either.

Robert

[George Armstrong Custer]

Thanks for that review, Robert - I'd spotted this book in Waterstone's recently but didn't have the time to do more than quickly leaf through it, so was wondering at what level of reader it was pitched at. From what you say I think I'll definitely have a closer look at it in the shop - though on balance your note that it contains 'a few pieces of additional material about stormtroopers not covered in most other books' will probably mean I'll buy it; and at £18.99 it's not exactly breaking the bank!

Does the author say anything about the myth that German stormtroop tactics on the Western Front were demonstrably superior to those of the allies? As historians like Paddy Griffith have pointed out it was the allies, of course, who had far more experience of mounting both trench raids and massed attacks, together with much deeper reserves of technology in support. And as Griffith's contends, 'by 1917/18 [the allies] had raised their technique to just as high a level as the Germans, and in many respects rather higher. An enthusiastic British 'storm-troop officer' such as Charles Carrington could therefore report his battles in very similar terms to [Ernst] Junger's, both in the heady success of surrounding and capturing 200 enemy at a stroke and in the cold depression of suffering eighty casualties in a single instant. The two sides were surely mirror images of each other in these battles, and it was only the subsequent myth-making and politicking that has left us with widely differing perceptions.' Does Bull compare and contrast to any extent the German innovations in infantry tactics with what was happening on the other side of the wire?

ciao,

GAC

[Robert Dunlop]

The author does address the perceived differences between stormtroopers and British/French assault troops to a limited degree. The issue of post-war 'glorification' is commented on. Mostly he notes the speed with which each side learned from the other, touching on this several times throughout the book. He also draws attention to the stated intent that Stosstrupptaktiken were to be widely disseminated and contrasts this with what actually happened. Bull is not alone in making this observation.

I think that taking a closer look at the book before you buy is the right way to go. I don't regret buying my copy.

Robert

[stephen bull]

Subtitled: 'Stosstrupptaktik: The First Stormtroopers' (ISBN 978 86227 362 7). I picked up a copy of this recently published book. As the title suggests, it focuses on the development of the German infantry assault tactics. The author has concentrated on correcting certain myths about stormtroopers, such as infiltration tactics were the invention of von Hutier; the tactics were first used in the Spring of 1918; and the tactics were uniformly successful, with lower casualty rates, in 1918. Most of these 'myths' have been successfully debunked by other authors in the past, most notably Bruce Gudmundsson. Stephen Bull has added some new information drawn from German sources. He has also drawn on the work of Martin Samuels in illustrating how Stosstrupptaktiken were forged as much in the defensive (for the Germans) battles of 1915 through 1917 as in offensive battles and raids. There are descriptions of the evolution of infantry tactics in general, with an emphasis on the rapid cross-fertilization between enemy forces, the development of grenades, flammenwerfer and gas warfare, machine gun tactics, and close-quarters combat, including combat against tanks. The casualties inflicted on stormtroop units is analysed. There are hints about the lack of widespread uptake of Stosstrupptaktiken in non-specialist units. Unfortunately, this book does not address the serious problems confronting stormtroops when they tried to attack heavily- and well-defended enemy positions, eg in Operation Friedensturm, compared with the defenses on parts of British Fifth Army's front on March 21, 1918.

The book was an easy read. For someone who is new to the concept of German stormtroops, it is not as detailed as Bruce Gudmundsson's or Martin Samuels' books (though it is not short on detail). It reads more like a supplement, and as such focuses more on assault tactics in general, with a few pieces of additional material about stormtroopers not covered in most other books. While there is some attention to assault tactics in defensive battles, other books provide more detail on this aspect. Personally, the book does not address what I regard as some of the major deficiencies in our understanding of specialist stormtroops (as per my comment on Operation Friedensturm above for example). For anyone with a detailed knowledge of stormtroops, I find it hard to recommend this book, though I would not reject it either.

Robert

Hello Chaps ! Stephen Bull butting into your conversation - hope this is welcome !

