'Goughie' The life of General Sir Hubert Gough

[armourersergeant]

This book is not easy to pick up at a reasonable price, so I was jubliant when I managed to get a copy for £8. yet to read again since I got it, I have dipped in to it and will re read it soon, but it has stirred memories of the time I did read it and I have brushed up the review I did some time ago.

This book almost alone made me re think my stancs on WW1 Generals, not that I agree totally with its conclusions but that it made me ask questions, it also showed a different side to Gough that showed a more human, less butcher side to him.

I apologise in advance if this review becomes a semi biographical peice on him, for it does in places.

‘Goughie’

The life of General Sir Hubert Gough

by

Anthony Farrar Hockley

I read this book over fifteen years ago and it more than any other is responsible for making me consider the Great War in a different light. Having initially drawn my knowledge from the likes of the comic strip magazine ‘Charley’s War’ I had a one dimensional view of the mud and blood of the trenches, totally reflective of the mood set in these comics. Whilst I still feel these comic stories capture some aspects of the western front it does set many stereotypical feelings in the reader. In particular, that the men did all the fighting and the officers were idiots and cowards at best.

Further reading such as ‘1914’ by Lyn Macdonald and ‘Farewell Leicester Square’ by Kate Caffrey, did little to change this perspective and even after reading other more analytical material I was still of the opinion, on the whole, that Generals were stupid ignorant individuals that had no imagination nor care for their men.

But that all changed when I came across Farrar-Hockley’s book ‘Goughie’ about one of the wars most controversial commanders. Even Sir Douglas Haig has more supporters than General Sir Hubert Gough.

Hubert Gough was the archetypical cavalry officer all dash and thrust, seemingly throwing caution to the wind, careless of lives in action, gaining as much ground as possible, hard on those that failed. The youngest full General of the Great War he came from a long line that had served the army and in particular the Indian army for many years. His father, uncle and brother all won the Victoria Cross, which may have been a driving force behind the cavalier attitude that Hubert adopted sometimes in battle, attempting to live up to his relatives exploits.

Yet Farrar-Hockley trys to paint a different picture of the man, which is only slightly watered down by the fact that he was using the private papers of Gough with the surviving family members permission and as such may have felt obliged to be kinder than normal! However this was not typical of the author whose reputation is of shooting from the hip!

It is the questions I asked myself after reading this book that greatly altered my opinion of Generals in the Great War. If only some of the assertions made by Farrar Hockley were true then perhaps some of the myths about commanders were flawed. Gough more than any is the scapegoat of the British Generals, where you can find many who leap to defend the honour of Sir Douglas Haig it is a lonely walk to find any who would put their reputation on Goughie.

That is not to say that Gough was a brilliant commander. He had faults and in many ways it can be difficult to find where in his pre world war one career he showed acts of brilliance. His conduct in South Africa and the loss of his column seem to imply a dash not backed by competence that made me wonder how he then went on to better things. However there is much evidence that Goughie endeared loyalty from rank and file as well as officers.

During the Curragh incident Gough finds himself at the centre of the storm, with the almost comical performance unravelling around him. Yet he only reacts to the events as they happened and did not really instigate them. That may seem out of kilter with the facts, yet Gough always claimed if ordered he would have obeyed, that did not happen and as he saw it he was given a choice, to which he then made his own decision. It is then easy to assume he influenced his officers to follow suit, and in a way he did, with charismatic leaders, it is surely not uncommon to see men follow a leader whom they have placed trust in. Yet can he be blamed for being a man who others would follow!

The flip side however is that he was petulant and impatient. Some of his actions during the Curragh demonstrate this and this can not have helped the situation. Very often unforgiving of others junior and senior around him. This is also demonstrated in 1914 when he detaches himself from Allenby’s command to go on his own. A fine example of insubordination he would not have allowed in others. What’s more he gets away with it. Patronage of Haig may have helped here, yet one can not help wondering why Allenby did not take action.

Gough leads his cavalrymen, by now commanding 2nd Cavalry division, with great courage during the dark days of late 1914 when they are forced to dismount and hold the line around Ypres. This is followed by temporary command of 7th division, whilst Major-General Thompson Capper recovers from a wound, however following this he does not return to his cavalry but is promoted to command I corps. He would lead this corps at the battle of Loos in September 1915.

In the coverage of July 1916, Farrar-Hockley makes a great case for showing the performance of the reserve corps, later to be designated 5thArmy, on the Somme in comparison to 4th Army, though figures can often be massaged to fit a requirement. Though it is worth noting that taking them literally as figures 5th out performs 4th Army in relation to casualties on a like for like basis. This also does not include casualties from the 1st of July. What can not be disputed is the personal recollections from soldiers as to Gough being in the front area, a concept often thought not followed by world war one Generals.

Following the hard fighting at Bullecourt in the aftermath of the battle of Arras, where perhaps we can start to see the tag of ‘butcher’ begin, he is involved in the battles of 3rd Ypres. His controversial appointment to proceed with the continued offensive in place of General Sir Hubert Plumer can not be blamed upon him, that must rest with Haig. However his choice to ignore or not see the importance of the Ghuelvet plateau must be seen as incompetence in a commander.

By now Gough’s command was coming in for some bad press. Not just from the rank and file but from more senior officers, whom it seems were not keen to serve under Gough. The author tries to lay the blame almost solely at the door of Major-General Neil Malcolm, who was 5th Army’s Chief staff officer (MGGS). Whilst it does seem that any veiled threats that emanated from headquarters came from the pen or voice of Malcolm, this is only to be expected as he was the vassal, it was after all his job, that Gough would have used to do this. An image of Gough visiting a command all chipper and full of beans and then Malcolm delivering a ending word out of Gough’s ear is painted. Creating an almost good cop bad cop scenario. Regardless of this it is in many ways irrelevant if this was with or without his sanction, he has to shoulder the blame as senior commander. It was his job to be aware of what was happening around him and whilst it is fair to assume that Malcolm could have filtered information to Gough, there is no evidence to prove this, nor can this be a justification of the conduct of one of his staff. It is also unfair to blame Malcolm, whom is maligned similarly as Kiggell. In both instances Haig and Gough may be guilty of loyalty to a junior officer whom they should have perhaps replaced thinking of the bigger picture. Yet again this is Gough and Haig’s fault not the staff officers.

There is then some irony that Gough is finally removed from command, ironically because, rumours had abounded and are alluded to by the author that Gough had been considered as a replacement to Haig earlier due to his conduct on the Somme in 1916. Though you have to wonder how much of this holds validity as it is not likely that Lloyd-George would have yet forgiven Gough for his part in the Curragh. It is further ironic that Gough is removed not for his part in 3rd Ypres but for the disposition and conduct of 5th army who were assaulted by the Germans on the 21st March 1918. There is good evidence to show that Gough had grave concerns of the ground he had to cover, with less men, worse prepared defences and more line than 3rd Army under Sir Julian Byng. Concerns he had voiced but that seem to have been ignored. The conduct of Gough in these few trying days bears well, he did not panic, his men whilst admittedly withdrawing did so with guts and determination. His dismissal from command was seen by many who made up 5th Army as an insult not just to their commander but to the rank and file, who had fought gallantly.

In later life Gough tried to restore not just his reputation but that of his men by writing an account of this battle.

So was Gough a stupid butcher or a worthy general? Well as is usual in this case the truth lays somewhere between these two poles. He was perhaps not as bad as painted by history but he does show some very serious errors of ability and judgement. Certainly he did not deserve to be sacked for March 1918 but then again he was either blind or compliant to the conduct of Neil Malcolm and as such was guilty.

It may be fair to say he was promoted one pay grade to high. That he did may in part be to Haig’s patronage and its easy to be machiavellian and wonder how his career would have advanced had his brother, a true Haig favourite, not died in 1915. This thought Farrar Hockley does not ponder. It is also fair I think to wonder how we would see Hubert Gough today had he had the advantage of leading 5th Army in the hundred days and how his reputation would have benefited from the success that Rawlinson did.