Just thought that you might be interested to know that the differences regarding British and German tactics had already been flagged up as a point of potential interest - and to this ends Paddy Griffiths and myself are organising a study day at Fulwood Barracks (near Preston) which will include a public forum and discussion on new work. We are also hoping to include a spots with Andy Robertshaw (yes him off the telly) and other authors etc. Hope you will be able to spread the word amongst other interested parties and informed people who would like to join us.

Best Wishes, Stephen Bull

[JMcCulloch]

I hope you include bob lempke. he knows quite a bit, being only "once removed" from the men themselves.

Chris boonzair might have some interesting things to add as well.

[bob lembke]

Speak of the Devil! I poked through Paddy Griffiths' book, and saw a lot that I would disagree with, but as it was quite a while ago I can't cite specifics. I can't agree that the Brit/French assault formations reached the level of sophistication of the first rank of German storm formations. What formations, can I ask? I am reading a lot of French and British sources lately. (About 160 French regimental histories in the last 3-4 months, for example) and I just don't see it. I can cite dozens of innovations that German storm formations developed that have no counterpart among the Allies. My father's storm formation suffered an average of about one KIA and DOW per storm attack, do to their skill, dash, weapons, and careful planning of attacks by the men involved. I will grant that the qualitiative gap narrowed in the last two years of the war.

An interesting detail from a scarce primary source, from a detailed list of the equipment to be carried by a storm trooper. It included four "egg" grenades, eight "stick" grenades or "potato mashers", a carbine, and 20 rounds for the carbine. In the case of my father's unit, in extensive oral history he never once mentioned anyone carrying a rifle or even a carbine in combat; from other sources I gather that perhaps one of ten or less men, at least at one period, carried a slung carbine. This suggests the lack of interest in the rifle as a storm weapon.

Bob Lembke

[JMcCulloch]

Hi Bob!

You should write here what you did at the GMIC. really interesting stuff.

The pic above I just put there because i had it o file-here's the Sturmkompanie of IR 471 in 1918. I have the Rgt. Commanders' "errinnerungsblatter". Tough men indeed-sharpening shovels and all that.

[Hoplophile]

Though I have yet to read the book in question, I would like to thank Stephen Bull for revisiting the topic of German stormtroop tactics. Despite the fact that Laslo Alfoldi's definitive article on the subject of 'Hutier tactics'* came out more than thirty years ago, and several other works have addressed the issue in some detail, the old myths have considerable staying power. What is worse, in many of the recent cases where the myths have been repeated, one or more of the post-Alfoldi myth-busting works are listed as sources! With that in mind, I am happy to say 'Bravo, Dr. Bull, and welcome aboard! There is still much work that needs to be done'.

*'The Hutier Legend', Parameters, 1976.

[IanA]

I thought I might bump this to the top. I have just finished it and found it interesting and enjoyable to read. As George says: "At £18.99 it's not exactly breaking the bank." My copy (new) cost £5.99 and I have seen it on a 'buy it now' basis on Ebay so I think it may have been remaindered. An absolute bargain at this price.

Ian

[David Filsell]

The book is about two years old now (published 2007)- and I quess remaindered. It was overproiced and remaider price represents good value for money. I came to storm troops having only read the Osprey book and felt it a good introduction to the subject (not inlike Ian Passingham's book about the Spring Offensives - which I think has been given a bit of an -ver - rough ride). As I am sure the author will agree, the storm troop book it is not the definitive book (but what is - suggestions please)

[bob lembke]

Above I have asserted that the best German storm units were more effective at their work than, for example, UK raiders, and interpret some comments by other Pals that they feel that this was not the case. Let me expand why I think that that is the case. (I am only referring to the "top-of-the-line" storm units, such as the storm battalions which were attached, one to each army, to the armies, and my father's flame regiment. The creme de la creme were Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), Jaeger=Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 3, u. Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer). ) Interestingly, none of these three elite storm units were infantry units.

One factor that IMHO put these units on a higher plane than UK raiders, for example (I have to confess that I know much less about UK raiding formations, but I think that I am correct here), is the top quality of the men. For example, when Jaeger=Bataillon Nr. 3, already a noted elite unit, was converted into J=S=B Nr. 3, it was found that 500 men of the original unit (must have been more than half) had to be culled and replaced with picked men to have all of the men of the storm battalion at the standard required for a storm battalion. Aside from individual physical condition, intelligence, etc. it was attempted to have all men under 25 and unmarried.