All of which brings me back to the start, if the book makes me ask questions and if I can do that about General Sir Hubert Gough then it must surely make me ask questions about other commanders.

With out doubt the book is well researched, even if you can question some of the conclusions gained by the author. Dealing not just with the first world war you get a rounded picture of the boy, man and pensioner, including his role with ‘Dads Army’ during world war two and attempts at a business career. Yet it is for the Great war he will always be remembered. Farrar Hockley goes someway to make you question the reputation that Gough receives today, it is down to the individual if he convinces conclusively.

Setting aside my own personal attachment to this book I would still recommend others to read it. It is not stodgy in content nor heavy to read, yet is packed with detail.

[Jonathan Saunders]

(1) However there is much evidence that Goughie endeared loyalty from rank and file as well as officers.

(2) The conduct of Gough in these few trying days bears well, he did not panic, his men whilst admittedly withdrawing did so with guts and determination.

(3) It is also fair I think to wonder how we would see Hubert Gough today had he had the advantage of leading 5th Army in the hundred days and how his reputation would have benefited from the success that Rawlinson did.

Thanks for the lengthy review. Just three comments to add from the points you highlighted above.

(1) In his memoirs, Earl Stanhope who served as a Staff Officer under Gough, only had the highest praise for Gough, which indicates Gough certainly provoked loyalty from those that served with him. Stanhope was critical of others, not least Haig.

(2) Can I recommend you read and evaluate Martin Kitchen German Offensives of 1918, which suggests strongly that Gough not only paniced, but failed to act on the intelligence as it was fed back to him and is condemning of Gough in the withdrawal.

(3) I think since 1915 Rawlinson had proved an ability to learn and adapt. That said Rawlinson was still making costly mistakes in September 1918 but it is that prior ability to learn that partly saves his reputation. However I do not see anything in Gough's pre March 1918 performance to suggest even a successful Last 100 Days would have saved him from overall criticism for what went before.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[truthergw]

Arm, the only reason I have not read this is the rather high price I have seen up to now. Your review has reinforced that intention. I also intend to read his own book, " Fifth Army" when I get a chance. The consensus seems to be that he owed his position to Haig's friendship with his brother. Haig was notoriously over loyal to his proteges. That said, I'd certainly like to read Gough's side of the story.

[armourersergeant]

Thanks for those three points Jon.

Of course you are right in point three in regard to Rawlinson, atleast in some respects. However if Rawlinson had not returned to command in 1918, what would his reputation be without the wins of 1918? I guess thats more the point I am trying to make there, rather than Gough was learning.

I will try to get hold of the book you suggest, or alteast to see one.

As for the Stanhope bits, I looked at those only recently on the thread that Andy posted them, coupled with some examples in the book about Gough being at the front line, do give a different side to that normally seen. However that in no way forgives the characteristics and lack of ability that he may have had.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Of course you are right in point three in regard to Rawlinson, atleast in some respects. However if Rawlinson had not returned to command in 1918, what would his reputation be without the wins of 1918? I guess thats more the point I am trying to make there, rather than Gough was learning.

Arm - I am not sure what would have happened to Rawlinson's reputation in the 1930s with the first revision but I do believe it would have survived the test of history ie. academic historians of recent years can appreciate that Rawlinson was 1) trying to prepare operations based on men and material at hand 2) identified the bite and hold concept etc. Therefore we can balance Rawlinson's meekness towards Haig and his errors in late 1918 and before, with a propensity to evaluate, learn and be innovative - this, IMO, is irrespective of 1918. These characteristics, to the best of my knowledge, are absent from Gough.

The Martin Kitchen book can be picked up for around £5 in remand bookshops - worth every penny.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[armourersergeant]

Surely without 1918, Rawlinson would just be the man who presided over the debacle of the Somme 1916, before being shipped off to the sidelines.

To ignore the effects of 1918 on Rawly is the same as considering the evolution of the BEF, with the war ending at the end of 1917, thus no 1918 to show that all that learning could finally be put together.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Surely without 1918, Rawlinson would just be the man who presided over the debacle of the Somme 1916, before being shipped off to the sidelines.