The personal attention and marks of prestige lavished on the men: I recently was able to have an evening of pizza and beer with a Hohenzollern prince (a German reserve officer), and he enjoyed the stories that I told him how his great grand-father (the Crown Prince) often, and his father the Kaiser, upon occasion, visited the barracks of my father's flame company, and how my father repeatedly caged cigarettes from the Crown Prince. In particular I had an especially funny story about a visit of the Kaiser. The men of my father's regiment wore the personal insignea of the Crown Prince, the skull and cross-bones, on their left sleeve, an honor awarded by a proclaimation of the Kaiser on the occasion of their 150th flame attack. The Storm Battalion Rohr wore the monogram of the Crown Prince on their left sleeve.

The use of special weapons, without the influence of silly mythology like the "spirit of the bayonet" much loved by Brit and French officers: Later in the war, in my father's regiment, the men carried no rifles or carbines, or, more likely, one in ten men (a NCO) carried a slung carbine, possibly only with 20 rounds. Every OR/EM either had a crew-served weapon or was a specially-trained grenadier, armed with special storm-troop assault stick grenades. They had flamethrowers, light MGs, mostly captured (lighter) French LMGs, and specially light mortars (44 lbs.) made in their own workshops.

One measure of success is the casualty rate I mentioned above. I have the complete death roll of my father's regiment, the unit's performance was uniqley documented, and the average number of KIA and DOW per attack was about 1.2 . And a number of attacks were by say 32 or 64 flamethrower teams, or even more, and many of the KIA were not suffered in the assault but inflicted by artillery fire called in on the captured position.

I have compiled some other "success statistics", and I heasitate (sp?) to even post them, they are so extreme. (There is at least one other good reason.) The figures really have to be further worked on and refined. But they really are eye-popping.

However, developing such elite units had the effect of draining the typical unit of some of their best men.

Did the UK army have similar dedicated units, not just elite, but specialized, as outlined above?

Bob Lembke

[bierast]

Above I have asserted that the best German storm units were more effective at their work than, for example, UK raiders, and interpret some comments by other Pals that they feel that this was not the case. Let me expand why I think that that is the case. (I am only referring to the "top-of-the-line" storm units, such as the storm battalions which were attached, one to each army, to the armies, and my father's flame regiment. The creme de la creme were Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), Jaeger=Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 3, u. Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer). ) Interestingly, none of these three elite storm units were infantry units.

As Bob indicates, these army-level assault units were few and number and of the very highest quality. One of their most important functions was supposed to be as training formations which would train up as large a proportion of the infantry as possible to be proficient in the new tactics, a task which was only partly successful.

The majority of German 'storm troops' were members of divisional assault companies which, though composed of picked men, would inevitably have been much more variable in quality.

For example, the Saxon 241 Division (a major object of interest to me as my GGF's regiment, Feldartillerie Regt. 48, were part of it for the last two years of the war) formed a divisional 'Sturmabteilung' in March 1917 during the course of intensive training near Brest-Litovsk (note that the division had been newly formed during the winter and had seen no combat, though half the men in the infantry regiments (472, 473 and 474) were veterans from older Saxon units and the divisional artillery and cavalry were both experienced pre-existing units).

The Sturmabteilung was raised by a contribution of 1 officer and 70-75 experienced NCOs and men from each of the infantry regiments, commanded by Leutnant der Reserve Wilhelm Flähmig, a highly decorated (EK I and Saxon Milit. St. Heinrich Orden (Ritter)) officer who had been wounded on the Somme with IR 104. The unit subsequently fought as the spearhead of the division whenever it was used in the attack. It is interesting to note that when 241 Division were being kept in reserve at the opening of Kaiserschlacht in the West, the Sturmabteilung were temporarily detached together with FAR 48, the divisional minenwerfer company (MWK 441) and the divisional 'MG-Lehrabteilung' for use in the attack under the nominal control of 13. Landwehr Division.

There is, incidentally, no mention in the regimental histories of any army-level storm unit being involved in their training. I am very interested to know anything further about the raising of assault formations on the Eastern front, especially as both KuK and Turkish assault formations were also definitely raised there and used in Galicia, where 241 Division likewise saw their first serious action. Sadly there is nothing in the book under discussion (unless I severely mis-remember it) on the assault troops of the other Central Powers or their connections with the development of German assault troops on this front.

A question arising from the above - did the German / KuK / Turkish Südarmee in Galicia have its own army-level assault battalion?

ARL

[George Armstrong Custer]

I have asserted that the best German storm units were more effective at their work than, for example, UK raiders,

I have to confess that I know much less about UK raiding formations

So your assertions need to be treated with extreme caution then?

ciao,

GAC

[truthergw]

Hi Bob. It appears that you are asserting that the very best of the German raiders were better than the average British raiders. Since there is no way to stage a rematch, and what you say seems intrinsically likely, I doubt if there is much to argue about. I expect we could claim the same for the cream of our raiders, supposing there was some way to single them out. There is of course a difference here which ought to be borne in mind. British raiders were simply selected from the unit manning that sector. A mixture of volunteers and some nominated men. They practised for, then carried out, a raid then went back to normal duties. German storm troopers were creamed off into their own units, intensively trained for that duty and were used only in that manner. There is a school of thought that this may have led to the weakening of the German Army as a whole, when the cream were exposed to very heavy casualties, there was inevitably a falling off in the calibre of those left behind, since they lacked the training, equipment and the motivation of the shock troops.

[bierast]

There is a school of thought that this may have led to the weakening of the German Army as a whole, when the cream were exposed to very heavy casualties, there was inevitably a falling off in the calibre of those left behind, since they lacked the training, equipment and the motivation of the shock troops.

This was certainly the rationale for those armies who chose not to go down this route. Swings / roundabouts...

[bob lembke]

So your assertions need to be treated with extreme caution then?

ciao,

GAC

I read a vast amount of stuff about WW I, hours a day for years, but I focus more on the German Army. I know a lot less about UK raiders, but have never seen mention of UK raiding units, but, as someone else mentioned, assume that raiding parties were pulled together for a particular "show" from the men at hand. What I meant was that I cannot say in absolute certainty that there were no special Brit permenant raiding units, but it seems that there were none. The casualty figures underline the skill of the specialized permament units, at least my father's. He also fought with the Storm Battalion Rohr, and had the highest praise for them, in contrast he had a low opinion of most German infantry units, who he felt could not be relied on. I have a letter from my father, from Verdun, to his father, a staff officer, describing an attack in which they lost three killed and 12 wounded as "a catastrophy" (sp?). My father's (and grand-father's) letters reflect the same argument; my father claiming that his "work", as he put it, was actually rather safe, and my g-f, a staff officer and a technical officer, simply finding it hard to believe. If you can show me a British unit that experienced an avarage of one dead per assault on the Western Front, I will grant you that it was a very skilled and well-prepared unit. One cannot reasonably expect that a raiding crew pulled together from a line unit for an attack, with the standard weapons, could perform to the level of such a dedicated unit. In other posts I have also mentioned how the commander of a FW unit sent to a infantry unit had the right of veto on the attack plan, even though the FW CO might be a NCO, and the infantry unit commander might be a Generalleutnant. (Some Forum Pals have found it impossible to believe that an army could operate in this fashion, a NCO saying "no" to a general, but the NCO was backed up by a written order from the Highest Army Command (OHL) to that effect. This helped insure that these skilled troops were used to best advantage and not squandered in some dumb attack.)

Bob

[bob lembke]

Hi Bob. It appears that you are asserting that the very best of the German raiders were better than the average British raiders. Since there is no way to stage a rematch, and what you say seems intrinsically likely, I doubt if there is much to argue about. I expect we could claim the same for the cream of our raiders, supposing there was some way to single them out. There is of course a difference here which ought to be borne in mind. British raiders were simply selected from the unit manning that sector. A mixture of volunteers and some nominated men. They practised for, then carried out, a raid then went back to normal duties. German storm troopers were creamed off into their own units, intensively trained for that duty and were used only in that manner. There is a school of thought that this may have led to the weakening of the German Army as a whole, when the cream were exposed to very heavy casualties, there was inevitably a falling off in the calibre of those left behind, since they lacked the training, equipment and the motivation of the shock troops.