To ignore the effects of 1918 on Rawly is the same as considering the evolution of the BEF, with the war ending at the end of 1917, thus no 1918 to show that all that learning could finally be put together.

Arm

Sorry as my additional comment was meant to clarify but it failed and I think we might be talking at cross purposes – we certainly shouldn’t ignore Rawlinson’s involvement in 1918.

You make reference to the Somme and Rawlinson’s responsibility for the Somme and specifically for the first 2 weeks of the Somme will always be subordinated, IMO, to Haig, due to Haig’s meddling and weakening of Fourth Army plans (my opinion). As Prior & Wilson have proved, evaluation of Rawlinson’s overall performance during the Great War is favourable and shows that he personally went through a learning process from 1915 and tried to apply this in 1916, and that Rawlinson experienced this learning process much quicker than Haig for example. I feel this helps his reputation DESPITE the costly errors he made in Sept 1918, where from memory I believe he pushed on rather than consolidate and bring up artillery to prepare furtehr advance with costly loss of life. If we were looking at Rawlinson purely on 1918 then as I recall, much criticism is aimed at him for the expenditure of lives lost in a rash attempt to defeat the German army. Nor can you look at Rawlinson on the Somme in 1916 in isolation from 1915. So the point I was poorly trying to make is that overall Rawlinson’s modern day reputation can be defended because there was evidence of learning (although he does not come out of 1918 that well IMHO).

In comparison I am saying that Gough showed no aptitude at any point. He was certainly not as able as Rawlinson so assuming his thrusting would have resulted in at least the same level of fatalities/casualties sustained by Rawlinson in 1918, then Gough would have been open to the same degree of criticism for 1918 as received by Rawlinson, but unlike Rawlinson, Gough had no previous “good conduct” to assist his overall reputation viz Beaumont Hamel & Beaucort, Third Ypres, Bullecourt, March Retreat and going back even further, you have already alluded to his inability in the mobile Boer war.

Also I looked up Gough in the new Haig biography by Mead last night and it certainly disputes that Gough commanded loyalty. The whispering campaign came from within his Command, and quite probably not without good reason.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Robert Dunlop]

(2) Can I recommend you read and evaluate Martin Kitchen German Offensives of 1918, which suggests strongly that Gough not only paniced, but failed to act on the intelligence as it was fed back to him and is condemning of Gough in the withdrawal.

Martin Kitchen's account is not helpful, IMHO. The description of Gough's responses to the attack of March 21 are referenced from 'Goughie'. Further on, Kitchen talks about 'the British Army's inability to learn the art of defensive warfare from the Germans'. This general comment is indicative of the general nature of his book. Any German soldier who participated in Operation Mars would give a different perspective on the British Army's defensive capabilities at this time.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Martin Kitchen's account is not helpful...

Robert – I will check out the references but as I recall Kitchen strongly indicates that Gough had no concept of how to conduct an elastic defence and actually started with most of his divisions in the forward line (with a non-withdrawal order). Are you saying this is wrong?

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - just to add further. I think Travers was equally condemning of Gough in both Crisis in Command and How the War Was Won and made similar conclusions to Kitchen.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[armourersergeant]

There is an account from a Brigadier-General name may be Sandilands, though not sure, too lazy to get book from upstairs, that is quite daming about Gough and the retreat, in Travers book 'The Killing Ground'. If I recall he had nothing good to say about Congreve either for 1918.

When I see little 'chapters' like these I tend to wonder where along the way he was done wrong by either man. It may be correct of course as he saw it.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

I see where you are coming from, but I still feel that 1918 change much for many of the commanders. It may be me not you that is muddying the waters, it wouldnt be the first time.

regards

Arm

[truthergw]

Even Haig took the command of III Ypres away from him and gave it to Plumer.