Tom;

I generally agree with you, except for the "very heavy casualties" suffered by the storm units. I have referred to the casualties suffered by my father's regiment. I also have the death roll of Storm=Batallion Rohr (which is probably not as accurate as that of the flame regiment), but I have not subjected it to the same analysis, but it also seems very short. I agree that these units were costly in terms of human and other materiel. It is also true that the hoped-for transfer of skills to the standard line units did not occur as well as had been hoped for. It was hoped that this transfer might eventually be so successful that the storm battalions might eventually be able to wither away.

Bob

[Pete1052]

Forum founder Chris Baker wrote an essay on the British approach to tactical innovation in small units that can be found by clicking here. It appears that during the Great War the British were less inclined than the Germans to found special-purpose assault units; instead, efforts were focused on the training of conventional line infantry battalions. There is something to be said for each approach--from about 1960 until the late 1970s there was a prejudice against Special Forces within the mainstream U.S. Army, which believed that quality personnel were being siphoned away from its infantry battalions. About three years ago I read that efforts were being made to reduce the repeated use of SAS or U.S. Special Forces units when standard infantry units were equally as capable of doing the job. The reasoning is that SAS and Special Forces are too few in number and expensive to train for them to be routinely used as a higher breed of infantrymen.

[truthergw]

Tom;

I generally agree with you, except for the "very heavy casualties" suffered by the storm units...................

Bob

However we define heavy casualties, Bob, they were being suffered by an elite group which could not be reinforced in the same way as a standard infantry battalion could. Their effect then was worse and as the unsuccessful attacks through 1918, continued, must have had a disproportionate effect on " the boldest and brave".

[bob lembke]

Previously in similar discussions I had been challanged vigorously by a Pal on the idea that a FW lieutenant or NCO had the right of review and veto of an assault plan written for or by a general. Yesterday a friend of mine, a US Army colonel and a published military historian, sent me a new source, which contained a German document on the employment of Flammenwerfer, translated by the Allies and published by the US Army War College in 1917 in a "Confidential" document, and the document several times states that the tactical employment of the FW troops is the responsibility of the FW commander (who 95% of the time would be a lieutenant or senior NCO), and that he has to review the attack plans. This is another special measure instituted to make the storm detachments more effective and avoid high casualties. I cannot imagine, in the UK army of WW I, a situation in which a NCO was authorized to state that the attack plan written up by or for a major or lieutenant general is deficient, and that his platoon would not participate until the attack plan was improved and then accepted by the senior NCO. (Most flame attacks were carried out by platoon-sized units, typically commanded by a second lieutenant or an Offizierstellvertrieter, Feldwebel=Leutnant, oder Vizefeldwebel, all NCO ranks. I think that that situation is really extraordinary. The NCO was backed up by a written order from the OHL, i.e., Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Another example of the extraordinary care for the men was something that I have posted before, how in my father's company of the flame regiment the company commander was a coward and a thief of the men's money, and that when given an opportunity on manuvers my father and other men shot him to death in a clearly deliberate fashion; there was a three day formal inquest, with the company surrounded by infantry pickets, interviews and depositions taken by officers, and at the end the infantry pickets were withdrawn and barrels of beer delivered to the barracks for the men who just killed their commanding officer. (The company reported directly to a HQ many miles away, plus the OHL, not to the local commanders, so it was easier to have an abusive company commander get away with improprieties, which were severe.) Can you see such tolerance in the British, French, or American Armies of the era?

Bob

[bierast]

Good morning Bob -

I have a British parallel of sorts for you, relating to the Machine Gun Corps. On 5/2/1916 the MG section of 6th Btn. / West Surreys was transferred to the MG Corps. George Coppard (With a Machine Gun to Cambrai p.66) states:

From then on, as members of a specialised corps, we came under the orders of our own superiors. Carried down the scale, this meant that an unpaid lance-corporal in charge of a gun in action, who became detached from his own superiors, would be the sole judge as to the best position for his gun, and when and where it should be fired.

On a quite unrelated note, I was wondering if your father ever expressed an opinion on the effectiveness of any of the 'organic' divisional assault companies, as opposed to the independent battalions such as Rohr? I expect the quality would have been highly variable, but it would be most interesting to know how far any of them came to living up to the standards of the true elite assault units who served as their model.

Kind regards

ARL

[bob lembke]

Hi, Andi;

Good morning Bob -

I have a British parallel of sorts for you, relating to the Machine Gun Corps. On 5/2/1916 the MG section of 6th Btn. / West Surreys was transferred to the MG Corps. George Coppard (With a Machine Gun to Cambrai p.66) states:

From then on, as members of a specialised corps, we came under the orders of our own superiors. Carried down the scale, this meant that an unpaid lance-corporal in charge of a gun in action, who became detached from his own superiors, would be the sole judge as to the best position for his gun, and when and where it should be fired.

Very interesting. I am not expert in the WW I British Army, but over the years have read a lot about it, mostly from UK sources, and the described independence seems very uncharacteristic. I can remember reading of a lt. col. who in combat wanted to move two MGs he had, due to the changing tactical situation, and since the siting and use of the MGs were laid out in his detailed plans, and the phone lines were cut, he had to send a runner to find a brigadier and get approval of his moving the MGs, this process taking four hours. Perhaps that also was not typical, but the account struck me hard, such a need would be absolutely unthinkable in the German Army of the period, even if the Kaiser himself had originally positioned the MGs.

On a quite unrelated note, I was wondering if your father ever expressed an opinion on the effectiveness of any of the 'organic' divisional assault companies, as opposed to the independent battalions such as Rohr? I expect the quality would have been highly variable, but it would be most interesting to know how far any of them came to living up to the standards of the true elite assault units who served as their model.

The only storm units he ever mentioned were G=R=P=R and Sturm=Bataillon Rohr; he served with both. He expressed a very low (and probably unfair) opinion of almost all German units, and the French (for a lack of stubbornness in the defense, said that they usually ran when the FWs were opened up) and the British, who he felt were unenthusiastic in the attack. (These probably were quite unfair opinions - he fought against the French a good deal, and must have fought the British at some time, there is evidence that he was in Flanders, but I have no specifics, only an anecdote.) The flame regiment eventually tried to avoid the involvement of other units and personnel, if possible, or on occasion train and lead infantry formations with their own officers.

Kind regards

ARL

Bob

[bierast]

Hi Bob -

I am likewise far more knowledgeable on the German than the British side, but it sounds to me that the situation you describe could have arisen precisely because of the independence of the Machine Gun Corps. If the senior MGC representative on the spot disagreed with the Lt-Col. he would have been obliged to refer his request upwards.

If it happened prior to the creation of the MGC (and the MGs were still part of the infantry unit they were supporting) then it certainly suggests that the Lt. Col.'s hands were more generally tied by higher authority.

Incidentally the Special Brigade Royal Engineers (gas specialists) were similarly supposed to be the final authority on all matters relating to the deployment of their cylinders. Accounts of the battle of Loos describe some REs who had sensibly declined to discharge their gas where the wind was plainly unfavourable supposedly being forced at gunpoint to proceed by infantry officers (resulting in the British front line being flooded with chlorine).

Thankyou for your comments on my German query - my GGF (who died long before I was born) never referred in any detail to his military service so far as my grandmother can recall, beyond a single anecdote about sharing a meal with some infantrymen which turned out to be the infantry CO's dog (supposedly killed by enemy action).

ARL

[bob lembke]

Hi Bob -

Incidentally the Special Brigade Royal Engineers (gas specialists) were similarly supposed to be the final authority on all matters relating to the deployment of their cylinders. Accounts of the battle of Loos describe some REs who had sensibly declined to discharge their gas where the wind was plainly unfavourable supposedly being forced at gunpoint to proceed by infantry officers (resulting in the British front line being flooded with chlorine).