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, I am saying that Kitchen's references to Gough are third-hand, and derive in large part from the book that Arm is reviewing. Kitchen's book makes some important contributions but not with respect to his comments about Gough. It would not be appropriate, IMHO, to judge Gough on Kitchen's superficial review. I am very familiar with Travers' books. I would not judge Gough on the basis of his conclusions either, FWIIW. As the analysis of Gough's performance in the first weeks of Third Ypres showed, there is much more to these issues than is superficially concluded by many writers, IMHO.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - thank you for the further comments. I guess sometimes it comes down to the historians we trust.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, your last point got me thinking back. It was actually one of Travers' books that got me questioning. It was one of the first books that I read on the Great War. I remember being very impressed, and this prompted me to follow-up on the details in various histories, diaries and anecdotal reports - all related to Fifth Army and 21st March. The Spring Offensives were quite unknown to me back then. The more I read, however, the more concerned I became about some of the interpretations that had made. What with the Somme, and more recently Third Ypres, it has not been possible to collate the material on the Spring Offensives. One day....

Robert

[ianw]

Another example of the age-old problem associated with Great War studies - the question of history versus historiography and the dearth of reliable testimony from soldiers of and above divisional rank as a basis for historical analysis - the sound of axes being ground and the daggers embedding between shoulder blades resounds across the decades! Truth is the first casualty of war and the holy grail of war's subsequent historians.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan, your last point got me thinking back. It was actually one of Travers' books that got me questioning. It was one of the first books that I read on the Great War. I remember being very impressed, and this prompted me to follow-up on the details in various histories, diaries and anecdotal reports - all related to Fifth Army and 21st March. The Spring Offensives were quite unknown to me back then. The more I read, however, the more concerned I became about some of the interpretations that had made. What with the Somme, and more recently Third Ypres, it has not been possible to collate the material on the Spring Offensives. One day....

That is where the personal aspect comes in - I feel Travers, particularly, reinforces my own thoughts and/or fills gaps that I hadnt previously been able to explain. Of course we all have differing views ...

[David Filsell]

Having read this book and much else about Gough, and being a great fan of 'Fara the Para' - who I once heard speak immpressively and authoritatively on the Somme battles for 90 minutes without note or pause - I think he was very, very kind to the man. Even if Gough had not been dismissed in 1918, there seem to be justified arguements for him to have beenbeen relieved earlier. In addition, a number of units certainly expressed little short of dread about being attached to his army.

[armourersergeant]

Someone alerted me to this clip. I have never heard Goughie speak, stupid as I am I thought he would have an Irish twang to his voice...doh

link is below, though you may have to sign up to hear it. Also if you do then do a general search on Hubert Gough and look for a selection about the red army as it has a preview symbol.

http://www.itnsource.com/en/Entire-Archive...g&duration=

hope it works

Arm

[stiletto_33853]

Another interesting debate gentleman, that I am trying to follow. I would like to add a few things for your consideration and comments that have always got me thinking.

Stanhope writes:-

"One point on the battle has seldom if ever been touched upon. On 20th January General Gough and the Fifth Army took over from the French a Corps front of 18,000 yards, and on the 15th February a further Corps front of another 30,000 yards. These both made two excessively long fronts for an Army Corps to hold. The correct policy wold have been to have re-adjusted Corps and divisional fronts throughout the whole British line, extending the sector held by each. GHQ was however unwilling to do this, as troops had been encouraged to strengthen their defences throughout the winter and they would have much disliked being moved from sectors they had made to take over sectors on which other people had worked, possibly less hard. The fact remains that the defences in the new sectors taken over from the French Army were very incomplete, and that in the short time available before the German attack our troops were not sufficiently numerous to do more than roughly prepare the Battle Zone, and the second and third lines had not even begun. We suffered disastrously later for this short sightedness. It might have been overcome by sending down all Army troops and labour battalions to work on the rear lines, though this perhaps is being wise after the event."

The 14th Divisions War Diary makes reference to one of the new sectors taken over from the French Army, saying that the front line trenches were in such a state of disrepair as to be not far from useless and that there were no other preparations at all as far as Battle Zone, second and third lines.

Andy

[stiletto_33853]

In his preface of "The Fifth Army in March 1918" the author W. Shaw Sparrow says quite a bit that is of interest and makes the eye-brows lift a little.