ARL

Andi;

However, there are other cases on record where the Special Brigade men robotically did open the cylinders, despite the wind being in the wrong direction, and one in which the Infantry reported that, after opening the cylinders, the Special Brigade men fled, taking the wrenches with them, leading to gas being discharged into the British first line for two hours. This led to a situation in which the wounded infantry from the assault, evacuated from "no-man's-land", were brought back to the first trench line and had to be laid in the gas at the bottom of the trench. Foulkes, the CO of the Special Brigade, was an odd and very rigid duck who was probably feared more than the enemy by his men.

Bob

[bierast]

NB Bob -

I emailed you re. the Pionier unit history I mentioned in another thread.

Re. the topic in hand - I was at the IWM reading up on the fighting in Galicia in July 1917, of which I am trying to assemble a coherent and detailed day-by-day account, and found some interesting information relating to assault units and related topics in the histories of the units of (Royal Saxon) 24 Reserve Division.

The history of RIR 104 (a small book which amounts to little more than a write-up of the war diary, retaining the calendar format of the source document; no photos or other extra information) describes the desperate fighting for the Lysonia Heights near Brzezany. It refers to:

- A Russian flame attack on 30/06 (kurz nach 4[pm] nebelt die Russe die Stellung ein und setzt Flammenwerfer in Taetigkeit - p.96). Subsequent infantry attacks were bloodily repelled, despite heavy artillery support including gas.

- A Russian tank(!?) and infantry attack on 01/07 at 10am, again with heavy artillery support including gas. I thought this worth mentioning as I was pretty certain that there were no tanks in Russian service at this time (10 vorm[ittags] greift der Gegner in 15 wellen an, wird aber durch unser gut einsetzendes Sperrfeuer mit sehr grossen verlusten fuer ihn zurueckgewiesen. Seine Tanks werden zur Umkehr gezwungen; die diesen Wagen folgenden Sturmtrupps werden vernichtet - p.96). This would be an attack across no man's land, so not practical for the Russians' numerous armoured cars.

- After the collapse of the Russian offensive on this part of the front, a Demonstrationsangriff in the night of 03-04/07 conducted by elements of RIR 104 and IR 361 with the support of 10 Trupps des Sturmbataillons 8 and 6 Flammenwerfer in 4 Kolonnen. By 06:00 the old German positions at Milowka were retaken, with a failed Russian counter-attack beaten off at 06:30. Isolated 'nests' of resistance cut off behind German lines were methodically wiped out in the usual manner. The men of the Sturmbataillon and the flamethrower teams were returned to higher command and left at 06:00 on 05/07 (pp 97-98).

While looking at the history of RIR 107 (a far more substantial work with a wealth of personal accounts in the appendices at the back), I found an intriguing little article by a Lt. d. Res. Zimmer (pp 378-380) entitled Das Weisse "S" auf gruenem Grund! This relates to the regimental volunteer Sturmtrupp of RIR 107 (the histories of 241. Division incidentally also refer to its newly raised infantry regiments forming internal Sturm- und Spah-trupps during training, as well as contributing personnel to the divisional assault company).

The article is mainly a vivid and gruesome account of a trench raid somewhere in the vicinity of Arras-Cambrai in January 1917 - an operation described as Aufklaerung "Fruelingsrauschen" ('Reconaissance "Spring Smoke"' or thereabouts). This raid culminated in the destruction of an especially troublesome British MG team by the simple and brutal expedient of a geballte ladung (presumably the 'six grenade heads lashed around one grenade' improvised demo charge) thrown into their dugout by surprise. The account notes that, as well as removing cockades and shoulder straps before the raid to prevent unit identification, they also removed their 'Sturmtruppabzeichen' - the title of the article suggests that this would be the supposedly unofficial white on green 'S' armband well known to have been worn by the stormtroops of the Saxon 23. Division. I am greatly intrigued to know how widely this item was worn in the Saxon Army and whence it emanated, as 24 Res. Div. was as unrelated to 23 Div. as any two Saxon divisions ever were (all of them of were course ultimately formed from the same pool of manpower and the same corps of officers, quite separate from the Prussian mainstream).

Bob - anything to contribute on the Sturmbtn. 8 / flame operations in Galicia? I presume this one was in part a Totenkopfpioniere operation?

ARL