"Haig visited Gough - on the 24th, I believe - during the battle's most critical days; he was too busy elsewhere. As for his C.G.S., Sir Herbert Lawrence did not come out at all; and this applies also to all of the senior G.S. officers from G.H.Q. Though the Fifth Army was the main centre of the storm, no sufficient efforts were made by G.H.Q. to see the staffs engaged, in order to get first hand information, other than that conveyed by the brief reports and the still rarer conversations on the telephone. That G.H.Q.did collect information by other means, and means of a very untrustworthy sort, is proved by the misinformation that Lord Milner got at G.H.Q., and also from Brig. - Gen. Wake, who served on Ralwinson's staff at Versailles.

Milner's momorandum on the events of March 28th, was published in The New Statesman, April 23rd, 1921. As an official document it is most important for it shows better than anything else the complete falsity of the information chosen from the reports that reached G.H.Q. It shows also that this falsity had its original source mainly in reports from the Third Army, and partly perhaps in lack of enough reports from the Fifth. But its real meaning as valuable history is that G,H,Q, had neither correct information nor control.

Milner was in France for two days, from about 6.30 p.m. of March 24th to about 7 p.m. of the 26th. In these forty-eight hours he motored untiringly, often at great speed behind the battle, yet he kept away from Gough's headquarters, and so did Sir Henry Wilson, the C.I.G.S. Important conferences were held at which the battle and its needs were discussed, yet Gough was never present.

To the great conference of Doullens on March 26th three British Army Commanders were invited - Plumer, Horne and Byng. Three Army Commanders !! Gough was ruled out. None of the higher authorities - not G.H.Q., nor G.Q.C., nor Versailles, nor the C.I.G.S., nor the British Government - would accept the blame at all; so a scapegoat was necessary."

[stiletto_33853]

A passage in Stanhope's book which always made me wonder:-

"On the 22nd March General Rawlinson sent me to G.H.Q. at Montreuil to find out the situation, a distance of 275 miles there and back. There was still a thickish fog near Amiens (through which I motored) though it was probably not so thick as the Germans were on the whole lucky enough to have had on the previous day. I found G.H.Q. busy, but not duly alarmed. While I was at lunch there an officer remarked that the French were sending three divisions to support our right, and someone said they had better not talk too much about the fighting in front of Gough's Army, but more of the fighting further north.

I was puzzled at the time by this remark until I looked at the agreement between Haig and Petain to which I have already referred, when I discovered the clause that Petain would take over large, moderate or small sector of the British front to set free our troops, but only on a sector on which the battle was not taking place.

He thus would not be committing the French to take part in the battle, and hence the remark not to say much about the fighting on the front to which the three French Divisions were coming. I was looked at rather as a strange wild beast when I remarked that the three divisions would not be of much use, as of course was proved, but it showed how little GHQ realised what the big German attack by 100 divisions would mean, even as late as midday on the second day of the battle. General Gough moved up both his GHQ Reserve Divisions before he had obtained authority from GHQ for their release to him. He therefore did his best to stop the break in the dam (or line of defence) before it had grown to such dimensions that the only method of stopping the German flood was to rebuild an entirely fresh dam further back.

Incredible as it may seem, no other British division got orders to move till well on in the second day of battle, when the 8th Division was ordered to move from St.Omer. They did not, I think, arrive on Gough's front till the fourth day of battle.

[stiletto_33853]

Just another thing to throw into the pot. Maybe the Third Army should be looked at a little more closely, quickly reverting back to W. Shaw Sparrow:-

"It has been seen that on the 68,000 yards battle front of the Fifth Army the battle zone was entered in four places on the 21st, the two serious breaches being on the fronts of the divisions holding respectively 5500 and 6000 yards. On the same day the front system of the Third Army battle zone was captured on a front of something more than eight miles."

Just food for thought, I am not a great fan of Hubert Gough but I do believe he was hung out to dry and did a better job than he is given credit for in March 1918.

Andy.

[armourersergeant]

Andy,

Thanks for those, I have always thought that Byng and 3rd Army does not share its blame for March 1918. Its interesting to see Stanhopes words. What was his appointment at this stage of the war?

regards

Arm